Ray v. State of Florida

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

CLIFTON MICHAEL RAY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-770-JES-NPM

STATE OF FLORIDA, CAPE

CORAL POLICE DEPARTMENT,

FORT MYERS POLICE

DEPARTMENT, and PUBLIC

DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Lee

County,

Defendants.

/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff Clifton Michael Ray, a pretrial detainee at the Lee

County Jail, initiated this action by filing a 23-page handwritten

pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint along with 30 pages

of attachments. (Doc. 1). Ray generally complains of alleged

constitutional violations that occurred during his arrest and his

pre-trial court proceedings. He also alleges unconstitutional

conditions of confinement and ineffective assistance of counsel.

Ray seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4), and his complaint

is before the Court on initial screening.

After careful consideration of the complaint and attachments,

the Court concludes that Ray has not stated a claim on which relief

may be granted. The complaint is, therefore, dismissed without

prejudice.

I. Complaint

On May 20, 2023, Ray was approached by Officer Kelvis

Rodriguez as he (Ray) sat in his legally parked car. (Doc. 1 at

5). Officer Rodriguez said that he was there because Ray had

violated an open container law. (Id. at 6). Officer Rodriguez

told Ray that his vehicle would be searched for narcotics. (Id.)

During the search, the police seized pay stubs, gift cards, tax

returns, bank and business documents, and electronics, but not

narcotics. (Id.) Ray was arrested and the vehicle impounded.

(Id.)1 Ray asserts that he did not receive a property receipt for

the vehicle or its contents. (Id. at 7). The remainder of Ray’s

complaint is directed towards his allegedly inept public

defender(s) and the lack of due process afforded to pretrial

detainees in Lee County courts. (Id. at 718). Ray also complains

about the price of commissary items at the Lee County Jail and

alleges that his mail has been tampered with. (Id. at 15). Ray

names as defendants the State of Florida, the Cape Coral Police

1 The exhibits attached to the complaint show that, when asked

for identification Ray provided Officer Rodriguez with a fake

identification card, and he was arrested for uttering a false

instrument, for providing false identification to a law

enforcement officer, and for failing to register as a sex offender.

(Doc. 1-1 at 3). See also Criminal case numbers 23-CF-015814, 23-

CF-015811 of the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit

in and for Lee County, Florida. See https://matrix.leeclerk.org

(query: Ray, Clifton).

Department, the Fort Myers Police Department, and the Lee County

Public Defender’s Office. (Id. at 3–4).

As relief, Ray asks the Court to order the State of Florida

to find him innocent of all charges and release him immediately,

to waive all fees and fines, and to return his property. (Doc. 1

at 20). He asks for a “serious investigation” into Officer

Rodriguez’s past traffic stops. (Id.) He also seeks eight

million dollars. (Id.)

II. Legal Standards

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the

section provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted;

or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against

a defendant who is immune

from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the

defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a

right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,

where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be

dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Ga. Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915

F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of

section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards

in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). That

is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual

allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts

to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations

(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as

true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on persons who, under

color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under section 1983, a

plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such

deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb

County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, where

a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on one who is not an active

participant in the alleged constitutional deprivation, that

plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional

deprivation. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th

Cir. 1982).

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, a plaintiff may set forth only related

claims in a single civil rights complaint. Here, Ray alleges

completely unrelated claims throughout his 53-pages of pleadings.

He argues that his arrest was unconstitutional, complains about

his prison conditions, describes the allegedly unconstitutional

process he has received in state court, and asserts that he has

received subpar representation from his public defenders. Under

Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff

may not join unrelated claims and various defendants unless the

claims arise “out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series

of transactions or occurrences” and if “any question of law or

fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” And “a

claim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence if there is

a logical relationship between the claims.” Constr. Aggregates,

Ltd. v. Forest Commodities Corp., 147 F. 3d 1334, 1337 n.6 (11th

Cir. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted); see also George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against

different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent

the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit

produced but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing

fees.”). Here, there is no logical relationship between Ray’s

improper arrest, due process, ineffective assistance of counsel,

mail tampering, or price gouging claims and, in fact, each of these

unrelated claims would involve a separate set of defendants. The

complaint is subject to dismissal for this reason alone.

In addition, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b)

requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered

paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of

circumstances.” Complaints that violate Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b)—

in letter or spirit—are often called “shotgun pleadings.” Weiland

v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th

Cir. 2015). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four categories

of shotgun pleadings, including complaints (such as this one) that

“assert[] multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts

or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought

against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Also frowned upon are

complaints that are “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause

of action.” Id. at 1322. Shotgun pleadings fail “to give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. (footnote

omitted). Here, Ray’s listing of unrelated claims, inclusion of

irrelevant facts and legal conclusions, and failure to separate

his claims by defendant all violate Rules 8(a)(2) and 10, rendering

it difficult or impossible for any defendant to file a cogent

response to the claims. Therefore, the complaint is subject to

dismissal as a shotgun pleading.

Nevertheless, the Court reviews Ray’s allegations as best it

is able and finds that, even if it did not violate Federal Rules

8, 10, and 20(a), his complaint would be subject to dismissal for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

A. Ray may not use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge a

pending state criminal case.

Ray challenges his state charges in Lee County Circuit Court

criminal case numbers 23CF015811 and 23CF015814, and alleges that

he is innocent. The state court docket reflects that Ray’s

criminal cases remain pending.2 Ray now asks the Court to direct

the state to find him “innocent of or drop all charges in all cases

and citations and release him immediately[.]” (Doc. 1 at 20).

Where, as here, the relief sought by a prisoner is a judicial

determination that he is entitled to release from prison, the

inmate’s federal remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus, not a

section 1983 complaint. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,

500 (1973) (holding that when a prisoner challenges the fact or

duration of his confinement, and the relief sought is release, his

sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus); Wilkinson v.

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (finding that “a prisoner in state

custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or

duration of his confinement.’ ”) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at

489). The Court will not construe Ray’s complaint as a habeas

petition. He does not style it as such, and he does not allege

that he has exhausted his habeas remedies in state court.

2 See https://matrix.leeclerk.org (query: Ray, Clifton).

Moreover, Ray may not use section 1983 to challenge an ongoing

state criminal case. Federal courts are not intended as a

“pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.” Braden v. 30th

Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973).

Further, principles of equity, comity, and federalism require the

Court to abstain from interfering in state criminal proceedings.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Ray provides no

reason for this Court to overlook the abstention principle. Nor

does he allege any facts that warrant application of any exception

3

to the Younger doctrine. Accordingly, Ray’s complaint is subject

to dismissal because he seeks relief that the Court is unable to

provide in a section 1983 action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Ray may not sue his public defender under 42

U.S.C. § 1983.

Ray names the Lee County Public Defender’s Office as a

defendant. (Doc. 1 at 4). He appears to generally allege that

no attorney appointed to represent him has given sufficient

attention to his case. Even assuming that Ray is receiving

ineffective assistance from the public defenders appointed to

represent him, he cannot sue them under section 1983. This is

3

See Hughes v. Attorney General of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263

n.6 (11th Cir. 2004)(noting that the Supreme Court in Younger set

three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: “(1) there is evidence

of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury

would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum

where the constitutional issues can be raised.”).

because section 1983 only bars civil rights abuses committed by

those acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. And “a

public defender does not act under color of state law when

performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a

defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454

U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th

Cir. 1985) (finding that the public defender “did not act under

‘color of state law’ notwithstanding his appointment as counsel by

a judicial officer”). Therefore, neither the Public Defender’s

Office nor Ray’s individual public defenders are liable under

section 1983 for any alleged civil rights violations stemming from

their representation. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

C. Ray has not stated a plausible conditions of

confinement claim.

The Court liberally construes Ray’s complaint as attempting

to raise unrelated conditions of confinement claims regarding his

treatment at the Lee County Jail. Ray alleges that “the State of

Florida illegally price gouges inmates for medical products,

postal supplies, food and other products.” (Doc. 1 at 15).

However, claims regarding prison or jail canteen prices do not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Ferguson v.

Thomas, No. 5:14-cv-02396-RDP-JHE, 2016 WL 3774126, at *11 (N.D.

Ala. Jun. 20, 2016) (“Claims concerning canteen prices do not

[state a § 1983 claim] because prisoners have no right to use of

a prison commissary.”); Munson v. Wilcher, No. CV419-058, 2019 WL

2339264, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2019) (recognizing that the

“Constitution does not guarantee fair prices at the commissary”).

Likewise, Ray’s sparse allegations regarding mail tampering—

that some of his mail has been printed on pink paper or

inexplicably opened outside his presence—are too conclusory to

state a plausible section 1983 claim. In fact, it is unclear who

Ray believes tampered with his mail. As noted, “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” and even if the Court were to conclude that

Ray’s sparse allegations stated a plausible section 1983 claim, it

is difficult to see how any defendant named in Ray’s complaint

would be liable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” (alterations and quotations

omitted)).

Although the Court must liberally construe a pro se complaint,

neither the Court nor the defendants are required to read between

the lines or comb through 53 pages of Ray’s unfiltered factual

allegations and legal conclusions to create a claim on his behalf,

which is what Ray appears to ask the Court to do here. See GJR

Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1998) (“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a

party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order

to sustain an action[.]”) (citations omitted). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s liberally-construed conditions of confinement claims

are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IV. Conclusion

Ray has filed an impermissible shotgun complaint, and it would

be impossible for any named defendant to file a responsive pleading

to the allegations raised therein. In addition, Ray’s complaint

does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted against

any named defendant. And while the Court generally allows a pro

se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a defective pleading, the

claims forming the gravamen of Ray’s complaint—challenges to his

ongoing state criminal prosecution and to the quality of his legal

representation—are not suitable to amendment. See Silberman v.

Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1133 (11th Cir. 2019)

(recognizing that no leave to amend is required when doing so would

be futile). Therefore, the dismissal is without leave to amend.

To the extent Ray believes he can state a claim against other

(unnamed) defendants related to his conditions of confinement at

the Lee County Jail, he can file a new complaint that complies

with this Order and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.?

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED :

1. Ray’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice under

Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (b) (11).

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment, deny any pending

motions aS moot, terminate any deadlines, and close this

case,

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 2nd day of

January 2024,

} A en Ae f

E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTIMP-2

Copies: Clifton Michael Ray

4 Ray will not be assessed a filing fee in this action.