The School Board of St. John's County, Florida v. C.L.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF ST.

JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-864-MMH-LLL

C.L.,

Defendant.

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF ST.

JOHNS COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1285-MMH-LLL

C.L., by and through C.L.’s Parents,

K.L. and M.L.,

Defendant.

ORDER

THESE CAUSES are before the Court on Plaintiff C.L.’s Motions to

Dismiss the above consolidated cases.1 See 864 Action, Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

1 On February 20, 2024, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 15) consolidating the above-

named cases at the parties’ request. Defendant filed the Motions to Dismiss prior to

consolidation. The Court will refer to case number 3:23-cv-864-MMH-LLL as the 864 Action,

and case number 3:23-cv-1285-MMH-LLL as the 1285 Action.

6; First Motion), filed on October 1, 2023; 1285 Action, Motion to Dismiss (Doc.

14; Second Motion), filed on January 5, 2024. Plaintiff, the School Board of St.

Johns County, Florida, filed a response in opposition to each Motion. See 864

Action, Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 9; First Response), filed on October 30, 2023; 1285 Action, Plaintiff’s

Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24; Second

Response), filed on January 26, 2024. Accordingly, these matters are ripe for

review.

I. Background

These cases arise under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and corresponding Florida laws, which

“guarantee[] disabled students a Free and Appropriate Public Education

(‘FAPE’).” Loren F. ex rel. Fisher v. Atl. Independent Sch. Sys., 349 F.3d 1309,

1311 (11th Cir. 2003). “To provide a FAPE, a school formulates an Individual

Educational Plan (‘IEP’) during a meeting between the student’s parents and

school officials.” Id. at 1312. If the parents and the school “cannot agree on

the contents of the IEP, either party may request a due process hearing.” See

School Bd. of Lee Cnty., Fla. v. M.M. ex rel. M.M., 348 F. App’x 504, 506 (11th

Cir. 2009).2 In Florida, the appropriate procedure “is to request a due process

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

hearing with a state administrative law judge [ALJ] in the Florida Division of

Administrative Hearings [DOAH].” See L.G. ex rel. B.G. v. Sch. Bd. of Palm

Beach Cnty., 255 F. App’x 360, 363 (11th Cir. 2007). If either party is

“aggrieved by the result of the administrative proceedings,” the IDEA

authorizes that party to bring a civil action challenging the decision in a federal

district court. See Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Bennett ex rel. Bennett, 203 F.3d

1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000); Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty., Fla., 348 F. App’x at 506-07;

see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). In any such action, the statute directs that

the reviewing court:

(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings;

(ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and

(iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,

shall grant such relief as the court determines is

appropriate.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

Here, the School Board seeks judicial review of two administrative

decisions concerning C.L., a child with a disability, who was enrolled in the

School District of St. Johns County, Florida. See 864 Action, Complaint (Doc.

1) ¶¶ 4, 6; 1285 Action, Complaint (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 5, 9. According to the allegations

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

of the Complaints, C.L. has a history of disruptive behaviors at school which

increased in frequency and intensity from November 30, 2022, through January

24, 2023. See 864 Action, Complaint ¶¶ 12-13; 1285 Action, Complaint ¶¶ 15-

16. In February 2023, the school personnel on C.L.’s IEP team determined

that “maintaining [C.L.’s] current placement was substantially likely to result

in injury to the student or to others, based on data collected by the school.” See

864 Action, Complaint ¶ 14; 1285 Action, Complaint ¶ 17. In addition, the

school personnel took the position that a more restrictive placement was

necessary for C.L. to receive a FAPE. See 864 Action, Complaint ¶ 15; 1285

Action, Complaint ¶ 18.

On March 9, 2023, C.L.’s parents filed a request for a due process hearing

with the DOAH challenging the school’s decision to place C.L. in a more

restrictive setting, among other things. See 864 Action, Complaint ¶ 17; 1285

Action, Complaint ¶¶ 20-21. Soon after C.L.’s parents filed the Student

Petition, on March 15, 2023, the School Board filed a separate request for a due

process hearing concerning C.L.’s placement (the School Petition). See 864

Action, Complaint ¶¶ 19-20. Specifically, the School Board “sought to obtain

an order permitting it to change [C.L.’s] placement to a separate class

placement with a low student-to-teacher ratio.” Id. ¶ 20. The two matters

were consolidated and the ALJ held an expedited due process hearing over a

span of five days. See id. ¶¶ 21-24.

Upon completion of the due process hearing, the ALJ entered an order on

April 24, 2023, severing the two cases. Id. ¶ 25. On April 25, 2023, the ALJ

issued a Final Order on the School Petition. See id. ¶ 26, Ex. A (April Order).

In the April Order, the ALJ ruled in C.L.’s favor. See id. ¶¶ 27-29. The School

Board, as the aggrieved party, filed the 864 Action on July 24, 2023, challenging

the April Order. A week later, on July 31, 2023, the ALJ entered a Final Order

on the Student Petition. See 1285 Action, Complaint ¶ 33; see also Second

Motion, Ex. 4 (July Order). The ALJ also ruled in favor of C.L. in the July

Order. See 1285 Action, Complaint ¶¶ 35-40. As such, on October 27, 2023,

the School Board, as the aggrieved party, filed the 1285 Action seeking judicial

review of the July Order. C.L. now moves to dismiss both cases, primarily

based on his contention that the School Board fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted.

II. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), the Court must accept

the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1

(2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182

(11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor

of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).

Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements.

Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” the

complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)

(per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The “plaintiff’s

obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see

also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations,

unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will

not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the

tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled

to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

III. Discussion

A. 864 Action, First Motion

1. Personal Jurisdiction

In the First Motion, C.L. moves to dismiss the 864 Action on two grounds:

lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See generally First

Motion. The Court turns first to the personal jurisdiction argument. C.L.

contends that he is a minor and as such, he does not have the capacity to be

sued. Id. at 1. C.L. then makes the analytical leap that his lack of capacity

for suit also deprives the Court of personal jurisdiction over him. Id. Notably,

C.L. fails to cite any legal support for this leap in reasoning, and upon review,

the Court finds C.L.’s argument to be without merit.

Pursuant to Rule 4(k), “[s]erving a summons or filing a waiver of service

establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . . who is subject to the

jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court

is located . . . .” See Rule 4(k)(1)(A). On August 16, 2023, the School Board

filed a waiver of service executed by C.L.’s attorney of record in this case. See

864 Action, Waiver of the Service of Summons (Doc. 5). In addition, the School

Board alleges in the Complaint that C.L. attends school in the State of Florida

and invoked the State of Florida’s IDEA administrative review process. See

864 Action, Complaint ¶¶ 4, 17. These unrebutted allegations are sufficient to

satisfy the Court that C.L. is a Florida resident subject to the jurisdiction of

Florida courts. Indeed, defense counsel does not offer any argument or

evidence to the contrary.

Instead, C.L. argues that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him

based on his status as a minor. But the fact that C.L. is a minor is inapposite

to the issue of personal jurisdiction. See Smith v. Langford, 255 So. 2d 294,

296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (explaining that the rule governing capacity to be sued

“is procedural only and does not constitute a jurisdictional bar to an action

brought by or against a minor in his individual capacity”).3 Indeed, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure provide that where a minor is sued in federal court, a

general guardian may defend the case on the child’s behalf. See Rule

17(c)(1)(A). If the minor has no general guardian, the Rule requires a court to

“appoint a guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect”

the minor. See Rule 17(c)(2). The plain implication of this Rule is that a

defendant’s status as a minor is not a basis for dismissal. See Smith, 255 So.

2d at 296 (observing that Florida’s analogous rule governing capacity “confers

upon the trial court the discretion to make such provision for the protection of

3 Rule 17(b) provides that an individual’s capacity to be sued is governed by the law of

the individual’s domicile. As such, and because the Florida Rule of Civil Procedure governing

capacity is analogous to Rule 17, compare Rule 17 with Rule 1.210, Fla. R. Civ. P., the Court

finds this Florida state court decision to be persuasive authority on the issue.

the infant’s interest in the litigation as may appear proper and necessary, but

it does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the person of the infant merely

because he . . . is sued as a defendant in an individual capacity and not by a

guardian or next friend.”). And significantly, C.L. does not cite a single case

where a court has found dismissal appropriate based on a defendant’s status as

a minor. See Motion at 1. To the contrary, the only capacity case cited in the

Motion is Gonzalez-Jimenez de Ruiz v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1187,

1197 (M.D. Fla. 2002) in which the court reasoned that even if the minor

plaintiffs were required to sue through a next friend, the court could order such

an appointment without dismissing the case. Thus, to the extent C.L. requests

dismissal based on his status as a minor, the Motion is due to be denied.

Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 17, the Court takes this opportunity to

ensure that C.L.’s interests are adequately protected in the matters pending

before the Court. Upon review of the record, it appears that C.L. has parents

who are acting on his behalf and who obtained a lawyer to represent him in the

underlying administrative proceedings and before this Court. See First

Motion, Exs. 1, 2; First Response, Ex. 1; see also Fla. Stat. § 744.301(1)

(providing that “parents jointly are the natural guardians of their own children

. . . during minority . . . .”). In an abundance of caution and to clarify the record,

the Court will direct the parties to confer and file a notice confirming that C.L.

has representation under Rule 17(c)(1) so that the docket may be updated

accordingly. However, if counsel, as officers of the Court, have reason to

believe that C.L.’s interests are not adequately protected in either the 864

Action or the 1285 Action, counsel must promptly notify the Court so that

appropriate protective measures can be taken.

2. Failure to State a Claim

Next, C.L. argues that dismissal is warranted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim. See First Motion at 2. According to C.L., the

School Board fails to state a claim in the 864 Action because it does not allege

in the Complaint with the “requisite specificity, what the standard of review is,

under what theory the ALJ decided wrongly and what relief the plaintiff would

be entitled [sic].” See id. at 2. In the Response, the School Board argues that

the Complaint provides adequate notice to C.L. that the School Board “seeks to

challenge, vacate, and/or reverse a Final Order entered in an IDEA due process

case through which [C.L.] was a party.” See First Response at 7. Upon

review, the Court finds that the School Board has adequately stated a claim for

relief pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).4

4 To the extent defense counsel argues that dismissal is warranted because the factual

allegations in the Complaint are inconsistent with the administrative record, see Motion at 3,

such an argument is unavailing. Plainly, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is

not the appropriate mechanism by which to challenge the factual correctness of the School

Board’s allegations. See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to

dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”

(emphasis added)). And notably, counsel does not identify which allegations she contends are

inconsistent with the record, much less identify the evidence that supports her position.

Indeed, the parties only recently filed the administrative record with the Court. Consistent

with the requirements of Rule 11, defense counsel is cautioned that she should ensure her

As previously stated, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the result of the

administrative proceedings in the state system has the right, under § 1415(i)(2),

to bring a civil action in the district court . . . .” See Walker, 203 F.3d at 1294.

Here, the School Board presents factual allegations demonstrating the

existence of a dispute between the parties arising under the IDEA concerning

the appropriate setting for C.L. to receive his FAPE. See 864 Action,

Complaint ¶¶ 6-16. The School Board asserts that it filed a due process

petition concerning this dispute with the Florida DOAH, and that the ALJ

rendered a final decision in C.L.’s favor. See 864 Complaint ¶¶ 19, 26-29, Ex.

A.5 The School Board asserts that it is aggrieved by that decision, see id. ¶¶

27-30, identifies the specific aspects of the decision that it contends are

erroneous, and asserts that the “testimony, record evidence, and applicable law

do not support” those findings. See id. ¶ 33. Based on these allegations, the

School Board asks this Court to reverse and/or vacate that decision. Id. at 11.

Notably, aside from broad principles of law, C.L. cites no authority for the

proposition that greater specificity is required to state a claim for judicial

review under the IDEA. See Landmark Fin. Solutions, LLC v. Jenkins, No.

arguments are legally and factually supported before raising them in federal court.

Throwaway arguments such as these do nothing more than waste judicial resources.

5 The Court notes that C.L. does not argue that the School Board failed to state an

actionable IDEA claim in the underlying due process petition.

3:14-cv-721-J-20JBT, 2014 WL 12984569, at *1 (denying a motion to dismiss

where the defendant “appears to have used merely boilerplate language

outlining the standards of review for a motion to dismiss without any

substantive argument”).6 And indeed, the School Board is not required to cite

specific evidence or present legal arguments in its pleading. See Chevy Chase

Bank, F.S.B. v. Carrington, No. 609-CV-2132-ORL31GJK, 2010 WL 745771, at

*4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010) (explaining that “lengthy legal arguments, case

citations, and quotations from treatises” are “almost never proper in a

complaint”). Rather, all that is required is a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” See Rule 8(a)(2). The

Court is satisfied that the School Board’s allegations are sufficient to meet that

standard and invoke its right to judicial review of the ALJ’s decision under the

IDEA. See Sch. Bd. of Lee Cnty., Fla., 348 F. App’x at 509; see also Torres v.

Sampson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 7:22-CV-99-FL, 2022 WL 17682634, at *7

(E.D.N.C. Dec. 14, 2022).

C.L.’s last argument in the First Motion is not entirely clear. See First

Motion at 3-4. C.L. appears to contend that the School Board cannot challenge

the ALJ’s decision on the School Petition (the April Order), because the School

6 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”).

Board had not challenged the ALJ’s decision on the Student Petition (the July

Order). See First Motion at 3-4. But, as stated in the School Board’s

Response, the School Board has now filed a timely challenge to the July Order.

See First Response at 8.7 Because the premise of C.L.’s argument is no longer

accurate, the Court rejects his request for dismissal on this basis as well.

Nevertheless, the Court does question whether the 864 Action continues

to be a live controversy given the ALJ’s subsequent decision on the Student

Petition set forth in the July Order. However, neither party squarely or

comprehensively addresses this issue in the briefing currently before the Court.

Moreover, resolving this question will require the Court to delve into the

administrative record, review the administrative procedures invoked and the

substance of the decisions, and consider the applicable law. Given that the

cases are now consolidated, the Court will allow the 864 Action to proceed and

address any question as to its mootness when it takes up the merits of the

School Board’s claims. In light of the foregoing, the Court will deny the First

Motion.

B. 1285 Action, Second Motion

In the Second Motion, C.L. argues that the 1285 Action is due to be

dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Second

7 Notably, when the School Board filed the 864 Action in which it challenges the April

Order, the ALJ had not yet issued the July Order.

Motion at 4. C.L. contends that the School Board has “failed to identify with

the requisite specificity, what findings were not supported by the record, under

what theory or law the ALJ decided wrongly nor [sic] why the relief awarded

was improper.” Id. at 4. But, as above, C.L. fails to identify a single case

where a court has found that the level of detail C.L. demands is necessary to

state a claim for judicial review under the IDEA. Upon review of the

Complaint in the 1285 Action, the Court is satisfied that the School Board’s

allegations are sufficient to provide C.L. “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Indeed, the School Board alleges the facts giving

rise to the underlying IDEA dispute, identifies the decision being challenged,

alleges that it is aggrieved by that decision, and lists specific aspects of the

decision that it contends are not supported by the evidence or the law. See

1285 Action, Complaint ¶¶ 35-40. Thus, for the same reasons discussed above,

the Court will deny C.L.’s request for dismissal on this basis.

Next, C.L. argues that the School Board alleges facts that are inconsistent

with the administrative record. See Second Motion at 5. C.L. contends that

the School Board is “now attempting to bring in facts that were specifically

excluded by the ALJ as being irrelevant to the case before it.” Id. As noted

above, see supra note 4, this argument is without merit. Remarkably, C.L.

presents this argument without identifying which allegations it contends are

inconsistent with the administrative record, or citing the evidence that supports

his position. But regardless, even accepting C.L.’s position that the School

Board’s allegations are inconsistent with the administrative record, C.L. cites

no legal authority to suggest that this argument is a proper basis for dismissal

at this stage in the proceedings. Indeed, as previously explained, the Court

must accept as true the factual allegations in the Complaint when presented

with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See supra note 4. C.L.’s argument—

for which he cites no legal authority—is also undermined by the plain text of

the statute which specifically authorizes the Court to “hear additional evidence

at the request of a party . . . .” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii). Notably, the

Eleventh Circuit has identified “improper exclusion of evidence by the

administrative agency” as one potential reason a district court could exercise

its discretion to allow additional evidence. See Walker Cnty. Sch. Dist., 203

F.3d at 1298-99 (quoting Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773,

790-91 (1st Cir. 1984) aff’d, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)). The Court expresses no

opinion on whether it will consider such evidence but, for purposes of resolving

the instant Motion, the School Board’s reliance on disputed facts is plainly not

a basis for dismissal.

Last, C.L. argues that certain “issues” alleged in the 1285 Action should

be dismissed because the issues are “unrelated” to the 1285 Action and “should

have been raised” in the 864 Action. See Second Motion at 5-6. According to

C.L., “[t]hese matters should have been raised in the [864 Action] and since they

were not raised in the [864 Action], it is now too late.” Id. at 5. Specifically,

C.L. identifies the unrelated issues as those set forth in paragraph 47 of the

Complaint which states:

DOAH erred and unfairly prejudiced [the School Board] when it

failed to bifurcate the expedited and non-expedited issues raised

in [the Student Petition] and [the School Petition] and required

[the School Board] to present its case-in-chief before [C.L.] and on

an expedited basis. Stated simply, by requiring [the School

Board] to present its case-in-chief first and prove that it provided

FAPE to [C.L.], DOAH improperly shifted the burden to [the

School Board] and shortened the timeframes applicable to non-

expedited proceedings.

See 1285 Action, Complaint ¶ 47.

Upon review, the Court finds C.L.’s request for dismissal of these “issues”

is due to be denied. Significantly, C.L.’s argument on this point is poorly

developed and largely conclusory. Indeed, C.L. insists that these issues

“should have been” raised in the 864 Action but makes no effort to explain why.

C.L. maintains that the issues “are unrelated to the case at bar” but does not

elaborate on why the matters raised in paragraph 47 are related to the 864

Action but not the 1285 Action. Based on these few vague sentences, the Court

cannot discern the basis for C.L.’s arguments and declines to speculate or make

arguments on C.L.’s behalf.

Regardless, the argument appears to be intertwined with the merits of

this case such that the Court would need to review the administrative record

and the substance of the ALJ’s rulings to resolve it. At this stage of the

proceedings, the Court is satisfied that the School Board has adequately alleged

that these issues concern the ALJ’s resolution of the Student Petition as set

forth in the July Order. To the extent C.L. disputes the School Board’s

characterization of the administrative proceedings, he is free to raise these

arguments at a later stage in these proceedings. In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss filed at Document 6 in 3:23-cv-864-

MMH-LLL, and at Document 14 in 3:28-cv-1285-MMH-LLL are

DENIED.

2. On or before June 28, 2024, the parties shall confer and file a notice

advising the Court of C.L.’s representation under Rule 17(c)(1).

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 30th day of May,

2024.

United States District Judge

Ie11

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