The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER PAUL MARION,
Plaintiff,
Vv. Case No. 5:23-cv-201-JA-PRL
JOSHUA PENNEY and SHERIFF
OF CITRUS COUNTY,
Defendants.
ORDER
This case is before the Court on Defendant Joshua Penney’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, (see Docs. 18 & 19), Plaintiffs response (Doc. 20), anc
Defendant’s reply (Doc. 21). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the
Court finds that the Motion must be granted.
I. FACTS!
Plaintiff Christopher Marion is 61 years old, and his friend Michael
Wilson is 71. (Marion Dep., Doc. 20-1, at 12; Wilson Dep., Doc. 20-2, at 12). They
are military veterans living in Crystal River, Florida. (Doc. 20-1 at 12; Doc. 20-
2 at 12). The evening of January 13, 2022, started off well for the friends. They
1 In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson
uv. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
went to dinner together and visited until about 11:00 p.m. (Doc. 20-1 at 18
Penney Aff., Doc. 19-1, at 6). After dinner, Plaintiff drove Wilson home. (Doc
20-1 at 58). Wilson’s house is behind Sara’s Diner and his property abuts the
diner’s parking lot. (Doc. 20-1 at 18). Wilson kept an Airstream trailer on hi:
property and was temporarily residing in the trailer while painting the inside
of his house. (Doc. 20-1 at 25). As they approached Wilson’s house, Wilsor
instructed Plaintiff to “pull around back” and park in the diner parking lot nea
the trailer. (Doc. 20-1 at 25). The diner had closed at 2:00 p.m., and except fo1
Marion’s car, the parking lot was empty. (Doc. 19-1 at 6).
After Plaintiff parked his car, the two friends remained in the car with
the headlights on, talking for at least ten minutes. (Doc. 20-1 at 23, 27). The
headlights illuminated a shed maintained by the diner. (Doc. 20-1 at 27). The
course of the evening then took a bad turn. While in the car, the friends noticed
a sheriffs patrol car with its bright lights on pull up behind them. (Doc. 20-1 at
30). Deputy Joshua Penney stepped out and approached the driver’s window o!
Plaintiffs car. (Doc. 20-1 at 33). Plaintiff asked, “What can I do for you, Sir?”
(Id.). The Deputy responded by asking for Plaintiffs identification. (Doc. 20-1 at
34). Instead of providing his driver’s license, Plaintiff asked, “For what reason?”
(Id.). The Deputy did not respond but instead tried to open Plaintiff's door. (Doc.
20-1 at 34-36). When his efforts to open the door failed, the deputy told Plaintiff
to get out of his car. (/d.). As Plaintiff opened the car door, he gave the Deputy
his name. (Doc. 20-1 at 36). Upon Plaintiffs exit from the car, the Deputy
handcuffed him and asked him what he was doing in the parking lot. (Doc. 20
1 at 36). Plaintiff responded, “I’m dropping my friend off at his house directly ir
front of us.” (Doc. 20-1 at 37). While still handcuffed, Plaintiff told the Deputy
that his identification card was in his jacket pocket. (Doc. 20-1 at 38). The
Deputy then searched Plaintiff and removed his cell phone, wallet, and keys anc
placed them on the roof of Plaintiffs car. (Id.). He then directed Plaintiff to stanc
behind Plaintiffs car. (/d.). Leaving Plaintiff standing, the Deputy approached
Wilson. (Doc. 20-1 at 38). Wilson asked the Deputy for permission to enter his
home to use the toilet, stating that he would come back. (Doc. 20-2 at 37). The
Deputy agreed. (Id.). When Wilson returned minutes later, he could not see
Plaintiff and assumed that he was in the Deputy’s patrol car. (Doc. 20-2 at 39).
The Deputy told Wilson that he was free to go. (Doc. 20-2 at 39).
After releasing Wilson, the Deputy returned to Plaintiff and asked him
why he was in the parking lot. (Doc. 20-1 at 40). Plaintiff repeated that he was
merely dropping Wilson off at his house. (Doc. 20-1 at 41). Approximately thirty
minutes after the Deputy first approached Plaintiff, the Deputy told him that
he was under arrest for “loitering, prowling, and resisting without violence.”
(Doc. 20-1 at 88). Early the next morning, a state judge determined that
probable cause existed to hold Plaintiff for loitering and prowling. (First
Appearance Findings and Orders, Doc. 19-4).
Plaintiff remained in the county jail for sixteen hours before Wilson paic
his bail. (Doc. 20-1 at 51, 58). The state prosecutor later dropped both charges.
(Doc. 20-1 at 80).
Il. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2023, Plaintiff filed this suit alleging three counts: (1) false
arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C
§ 1983 against the Deputy; (2) false imprisonment against the Sheriff of Citru:
County; and (8) battery against the Sheriff of Citrus County. (See Docs. 1, 11, &
12). After discovery was completed, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
(Doc. 18). Plaintiff has since settled with the Sheriff. (See Docs. 28—30 & 38)
Accordingly, Count I against the Deputy is the only count remaining fox
resolution by the Court.
Ill. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment shall be granted if the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and the moving party “is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Generally, in
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court “view[s] the facts and
? Plaintiff was charged with (1) loitering and prowling, § 856.021, Fla. Stat., and
(2) resisting officer without violence to his or her person, § 843.02, Fla. Stat. (See Doc.
19-4).
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of [the nonmoving party].” Kidd v
Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 (11th Cir. 20138).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden □□
demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact remain. Celotex Corp. v
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden “may be discharged by
‘showing —that is, pointing out to the [C]lourt—that there is an absence o:
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. When presented
with a “properly supported motion for summary judgment, [the nonmoving
party] must come forward with specific factual evidence, presenting more thar
mere allegations.” Gargiulo v. G.M. Sales, Inc., 1381 F.3d 995, 999 (11th Cir
1997). The Court’s role at the summary judgment stage is not “to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 24¢
(1986). “In essence, ... the inquiry □□□ is... whether the evidence presents a
sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.
IV. DISCUSSION
In his summary judgment motion, the Deputy relies in part on the
doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government
officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory □□
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlou
u. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). If a government official proves that they
were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority, the burden shift:
to the plaintiff to show both that (1) the official violated a constitutional righ
and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Jacob)
v. Baldwin County, 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, the parties do not appear to dispute that the Deputy was acting
within his discretionary authority for purposes of qualified immunity. (See Docs
18, 20, & 21). So, Plaintiff must show a violation of a clearly establishec
constitutional right. Plaintiff claims that the Deputy arrested him without
probable cause, in violation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth anc
Fourteenth Amendments. (See Doc. 20 at 18-19). Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176
1186 (11th Cir. 2023).
“To receive qualified immunity [in a false arrest case], an officer need not
have probable cause, but only ‘arguable’ probable cause.” Brown v. City oj
Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). “Arguable probable cause exists
where ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same
knowledge as the Defendant[] could have believed that probable cause existed
to arrest Plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F. 3d 1220,1232
(11th Cir. 2004)). To determine whether the Deputy had arguable probable
cause for the arrest, the Court must look at the totality of the circumstances.
including what the Deputy knew at the time of the arrest. Garcia, 75 F.4th a
1187-88.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Deputy had arguabl
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for loitering and prowling. The Florid:
loitering and prowling statute makes it “unlawful for any person to loiter o
prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals
under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm o
immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
§ 856.021, Fla. Stat. Here, it was late at night, (Doc. 19-1 at 6); the car had bee
idling for at least ten minutes, (Doc. 20-1 at 23); the car was parked in the
parking lot of a diner that had been closed for nine hours, (Doc. 19-1 at 6); anc
the car’s headlights illuminated the shed in front of them, (Doc. 20-1 at 27)
Because it was not obvious that the Deputy’s arrest of Plaintiff for loitering anc
prowling in these specific circumstances would violate the Fourth Amendment.
the Deputy is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs false arrest claim. See
Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1187.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Deputy Penney’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) is
GRANTED.
2. The Clerk is directed to enter a judgment providing that Plaintiff takes
nothing on his claim against Defendant Joshua Penney in this case
Thereafter, the Clerk shall close this case.
DONE and ORDERED on April 24,
——
JOHN ANTOON II
nited States District Judge
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record