The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER PAUL MARION,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Case No. 5:23-cv-201-JA-PRL
JOSHUA PENNEY,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff Christopher Marion brought a claim of false arrest against
Defendant Joshua Penney and related claims of false imprisonment and battery
against the Citrus County Sheriffs Office. The Sheriff's Office settled the claims
against it, (see Doc. 29), and Penney was granted summary judgment on the
false arrest claim based on qualified immunity, (see Doc. 39). Now before the
Court are Penney’s Motion for Costs, Including Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 43), and
Plaintiffs Response (Doc. 44). As set forth below, Penney’s Motion is denied.
I, LEGAL STANDARDS
District courts have discretion to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing
party in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case at summary judgment “upon a finding that the
plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (Title VII context)
see Beach Blitz Co. v. City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021
(applying this standard to § 1983 cases).
The Court evaluates the frivolity of a case based on four factors: (1
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendan
offered to settle; (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial; anc
(4) whether there was enough support for the claim to warrant close attentior
by the court. See Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 118:
(11th Cir. 1985); Beach Blitz, 13 F.4th at 1302.1
II. ANALYSIS
The first factor—whether Marion established a prima facie case against
Penney—favors Penney. To prove a prima facie case of false arrest under the
Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Marion had to show that he was
arrested without probable cause. See Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11tk
Cir. 2023). The reason this Court granted Penney’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is that it found there to be arguable probable cause for Penney’s
arrest and therefore Marion did not overcome Penney’s qualified immunity.
The first three factors come from Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County,
773 F. 2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985). The fourth factor comes from Beach Blitz Co. v.
City of Miami Beach, 13 F.4th 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 1991)).
Although not addressed in the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court nov
finds that there was also actual probable cause for the arrest.
The second factor—whether a settlement offer has been made—does no
favor either party. Although Penney did not offer to settle the one claim assertec
against him, the principal Defendant in this case, the Citrus County Sheriff:
Office, which was represented by the same attorneys as Penney, settled the twe
claims brought against it. Because “[d]eterminations regarding frivolity are t«
be made on a case-by-case basis” under Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1182, the
settlement offer made by the Sheriff's Office is relevant to a proper analysis o
this factor. Thus, the factor favors neither party.2
The third factor—whether the case was dismissed prior to trial—favors
Penney, but not strongly. As mentioned above, Marion’s claim against Penney
was dismissed at the summary judgment stage due to Marion’s inability tc
overcome Penney’s qualified immunity. However, while dismissal at the
pleading stage weighs in favor of frivolity, Beach Blitz 13 F.4th at 1303, here
the parties went through the pleading stage, discovery, mediation, and
settlement discussions, and they filed their pretrial statements, proposed voix
2 The Court is aware that “if a plaintiff succeeds on one claim but also asserts a
frivolous claim unrelated to the successful claim, ‘the defendant may recover attorney’s
fees incurred in responding’ to the frivolous claim.” Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306,
1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 n.10 (1988)).
However, the claims against Penney and the Sheriffs Office were related, not
“unrelated.” Id. And the “case-by-case basis” required under Sullivan supports viewing
the related claims together.
dire questions, and proposed jury instructions before Penney prevailed or
summary judgment. This weighs against the case’s frivolity.
Finally, the fourth factor asks whether the dismissal of the claim requirec
close attention by the court. This factor is “particularly important” and favor:
Marion.’ Beach Blitz, 13 F.4th at 13802; see also Busby v. City of Orlando, 93:
F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Our circuit has held that the plaintiff's sectior
1983 claims should not be considered groundless or without foundation for the
purpose of an award of fees in favor of the defendants when the claims are
meritorious enough to receive careful attention and review.”). The Court did not
resolve this case on summary judgment without paying close attention to the
facts—including a meticulous reading of the two depositions and carefu
consideration of the relevant Florida criminal statutes—or without conducting <
painstaking review of Eleventh Circuit caselaw on arguable probable cause. See
Edger v. McCabe, 84 F.4th 1230, 1235 (11th Cir. 2023) (acknowledging the
Eleventh Circuit’s “inconsistent expositions” between actual and arguable
probable cause.). Additionally, Penney’s conduct, including his inexplicable
release of Marion’s friend, Michael Wilson, complicated the analysis. As
demonstrated above, this case clearly required close attention.
3 The Court considers this factor to be so important in this case that even if al]
the other factors favored Penney, the Court would have reached the same conclusion.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Marion’s action in bringing this suit cannot □□
characterized as unreasonable or meritless because the basis upon whicl
Penney prevailed was an issue of legal immunity requiring judicial resolution
Marion’s interpretation of the events that took place was not without foundatior
or frivolous, and the case required close attention by the Court. Accordingly
Penney’s Motion for Costs, Including Attorneys’ Fees, (Doc. 43), is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED on May 2024,
EP =f Ries □□
/ JOHN ANTOON II
Wnited States District Judge
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