Miller v. Willis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIS MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-832-BJD-MCR

SGT. WILLIS, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, Willis Miller, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDC), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on an amended

complaint for the violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 12; Am.

Compl.) with exhibits (Docs. 1-2–1-13; Compl. Ex. 1–12). Plaintiff alleges

Defendants, five officers at Florida State Prison (FSP), used unnecessary force

against him on February 9, 2018, causing serious injuries that required

treatment at an outside hospital.1 See Am. Compl. at 10–12. He seeks damages,

including punitive, and injunctive relief. Id. at 13–14.

1 Plaintiff’s claims against a sixth Defendant, identified in the complaint as

“Bassermorn,” but later identified as “Bosserman,” were dismissed for Plaintiff’s

failure to timely serve this Defendant. See Order (Doc. 66). Defendant Walin is

identified by the last name “Gerow” in the amended complaint. Plaintiff later

corrected this Defendant’s name. See Order (Doc. 42).

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98;

Def. Mot.) with an exhibit (Doc. 98-1; Def. Ex.). Plaintiff opposes the motion

(Doc. 99; Pl. Resp.) with his own exhibits (Docs. 99-1–99-10).2

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v.

Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A]

mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate

of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

2 Plaintiff subsequently filed other documents, exhibits, and notices, without

seeking leave to supplement his response or without seeking any discernible relief

(Docs. 100, 103, 104, 105, 106). As such, the Court does not consider them but notes

that most documents filed in supplement to his response are duplicative of other

documents already on the docket or of facts and arguments already considered.

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on

a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving

party must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute

of material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and

“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is

appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. City of Miami,

52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca

Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Facts

A. Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint Allegations3

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the relevant events began

when Defendant Willis and another officer were escorting him from his cell to

a disciplinary report (DR) hearing. See Am. Compl. at 7. According to Plaintiff,

after he was fully shackled and removed from his cell, Defendant Willis began

“taunting” him, saying, “Yeah, I heard you were a ‘cho-mo’ [child molester], so

you better hope they throw your [DR] out, because if you stay on this wing,

we’re gonna have problems.” Id. Plaintiff admittedly stopped walking and sat

on the floor because he feared for his safety. Id. at 8. Defendant Willis and the

other officer then “started to ‘drag’ and ‘carry’ Plaintiff back to his assigned

cell,” without first contacting mental health, as Plaintiff claims is required

under the Florida Administrative Code (FAC) before an officer uses force on an

inmate with a mental health grade of S3. Id. at 8–9.4

Plaintiff further alleges that, after he was back inside his cell, Defendant

Willis “placed both knees on [his] back . . . and then proceeded to slap [him]

against his . . . face multiple times.” Id. at 9. Defendant Willis allegedly called

3 A plaintiff’s allegations in his verified complaint are to be given the same

weight as an affidavit. See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014).

4 Plaintiff also asserts Defendant Willis and the other officer violated other

provisions of the FAC when they “drag[ged]” him back to his cell. See Am. Compl. at

8–9.

for assistance, and Defendants Dykes, Walin, Lavoie, and Halsey arrived but

instead of “interven[ing] [to] stop or prevent further injury,” they “began

punching repeat[ed]ly . . . Plaintiff’s upper body.” Id. at 10–11. Thereafter,

Defendant Willis allegedly “began kicking . . . Plaintiff . . . in the torso and

head area [and] then returned to punching [him] in the fac[e],” while the other

Defendants watched. Id. at 11.

Prison medical records reflect that Plaintiff suffered a hematoma to the

right side of his forehead, swelling around his left eye, and various lacerations

that caused “severe bleeding” and possibly needed sutures, necessitating a trip

to an outside hospital.5 See Compl. Ex. 5 at 2–3. At the hospital, Plaintiff

learned he also sustained a fractured nasal bone and fractured orbital floor.

See Compl. Ex. 3 at 2–3, 5. See also Compl. Ex. 7 at 4–5. Plaintiff provides

other medical and grievance records documenting or reporting additional

injuries he learned of after-the-fact, which he attributes to the February 9,

2018 use-of-force incident, including back pain, see Compl. Ex. 7 at 4; Compl.

Ex. 10 at 8–9, and pain and blurry vision in the left eye, see Compl. Ex. 8 at 2;

Compl. Ex. 10 at 11.

5 A force report provided by Defendants explains that Plaintiff was sent to an

outside hospital because the incident occurred at 5:30 a.m. when no doctor was on

duty. See Def. Ex. at 28.

Plaintiff offers the affidavits of two inmates: Michael Love; and Bryant

Williams. See Compl. Ex. 4; Compl. Ex. 11. Inmate Love contends he

“witness[ed] . . . a[n] unn[ec]essary use of force” against Plaintiff on February

9, 2018. See Compl. Ex. 4 at 2. According to inmate Love, Defendant Dykes and

other unidentified officers “jumped on [Plaintiff] … in front of his cell.” Id. Love

contends the officers “beat” Plaintiff and tried to drag him inside his cell while

“he was unconscious.” Id. Inmate Bryant’s affidavit appears to address other

issues or incidents involving Plaintiff—he does not aver having witnessed the

incident that is the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint, nor does he say he has any

independent knowledge about the incident. See Compl. Ex. 11 at 2.

B. Defendants’ Position

Defendants provide use-of-force reports, which relay a narrative that

differs starkly from Plaintiff’s. See Def. Ex. at 2–3, 10–13. The only part of

Defendants’ narrative that aligns with Plaintiff’s is that Plaintiff sat on the

floor when Defendant Willis and another officer were escorting him to a DR

hearing. See id. at 2, 10, 12. Defendants Willis and Officer Jonathon Carnes

report that Plaintiff refused orders to stand and walk, so they “utilized [a] two

man carry technique [to] carr[y] [Plaintiff] back inside his [cell].” Id. at 10, 12.

They both report the following subsequent events, taken from Defendant

Willis’s force report:

Upon entering the cell, [Plaintiff] spat on [Defendant

Willis] striking [him] in the upper torso area and then

head butted [Defendant Willis] in the lower left chin

area. [Defendant Willis] maintained [his] grasp of

[Plaintiff], and with the assistance of Officer Carnes …

forced [Plaintiff] face down to the cell floor. …

[Plaintiff] struck his forehead and the side of his face

on the floor. [Plaintiff] continued to be resistant by

twisting and contorting his body in an attempt to

break [Defendant Willis’s] grasp. Officer Carnes and

[Defendant Willis] released [their] grip of [Plaintiff]

and attempted to exit the cell. As [they] attempted to

exit the cell, [Plaintiff] jumped up from the cell floor

and charged at [Defendant Willis], and again head

butted [him] striking [him] in the facial area.

[Defendant Willis] redirected [Plaintiff] toward the

back of the cell and grasped him by his upper left arm

with both hands, and with the assistance of Officer

Carnes … forced [Plaintiff] to the bunk face down

landing between the cell wall and corner of the bunk.

… [Plaintiff] struck his forehead and mouth on the

edge of the bunk.

Id. at 10–13. Defendant Willis’s report notes that the “[i]ncident [was] captured

on fixed wing and/or handheld video,” but Defendants provide no video

evidence in support of their motion. See id. at 10. See also generally Def. Mot.

Other officers arrived after Plaintiff struck his face on the edge of his

bunk, at which time Defendant Willis and Officer Carnes were able to leave

the cell without using any additional force. See Def. Ex. at 11, 13. Defendants

Lavoie, Walin, and Dykes deny having witnessed the events that occurred

inside Plaintiff’s cell, and they deny having used force against Plaintiff other

than to assist him to a gurney to be taken to medical. See id. at 14, 16, 22.

Defendant Dykes reports he “witnessed [Defendant] Willis and Officer

Jonathon Carnes utilize a two many carry to carry [Plaintiff] . . . to his assigned

cell . . . due to him refusing all orders to walk.” Id. at 22. Defendants Lavoie

and Walin report that they arrived after Defendant Willis and Officer Carnes

exited Plaintiff’s cell, when Plaintiff was “compl[ying]” with officers’ orders. Id.

at 14, 16. They report that Plaintiff “refused to stand and walk,” so they, along

with two other officers, “four man carried [Plaintiff] to the second floor

quarterdeck,” where a gurney was waiting to transport him to the medical unit.

Id.

C. Plaintiff’s Response6

Plaintiff contends in his response that all officers who completed a force

report are “telling a lie.” See Pl. Resp. at 6. He claims he “never refused to

comply with any officer[s’] order, and he repeats that he sat on the floor

initially because Defendant Willis threatened him. Id. at 7–9. He denies having

head-butted or spat on anyone. Id. at 9.

IV. Legal Analysis & Conclusions of Law

Defendants invoke qualified immunity, arguing the undisputed facts

show that officers were justified in using force to subdue Plaintiff because

6 The exhibits Plaintiff provides in support of his response are mostly

duplicative of many he filed with his amended complaint or of those Defendants

provide with their motion.

Plaintiff refused to comply with officers’ commands and attacked Defendant

Willis. See Def. Mot. at 1–3, 10–11, 21. They also assert Plaintiff’s request for

punitive damages is statutorily barred. Id. at 1, 11.

A. Qualified Immunity

Prison officials sued in their individual capacities are “entitled to

qualified immunity for [their] discretionary actions unless [they] violated

‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir.

2016) (quoting Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Qualified immunity allows government employees to exercise their official

duties without fear of facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944,

951 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. In other

words, even if a prison official makes a decision that is later found to be

constitutionally deficient, the official is entitled to qualified immunity if the

decision was based on a reasonable misapprehension of the law. Taylor v.

Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53 (2020) (citing Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198

(2004)).

Upon invoking qualified immunity, a defendant bears the initial burden

to demonstrate he was performing discretionary duties at the relevant times.

Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951. Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were acting

within the scope of their discretionary duties as corrections officers when the

incident occurred. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff, who must point to

facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate each Defendant violated a

constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. Id. (“Because §

1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s

acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant is

entitled to an independent qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or

her actions and omissions.”).

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological

justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987). At the same

time, it is well understood that prison guards, who are charged with

maintaining order and protecting inmates and staff, may use force when

necessary. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986); Williams v. Burton,

943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, courts must balance an

inmate’s right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment with a prison

official’s obligation to ensure a safe and secure institution. Ort, 813 F.2d at

321–22.

An inmate against whom force is used to restore order demonstrates an

Eighth Amendment violation “only if the measure taken ‘inflicted unnecessary

and wanton pain and suffering’ caused by force used ‘maliciously and

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.’” Williams, 943 F.2d at 1575

(emphasis is original). Whether an officer used more force than necessary to

quell a disturbance or regain control of a prisoner requires courts to consider

various factors, including the need for force, the extent of force used in relation

to the prisoner’s conduct, the threat of harm the prisoner posed to staff and

inmates, whether the officer tried to “temper the severity of a forceful

response,” and the injuries inflicted. See id.; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321 (“Whitley

factors”). See also Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).

In considering the Whitley factors, courts should “give a wide range of

deference to prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security.” Cockrell

v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has

stressed,

[C]ourts must determine whether the evidence goes

beyond a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a

particular use of force or the existence of arguably

superior alternatives. Unless it appears that the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of

wantonness in the infliction of pain under the

standard we have described, the case should not go to

the jury.

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322. Nonetheless, if an officer reasonably uses force to

quell a disturbance, the force should cease once the behavior giving rise to the

need for force abates. Ort, 813 F.2d at 324. When an officer uses excessive force

against an inmate, officers who are present and can intervene but do not can

be held liable. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir.

2007) (“The law of this circuit is that an officer who is present at the scene and

who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use

of excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)).

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff complains that the following conduct

constituted excessive force: Defendant Willis (and another officer) carried or

dragged him to his cell after he sat on the floor; Defendant Willis placed both

knees on his back and slapped him in the face; and all Defendants “severely

beat[]” him while he was fully restrained inside his cell, including punching

him, kicking him, and stomping on him, or failed to intervene. See Am. Compl.

at 8–12. See also Compl. Ex. 4 at 2.

With respect to the first use-of-force involving only Defendant Willis (i.e.,

the two-man carry), the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff sat on the floor

when he was on his way to a DR hearing and that Defendant Willis and

another officer carried or “drag[ged]” him back to his cell. See Am. Compl. at 7;

Def. Ex. at 10, 12. Even though Plaintiff denies having disobeyed any officers’

orders, see Pl. Resp. at 7, he concedes that he sat on the floor instead of walking

to the DR hearing, see Am. Compl. at 7. Regardless of the reason Plaintiff

refused to walk and sat down instead, such conduct by a prisoner is

tantamount to disobeying a lawful order.

Affording Defendant Willis “a wide range of deference” in maintaining

prison security, the Whitley factors balance in his favor based on this conduct:

there was a need to use some force given Plaintiff defied direct or indirect

orders to walk; the extent of force used was minimal and appeared to have been

tempered; objectively, Plaintiff’s conduct does not appear to have posed harm

to himself, staff, or other inmates, but the Court accepts that having a

disobedient inmate sitting on the floor of a prison wing could cause security

concerns; and Plaintiff sustained no injuries from the two-man carry.

Under the undisputed facts, the Court finds Defendant Willis’s use of a

two-many carry does not amount to excessive force in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, and he is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity on this portion

of the claim. This is so even if Defendant Willis violated provisions of the FAC.

See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995) (explaining that prison

regulations do not confer rights on inmates but guide corrections officials in

carrying out their duties); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002)

(“[Section] 1983 merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights

‘secured’ elsewhere, i.e., rights independently ‘secured by the Constitution and

laws’ of the United States.”).

Although the Court finds Defendant Willis was justified in carrying

Plaintiff back to his cell, the parties tell sharply conflicting stories about what

happened thereafter. Through a verified amended complaint and at least one

witness statement, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Willis, Dykes, Walin, Lavoie,

and Halsey gratuitously beat or “jumped” him or watched him being beaten

without intervening. On the other hand, Defendants claim Plaintiff spat on

and twice head-butted Defendant Willis, which prompted a reactionary use-of-

force by Defendant Willis that was not witnessed by any other Defendant.

When two parties’ stories conflict, neither of which is blatantly

contradicted by indisputable evidence, a district court may not make credibility

determinations in favor of one party over the other. See Sears v. Roberts, 922

F.3d 1199, 1206, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s entry

of summary judgment in favor of the officer-defendants because the officers’

documentary evidence, including disciplinary reports and affidavits, consisted

of “various forms of their own testimony,” which directly contradicted

Plaintiff’s sworn allegations). Defendants offer no indisputable evidence, such

as video footage, that blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s account of the incident,

which the Court must accept as true. See Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918,

921 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining a district court considering a motion for

summary judgment “must view all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences” in the non-movant’s favor). The record presents “a classic swearing

match, which is the stuff of which jury trials are made.” Sears, 922 F.3d at

1208 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir.

2013)).

Because Plaintiff asserts facts that, accepted as true, amount to an

Eighth Amendment violation under clearly established law, Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity. See Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1310

(11th Cir. 2008) (“‘[T]here is no room for qualified immunity’ in . . . excessive

force cases because they require a subjective element that is ‘so extreme’ that

no reasonable person could believe that his actions were lawful.” (quoting

Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2002))), overruled in

part on other grounds as recognized by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th

Cir. 2010). See also Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1302, 1304–05 (holding the district

court properly denied qualified immunity to officers who collectively

participated in or witnessed “a severe beating [administered for] no other

purpose than [to] inflict[] pain”).

B. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) precludes an award of

punitive damages. See Def. Mot. at 11–12. Their argument, however, is

unconvincing. On the one hand, they assert, “Punitive damages are statutorily

barred,” citing § 3626(a)(1)(A), but on the other hand, they concede that “[§]

3626(a)(1)(A) applies to punitive damages” and that the Eleventh Circuit has

not interpreted this section to “bar punitive damages.” See id. at 11, 12, 14–15

(emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1325–26 (11th

Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.

389, 395 (2015)).7

Neither the statutory text nor the Eleventh Circuit’s Johnson opinion

supports Defendants’ argument. The relevant statutory provision does not bar

any relief but rather sets forth strict parameters under which prospective relief

may be awarded in a prison conditions civil rights case. It provides:

(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any

civil action with respect to prison conditions shall

extend no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff

or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any

prospective relief unless the court finds that such

relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct

the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give

substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system

caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit held that punitive

damages constitute “prospective relief” and, as such, any punitive damages

award must satisfy the strict parameters delineated in § 3626(a)(1)(A). See 280

F.3d at 1325 (“Because Congress has provided that punitive damages are

prospective relief, we must give the requirements of § 3626(a)(1)(A) some

7 Defendants state in a footnote that they raise the argument “to preserve the

issue for appellate review.” See Def. Mot. at 14 n.1.

meaning in the context of punitive damages.”). Finding Defendants’ argument

unconvincing, their motion will be denied with respect to this argument.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 98) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED only to

the extent that Defendant Willis is entitled to qualified immunity on the claim

that he used excessive force when he two-man carried Plaintiff to his cell for

Plaintiff’s refusal to walk. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.

2. This case is in a posture to proceed to settlement conference and,

if settlement negotiations fail, to trial. The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to

the appointment of counsel to assist him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v.

Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, this case is REFERRED

to the Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program so the

designated deputy clerk of the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff.

The Court encourages the parties to attempt to settle the case privately in the

meantime. If settlement negotiations are successful, the parties shall

immediately notify the Court.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 31st day of May

2024.

Mh . / \ .

Prion}, Pom—

BRIAN. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Willis Miller

Counsel of Record

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