The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LIQUINDELLA CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:22-cv-001885-WFJ-NHA
POLK COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER
Before the Court is Polk County School Board’s (“Defendant”) Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 39) on Liquindella Clark’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended
Complaint (Dkt. 23). Plaintiff submitted a Response in Opposition (Dkt. 45) and a
Response to Plaintiff’s Undisputed Facts (Dkt. 46). Defendant submitted a Reply
(Dkt. 49) and, at the Court’s request, a Sur Reply (Dkt. 54). Plaintiff declined the
opportunity to file her own sur reply. After careful consideration, the Court finds
that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment and denies
Defendant’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a teacher in the Polk County School
District for approximately twenty-one years. Dkt. 39-3 at 3–4. In February 2021,
Plaintiff was arrested and charged with child abuse. Dkt. 45–7 at 1. Defendant
subsequently placed her on paid administrative leave. Id. A letter delivered to
Plaintiff upon her release from jail explained that Plaintiff would be recommended
for termination, but that she could request a hearing prior to Defendant’s final action.
Id. at 1–2. Plaintiff initially requested a hearing, but she resigned in lieu of
termination before it occurred. Dkt. 46 ¶ 34.
After Plaintiff was acquitted of her criminal charge, she sought reemployment
with Defendant. Dkt. 39-3 at 14. Defendant informed Plaintiff that it has a policy of
not rehiring employees who have resigned in lieu of termination. Dkt. 46 ¶ 43.
Plaintiff was not rehired. Id.
Plaintiff was not the only Polk County School District employee who was
arrested after a physical altercation with students that year. Id. ¶ 46. Teacher Rhonda
Rice was arrested on a battery charge after allegedly biting two students in
November 2021. Id. She was suspended without pay and eventually retained her job.
Dkt. 23 ¶ 32; Dkt. 39 at 12. Plaintiff, an African American woman, asserts that she
was treated disparately from Ms. Rice, an allegedly similarly-situated Caucasian
woman. Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 33–35.
Disputed Facts
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misled her in two key ways during her
suspension. Defendant contests both.
First, Plaintiff asserts that Donald Wilson, an attorney for Defendant, told
Plaintiff’s attorney that Plaintiff was going to be terminated and “that as a result she
would with 100% certainty lose a portion of her retirement benefits, if not all her
retirement benefits, and that the only way to avoid losing her retirement benefits,
was by [Plaintiff] tendering her resignation in lieu of termination.” Dkt. 46 ¶ 35. In
contrast, Defendant states that Mr. Wilson told Plaintiff’s counsel “it was unlikely
[Plaintiff’s] retirement benefits were in danger.” Dkt. 39-1 ¶ 37.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant does not have a policy making
employees who resign in lieu of termination ineligible for reemployment, and that
no such policy was communicated to her or her counsel prior to her resignation. Dkt.
46 ¶ 36. For its part, Defendant contends that Mr. Wilson told Plaintiff’s counsel of
the policy, which does exist, prior to Plaintiff’s resignation. Dkt. 39-1 ¶¶ 36, 42.
Plaintiff filed her one-count Amended Complaint for Title VII race
discrimination, alleging that Defendant constructively discharged her and refused to
rehire her due to her race. Dkt. 23 ¶¶ 6–7. Defendant moved for Summary Judgment,
arguing that: (1) Plaintiff was not constructively discharged; (2) Plaintiff failed to
make out a prima facie case of race-based discrimination; (3) even if Plaintiff had
carried her prima facie burden, she did not rebut Defendant’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for termination. Dkt. 39 at 1.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). An issue
of fact is “genuine” only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing
law. Id.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court
must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136
(11th Cir. 2007). In addition, the Court must resolve any reasonable doubts in the
non-moving party's favor. Id. Summary judgment should only be granted “[w]here
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party[.]” Matsushita Electric Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 587 (1986).
DISCUSSION
Title VII “prohibits employers from discriminating against ‘any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’
because of that individual's race.” Davis v. Legal Servs. Ala., 19 F.4th 1261, 1265
(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). “[T]he ultimate question in a
discrimination case is whether there is enough evidence to show that the reason for
an adverse employment action was illegal discrimination.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t Juv.
Just., 88 F.4th 939, 941 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2023). In the instant case, the disputed
facts render the Court unable to answer that ultimate question. Therefore, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
If the facts are as Plaintiff alleges, she may have experienced an adverse action
that was motivated by racial animus. A reasonable person might find the risk of
losing retirement benefits worth $1.3 million to be intolerable. See Fitz v. Pugmire
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 348 F.3d 974, 977 (11th Cir. 2003) (defining constructive
discharge); Dkt. 45 at 17–18. And if Defendant cited a nonexistent policy to justify
its failure to rehire Plaintiff once she was acquitted of her criminal charges, that
ultimate employment decision would constitute an adverse action. See Van Voorhis
v. Hillsborough Cnty Bd. of Cnty Com’rs, 512 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008). If,
as Plaintiff suggests, Defendant did not similarly misinform Ms. Rice, Dkt. 45 at 13,
a rational trier of fact could find evidence of illegal discrimination.
The Court makes no findings as to the credibility of Plaintiff’s assertions. At
this stage, it is sufficient that genuine issues of material fact exist: (1) whether Mr.
Wilson told Plaintiff, via her counsel, that she would lose her retirement benefits if
terminated; (2) whether Defendant notified Plaintiff prior to her resignation that it
has a policy of not rehiring employees who resign in lieu of termination; (3) whether
such a policy does, in fact, exist; and (4) whether Defendant provided different
information to Ms. Rice. These genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary
judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 39) is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on January 10,
2024.
/s/ William F. Jung
WILLIAM F. JUNG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record