Corpus v. Yen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

ANDREW CORPUS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-502-JES-NPM

LE YEN and GARDENER,

Defendants.

/

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Andrew Corpus, a civilly committed resident of the

Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), initiated this action by

filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).

Corpus generally alleges that the defendants refuse to prescribe

him appropriate pain relief for a broken thumb and for his chronic

back pain. (Id.) Corpus also seeks a preliminary injunction

requiring Dr. Le Yen to prescribe Tramadol for his back pain.

(Doc. 4). Corpus seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”)(Doc. 10), and his complaint is before the Court on initial

1

screening.

1 A prisoner who seeks to proceed IFP in this Court will have

his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the

court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of

process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). And although, as a

civilly committed resident of the FCCC, Corpus is not a “prisoner”

After careful review, the Court dismisses Corpus’s claims

against Defendant Gardener for failure to state a claim against

her and denies his motion for injunctive relief. Corpus must

complete and return service forms if he wishes to proceed against

Defendant Le Yen.

I. Pleadings

A. Complaint

Corpus generally asserts that he has not received proper pain

management for a recently broken thumb or for back pain that began

long before he became a resident at the FCCC. Corpus’s inclusion

of caselaw, legal jargon, and irrelevant commentary, along with

his non-chronological and repetitive recitation of the facts, make

it difficult to extract logical factual allegations from his 20-

page complaint. Nevertheless, the Court liberally construes the

pleading and sets forth the relevant facts and claims as best it

2

is able. For clarity, the Court separates Corpus’s allegations

under § 1915(e), district courts have the power to screen

complaints filed by all IFP litigants—prisoners and non-prisoners

alike. See Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (11th Cir.

2002) (finding “no error” in the district court's dismissal of a

civil detainee’s complaint under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

2

To the extent Corpus intended to offer facts, claims, or

theories of relief not recognized in this Order, they are dismissed

under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

GJR Invs. V. Cnty of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1998) (recognizing the leniency afforded pro se litigants but

finding that “even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency

does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a

party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

regarding his broken thumb from those related to his chronic back

issues.

1. Broken Thumb

On March 15, 2023, Corpus fell and injured his hand. (Doc.

1 at 4, ¶ 1). For two days afterwards, his hand was numb, and he

felt no pain. However, after the first two days, he felt

excruciating pain. (Id.) He visited Defendant Dr. Le Yen for

pain medication, but Dr. Le Yen refused to provide any. (Id.)

On March 20, 2023, Corpus was taken to Desoto Memorial

Hospital, where an x-ray showed that Corpus’s thumb was broken in

two places. (Id. ¶ 4). The hospital nurse gave Corpus one

Tramadol pill for the pain, which was the only pain medication

Corpus had received since the accident. (Id.)

On March 24, 2023, Corpus was taken to an orthopedic surgeon,

Dr. Connolly. (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 6). Corpus told Dr. Connolly’s

assistant about the lack of pain medication. (Id.) The assistant

said that Dr. Connolly prescribed Corpus “Norco” three times a

day, and she gave the escorting officer an envelope with

information for Dr. Le Yen. (Id.)

On April 1, 2023, Corpus met with Captain King, Dr. Le Yen,

and Defendant Nurse Gardener because he was in pain. (Doc. 1 at

7, ¶ 8). Although Dr. Le Yen was aware of the information from

sustain an action”) (overruled on other grounds by Randall v.

Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010)).

Desoto Memorial Hospital and Dr. Connolly, she still did not want

to prescribe anything except Tylenol and Ibuprofen for Corpus’s

pain. (Id.) Nurse Gardener said, “Mr. Corpus, we cannot give you

Tramadol every time that you come to medical.” (Id.)

On April 25, 2023, Corpus had a follow-up with Dr. Connolly

who told him that his broken thumb looked good. (Doc. 1 at 9, ¶

13). Dr. Connolly told Corpus that he would extend the Norco

prescription for seven days. (Id.) However, Corpus never

received it. (Id.)

2. Back Pain

Corpus was transferred to the Florida Civil Commitment Center

on December 18, 2005. (Doc. 1 at 18, ¶ 41.) He experienced

chronic and excruciating back pain every morning. (Id.) Dr.

Lamour prescribed Tylenol #3 to be taken three times per day.

(Id. ¶ 42). He also prescribed an antibiotic for an ear infection.

(Id.)

On April 8, 2009, Dr. Lamour sent Corpus to an outside doctor

who gave him a spinal injection. (Doc. 1 at 18, ¶ 43.) The

outside doctor also prescribed Tylenol #3. (Id.) Dr. Lamour

changed Corpus’s prescription to Vicodin and then Tramadol. (Id.)

Corpus asserts that Dr. Le’s and Nurse Gardener’s “refusal to

treat [his] pain rising from his serious medical need of medication

for the pain in his broken thumb and his chronic lower back pain”

was deliberately indifferent. (Doc. 1 at 12, ¶ 24.) He also

asserts that their actions “did rise to the level of gross

negligence[.]” (Id. at 15, ¶ 33). He seeks injunctive relief and

monetary damages from both defendants. (Id. at 11).

B. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

Corpus has filed an “emergency” motion for a preliminary

injunction and temporary restraining order. (Doc. 4). Corpus

seeks an order from the Court requiring Dr. Le Yen to restart his

Tramadol prescription. (Id. at 5). He asserts that Dr. Le Yen

told Corpus that she was “afraid [Corpus] was getting addicted [to

Tramadol],” but that the lack of Tramadol was causing Corpus to

“relapse into chronic suffering and pain as he was forced to live

without the necessary medications.” (Id. at 3–4). Corpus asserts

that he has difficulty with prolonged standing, walking, and

sitting due to lack of medication. (Id. at 6).

II. Discussion

Corpus asserts that the defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his pain. The Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment when they display “deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104 (1976).3 “A deliberate-indifference claim entails both an

3 Although, as a civilly committed resident of the FCCC,

Corpus’s medical claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, it

is “ ‘evaluated under the same standard [deliberate indifference]

as a prisoner’s claim of inadequate care under the Eighth

objective and a subjective component.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of

Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). “First, the

inmate must establish an objectively serious medical need . . .

that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious

4

harm.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“Second, the inmate must prove that prison officials acted

with deliberate indifference to that need by showing (1) that they

had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and (2) that

Amendment.’ ” Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting Dang ex rel. v. Sheriff, Seminole Cty. Fla., 871

F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017)); Hall v. Administrator, FCCC,

2022 WL 4100705, at *2 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding that the district

court erred by evaluating the civilly committed plaintiff’s

medical claims under a professional judgment standard instead of

a deliberate indifference standard); compare Hood v. Dep’t of

Children and Families, 700 F. App’x 988, 990 n.1 (11th Cir. 2017)

(noting that the district court erred when it applied a deliberate

indifference standard to a resident’s claim of inadequate medical

treatment because “[t]he district court should have used the

‘professional judgment’ standard from [Youngberg v. Romeo, 457

U.S. 307 (1982)] because [the plaintiff] is a civil detainee, not

a prisoner”). The professional judgment standard acknowledges

“that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a

qualified professional” and that the “decision, if made by a

professional, is presumptively valid[.]” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at

322–23. Under this standard, “liability may be imposed only when

the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure

from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the

decision on such a judgment.” Id. at 323 (footnotes omitted).

Here, the Court finds that evaluating liability under the

professional judgment standard would not result in a different

outcome. See discussion infra.

4 For the purpose of this screening order only, the Court

finds both Corpus’s broken finger and his chronic back pain to

constitute serious medical needs.

they disregarded that risk (3) by conduct that was more than mere

negligence.” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266 (brackets and quotation

omitted). To show that medical treatment, when provided, was

deliberately indifferent, the plaintiff must show that the care

was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock

the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.”

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).

A. Nurse Gardener

Corpus makes very few allegations against Defendant Nurse

Gardener in his complaint. He alleges only that she told him that

the FCCC could not give him Tramadol every time he came to medical

(Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 8) and that he tries to avoid going to the medical

department when Nurse Gardner is there because “she always start[s]

an argument with me.” (Id. 17, ¶ 38). Neither Defendant

Gardener’s statement that Corpus could not have Tramadol on demand

nor her alleged propensity to quarrel with him rises to the level

of deliberate indifference. And, while Corpus generally avers

throughout the complaint that both defendants refused to provide

him with appropriate pain medication, by Corpus’s own admission,

the decision to treat his pain with Tylenol and Ibuprofen (or not

at all) instead of prescribing Tramadol was made by Dr. Le Yen,

not Nurse Gardener. Corpus does not explain how Nurse Gardener

was to provide him the requested Tramadol (or other prescription

narcotic pain relief) without an authorized prescription from Dr.

Le Yen. Accordingly, the claims against Defendant Gardner are

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. See Bauer v. Kramer, 424 F. App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir.

2011) (holding that nurses and other such prison personnel are not

deliberately indifferent when they reasonably follow a doctor’s

orders); Smith v. R.G. Harris, D.D.S., 401 F. App’x 952 (5th Cir.

2010) (prison nurse’s failure to write prescription for pain

medication for infected teeth did not support deliberate

indifference claim where nurse was unauthorized to write

prescriptions); Holloway v. Del. Cty. Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063, 1075

(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that nurses may generally defer to

instructions given by physicians unless it is clear that doing so

will likely cause significant harm to the inmate).

B. Dr. Le Yen

In his complaint, Corpus inconsistently asserts that Dr. Le

Yen has offered either no pain relief or ineffective pain relief

for his broken finger and back pain. As a rule, “a dispute over

the adequacy of medication prescribed by a treating physician

generally does not amount to a constitutional claim.” Brennan v.

Thomas, 780 F. App’x 813, 822 (11th Cir. 2019). See also Brennan

v. Headley, 807 F. App’x 927, 935 (11th Cir. 2020) (“When a

prisoner has received medical attention, courts are reluctant to

second-guess medical judgments even if there is a dispute over the

adequacy of the treatment.”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567,

1575 (11th Cir. 1985).

Therefore, to the extent Dr. Le Yen’s decision to limit

Corpus’s pain management regimen to non-opioids was a matter of

medical judgment, Corpus has not stated a deliberate indifference

claim. See Phillips v. Robbins, 752 F. App’x 759, 764-65 (11th

Cir. 2018) (continued reevaluation of allegedly ineffective pain

medication, despite refusal to prescribe alternative medication,

“suggests disagreements in medical opinion, rather than deliberate

indifference.” (citation omitted)); Ross v. Corizon Med. Servs.,

700 F. App’x 914, 916 (11th Cir. 2017) (“The failure to administer

stronger medication [for pain] is generally a medical judgment

that is not an appropriate basis for imposing liability.”); Wright

v. Langford, 562 F. App’x 769, 779 (11th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s

“claim that he should have received some other form of pain

medication ... does not state an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim because a doctor’s choice of treatment is

generally ... a matter of medical judgment.”); Locket v. Bonson,

937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The decision to prescribe

non-narcotic pain medication was within the bounds of professional

judgment.”)

Nevertheless, Corpus also states that he received no pain

relief for his broken finger, at least during the time between the

break and his visit to Desoto Memorial Hospital, and that he

receives no, or completely ineffective, pain relief for his back.

And while Corpus admits in his motion for a temporary restraining

order that Dr. Le Yen has expressed concern that Corpus was

becoming addicted to Tramadol (and refuses to prescribe it for

that reason), when testing the sufficiency of a complaint, courts

do not consider matters outside the four corners of the pleading.

See Hayes v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 648 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th

Cir. 2016). Moreover, the Court must evaluate the facts in the

light most favorable to Corpus. Id. And the complete withholding

of pain medication, if proven, can constitute deliberate

indifference. Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543–44 (11th Cir.

1995)(“Our cases have consistently held that knowledge of the need

for medical care and an intentional refusal to provide that care

constitutes deliberate indifference.”)

Therefore, Corpus will be allowed to develop his claim against

Dr. Le Yen. That it will be difficult for Corpus to overcome the

deference courts have historically afforded matters of medical

judgment—particularly if Dr. Le Yen offers evidence that Corpus

was offered other, non-narcotic, pain relief—does not justify

dismissal at this stage of litigation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)(“And, of course, a well-pleaded

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual

proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very

remote and unlikely.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. Motion for Injunctive Relief

In a separate “Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction

and Temporary Restraining Order,” Corpus asks the Court to order

Dr. Le Yen to renew his Tramadol prescription to treat his lower

back pain. (Doc. 4). The party moving for injunctive relief must

show the following: “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the

merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the

injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant

outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the

opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be

adverse to the public interest.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson,

147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing All Care Nursing

Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537

(11th Cir. 1989)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly

establishes the burden of persuasion as to [all] four requisites.”

All Care Nursing Serv., Inc., 887 F.2d at 1537 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Corpus has not met his burden of persuasion on the

requirements for obtaining injunctive relief. First, service of

process has not been effected on Dr. Le Yen, and no discovery has

been exchanged. Therefore, the record contains only Corpus’s

unsubstantiated allegations, meaning that Corpus has only alleged—

not shown—a likelihood of success on the merits. Next, as

discussed above (and repeatedly alleged in Corpus’s complaint and

motion), the FCCC has a duty to provide adequate medical care to

its residents. Thus, an order requiring Dr. Le Yen to adequately

treat Corpus’s pain would serve little purpose, as it would amount

to nothing more than an instruction to “obey the law,” which is a

duty already in place. See Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178

F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (refusing to issue order which

would amount to broad instruction to simply “obey the law”).

Finally, a motion for a preliminary injunction is not

appropriately used as a vehicle for final relief on the merits.

Heckler v. Redbud Hosp. Dist., 473 U.S. 1308, 1314 (1985). Corpus

asserts that Dr. Le Yen is not presently providing him with

Tramadol (and has not done so for years), and he seeks an order

from the Court requiring her to do so, which is (in addition to

monetary damages) the ultimate relief sought in his complaint. In

other words, Corpus attempts to leapfrog the litigation process

and have the Court grant relief without hearing from the

opposition. The Court thus denies his motion for injunctive

relief.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant Gardener is DISMISSED from this action for

failure to state a claim against her on which relief can

be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2. Corpus’s motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 4) is

DENIED. Corpus’s motion for a ruling on his motion for

injunctive relief (Doc. 15) is DENIED as moot.

3. If Corpus wishes to continue the prosecution of this

action against Defendant Le Yen, he must complete and

electronically return the highlighted portions of the

attached return service forms within TWENTY-ONE (21)

DAYS.°I

4, If Corpus does not timely return the forms, or explain

his inability to comply, this case will be dismissed for

failure to prosecute without further notice.

5. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Corpus with the

appropriate highlighted service forms.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 15th day of

December 2023.

NON Zé AKL

JGHE E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: Andrew Corpus

Encl: Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a

Summons, Waiver of the Service of Summons, Summons in a

Civil Action

> If Plaintiff uses the United States Postal Service instead

of e-filing to return the forms, he must also return a copy of his

complaint, including all exhibits, with his service forms. If

Plaintiff uses the FCCC e-filing procedures, he does not need to

provide a service copy of his complaint.