SNEED v. DIXON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

TIMOTHY SNEED,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 4:21-cv-420-AW-MAF

RICKY D. DIXON, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Respondent moved to dismiss Sneed’s habeas petition1 as untimely. See

ECF Nos. 21, 25. The magistrate judge has recommended granting the motion. ECF

No. 32. Sneed filed objections, arguing that the clock did not start until he “was

entitled to immediate release at the end of his sentence.” ECF No. 33 at 6.

Having carefully considered the matter, and having reviewed de novo the

issues raised in the objections, I agree that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

The Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 32) is adopted to the extent it concluded

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) warranted dismissal for untimeliness.

1 This is not Sneed’s first postconviction challenge. See, e.g., Sneed v. State,

201 So. 3d 48, 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (mem.) (“Sneed is hereby directed to show

cause, within thirty days from the date of this opinion, why he should not be

prohibited from filing any further pro se appeals, petitions, motions or other

pleadings related to his criminal conviction in circuit court case number 98-33905.”);

Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x. 20 (11th Cir. 2012).

The § 2244(d)(1) one-year statute of limitation applies to a habeas petition

“by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Sneed contends

he is not in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment because he has served his full

sentence already and is entitled to immediate release. But this argument hinges on

Sneed’s claim that he’s entitled to additional credit for time served—a claim the state

court has rejected. At any rate, an inmate is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a state court” even where he challenges an administrative decision that he argues has

impacted that custody. See, e.g., Peoples v. Chatman, 393 F.3d 1352, 1353 (11th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that § 2244(d) applied to a § 2241 petition brought

to challenge state prisoner’s parole revocation); Dill v. Holt, 371 F.3d 1301, 1302-

03 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that inmate was “in custody pursuant to his original state

conviction and sentence, despite the fact that his current incarceration resulted from

an administrative proceeding of an executive branch agency [a parole board] instead

of a court”); Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003)

(holding that inmate’s habeas petition challenging a disciplinary proceeding that

resulted in the loss of gain time was subject to both § 2241 and § 2254 because he

was in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, but noting that if “a prisoner

is in prison pursuant to something other than a judgment of a state court, e.g., a pre-

trial bond order, then his petition is not subject to § 2254”).

In fairness to Sneed, much of the procedural history is confusing, and the state

did not always get things right. More than ten years ago, the Third DCA recognized

that “[t]his case has followed a tortuous path from Sneed’s first trial in 2000 to his

re-trial in 2005, and has continued with his subsequent unsuccessful attempts to

receive the proper amount of credit for time served since his resentencing in 2006.”

Sneed v. State, 99 So. 3d 514, 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (mem.).

The basic history goes something like this. Sneed was convicted of murder in

2000 and sentenced to 35 years, with credit for 765 days. ECF No. 25 at 16-18. After

a successful direct appeal, id. at 26, he got a new trial but was again convicted in

2006, id. at 28. The court then sentenced him to 30 years. Id. at 34. He should have

had some 2,700 days’ credit—for time dating back to his 1998 pretrial detention—

but the court inexplicably granted him only 495. Id. at 36. Sneed moved for a

correction, asking for 2,746 days. The court granted the motion and ordered an

amended judgment. But the amended judgment had only 1,265 days’ credit. ECF

No. 1 at 14 (Order Correcting Sentence dated March 2, 2010 (nunc pro tunc February

28, 2006)). Sneed again sought relief in the trial court, but the court summarily

denied his motion. See Sneed, 99 So. 3d at 514 (mem.). Sneed appealed to the Third

DCA, where the state conceded error. Id. (noting that the State “conced[es] that

Sneed is entitled to additional credit for time served”). But the DCA left it up to the

trial court to figure just how much credit Sneed deserved. Id. (noting that according

to the State’s calculations, “Sneed may be entitled to a total of 2,703 days credit,

rather than 2,746 days that Sneed requests”). On remand, the trial court settled on

2,701, but it inexplicably ordered that Sneed receive “an additional” 2,701 days. ECF

No. 25 at 44.

Sneed, understandably pleased with the order’s use of the term “additional,”

insists that he is entitled to 2,701 days plus the 1,265 from his earlier judgment. ECF

No. 1 at 8 ¶ 13. But the DCA rejected this idea, stating in a 2012 order that Sneed

“was not awarded an additional credit of 2,701 days”; instead it was 2,701 days

“total.” ECF No. 25 at 43; see also id. at 41-42 (August 24, 2011 order stating that

“[t]he Defendant shall be awarded a total of 2,701 days credit for time served”).

Sometime later in 2012, the Department of Corrections modified Sneed’s tentative

release date based on the new—finally correct—time-served calculation. Cf. ECF

No. 21 at 6-7 (Respondent’s motion to dismiss, noting that “exact date” is not clear).

The thrust of Sneed’s petition is that 2,701 days is not the right number—

either because the court got it wrong (when the Third DCA explicitly said in 2012

that 2,701 days was the right number) or because the Department of Corrections

lacked authority to rescind credit previously issued (which it did later in 2012 after

the Third DCA ruled). Thus, in the end, his claim that he is entitled to immediate

release—and that he has already served all he should serve—relies on his claim that

he is (or was) entitled to more than 2,701 days’ credit. And because there is a State

judgment (the Third DCA’s 2012 order) saying 2,701 is all he gets, he is in custody

pursuant to a state judgment.

All of this leads to the conclusion that § 2244’s one-year time limit applied.

Sneed had one year from “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence,”

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), to challenge “the rescission of the 1,265 days,” ECF No. 33 at 6.

That clock started to run sometime in 2012. It was likely the Third DCA’s order. But

even if it was the DOC’s subsequent rescission, it was still in 2012. And neither of

those events was unknown to Sneed. Compare ECF No. 1 at 21 (Inmate Notice dated

October 12, 2012 with tentative release date of 7/14/2023), with id. at 22 (Inmate

Notice dated November 15, 2012 with tentative release date of 12/20/2026

(difference of 1,255 days)); see also ECF No. 25 at 86 (Sneed’s petition for writ of

certiorari dated October 2013 arguing that “in applying the additional award of the

2,701 days; [FDC] rescinded from the previous award of the 1,265 days” and citing

FDC’s calculated tentative release dates in September 2012 compared to November

2012). And Sneed acknowledges at least a five-year period during which nothing

was pending related to this challenge, see ECF No. 33 at 6, so the petition is

untimely.2

2 Even if Sneed were correct that there is a distinction between his previous

state-court challenge related to the award of an additional 2,701 days and a challenge

The report and recommendation (ECF No. 32) is APPROVED. The State’s

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED. A certificate of appealability is

DENIED. The clerk will enter judgment that says, “The habeas petition is

DISMISSED as untimely.” The clerk will then close the file.

SO ORDERED on August 12, 2022.

s/ Allen Winsor

United States District Judge

related to FDC’s rescinding 1,265 days, that would simply mean that his one-year

period was never tolled because the factual predicate existed as early as 2012 either

way. To be clear, the record does not support that distinction. See ECF No. 1 at 9

(“The record will reveal that on November 15, 2012 . . . the 1,265 days of the prior

award thereof was illegally rescinded by ‘FDOC.’”); id. (“On July 3, 2019 . . .

petitioner again attempted to redress the illegal recission of the previous[] award of

the 1,265 days . . . .” (emphasis added)).