The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
VIRGINIA BUHMANN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-1576-VMC-SPF
SCHOOL BOARD OF POLK COUNTY,
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
School Board of Polk County, Florida’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. # 36), filed on April 10, 2024. Plaintiff
Virginia Buhmann has not filed a response to the Motion and
the time to respond has expired. For the reasons that follow,
the Motion is granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 14, 2023,
asserting a violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”) by her employer. (Doc. # 1). She filed her amended
complaint on August 28, 2023, again asserting a single FMLA
claim based on Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s FMLA leave
request. (Doc. # 22). The amended complaint seeks
“compensation for lost wages, benefits, liquidated damages,
interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and any other damages or
remuneration allowable at law” under the FMLA. (Id. at 1).
Defendant filed its answer on September 7, 2023. (Doc. # 23).
The case proceeded through discovery.
Now, Defendant moves for summary judgment (Doc. # 36),
and Plaintiff has failed to respond. Thus, the Motion is
unopposed. The record evidence cited by Defendant reveals the
following. See (Doc. # 21 at 2-3) (“In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court will deem admitted any fact in
the statement of material facts that the opposing party does
not specifically controvert, provided record evidence
supports the moving party’s statement.”).
“On or about November 15, 2022, [Plaintiff] requested
[FMLA] ‘leave time’ with a retroactive effective or start
date of November 1, 2022.” (King Affidavit Doc. # 36-1 at ¶
5). “At the time [Plaintiff] requested FMLA leave,
[Defendant’s] staff performed a review of [Plaintiff’s]
employment history. Staff determined [Plaintiff] was several
days short of FMLA’s minimum of one year employment
requirement and denied [Plaintiff] FMLA leave.” (Id. at ¶ 6).
“[Defendant’s] staff approved [Plaintiff] for [non-FMLA]
medical leave. At the time [P]laintiff requested FMLA leave,
[Defendant’s] policy 3430.03, stated,
Employees may be granted up to twelve (12) months
of unpaid medical leave without benefits for
illness to themselves or members of their household
or as otherwise provided in the various collective
bargaining agreements. The Superintendent may grant
an employee an additional twelve (12) months of
unpaid medical leave in cases involving unusual
medical circumstances.
(Id. at ¶ 7 & Ex. 1, The School Board of Polk County, Florida’s
policy 3430.03).
“Medical leave does not include paid benefits, but
[Defendant] holds the same position open for the employee
once they return from medical leave.” (Id. at ¶ 8).
“[Plaintiff] was out of work on approved medical leave
starting November 1, 2022, and she returned to her same job
on January 23, 2023.” (Id. at ¶ 9).
“When an employee like [Plaintiff] is on FMLA leave,
[Defendant] is required to maintain the employee’s group
health insurance. When an employee is not eligible for FMLA
leave and that employee takes medical leave or another
extended leave of absence, under most circumstances,
[Defendant] does not maintain group health insurance and the
cost of health insurance becomes the responsibility of the
employee during medical or other non-FMLA leave.” (Id. at ¶
10). “Also, an employee not eligible for FMLA leave who takes
an extended leave of absence runs the risk of losing their
specific job and would be required to re-apply for a position
for which they are qualified at the end of their leave.”
(Id.).
“Due to an administrative oversight by [Defendant’s]
staff, [Defendant] continued to maintain [Plaintiff’s] group
health coverage during the time she was on medical leave.
Based upon a review of available and relevant records,
[Plaintiff] was not required to pay any additional money for
her group health coverage during the length of her medical
leave.” (Id. at ¶ 11).
“On January 23, 2023, [Plaintiff] returned to work. She
remains employed by [Defendant] in the same position she was
in when she took medical leave on November 1, 2022.” (Id. at
¶ 12). “[Plaintiff] was not subject to any adverse employment
decisions while she was on medical leave from November 1,
2022, to January 23, 2023.” (Id. at ¶ 13). “[Plaintiff] was
not denied any benefits guaranteed by FMLA while she was on
medical leave from November 1, 2022, to January 23, 2023.”
(Id. at ¶ 14).
Based on this evidence, Defendant asserts that — even if
she were eligible for FMLA leave — Plaintiff suffered no
adverse employment actions nor suffered any damages when
Defendant denied her FMLA leave. (Doc. # 36). As explained
below, the Court agrees.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,
593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
As mentioned before, this Motion is unopposed by
Plaintiff because she failed to respond by the deadline set
by the Middle District of Florida’s Local Rule 3.01(c). See
Local Rule 3.01(c) (“[A] party may respond within twenty-one
days after service to a motion to dismiss, for judgment on
the pleadings, for summary judgment, to exclude or limit
expert testimony, to certify a class, for a new trial, or to
alter or amend the judgment. If a party fails to timely
respond, the motion is subject to treatment as unopposed.”).
“In unopposed motions for summary judgment, ‘the
district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on
the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather,
must consider the merits of the motion.’” Hurst v. Youngelson,
354 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (quoting United
States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th
Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004)).
“The [C]ourt need not review all the evidentiary materials
sua sponte, but the [C]ourt must make sure that the order is
supported at least by the evidentiary materials submitted in
support of the order.” Id.
Here, the record evidence presented by Defendant
supports the grant of summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.
While Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave,
she received the same treatment she would have received if
her FMLA request had been granted. That is, Plaintiff took
twelve weeks unpaid leave from her job, during which time
Defendant maintained Plaintiff’s group health insurance due
to an oversight. (King Affidavit Doc. # 36-1 at ¶¶ 9-11).
Importantly, when her unpaid leave was finished, Plaintiff
returned to her same position with Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 12).
Thus, Plaintiff “was not subject to any adverse employment
decisions while she was on medical leave from November 1,
2022, to January 23, 2023,” and “was not denied any benefits
guaranteed by FMLA while she was on medical leave from
November 1, 2022, to January 23, 2023.” (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14).
The FMLA allows an eligible employee the right to take
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually for several
reasons, including “a serious health condition” that prevents
the employee from performing the functions of her position.
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). After completion of FMLA leave,
eligible employees have the right “to be restored by the
employer to the position of employment held by the employee
when the leave commenced.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). “During
the mandatory 12 weeks, the employer must maintain the
employee’s group health coverage.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
2614(c)(1)).
Here, the amended complaint only asserts a FMLA
interference claim. See (Doc. # 22 at 2-3) (complaining of
Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s FMLA request). Employers
who violate the FMLA are “liable to any eligible employees
affected . . . for damages” and “for such equitable relief as
may be appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1). A plaintiff
employee can recover damages under the FMLA for “any wages,
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or
lost to such employee by reason of the violation,” or “in a
case in which wages, salary, employment benefits, or other
compensation have not been denied or lost to the employee,
any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a
direct result of the violation.” 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)
(emphasis added).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]o prevail under
the cause of action set out in § 2617, an employee must prove,
as a threshold matter, that the employer violated § 2615 by
interfering with, restraining, or denying his or her exercise
of FMLA rights.” Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89. “Even then, § 2617
provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by
the violation: The employer is liable only for compensation
and benefits lost ‘by reason of the violation,’ §
2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), for other monetary losses sustained ‘as
a direct result of the violation,’ § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II),
and for ‘appropriate’ equitable relief, including employment,
reinstatement, and promotion, § 2617(a)(1)(B).” Id.
“A FMLA interference claim based solely on her leave
status requires Plaintiff to show that she was denied benefits
because she was not on FMLA leave.” Rodriguez v. Sch. Bd. of
Hillsborough Cnty., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1273, 1279 (M.D. Fla.
2014). The Eleventh Circuit “has previously held that, even
where there may have been technical violations of the FMLA,
those violations are not compensable where, as here, a
plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any
‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of stating a prima
facie case under the statute.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301,
1307 (11th Cir. 2006); see also Graham v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating
“[e]ven if the defendants have committed certain technical
infractions under the FMLA, plaintiff may not recover in the
absence of damages” and noting that “the FMLA does not allow
recovery for mental distress or the loss of job security”).
Plaintiff suffered no damages “by reason of” the denial
of her FMLA leave because (1) she received the same twelve
weeks of unpaid leave with her group insurance maintained
that she would have received if she had been granted FMLA
leave and (2) she returned to her same position after her
medical leave, just as she would have if she had been on FMLA
leave. See Graham, 193 F.3d at 1284 (holding that employee
suffered no damages when she was wrongly told she did not
qualify for FMLA but was nonetheless given equivalent leave).
There is no evidence before the Court that Defendant’s alleged
technical violation of the FMLA resulted in any actual
monetary losses for Plaintiff. Indeed, by not responding to
the Motion, Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence that
could create a genuine dispute as to whether she suffered any
damages.
In short, Plaintiff’s FMLA claim fails as a matter of
law. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant School Board of Polk County, Florida’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 36) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff Virginia Buhmann.
(3) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
10th day of May, 2024.
fan Hunaby (mei¥h
VIR! IA M. HERNANDEZ’*COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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