Santiago v. Florida Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

HEATHER SANTIAGO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-886-MMH-MCR

OFFICER SHAWN SWAIN, et al.,

Defendant.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsider

[sic] of Order Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Sellers

(Doc. 68; Motion), filed November 20, 2023.1 Citing Rule 54(b) of the Federal

1 The Court notes that Santiago’s counsel has failed to comply with Local Rule

3.01(g), Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

(Local Rule(s)), regarding the duty to confer. In the Motion, counsel states that he “conferred

with Defendant’s counsel . . . in an unrelated email regarding [the Motion for Taxation of

Costs.]” Motion at 19. However, it appears as though counsel never conferred with defense

counsel as to this Motion. Indeed, counsel stated that he “will confer again with [defense

counsel] and get his position and amend the motion as to his position now that the motion

has been completed.” Id. This is not how Rule 3.01(g) works. Specifically, Rule 3.01(g)

requires a movant to confer “[b]efore filing a motion in a civil action[.]” Local Rule 3.01(g)(1)

(emphasis added). Although there is an exception when “the opposing party is unavailable

before the motion’s filing,” counsel does not assert that defense counsel was unavailable, nor

does he acknowledge the requirement that the movant diligently try to contact opposing

counsel “for three days” after filing the motion. Id. § 3.01(g)(3). Moreover, counsel informed

the Court that he would amend the Motion to include defense counsel’s position, but to date,

no such amendment has been filed. In fact, it does not appear as though defense counsel has

been contacted at all. See Response at 3–4 (“[Counsel] then concludes the Motion for

Reconsideration with a Certification Pursuant to Local Rule 3.01(g), representing to the

Court he would confer with Counsel for Deputy Sellers when, in fact, that never happened.”).

Counsel is advised that in the future his failure to comply with the Local Rules may result in

Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), Plaintiff Heather Santiago seeks

reconsideration of the Court’s Order (Doc. 64; Dismissal Order) granting

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Deputy Phillip Sellers. See Motion

at 1. On December 27, 2023, Deputy Sellers filed a response in opposition to

the Motion. See Defendant Deputy Phillip Sellers’ Response to Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 72; Response). Accordingly, this matter is

ripe for review.

I. Standard of Review

A motion to alter or amend a judgment may be filed pursuant to Rule

59(e).2 Rule 59(e) affords the Court discretion to reconsider an order which it

has entered. See Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000); O’Neal

v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992). “The only grounds for

granting a Rule 59 motion are newly[ ]discovered evidence or manifest errors

of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per

curiam) (quotations and citations omitted). This Court has interpreted those

sanctions. Therefore, counsel is strongly advised to familiarize himself with the Local Rules

before practicing before the Court again.

2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing of a

motion for reconsideration. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir.

1991); Controlled Semiconductor, Inc. v. Control Systemation, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-1742-Orl-

31KRS, 2008 WL 4459085, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2008). However, although Santiago moves

for reconsideration under Rule 54(b), it is widely recognized that Rule 59(e) (which governs

motions “to alter or amend a judgment”) encompasses motions for reconsideration.

Controlled Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 4459085, at *1 (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright,

Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 2810.1 (2007)). Thus,

the Court will analyze the Motion under Rule 59(e).

parameters to include “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the

availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest

injustice.” Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D.

480, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1999). For example, reconsideration may be appropriate

where “the Court has patently misunderstood a party.” O’Neill v. Home Depot

U.S.A., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 469, 483 (S.D. Fla. 2006).

The purpose of Rule 59 is not to ask the Court to reexamine an

unfavorable ruling in the absence of a manifest error of law or fact. See Jacobs

v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010). As such,

Rule 59(e) cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael

Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).

Additionally, motions to alter or amend “should not be used to raise

arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment was

issued.” O’Neal, 958 F.2d at 1047. Indeed, permitting a party to raise new

arguments on a motion for reconsideration “essentially affords a litigant ‘two

bites of the apple.’” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assocs., Inc.,

763 F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Mincey, 206 F.3d at 1137 n.69;

Mays v. U.S. Postal Service, 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[A]

motion to reconsider should not be used by the parties to set forth new

theories of law.”). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held

that the “[d]enial of a motion for reconsideration is especially sound when the

party has failed to articulate any reason for the failure to raise the issue at an

earlier stage of the litigation.” Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 243 F.3d

1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Moreover, “[w]hen evaluating a motion for reconsideration, a court should

proceed cautiously, realizing that ‘in the interests of finality and conservation

of scarce judicial resources, reconsideration of a previous order is an

extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.’” United States v. Bailey, 288

F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citation omitted).

II. Discussion

In the Motion, Santiago does not argue that reconsideration is

warranted because there has been an intervening change in the law, nor does

she argue that newly discovered evidence has become available. Instead, she

contends only that the Court committed clear error in its application of the

law, and that reconsideration of the Dismissal Order is necessary to prevent a

manifest injustice. Motion at 7. Upon review of the parties’ briefing and the

applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion is due to be denied.

First, Santiago argues that the Court “failed to consider the litany of

cases that have not” found constructive possession, and that “in counsel’s

humble opinion,” the Court “has misapprehended the law with regard to

exclusive and joint possession, as well as dominion and control.” Id. In support

of this contention, Santiago cites to numerous cases that were not previously

presented to the Court at summary judgment. Id. at 9, 12, 13. These cases do

not show that the Court misapprehended the law, but only that Santiago

disagrees with the way that the Court applied the law to the facts of her case.

As such, Santiago is foreclosed from relitigating these issues a second time

around. See Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d at 763 (Rule 59(e) cannot be used

“to relitigate old matters”).

Second, Santiago argues that in the Dismissal Order the Court

improperly assumed a fact in favor of Deputy Sellers that was contrary to the

evidence and was genuinely disputed. Motion at 15. Specifically, Santiago

contends that the alleged contraband found in her car was not “a green leafy

substance consistent with ‘synthetic marijuana,’” but was instead a “white

powder.” Id. Notably, Santiago never identified this as a disputed fact at

summary judgment. In fact, Santiago stated in her “statement of material

undisputed facts” that “Officer Goodwin [sic] then cut the objects, essentially

tampering with evidence, to determine the contents and discovered synthetic

marijuana (AKA Spice).” See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Deputy Phillip

Sellers’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3–4 (Doc. 54). Plaintiff also

identified the fact that Deputy Sellers arrested her “based on the

information . . . obtained from [Officer Godwin] regarding his discoveries” as

undisputed. Id. at 5. Santiago cannot now pivot, and claim that a dispute

exists as to whether Officer Godwin knew that the contraband was synthetic

marijuana. Indeed, if “counsel was licking at the chops for the opportunity to

cross examine [Officer] Godwin with the actual photograph of the substance[,]”

certainly counsel would have raised this issue as a disputed fact for trial.

Motion at 15. But, because counsel did not dispute that Officer Godwin knew

the substance to be synthetic marijuana, this issue cannot be raised for the

first time as a basis to reconsider the Dismissal Order. See Sanderlin, 243

F.3d at 1292 (“Denial of a motion for reconsideration is especially sound when

the party has failed to articulate any reason for the failure to raise the issue

at an earlier stage of the litigation.”).

Third, Santiago argues that the Court erred by misapplying the law

regarding the testing of marijuana. Motion at 17. Specifically, Santiago

acknowledges that natural marijuana does not need physical testing to

determine whether it is contraband because an officer can rely on their own

senses. Id. But counsel contends, for the first time in the Motion, that

synthetic marijuana does need physical testing because it cannot be readily

ascertained to be contraband. Id. In support of this contention, counsel

attaches media articles from the internet describing the differences between

natural marijuana and synthetic marijuana. Id. at 21–57. However, these

articles were never provided to the Court at summary judgment, nor was this

a legal theory that was ever advanced. See Mays, 122 F.3d at 46 (“[A] motion

to reconsider should not be used by the parties to set forth new theories of

law.”). Even if Santiago had raised this argument, “counsel acknowledges that

the case law is sparse with regard to the sufficiency of expertise needed for the

‘naked eye’ to establish that a substance is synthetic marijuana[.]” Motion at

18. Despite this, “counsel avers that where it is a manner of first impression

within this jurisdiction, then the trial court should not side with qualified

immunity, but side with that of the aggrieved Plaintiff.” Id. Counsel is

incorrect. Indeed, that is the exact opposite of how qualified immunity works.

See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (emphasis added) (“Qualified

immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established

at the time of the challenged conduct.”).

III. Conclusion

Because Santiago has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 59(e), the

Court will deny her Motion. Additionally, because Santiago has settled the

claims she brought against the remaining Defendants, the Court finds that

there is no just reason for delay in the entry of judgment as to Deputy Sellers.

As such, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in his

favor. But, the parties shall still file a proper request for dismissal, signed by

all parties, with regard to the claims Santiago has settled against Defendants

Shawn Swain and Jim Godwin.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsider [sic] of Order Granting Summary

Judgment in Favor of Defendant Sellers (Doc. 68) is DENIED.

2. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), having found no just reason for delay, the

Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT in favor of

Defendant Phillip Sellers and against Plaintiff Heather Santiago.

3. To accomplish the dismissal of Plaintiffs claims against Defendants

Swain and Godwin, the parties are again directed to file an amended

request for dismissal on or before April 1, 2024.3

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 29th day of

March, 2024.

United States District Judge

Lce32

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

’'The Court reminds the parties that the amended request for dismissal must be

signed by all parties who have appeared in this action.