Murdock v. American Maritime Officers Union National Executive Board

United States District Court

for the

Southern District of Florida

Charles Murdock, Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

) Civil Action No. 19-62687-Civ-Scola

American Maritime Officers Union )

National Executive Board and Paul )

Doell, Defendants. )

Order Staying the Case

Now before the Court is the Defendants American Maritime Officers Union

National Executive Board (the “Executive Board”) and Paul Doell’s motion to

dismiss, or in the alternative to stay the case. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court grants the alternative relief sought in the Defendants’ motion (ECF

No. 23). The Court stays this case pending the exhaustion of internal union

proceedings, not to exceed four months.

1. Background1

The Plaintiff Charles Murdock is the Secretary-Treasurer of the American

Maritime Officers Union (“AMO”). (Compl., ECF No. 13 at ¶ 3.) The Defendant

Paul Doell is the National President of the AMO. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Doell and Murdock

have disagreed on a number of significant issues. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Doell stripped

Murdock of many of his constitutionally-defined duties as Secretary-Treasurer

in violation of the AMO’s constitution. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Many of Murdock’s stripped

responsibilities were re-assigned to the National President’s Executive Assistant

Marie Doruth and to employees within the AMO accounting department. (Id.)

Doell’s removal of Murdock’s constitutionally designated authority and his

reassignment of those duties to union employees working under his supervision

allows Doell to control the finances and assets of the Union without oversight.

(Id. at ¶ 20.) Later, when Murdock submitted a formal request to reinstate his

authority as Secretary-Treasurer, Doell stonewalled the motion by delaying the

national meeting and limiting the time Murdock had to present his motion to 20

minutes. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-28.) Murdock’s motion to reclaim the constitutional

authority of his position failed.

1 The Court accepts as true the facts pled in the Complaint. Cf. Beck v.

Deloitte & Touche, 144 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In evaluating the

sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept the well pleaded facts as true and

resolve them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”).

After Murdock’s successful re-election bid, two challengers (one was from

Doell’s faction of the AMO) instituted union proceedings against him to overturn

the election results. (Id. at ¶ 29.) The challenge was unsuccessful, despite Doell

intervening on behalf of the challengers. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-32.) The “union officer

presiding over the complaint adjudicated and completely rejected the allegations

against” Murdock. (Id. at ¶ 30.) Following his failure to invalidate the election

results, Doell began a campaign of harassment against Murdock that entailed

the following:

(a) cutting Mr. Murdock’s compensation by 25%;

(b) barring Mr. Murdock’s access to AMO headquarters and use of

AMO’s remote access server;

(c) prohibiting the Controller and other AMO employees from sharing

information with Mr. Murdock;

(d) continued instructions to financial institutions to bar Mr.

Murdock’s access to information concerning AMO accounts;

(e) continuing the suspension of Mr. Murdock’s access to the AMO

email system which Doell had suspended on September 29, 2018;

(f) continuing the suspension of access to the primary AMO

databases;

(g) threatening to relocate Mr. Murdock from southern Florida to a

distant port;

(h) initially barring Mr. Murdock from attending an audit by the

United States Department of Labor to determine AMO’s compliance

with provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure

Act; and

(i) excluding Mr. Murdock from the development and migration of

the database transition from TECH Plus to JayStar including

important correspondence, files, records and financial components

of the system.

(Id. at ¶ 34(a)-(i)). Murdock finally alleges that, as retaliation for filing this

lawsuit, the Defendants initiated internal disciplinary proceedings against

Murdock, which falsely alleged that Murdock “assaulted, battered and

injured” Doell’s assistant Marie Doruth. (Id. at ¶ 50.)

2. Analysis

Murdock filed suit against the Defendants for violations of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 411,

for violations of his guarantee to equal rights under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) and for

violations of his guarantee to freedom of speech and assembly under § 411(a)(2).

Murdock also sued the Defendants for breach of contract and for retaliation

under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). The Defendants argue that Murdock’s claims must

be dismissed because he failed to exhaust internal union remedies. Namely,

under the union’s constitution, two remedies are available to Murdock: (1) Any

member may file charges before a member-elected Trial Committee of “all

violations of this Constitution, laws, rules, regulations or Shipping Rules of this

Union.” (2) A national executive officer, such as Murdock, may bring charges

against any national officer for their conduct in office including for “malfeasance,

misfeasance, nonfeasance, corruption, favoritism . . . oppression in office . . . or

failure to conform to the AMO National Constitution or to a National Executive

Board Policy.” AMO Constitution Articles XIII and XXIII.2 Under the first,

Murdock could file charges claiming that the stripping of his duties violated the

AMO constitution, and, under the second, he could file suit for any grievances

of malfeasance or favoritism against Doell.

The LMRDA provides that a labor organization member “may be required

to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures” within the organization prior to

instituting legal proceedings, except that the period of time consumed by the

exhaustion procedures shall not exceed four months. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). “The

decision to enforce [the exhaustion] requirement in a particular case is within

the sound discretion of the district court.” Chapa v. Local 18, 737 F.2d 929, 931

(11th Cir. 1984) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Shipbuilding Local 22, 391 U.S. 418 (1968)

(“We conclude that ‘may be required’ is not a grant of authority to unions more

firmly to police their members but a statement of policy that the public tribunals

whose aid is invoked may in their discretion stay their hands for four months,

while the aggrieved person seeks relief within the union.”). In other words, this

Court may require Murdock to exhaust the internal union remedies if, in its

discretion, it determines that exhaustion of those remedies is appropriate.

Murdock argues that exhaustion would be futile. He states that the

“kangaroo Trial Committee” will deny Murdock’s charges and that the decision

will be “rubber-stamped by the handful of members who happen to attend who

undoubtedly would be intimidated from openly opposing Doell.” (ECF No. 30 at

14.) These allegations are insufficient to convince the Court that the internal

union remedies available to Murdock would be futile. See Springer v. Wal-Mart

Associates’ Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 901 (11th Cir. 1990) (bare

allegations of futility are not sufficient to excuse exhaustion). Indeed, Murdock’s

allegations that he successfully won the January 2019 election challenge—

2 Murdock incorporated the AMO constitution by reference in his Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 13 at ¶ 11). The AMO constitution can be found at

http://www.amo-union.org/PDFs/Constitution.pdf.

despite Doell, the AMO president, intervening against him—cut against his

assertion that exhausting the internal union procedures is futile. (ECF No. 13 at

q 30.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has adopted a general policy not to unduly

harass legitimate unionism, nor to unnecessarily interfere with the union’s

interest in internal governance. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457

U.S. 102, 109 (1959) (the union’s right to adopt its own reasonable rules was

designed “to assure that the amendment would not unduly harass and obstruct

legitimate unionism”); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n, 389 U.S.

463, 471 (1968) (“The legislative history shows that Congress weighed how best

to legislate against revealed abuses in union elections without departing

needlessly from its long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental

intrusion into internal union affairs”). Therefore, the Court finds that a stay

pending exhaustion of internal union proceedings is appropriate in this case

because this dispute could be resolved internally without the need for judicial

intervention.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the Court stays this case, pending Murdock’s exhaustion of

internal union proceedings, not to exceed four months. If, after the proceedings

have concluded or after the proceedings have persisted for four months, the

matter is not resolved, the Plaintiff may move to reopen this case. If, after the

proceedings have concluded, this matter is resolved, the parties must file a joint

status report with the Court explaining the results of the union proceedings.

The Court directs the Clerk to administratively close this case. All

pending motions are denied as moot, without prejudice and with leave to refile

if the case is reopened.

Done and ordered at Miami, Florida, on April 14, 2020.

topen N. Scola, Jr.

United States District Judge