Armstrong v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections (Duval County)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

RAYTAURUS EMON ARMSTRONG,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-294-TJC-JBT

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action

through counsel by filing a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1). Petitioner is proceeding on an Amended Petition (Doc. 3), in

which he challenges a 2014 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of

conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Petitioner is serving

an 18-year term of incarceration as a habitual felony offender (HFO).

Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 6; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 6-1 to 6-

13; Ex.). Petitioner filed a counseled Reply (Doc. 11). This case is ripe for

review.1

1 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need

for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318

II. Standard Under AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1432 (2017). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure

that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id.

(quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. See

Marshall v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The

state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s

decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is

unaccompanied by an explanation,

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th

Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s

factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the

record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,

a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that

“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. [at 102] (citing Lockyer v. Andrade,

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has

repeatedly instructed lower federal courts that an

unreasonable application of law requires more than

mere error or even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v.

Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at

75 (“The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear

error) with unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect

application of federal law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal

citations modified).

III. Analysis

Petitioner raises one ground in the Amended Petition: “The sentencing

judge violated Armstrong’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine

any fact that increased the statutory maximum in his case.” Doc. 3 at 6 (some

capitalization and emphasis omitted). Petitioner contends that the sentencing

judge designated him as an HFO pursuant to Florida Statutes § 775.084, which

requires the sentencing court to find “dangerousness as a predicate requirement

to habitualization.” Doc. 3-1 at 1. According to Petitioner, because the question

of whether an enhanced sentence was necessary for the protection of the public

was not determined by a jury, his HFO sentence violates the Sixth Amendment

as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny.

See generally Reply.

Respondents contend that the state court’s adjudication of this claim is

entitled to deference under AEDPA. See generally Response. Respondents

argue that “Florida’s HFO designation is based entirely on the existence of prior

convictions.” Id. at 12. And although the state sentencing judge made a “public

protection” finding, such finding was not required under the HFO statute and

“no impermissible judicial fact-finding took place.” Id. at 13. Respondents

explain:

Imposition of the HFO penalty under

§ 775.084(3), requires a two-part inquiry. First, the

court must determine if a defendant has the requisite

convictions to be classified an HFO, meaning if “[t]he

defendant has previously been convicted of any

combination of two or more felonies.” § 775.084(1), Fla.

Stat. (2012). If the defendant qualifies for an HFO

sentence, then the court must consider the second

inquiry, whether the court should use its discretion in

sentencing the defendant to the enhanced penalty.

§ 775.084(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). The state court can

impose a non-HFO sentence only if the court makes a

finding with written reasons that the defendant does

not pose a danger to the public.

Response at 14-15 (citations omitted).

Petitioner’s sentencing was bifurcated into two hearings in compliance

with Florida’s HFO statute. See Exs. B, C. During the first hearing, the

sentencing judge reviewed Petitioner’s prior convictions and determined that

“the state has demonstrated a predicate for habitual felony offender status”

based on Petitioner’s prior convictions. See Ex. B at 27. After hearing argument

from counsel and from Petitioner at the second hearing, the trial court classified

Petitioner as an HFO, explaining, in part, as follows:

This crime, itself, is even more scary than your

record of seven or eight prior felony convictions. You

brought it on yourself, and you represented yourself

well and your attorney has represented you well, but

that doesn’t change the fact of how serious this case is.

Therefore, at this time your having been found

guilty by the jury I will adjudicate you guilty. Now, in

my discretion I may have already decided this back

during your last hearing. But today, if I were to

reconsider I would still make the decision. I do find

you are danger to the community, and it is

necessary for the protection of the public that

you be classified as a habitual felony offender,

and I do so classify you.

Ex. C at 36-37 (emphasis added).

Petitioner, through counsel, challenged the sentencing judge’s imposition

of his HFO sentence in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.800(a). See Ex. J at 1-4. The state filed a response. See id. at 148-

52. The state court denied the claim:

In the instant Motion, Defendant asserts that he

was sentenced in error because the trial judge, and not

a jury, made the finding that the Defendant’s sentence

as a Habitual Felony Offender was necessary for the

protection of the public under § 775.084. Defendant

cites to the case of Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147 (Fla.

2008)[,] for the proposition that a jury finding was

required for Defendant’s Habitual Felony Offender

sentence to be imposed. However, this Court agrees

with the reasoning and assertion in the State’s

Response after a thorough and comprehensive legal

analysis that “[A]s the Defendant was not sentenced

above a ‘statutory maximum’ in the instant case, but

was merely found to meet the recidivist requirements

outlined by the Habitual Felony Offender statute, no

upward departure occurred and, thus, no findings by a

jury were required.”

Id. at 155.

Petitioner, through counsel, filed an appeal and an initial brief. Ex. K.

The state filed a notice that it would not file an answer brief. Ex. L. The First

District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s Rule 3.800(a) motion

and entered the following written opinion:

Appellant appeals the summary denial of his

postconviction motion brought under Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We affirm.

Armstrong was convicted of possession of a

firearm by a felon during a trial in which he stipulated

that he had a prior felony conviction. The trial court

sentenced him to eighteen years imprisonment as a

habitual felony offender. We affirmed the judgment

and sentence on direct appeal, with the mandate

issuing on August 21, 2015. Armstrong v. State, 171

So. 3d 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

In March 2019, Armstrong filed the instant

motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule

of Criminal Procedure 3.800. He argued that his

eighteen-year habitual felony sentence was illegal

because it exceeded the statutory maximum of fifteen

years for a second-degree felony. Armstrong asserted

that the trial court’s decision to “depart from the

statutory maximum” was made as the result of a

“dangerousness finding required as a condition

predicate to habitualization . . . .” Appellant cited to

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), and

Brown v. State, 260 So. 3d 147 (Fla. 2018), and

concluded that such a factual finding must be made by

a jury.

In January 2020, the lower court summarily

denied Appellant’s motion. The lower court agreed

with the State’s response that Brown was

distinguishable from the present case because Brown

concerned the application of section 775.082(10),

Florida Statutes (2015), which required a factual

finding that the defendant presented a “danger to the

public.” The present case concerned section 775.084,

Florida Statutes (2012). The lower court sentenced

Armstrong based on the recidivist requirements of the

statute which did not require a jury finding.

The trial court here was correct. The lower court

was authorized to impose the enhanced punishment of

up to thirty years imprisonment, twice the statutory

maximum, because of Armstrong’s prior felony

convictions—not because of any judicial fact-finding.

See § 775.084(1)(a), (4)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (2012).

Recidivist-sentencing enhancement based on prior

felony convictions do not require findings of fact. See

Hunter v. State, 174 So. 3d 1011, 1016-17 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2015) (holding that state was not required to

prove enhancement factors to jury prior to trial court’s

imposition of habitual violent felony offender

enhancement); see McBride v. State, 884 So. 2d 476

(Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that a jury did not need

to determine whether defendant had the requisite

predicate convictions for habitual felony sentence).

Thus, Armstrong’s sentence does not violate the Sixth

Amendment’s right to trial by jury, as the trial court

correctly ruled.

Ex. M.

The Court addresses this claim in accordance with the deferential

standard for federal court review of state court adjudications. Under Apprendi,

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a

jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.

Florida’s HFO designation is based entirely on a defendant’s prior felony

convictions. See Fla. Stat. § 775.084(1)(a). Once the court determines the

existence of a defendant’s prior qualifying convictions and finds the defendant

to be an HFO,

the court must sentence the defendant as a habitual

felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender,

subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section

unless the court finds that such sentence is not

necessary for the protection of the public. If the court

finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the

public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony

offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court

shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of

orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the

court within 7 days after the date of sentencing.

Fla. Stat. § 775.084(3)(a)(6) (2012). Thus, the sentencing court can impose an

HFO sentence if it finds that the defendant has prior qualifying felony

convictions. If the court determines it to be unnecessary for the protection of the

public to sentence the defendant as an HFO, the court must provide written

reasons explaining its decision.

Here, the sentencing judge’s finding that he was classifying Petitioner as

an HFO for the protection of the public was unnecessary and not required by

the statute. However, imposition of an HFO sentence was proper under the

statute in light of Petitioner’s prior convictions—convictions which the

sentencing judge extensively reviewed and specifically found qualified

Petitioner for an HFO sentence. See Dinkens v. State, 976 So. 2d 660, 662 (Fla.

1st DCA 2008) (“[T]he habitual felony offender statute is based solely on prior

convictions and therefore does not require a jury determination pursuant to

Apprendi.”). Apprendi does not apply to increases in a sentence due to

recidivism. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488-90 (recognizing recidivism as a

traditional basis for a sentencing court’s increase in an offender’s sentence); see

also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243-47 (1998) (holding

that a defendant’s prior conviction is merely a “sentencing factor” that does not

have to be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). And

Florida courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that an HFO sentence

must be made by a jury. See Lyons v. State, 292 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)

(citing cases). Upon thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the state

court’s adjudication of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law. Nor was the state court’s

adjudication based on an unreasonable determination of the facts given the

evidence presented in the state court proceedings. As such, Ground One is

denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Amended Petition (Doc. 3) is DENIED, and this case is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not

warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any

motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such

termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.?

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 54 day of

February, 2024.

Ww. TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

United States District Judge

JAX-3 1/31

C:

Raytaurus Emon Armstrong, #130068

Counsel of Record

2 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To

make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong,’ Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration

of the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

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