United States v. Gaynor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-382-JES-KCD

GEORGE N. GAYNOR JR., in

his capacity as personal

representative of the

Estate of Lavern N. Gaynor

and trustee of the Lavern

N. Gaynor Revocable Trust,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on two Motions in Limine,

one filed by the United States of America (the Government or

Plaintiff) on January 11, 2024 (Doc. #68) and the other filed by

defendant George N. Gaynor Jr. on the same day. (Doc. #69.) Each

party also filed their respective Responses in Opposition. (Docs

##76-77.)

The only issue for the jury in this case is whether Lavern

N. Gaynor’s (Mrs. Gaynor) failure to file FBAR forms for each of

the tax years 2009, 2010, and 2011 was “willful.” Mrs. Gaynor

is deceased, so the defendant is her son, George N. Gaynor Jr.

(Gaynor or Defendant), in his representative capacity. The

motions in limine relate to the admissibility of three categories

of evidence: (1) certain financial records; (2) a biographical

“as told to” book titled Lal: A Legacy of Gracious Giving; and

(3) evidence about Gaynor’s own FBAR penalty proceedings. For the

reasons set forth below, each motion is granted in part and denied

in part.

I.

A motion in limine is a "motion, whether made before or

during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before

the evidence is actually offered." Luce v. United States, 469

U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984). These motions "are generally disfavored."

Acevedo v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1192 (S.D. Fla.

2017). "Evidence is excluded upon a motion in limine only if the

evidence is clearly inadmissible for any purpose." Id. "A motion

in limine is not the proper vehicle to resolve substantive issues,

to test issues of law, or to address or narrow the issues to be

tried." McHale v. Crown Equip. Corp., No. 8:19-CV-707-VMC-SPF,

2021 WL 4527509, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2021)(citing LSQ Funding

Grp. v. EDS Field Servs., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1337 (M.D. Fla.

2012)). "Nor may a party use a motion in limine to sterilize the

other party's presentation of the case." Harris v. Wingo, No.

2:18-CV-17-FTM-29MRM, 2021 WL 5028201, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29,

2021)(cleaned up). Additionally, as the Supreme Court has

cautioned:

The ruling is subject to change when the case unfolds,

particularly if the actual testimony differs from what

was contained in the defendant's proffer. Indeed even

if nothing unexpected happens at trial, the district

judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial

discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling.

Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42.

"A denial of a motion in limine is not a ruling which

affirmatively admits any particular evidence," Harris, 2021 WL

5028201, at *1, and does not preserve an issue for appellate

review. United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.2 (11th Cir.

2009). “The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that the

evidence is inadmissible on any relevant ground.” United States

v. Gonzalez, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010). "Unless

evidence meets this high standard, evidentiary rulings should be

deferred until trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy,

and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context." In

re Seroquel Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 606MD-1769-ORL-22DAB, 2009

WL 260989, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2009).

II.

The parties disagree over the admissibility of certain

financial records. The parties do not dispute the authenticity

of the records (Doc. #77, p. 1), or the accuracy of the

translations. (Id.) Rather, the issue is whether the records come

within the business records exception to hearsay contained in

Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 803(6), or alternatively, Rule

807’s residual hearsay exception.

“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by a declarant

while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth

of the matter asserted.” United States v. Santos, 947 F.3d 711,

723 (11th Cir. 2020)(quoting United States v. Rivera, 780 F.3d

1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015)). “Hearsay is inadmissible unless the

statement is not hearsay as provided by Rule 801(d) or falls into

one of the hearsay exceptions.” United States v. Caraballo, 595

F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010)(quoting United States v. Baker,

432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005)).

A. Business Records Exception to Hearsay

A statement that is otherwise inadmissible hearsay is

admissible if it satisfies the business record exception to the

hearsay rule. A statement is a business record if it is a record

of an event and: (1) was made at or near the time of the event

by someone with knowledge; (2) was kept in the course of a

regularly conducted business activity; (3) making the record was

a regular practice of that activity; (4) those conditions are

shown by the testimony of the custodian of the records or another

qualified witness or by a certification that complies with Rule

902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(5) the opponent does not show that the source of information or

the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of

trustworthiness. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). See Carrizosa v. Chiquita

Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022).

The “qualified witness” need not have been the one who

prepared the documents, “so long as other circumstantial evidence

and testimony suggest their trustworthiness.” Itel Cap. Corp. v.

Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 1983). A “testifying

witness does not need firsthand knowledge of the contents of the

records, of their authors, or even of their preparation. Nor

must the witness know the precise circumstances under which the

records were kept as long as enough circumstantial evidence

establish[es] the trustworthiness of the underlying documents.

Rule 803 does not demand that the one who kept the record, or

even had supervision over [its] preparation, testify.” United

States v. Ahmed, 73 F.4th 1363, 1383 (11th Cir. 2023)(citations

and internal punctuation omitted.)

As the proponent of the evidence, the Government bears the

burden of showing that the documents are authentic” and that they

meet the requirements of Rule 803(6). In re Int'l Mgmt. Assocs.,

LLC, 781 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2015). Since the parties

agree the documents are authentic, (Doc. #77, p. 1), the only

question is whether the financial records meet the requirements

of Rule 803(6). “In the end, admissibility under the business

records exception boils down to reliability, ‘and a trial judge

has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of such

evidence.’” Ahmed, 73 F.4th at 1382–83 (quoting United States

v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020)).

B. Residual Hearsay Exception

After reasonable notice, “Rule 807 allows a hearsay

statement to be admitted, even if it doesn't fall under any

exception in Rules 803 or 804, if the statement (1) ‘is supported

by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after considering the

totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence,

if any, corroborating the statement,’ and (2) ‘is more probative

on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that

the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.’” Chiquita

Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th at 1326 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

807(a)). “‘Congress intended the residual hearsay exception to

be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances,’ and

it ‘appl[ies] only when certain exceptional guarantees of

trustworthiness exist and when high degrees of probativeness and

necessity are present.’” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306,

1312 (11th Cir. 2015)(quoting United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556

F.3d 1260, 1279 (11th Cir.2009)). “[T]he burden is on the party

seeking to invoke the residual exception to clearly demonstrate

the existence of the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness.”

N.L.R.B. v. United Sanitation Serv., Div. of Sanitas Serv. Corp.,

737 F.2d 936, 941 (11th Cir. 1984)(citing United States v. Colson,

662 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1981)).

C. The Contested Financial Documents

The contested financial records can be divided into four

categories, based on how they are being certified: (1) Records

of Frey & Co. Administration AG, which are supported by a

declaration from Ernst Specht, identified as the managing

director of Frey & Co. Administration AG (Doc. #68-2); (2) Records

of Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation, which are supported

by a declaration from Sascha Zuger, identified as the country

managing director of Vistra Zurich (Doc. #68-4); (3) Records of

Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd., which are supported by a declaration

from Christoph Hiestand, identified as Group General Counsel for

Julius Baer Group Ltd. (Doc. #68-1); and (4) Records of Banque

Louis, which are unsupported by any declaration.

(1) Frey & Co. Administration AG Records

Defendant argues the Frey & Co. Administration AG records

do not meet the requirement in Rule 803(6)(d) because “the

declarant—Ernst Specht—has inserted a caveat to the declaration”

by adding the word ‘presumably’. (Doc. #77, p. 4.) The declaration

was obviously modified to insert the word ‘presumably’, as

follows:

I further declare that the documents attached are

original records or true copies of records that: were

made at or near the time of the occurrence of the

matters set forth therein, by (or from information

transmitted by) a person presumably with knowledge of

those matters . . . .

(Doc. #68-2)(emphasis added.) “The problem,” the Defendant

argues, “is that by inserti[ng] the word ‘presumably’ to qualify

his attestation, Specht states merely that he assumes the fact

is correct, rather than that he can attest to it even based upon

other than first-hand knowledge.” (Doc. #77, p. 4-5.)

Defendant cites no authority and his argument is

unpersuasive. Declarations under Rule 803(6) need not adhere to

a set language to be valid. See Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47

F.4th at 1300. The declarant here is merely stating what is often

the case: he cannot personally speak for someone else’s

knowledge. Nor does he need to. “It is not essential that the

offering witness be the recorder or even be certain of who

recorded the item. It is sufficient that the witness be able to

identify the record as authentic and specify that it was made and

preserved in the regular course of business.” United States v.

Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1327 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United

States v. Atchley, 699 F.2d 1055, 1058 (11th Cir. 1983)). Here,

the declarant does just that: “I further declare that that the

documents attached hereto . . . were kept in the course of the

regularly conducted business activity of Frey & Co.” and “were

prepared or maintained in the course of the said business activity

as a regular practice . . . .” (Doc. #68-2.) The insertion of the

word ‘presumably’ does not make the declaration or the evidence

it supports unreliable.

This portion of Defendant’s motion is denied. The Frey &

Co. Administration AG records are not inadmissible under the

business records exception.

(2) Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation Records

Defendant argues that the Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto

Foundation records do not meet the requirement in Rule 803(6)(d)

because the declarant, Sascha Zuger, “does not explain how—as an

employee of Vistra Zurich—he could be in a position to attest to

the records of Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation.” (Doc.

#77, p. 5.)

A declarant does not need to be employed by the same entity

whose business records are offered. See United States v. Flom,

558 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1977)1 (“Although the usual case

involves an employee of the preparing business laying the

necessary foundation under 803(6), the law is clear that under

circumstances which demonstrate trustworthiness it is not

necessary that the one who kept the record, or even had

supervision over [its] preparation, testify.”). But “Fed. R.

Evid. 803(6) [does] require[] the testimony [or declaration] of

1 The Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] adopted as binding precedent

all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981, as

well as all decisions issued after that date by a Unit B panel

of the former Fifth Circuit.” In re Forrest, 47 F.4th 1229, 1235

n.3 (11th Cir. 2022)(citing Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667

F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982)). Any other opinions from other

circuits are merely persuasive.

a custodian or other qualified witness who can explain the record-

keeping procedure utilized.” United States v. Garnett, 122 F.3d

1016, 1018–19 (11th Cir. 1997). Who qualifies as “[a ‘]qualified

witness’ is given a very broad interpretation. The witness need

only have enough familiarity with the record-keeping system of

the entity in question to explain how the record came into

existence.” Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 47 F.4th at 1299–300

(alterations in the original) (quoting Weinstein's Fed. Evid. §

at 803.08[8][a]). “It is not necessary for the person who actually

prepared the documents to testify so long as there is other

circumstantial evidence and testimony to suggest the

trustworthiness of the documents.” Garnett, 122 F.3d at

1019(citing Itel Capital Corp. v. Cups Coal Co., 707 F.2d 1253,

1259 (11th Cir. 1983)).

The Government does not explain the link between Vistra

Zurich and the entities whose records are being offered. Sascha

Zuger states in her declaration that “[b]y reasons of [her]

position [she is] authorized and qualified to make th[e]

declaration.” (Doc. #68-4.) But this does not say what the

position is with regard to Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto

Foundation, or who authorized her, or how she is qualified. Such

conclusory statements are not sufficient to show the

trustworthiness of the records.

This portion of Defendant’s motion is granted to the extent

that the Gery Trading Corp. and Gusto Foundation records are

inadmissible under the business records exception if this is the

foundation presented at trial.

(3) Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd Records

Defendant argues that the Bank Julius records do not meet

the requirement in Rule 803(6)(e) because the bank has previously

“admitted to falsifying records concerning foreign bank accounts

held by American taxpayers—the very kinds of records the

Government seeks to admit” here. (Doc. #77, pp. 5-6.) The

defendant points to two deferred prosecution agreements executed

by Bank Julius in 2016 and 2021 as proof. (See Docs. ##77-1,2.)

“Even if the underlying documents satisfied [all the other

803(6)] requirements, they would still be inadmissible if either

their ‘source of information’ or their ‘method or circumstances

of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.’” In re Int'l

Mgmt. Assocs., LLC, 781 F.3d at 1267 (quoting Fed. R. Evid.

803(6)(e)). For example, in Dreer, the proffered evidence itself

was not shown to be “falsified, [but] there was an extremely

strong inference arising from evidence of numerous other forged

financial documents that the proffered evidence was not genuine.”

Id., 740 F.2d at 20. That was enough for the district court to

find the proponent had not met his burden of establishing the

evidence was reliable enough to qualify under the business

records exception. Id.

Here, Defendant presents no evidence of “numerous” other

forged financial documents. In the first deferred prosecution

agreement, Bank Julius admitted to, among other things, giving

clients codenames, maintaining accounts for clients in names of

others, and not maintaining bank records in the United States,

all to help those clients evade taxes. (Doc. #77-1, pp. 27-28.)

Nowhere does Bank Julius admit to falsifying its documents. In

the second deferred prosecution agreement, Bank Julius admitted

generally to turning a blind eye to money laundering for soccer

bribes from about February 2013 to May 2015. (Doc. #77-2, p. 25-

35.) Again, nowhere does Bank Julius admit to falsifying its

documents. Additionally, the admissions relate to an unrelated

time-period and topic. This portion of Defendant’s motion is

denied. The Bank Julius records are not inadmissible under the

business records exception.

(4) Banque Louis Records

The Government argues the uncertified Banque Louis records

are admissible through Rule 807’s residual hearsay exception.

(Doc. #68, pp. 8-14.) The Defendant disagrees. (Doc. #77, pp. 7-

9.) So does the Court.

The Banque Louis records fail to satisfy the requirements

of Rule 807 for several reasons. First, they cannot be said to

possess exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness. While they

seem to bear typical bank markings, they are not accompanied by

any testimony, declaration, certification or evidence that can

attest to their truthfulness or reliability. The Government

indicates they were pulled by an unnamed “former IT technician”

(Doc. #68, p. 2), so its chain of custody is questionable at

best. The Government has “made no showing that reasonable

efforts could not have produced a witness with personal knowledge

of” the information in the proffered exhibits. United States v.

Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1001 (11th Cir. 1987). Defendant’s motion

is granted to the extent the Banque Louis records will not be

admissible if this is the only foundation presented at trial.

III.

Defendant argues Lal should be excluded because it is

impermissible hearsay, irrelevant under Rule 401, and

substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403.

(Doc. #69, p. 3.) The Government responds that “the book is not

hearsay because it is an adopted statement of a party opponent”

under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), it is not offered to prove the truth of

the matter, and it is relevant. (Doc. # 76, pp. 4-5.) The offered

passages recount Mrs. Gaynor’s great-grandmother’s “boycott of

the IRS” and how Mrs. Gaynor “inherited [her] great grandmother’s

belief . . . .” (Lal, at 19-21.) They also recount how “well over

seventy percent of [her uncle’s] money went to the government,”

(id. at 60), how she was “vocal about [her] beliefs” that “double-

tax[ation]” while living overseas was wrong, (id. at 223), “that

capital gains taxes are wrong,” (id.), and that she was “adamantly

against taxation.” (Id.)

As pertinent to this case, to be admissible as an adoptive

admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), “there must be sufficient

foundational facts from which the jury could infer that the

defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement.”

Santos, 947 F.3d at 724 (quoting United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d

1303, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1990)). The foundational facts from

which the jury could infer that Mrs. Gaynor heard, understood,

and acquiesced in the contents of the book, according to the

Government, are that she holds the book’s copyright, that she

distributed the book to her family members, and the author of the

book submitted a declaration stating that Mrs. Gaynor “reviewed

and accepted” the book “as an accurate retelling of her life

story . . . .” (Doc. #69-2, ¶¶ 6-7.) None are sufficient, either

alone or cumulatively.

A jury could not infer from Mrs. Gaynor’s copyright and her

distribution of the book that she heard, understood, and

acquiesced in the particular statements sought to be offered. The

author’s declaration is more on point, but it itself is hearsay

and thus not a “foundational fact” on which the jury could rely.

See Woodyard v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 700 F. App'x 927, 929 n.3

(11th Cir. 2017).2 Additionally, it is undisputed that the words

in the book are those of Dr. Judith Kolva, and not those of Mrs.

Gaynor. (See Doc. #69-2, ¶ 6)(Dr. Kolva’s declaration that “the

text reflects [her] reconstruction of what Mrs. Gaynor said . .

. using words and phrases [Dr. Kolva] drafted.”).3 Thus, “[t]he

[book] involves two levels of hearsay: the [book] says that [Dr.

Kolva] said (first level) that [Mrs. Gaynor] made certain

admissions (second level).” S. Stone Co. v. Singer, 665 F.2d 698,

703 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Based on this record, the book remains

inadmissible hearsay.

The Government argues that “to the extent the book contains

hearsay statements, the United States is not offering them to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, it would offer

the statement to demonstrate Mrs. Gaynor’s state of mind and

motive for keeping a secret Swiss account.” (Doc. #76, p.

9)(internal citations omitted). As an example, the Government

illustrates that it is not offering the statements “to show that

Mrs. Gaynor’s uncle’s estate did in fact pay ‘well over seventy

2 “Unpublished opinions are not controlling authority and

are persuasive only insofar as their legal analysis warrants.”

Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7

(11th Cir. 2007).

3 If the book was Mrs. Gaynor’s statements, then Rule

801(d)(2)(B) would not even be applicable. United States v.

Mentor, 570 F. App'x 894, 898 (11th Cir.

2014)(unpublished)(“[S]ince the letter was [defendant]'s own

statement, it cannot be an adoptive admission.”).

percent of the money . . . to the government.’” (Id.)(quoting Lal

at p. 60.)

But the Government’s argument only attacks the second level

of hearsay—Mrs. Gaynor’s alleged statements—while the other level

remains. See United States v. Pendas-Martinez, 845 F.2d 938, 942

(11th Cir. 1988)(explaining that under Rule 805, a statement with

multiple levels of hearsay is not admissible unless all levels

fall under Rule 801 or an exception). By necessity, the

Government is offering Dr. Kolva’s hearsay—that Mrs. Gaynor said

these statements—for their truth. Otherwise, the book would be

worthless (i.e., irrelevant)4 to the case. Defendant’s motion

is granted to the extent the book and its cited passages will not

be admissible if this is the only foundation presented at trial.

IV.

Defendant argues that reference to his own prior FBAR

proceedings should be excluded as irrelevant under Rule 401,

substantially more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403, and

privileged under Rule 408. (Doc. #69, p. 11.) The prior

proceedings, as described by the Defendant, are as follows:

In January 27, 2014, George Gaynor, Jr. was advised

that his 2010 Tax Return had been selected for audit.

4 Defendant argues that the book is “not relevant to this

case and run[s] a substantial risk of unfairly prejudicing

Defendant, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury.” (Doc.

#69, p. 9.) The Court questions the relevancy of the cited

passages, but need not resolve that issue in light of the

continuing hearsay nature of the evidence.

On May 18, 2017, the IRS assessed willful FBAR

penalties against George Gaynor, Jr., for his failure

to report a bank account in which he had a reportable

interest. The accounts at issue in George Gaynor Jr.’s

FBAR case were not the same accounts as are at issue

in this case. George Gaynor appealed this assessment

within the IRS and eventually filed suit concerning the

liability in the United States Court for Federal

Claims. The case was ultimately settled in September

2021.

(Id. at pp. 10-11.) The Government explains that some of the

facts between the cases are intertwined, as “Mrs. Gaynor managed

her Swiss Accounts through Mr. Gaynor” and “Mr. Gaynor met with

the same individual Swiss bankers and Swiss financial advisors .

. . to manage both his mother’s accounts and his own.” (Doc. #76,

p. 12.) The Government states it only intends to “use the facts

underlying those proceedings that are relevant here,” with the

“source[s]” being “admissions, testimony, and party stipulations

in Mr. Gaynor’s prior FBAR litigation in the Court of Federal

claims.” (Id. at p. 14.)

Courts in this Circuit have consistently been wary that

“raising . . . prior . . . lawsuit[s] would effectively create a

‘mini-trial’ about the merits of the previous case[s] and other

‘collateral issues’ that may not relate to the present case.”

Goussen v. Mendez Fuel Holdings LLC, No. 18-20012-CIV, 2018 WL

5831084, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018)(quoting Bui v. Minority

Mobile Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 6518804, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28,

2016); see also Gutierrez v. Galiano Enterprises of Miami, Corp.,

No. 17-24081-CIV, 2019 WL 3302325, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 23,

2019); Pineda v. Pescatlantic Grp., LLC, No. 16-25291-CIV, 2018

WL 11346674, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2018). The relevancy is

even more dubious here given that the prior case is not even Mrs.

Gaynor’s. Courts have recognized that “Plaintiff can demonstrate

Defendants' potential willfulness . . . through witness

testimonies or other evidence of Defendant[‘s] past actions and

practices without mention of previous lawsuits.” Goussen, 2018

WL 5831084, at *2 (quoting Bui, 2016 WL 6518804, at *1). While

the government may, for example, elicit testimony that “Mrs.

Gaynor managed her Swiss Accounts through Mr. Gaynor,” this would

not seem to make Gaynor’s personal FBAR experience relevant or

admissible. But, as is often the case with evidentiary issues,

the Court is not in a position prior to trial to definitively

resolve the objection. United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 336, 339

(5th Cir. 1979)(“[Q]uestions of admissibility are more easily

understood in the specific context in which they arise.”) The

motion will be granted to the extent that the government may not

elicit testimony or evidence concerning Gaynor’s own FBAR

proceedings without the prior approval of the Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

The Parties’ Motion in Limine (Doc. #68) and Motion in Limine

(Doc. #69) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth

above.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 9th day

of February, 2024.

— (2 _ i

AA) Pe,

JQGH E. STEELE

5 ISR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Counsel of Record