Jones v. Waters

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TIMOTHY E. JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-45-MMH-LLL

SHERIFF T.K. WATERS, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Timothy E. Jones, a pretrial detainee at the Duval County Jail,

initiated this action on January 12, 2024, by filing a pro se Complaint for a

Civil Case (Complaint; Doc. 1). Jones names Sheriff T.K. Waters and Waste

Management Insurance Company as the Defendants. Complaint at 2. In the

Complaint, he asserts law enforcement officers used excessive force at the time

of his arrest and while he was in custody. Id. at 4. As a result of the force, Jones

allegedly sustained injuries to his head, ankle, and foot. Id. He requests

$750,000 in damages. Id.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore have an

obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See Kirkland v.

Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation

exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d

405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated

to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be

lacking.”). “In a given case, a federal district court must have at least one of

three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a specific

statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331;

or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron

Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).

Here, Jones invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1332. See Complaint at 3. For a court to have diversity jurisdiction,

“all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d

at 412. To establish diversity over a natural person, a party must include

allegations of the person’s citizenship. Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367

(11th Cir. 1994). Whereas “[t]he federal diversity jurisdiction statute provides

that ‘a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has

been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.’”

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). In the Complaint, Jones fails to present allegations

sufficient to establish that the parties are diverse from each other. Although

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Jones alleges that he is a citizen of Florida, he provides no citizenship

information for the Defendants. See Complaint at 3–4. He thus fails to

demonstrate the existence of diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it appears

Jones intends to bring a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because his

factual allegations concern law enforcement officers’ use of force during his

arrest and custody. See Complaint at 4. Such a claim invokes the Court’s

federal question jurisdiction.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

1 Jones has neither paid the filing fee nor filed an application to proceed as a

pauper. As such, for purposes of the Court’s required screening, the Court will assume

he intends to proceed as a pauper.

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only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

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draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Jones’ pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

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drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Liberally read, Jones’ Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim

against Defendants. A plaintiff can only raise § 1983 claims against “a person

acting under the color of state law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295,

1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Jones does not allege that Waste Management

Insurance Company (WMIC) is a state actor subject to liability under § 1983,

nor does the Complaint contain factual allegations suggesting a close nexus

between WMIC and the state such that its activity may be attributable to the

state. Indeed, Jones pleads no facts connecting WMIC to the underlying use of

force. As such, the claims against WMIC are due to be dismissed.

In addition, it appears Jones sues Sheriff Waters based on his

supervisory position. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[i]t is well

established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983

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for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th

Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d

701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory conduct,

a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated in the

unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014).

Causation “may be established and supervisory

liability imposed where the supervisor’s improper

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights.” Id.[3] (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff can

also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation

of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[4] 923 F.3d at 957.

“Either way, though, to prove that a policy or its

absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must

point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior

misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation

omitted). And allegations of a single incident of

unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for

supervisory liability, even when the conduct involves

several subordinates. Id. at 957-58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022). Jones has not alleged

that Sheriff Waters was personally involved in or causally connected to the

3 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

4 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).

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alleged violations of his rights. As such, he fails to state a claim for relief

against Sheriff Waters. Therefore, this case will be dismissed without prejudice

to Jones’ right to refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual

allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief against a proper defendant if

he elects to do so. The Court has approved the use of a form for § 1988 actions,

and Jones will be provided with a copy of this form.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

3. The Clerk shall send Jones a civil rights complaint form and an

application to proceed in forma pauperis (prisoner filings) form.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 7th day of

February, 2024.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 2/7

c: Timothy E. Jones, #2023029419

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