Henderson v. Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DAVORIO HENDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-890-MMH-LLL

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

and MS. BROWN,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Davorio Henderson, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDC), initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Henderson names the FDC as a Defendant in the case caption on page 1 of the

Complaint Form, but he lists only “Ms. Brown” as a Defendant in section I.B.

(“The Defendant(s)”). Complaint at 1, 2. Henderson alleges his confinement

status was upgraded to administrative confinement on May 19, 2023, which

resulted in the loss of privileges, including the right to participate in CORE

classes and work release and the ability to easily and quickly communicate

with his family using a tablet or kiosk. Id. at 13. He also says that spending

three days in a confinement cell made him attempt suicide, at which point he

was taken to Florida State Prison for apparent psychiatric intervention. Id.

Henderson explains that Defendant Brown, a classification officer,

informed him on May 24, 2023, that the change in his custody status was

attributable to a 2002 criminal charge against him as a juvenile. Id. With his

Complaint, Henderson provides copies of grievance records (Doc. 1-1), which

reflect that his custody status was automatically changed following an audit

that “revealed a juvenile arrest.”1 Doc. 1-1 at 1, 3. As relief, he seeks

compensatory damages because “now [his] wife wants a divorce and [his] kids

don’t want anything to do with [him].” Complaint at 12.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a court to dismiss a

complaint at any time if the court determines it is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B),

1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or fact.”

Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Battle v. Cent.

State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A complaint filed in forma

1 In a grievance response, prison officials advised that he lost some privileges

because he incurred disciplinary charges to which he pled guilty. See Doc. 1-1 at 1.

Liberally construing Henderson’s complaint, it does not appear he is challenging the

disciplinary charges that were brought against him.

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pauperis that fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous.2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328

(1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should only be ordered when the

legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327, or when the claims rely

on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims ‘describing fantastic or

delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district judges are all too

familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears that

a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint “fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA

mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.3 Mitchell v. Farcass,

112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249,

1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

2 Henderson requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).

3 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

In assessing the Complaint, the Court liberally construes Henderson’s

pro se allegations. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Tannenbaum v.

United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, the Court will

not “serve as de facto counsel” for Henderson or “rewrite” his Complaint.

Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014).

In the section of the Complaint Form prompting Henderson to identify

the federal constitutional or statutory rights allegedly violated, he wrote the

following: “[d]ouble [j]eopardy and [d]octoring paperwork.” Complaint at 3. He

provides no factual allegations supporting either purported claim. Regardless,

a double jeopardy claim challenging the “lawfulness of confinement . . . falls

solely within the province of habeas corpus.” Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750,

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754 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, accepting as true

that someone—Henderson does not say who—“doctor[ed] paperwork,” such

conduct is not a constitutional violation.

Moreover, to the extent Henderson seeks to proceed on a claim for

damages against the FDC, any such claim would be subject to dismissal

because state and governmental entities that are considered “arms of the state”

are not “persons” subject to monetary liability within the meaning of § 1983.

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). The FDC is an arm

of the executive branch of state government, see Fla. Stat. § 20.315, and thus

is not a person for purposes of § 1983 litigation, see Gardner v. Riska, 444 F.

App’x 353, 355 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding the plaintiff’s claim for damages

against the FDC, a state agency, was frivolous because state agencies are not

persons subject to monetary liability under § 1983).4

To the extent Henderson seeks to proceed on a due process claim against

Defendant Brown for his change in custody status, he fails to state a plausible

claim for relief. Not only does Henderson not allege Defendant Brown herself

was personally responsible for his change in custody status, see Complaint at

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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13, but even if she had been, “[inmates have] no constitutionally protected

liberty interest in being classified at a certain security level or housed in a

certain prison.” See Kramer v. Donald, 286 F. App’x 674, 676 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). Indeed, the Supreme Court

has held that the use of disciplinary confinement itself does not implicate

constitutional liberty interests, reasoning that “[d]iscipline by prison officials

in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters

of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485

(1995). Henderson asserts no facts indicating his change in custody status has

resulted in “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of . . . [his]

sentence.” See id. at 487.

Finally, to the extent Henderson suggests an officer or officers failed to

provide him help when he was experiencing a psychiatric crisis during his first

three days in an administrative confinement cell, he names no individual(s)

allegedly responsible for such conduct. See Complaint at 13.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

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2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of

January 2024.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Davorio Henderson, # W28728