The opinion
UMNIIDTEDDL ES TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORFI FCLTO CROIDURAT
TAMPA DIVISION
DEON JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-617-SDM-AEP
DEPUTY SEAN M. CARLSON, et. al.,
Defendant.
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ORDER
After suffering two allegedly wrongful arrests, Deon Johnston sues Deputy
Sean Carlson, Deputy Melanie Stickney, and Deputy Jose Maldonado and alleges
that each defendant infringed Deon’s right under the Fourth Amendment to freedom
from an unreasonable seizure. An earlier order (Doc. 28) dismisses the plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim and allows the plaintiff to amend the complaint.
The plaintiff amends (Doc. 30) the complaint, and the defendants again move (Doc.
31) to dismiss. The plaintiff responds (Doc. 40).
BACKGROUND1
Nicole Johnston, Deon’s wife, secured a domestic-violence injunction against
Deon. (Doc. 30-1) Under the injunction, Deon (1) “shall have no contact” with
1 This order presumes true, and construes favorably to Deon, the following facts, which the
complaint alleges. Because the earlier order (Doc. 28) thoroughly recites the allegations in this ac-
tion, this order includes only facts necessary to the analysis.
Nicole; (2) “shall not directly or indirectly contact [Nicole] in person by mail, e-mail,
fax, telephone, through another person, or in any other manner”; (3) “shall not con-
tact or have any third-party contact anyone connected with [Nicole’s] employment
or school to inquire about [Nicole] or to send any messages to [Nicole]”; (4) shall go
nowhere “within 500 feet of [Nicole’s] current [or future] residence”; and (5) shall go
nowhere knowingly within 100 feet of [Nicole’s] automobile.” (Doc. 30-1 at 2–3)
On December 4, 2022, Deon arrived at Harborside Christian Church and sat
near the front of the church. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 23) Nicole arrived at the church some-
time after Deon. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 27) Deon remained unaware of Nicole’s presence.
(Doc. 30 at ¶ 27) But believing that Deon’s presence at the church violated the in-
junction, Nicole notified law enforcement. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 29) Deputy Carlson re-
sponded to Nicole’s call. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 30) Upon Deputy Carlson’s arrival at the
church, Nicole furnished Deputy Carlson with a copy of the injunction. (Doc. 30 at
¶ 30) Because of his initial uncertainty after reviewing the injunction, Deputy Carl-
son conferred with Deputy Stickney, who arrived shortly after Deputy Carlson, to
determine if Deon’s presence violated the injunction. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 33) Deputy Carl-
son proceeded to arrest Deon and signed an arrest affidavit, which states that Deon
willfully violated the injunction. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 34)
On February 19, 2023, Deon again arrived at Harborside, and Nicole arrived
at Harborside after Deon. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 45) Deon remained unaware of Nicole’s
presence. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 48) But believing that Deon violated the injunction, Nicole
notified law enforcement. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 49) Deputy Jose P. Maldonado arrived at
the church and arrested Deon. (Doc. 30 ¶ 55) Deputy Maldonado signed an arrest
affidavit, which states that Deon willfully violated the injunction and that Deon
made eye contact with Nicole. (Doc. 30 at ¶ 57)
Deon sues Deputy Carlson, Deputy Stickney, and Deputy Maldonado and as-
serts that because each deputy arrested Deon without probable cause, each deputy vi-
olated Deon’s rights secured by the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved
(Doc. 14) to dismiss an earlier version of the complaint (Doc. 12). An earlier order
(Doc. 28) grants the motion because the earlier complaint constitutes a shotgun
pleading and because the earlier complaint fails to allege facts that defeat the defend-
ants’ qualified immunity. About qualified immunity, the earlier order concludes that
each deputy “had ‘arguable probable cause’ to believe that the defendant committed
a crime.” The order permits Deon to amend the complaint.
Deon amends (Doc. 30) the complaint. Each defendant moves (Doc. 31) to
dismiss the new complaint and argues that Deon fails to state a claim against any de-
fendant and, in any event, that qualified immunity protects each defendant. Deon re-
sponds (Doc. 40) and attempts to refute each of the defendants’ arguments.
ANALYSIS
Because the earlier order determines that the facts alleged in the earlier com-
plaint fail to state a claim, Deon’s latest complaint must allege new, legally signifi-
cant facts for this complaint to rectify the earlier complaint’s failures. But the
amended complaint alleges no new facts that alter the legal analysis. Thus, the earlier
order’s analysis and conclusion stand.
Quoting Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001), the earlier
order states that “[t]o defeat a deputy’s qualified immunity, Deon must allege facts
plausibly showing that the deputies lacked ‘arguable probable cause’ to arrest
[Deon].” Further, “arguable probable cause exists if ‘reasonable officers in the same
circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the [defendants] could have be-
lieved that probable cause existed to arrest.’” The earlier order notes that a reasona-
ble mistake of law insulates a deputy from liability, and the parties disagree “about
whether Deon’s presence in the church amounted to a crime authorizing his arrest.
Specifically, the parties disagree about whether Deon violated Section 741.31, Flor-
ida Statutes.”
Section 741.31, Florida Statutes establishes as a crime a person’s violating an
injunction by “[g]oing to, or being within 500 feet of . . . a specified place frequented
regularly by the petitioner,” or by “contacting . . . the petitioner directly or indi-
rectly.” After describing the circumstance that each defendant confronted, the earlier
order concludes that a reasonable officer in each of the defendants’ circumstances
could infer reasonably that Deon violated Section 741.31. For the reasons stated in
the earlier order, this order concludes the same. Also, Deputy Carlson and Deputy
Maldonado confronted Deon on separate days but under the same circumstance, and
each deputy decided to arrest Deon. Each deputy’s decision — based on the same
circumstance — to arrest Deon reinforces the objective reasonableness of Deon’s
arrest. Further, no facts in the complaint allege that Deputy Stickney participated in
Deon’s arrest.
Deon alleges (in a conclusory manner) that at the church Deon had no contact
with Nicole and that Deon notified the officers about the absence of a knowing or in-
tentional contact with Nicole. But these new allegations evidence only that Deon vi-
olated neither the injunction nor the criminal statute. As the earlier order states,
“Although prolonged debate might resolve . . . that Deon’s violation of the ‘no con-
tact’ prohibition amounted to no violation of Florida’s criminal law, the deputies[’]
mistake was at least reasonably arguable.”
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and others stated by the defendants, the defendants’ motion
to dismiss (Doc. 31) is GRANTED. The complaint (Doc. 30) is DISMISSED. The
clerk must close the case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 23, 2024.
STEVEND.MERRYDAY __
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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