Comley v. Lawson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

DEREK COMLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-960-JES-NPM

DEPUTY LAWSON, JUDGE

BURNS, and CHARLOTTE COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Derek Comley’s

pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. (Doc. 1). Comley,

a pretrial detainee at the Charlotte County Jail, names as

defendants Charlotte County Sheriff’s Deputy Lawson, Charlotte

County Judge Burns, and the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office.

(Id. at 3–4). Comley seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. 2), and his complaint is before the Court on initial

screening.

After careful review, the Court concludes that Comley has

filed a complaint that must be dismissed for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

I. Complaint

Comley asserts that, at some point in time, he came into

contact with Defendant Deputy Larson, who issued him a citation

for trespassing at the Charlotte County Homeless Coalition. (Doc.

1 at 5). However, Comley did not receive a physical copy of the

citation. (Id.) Moreover, Deputy Larson did not return Comley’s

identification card and other “identification property.” (Id.)

Although unclear, it appears that Comley asserts that this resulted

in him being unable to visit an elderly family member at the

Homeless Coalition without “the risk of committing a crime.” (Id.

at 6). Comley emailed the Sheriff’s Department several times to

complain of Defendant Lawson’s unprofessional conduct and to seek

return of his property, but his property was not returned. (Id.)

When Comley complained to Judge Burns on October 25, 2023

that he had not received a proper citation from Deputy Lawson, the

judge refused to throw out the charges against him or give Comley

a compassionate release bond to care for his aging grandmother.

(Doc. 1 at 6). Nor would Judge Burns allow Comley to fire his

lawyer in open court, and the judge ignored Comley’s formal request

for a writ of habeas corpus. (Id.)

Comley asserts that unnamed jail staff at the Charlotte County

Jail have refused his requests to use the law library at the jail.

(Doc. 1 at 7). He states that the grievances he writes are

returned to him marked as “not a grievance,” even after he

“reminded them on numerous occasions that the federal courts have

ruled that every jail should have a law library with tables and

chairs, adequate resources and access, etc.” (Id.) Comley’s

initial request for a “pro se pack” was denied because the jail

thought he had a public defender. (Id.)

Comley generally asserts, without explanation, that he has

been denied due process throughout his criminal proceedings.

(Doc. 1 at 5–7). As relief, Comley seeks the following:

I want this county to fix these

unconstitutional conditions, training methods

which led to these conditions, replace all

staff who have made it their modus operandi to

enforce these unconstitutional conditions,

and to rectify the situation that has resulted

in my loss of life, liberty, and property

without proper due process, and deprived me of

my ability to receive a fair and speedy jury

trial as per my constitutional rights as an

American citizen.

(Id. at 8.)

II. Screening Standard

A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the

section provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the

defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a

right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,

where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be

dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd.,

915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of

section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards

in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). That

is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual

allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts

to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations

(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as

true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the Court must construe the plaintiff’s pro se

allegations liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

III. Discussion

A. This Court will not interfere with an ongoing state

criminal prosecution.

Comley’s claims arise from his state criminal case (23-

001007MM), which is still pending trial in the County Court of the

Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County, Florida.1

Comley asks this Court “rectify the situation” that led to his

incarceration. To the extent Comley’s request for rectification

is directed towards the process he has received (or is receiving)

in his state criminal trial, the Younger abstention doctrine

prohibits federal courts from interfering (through a section 1983

complaint) with a plaintiff’s pending state criminal proceedings.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Under Younger and its progeny, federal courts must abstain

from interfering with an ongoing state criminal proceeding when

1 The Court takes notice of the online docket of Comley’s

criminal trespassing case. Search (charlotteclerk.com) (Comley,

Derek).

doing so would implicate important state interests and where (as

here) there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to

raise constitutional challenges. See Foster Children v. Bush, 329

F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Comley can raise his

constitutional claims in state court, and he provides no reason

for this Court to overlook the abstention principle. Nor does he

allege any facts that warrant application of an exception to the

Younger doctrine. See Hughes v. Attorney General of Florida, 377

F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court

in Younger set three exceptions to the abstention doctrine: “(1)

there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2)

irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate

alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be

raised”).

B. Comley has not stated a claim for denial of access

to the courts.

Comley also suggests, without elaboration that he is being

denied access to the courts because of an inadequate grievance

procedure and inadequate legal library at the Charlotte County

Jail. This “access” claim must be dismissed for two reasons.

First, to state a viable section 1983 action, the legal entity

sued must be subject to suit. Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214

(11th Cir. 1992). The capacity of a governmental corporation to

be sued in federal court is governed by the law of the state in

which the district court is located. Id. at 1214; Fed. R. Civ.

P. 17(b). Florida law does not recognize a jail facility as a

legal entity separate and apart from the Sheriff charged with its

operation and control. See generally Chapter 30, Florida Statues.

Therefore, Comley’s claims against the Charlotte County Jail are

dismissed. See Monroe v. Jail, No. 2:15-cv-729-FtM-99MRM, 2015

WL 7777521, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2015) (“The jail is not an

actionable legal entity because it does not enjoy a separate legal

existence independent of the County or the Sheriff’s Office.”

(citation omitted)); Mellen v. Florida, No. 3:13-cv-1233-J-34,

2014 WL 5093885, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 9, 2014) (recognizing that

sheriff’s offices and jail facilities are not amenable to suit

under section 1983).

Next, even if Comley had directed his claims towards specific

officers at the jail, he has not stated a section 1983 claim. To

the extent Comley bases his First Amendment access claim on the

return (or denial) of his grievances, an inmate does not have a

constitutionally protected interest in a grievance procedure.

Thomas v. Warner, 237 F. App'x 435, 437 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We agree

with other circuits that have decided that a prisoner does not

have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in an inmate

grievance procedure.”); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.

1995) (“[T]he Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance

procedures or access to any such procedure voluntarily established

by a state.”) And because Comley has no constitutional right to

a grievance procedure, it follows that he also has no

constitutional right to receive his desired response to a

grievance. Thomas, 237 F. App'x at 437. Accordingly, any claims

based solely upon jail staff’s return of, or unsatisfactory

responses to, Comley’s grievances are dismissed from this action

for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

Comley’s claim alleging constitutionally inadequate access to

the courts because of the jail’s subpar legal library is equally

unavailing. The interference with an inmate's access to the

courts is a violation of a First Amendment right actionable under

section 1983. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). However—

despite Comley’s assertion otherwise—a confined individual does

not have a freestanding right to a law library or other forms of

legal assistance. Id. at 350. Rather, to state an access-to-

the-courts claim, any alleged infringement of Comley’s right to

access the courts “must have frustrated or impeded [his] efforts

to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.” Bass v. Singletary, 143

F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). And conclusory allegations of

injury or prejudice are insufficient. “[A]n inmate cannot

establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his

prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some

theoretical sense.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Rather, “the right

is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff

cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.”

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).

Here, Comley has not alleged that he was “shut out” of court

in any manner as a result of the Charlotte County Jail’s allegedly

deficient library, and as a result, any First Amendment access

claim is premature.

C. Comley cannot sue Judge Burns for actions taken in

his judicial capacity.

Comley names Judge Burns as a defendant and complains that

the judge has refused to throw out the charges against him, has

refused a compassionate release bond, and has denied his petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1 at 6). However, “[j]udges

are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages under

section 1983 for those acts taken while they are acting in their

judicial capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” McBrearty v. Koji, 348 F. App'x 437, 439 (11th

Cir. 2009). Of note, “[a] judge does not act in the ‘clear absence

of all jurisdiction’ when he acts erroneously, maliciously, or in

excess of his authority, but instead, only when he acts without

subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted). And

“judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate

assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).

Here, Comley does not allege that Judge Burns acted outside

the scope of his judicial capacity or without jurisdiction when he

did not grant Comley’s requests to dismiss the charges against

him, order a compassionate release bond, or grant his petition for

writ of habeas corpus. As a result, Judge Burns is entitled to

judicial immunity in this action, and all claims against him must

be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

D. Comley has not stated a claim against Deputy

Lawson.

Comley’s only allegations against Deputy Lawson are that the

deputy did not provide him with a written copy of the trespassing

citation and did not return his identification papers after his

arrest. (Doc. 1 at 5–6). The adjudication of a claim asserting

that Comley was denied due process because he did not receive a

written citation would require this Court to rule upon issues

relevant to the disposition of his pending state criminal charges.

But, as explained above, see discussion supra Part III(A), federal

courts do not exist as pretrial forums to challenge a plaintiff’s

state criminal charges. To the extent Comley believes that he was

improperly charged (or denied due process) because of Deputy

Lawson’s failure to provide a written citation, his argument should

be addressed in Comley’s criminal trial and is barred under

Younger.

Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that

the deprivation of property does not violate the Due Process

Clause, so long as there exists an adequate post-deprivation

remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (“For

intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state

employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it

provides or refuses to provide a suitable post deprivation

remedy.”) If Deputy Lawson deprived Comley of property by

withholding his identification material, he has an adequate post-

deprivation remedy under state law. In Florida, Comley can sue

for the conversion of his personal property. See Case v. Eslinger,

555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Under the law of Florida,

law enforcement officers may be liable for conversion for the

seizure or retention of personal property.”) (internal citations

omitted); Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App’x 697, 698 (11th Cir. 2014)

(affirming district court’s order that dismissed state prisoner’s

destruction of property claim). Because Comley has access to an

adequate post-deprivation remedy, no due process violation has

occurred as it relates to Defendant Lawson’s alleged refusal to

return his identification property.

IV. Conclusion

Comley has not stated an actionable civil rights claim against

any named defendant, and his complaint will be dismissed for

failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Given that the claims raised by Comley are

either not cognizable in federal court or would require federal

court interference with an ongoing state criminal prosecution, the

dismissal is without leave to amend because doing so would be

futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (providing

that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be futile).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED :

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915 (e) (2) (B) (11).

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment, deny any pending

motions as moot, terminate any deadlines, and close this

case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 8th day

of December 2023.

ox EL

aff le hy ) Z. A Kook

J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies: Derek Comley