Mazak v. William

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

STEVE HENRY MAZAK,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:22-cv-00219-WFJ-PRL

DANIEL DAVID ELIAS,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Daniel Elias’s (“Defendant”) Motion

for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 57). Although the Court granted him an extension of

time, Steve Mazak (“Plaintiff”) did not file a Response. After careful consideration,

the Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

While incarcerated in the Sumter County Detention Center, Plaintiff filed the

instant § 1983 Complaint for “malicious and false arrest.” Dkt. 1 at 7. The Court will

construe the Complaint as alleging malicious prosecution.1

1 See Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1995) (explaining that courts should construe

pro se complaints liberally). Defendant interpreted the Complaint as containing two claims:

malicious prosecution and false arrest. Dkt. 57 at 1. However, Plaintiff’s ultimate arrest was based

on a warrant. Dkt. 57 at 4. Therefore, his only viable claim is for malicious prosecution. Carter v.

Gore, 557 F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014) (“where an individual has been arrested pursuant to

a warrant, his claim is for malicious prosecution rather than false arrest”).

The events forming the basis of Plaintiff’s grievance occurred on August 9,

2018. Dkt. 57 at 2. Just after midnight, Defendant, then a Sumter County Sheriff’s

Office Deputy, was on duty when he observed a White Ford F-150 driving in

Webster, Florida. Id. The lights of Defendant’s patrol car illuminated the interior of

the vehicle, and Defendant identified the driver as Plaintiff. Id. at 3. Defendant was

familiar with Plaintiff’s physical appearance, knew that he drove a white F-150, and

believed him to have a suspended driver’s license and multiple active warrants. Id.

at 2–3, 11–12.

Defendant turned on his patrol car’s lights and sirens and began following the

F-150, which sped up and executed a U-turn. Id. at 3. Eventually, the F-150 turned

into a wooded area, at which point Defendant terminated the chase. Id. Defendant

wrote a report and issued citations for eluding / fleeing and driving with license

suspended. Id. These filings were used to obtain a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. Id.

at 3–4. Plaintiff was arrested several weeks later on other charges, at which time the

warrant based on Defendant’s filings was served as well. Id. at 4.

Plaintiff argues that he could not have been the driver of the white F-150 in

question. Id. at 6. He gives multiple reasons for this, including that he was in bed

asleep on the night in question, that his white F-150 was in the shop at the time, and

that his license plate was seized by the Venice Police Department one month prior.2

Id. at 6, 14.

Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on July 5, 2023. Dkt. 57.

On August 28, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file a Response

(Dkt. 60). The Court granted an extension until September 26, 2023, Dkt. 61, but

Plaintiff never filed a Response.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see

also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). An issue

of fact is “genuine” only if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing

law. Id.

In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court

must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom in a light most

favorable to the non-moving party. Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136

2 The Court agrees with Defendant that it is immaterial whether Plaintiff was actually the driver of

the white F-150 in question. See id. at 10. The undisputed facts recounted in the above paragraphs

are sufficient to resolve this matter on summary judgment.

(11th Cir. 2007). In addition, the Court must resolve any reasonable doubts in the

non-moving party's favor. Id. Summary judgment should only be granted “[w]here

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-

moving party[.]” Matsushita Electric Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the

record demonstrating the lack of a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If met, the burden shifts to the non-

moving party to “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted).

If the nonmoving party fails to respond entirely, the district court may not

grant summary judgment by default. U.S. v. One Piece of Real Prop., 363 F.3d 1099,

1101 (11th Cir. 2004). Instead, it must address the merits of the motion after a review

of the cited evidentiary materials. Id. at 1101-02. After this review, a court may grant

summary judgment if it determines that the moving party has established a right to

relief as a matter of law and that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks summary judgment on his affirmative defense of qualified

immunity. Dkt. 57 at 18–23. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects agents of

the government “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Defendant must first establish that he

was acting under discretionary authority—that the actions he undertook were of the

type that fell within his job responsibilities. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland,

370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). Upon this showing, the burden shifts to

Plaintiff to show that: (1) Defendant violated his constitutional rights; and (2) the

rights violated were clearly established at the time of Defendant’s alleged

misconduct. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014). Plaintiff must satisfy

both requirements. Id.

Here, the undisputed facts show that Defendant has met his burden. When he

pursued the white F-150 and wrote his subsequent report and citations, Defendant

was clearly acting within his discretionary authority as an on-duty sheriff’s deputy.

See Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 2003) (state trooper acted within

his discretionary authority when conducting a traffic stop and issuing a citation).

Thus, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that Defendant violated a clearly

established constitutional right. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff cannot meet

this burden.

The Supreme Court has recognized § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims based

on malicious prosecution. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022). These claims

require that the criminal prosecution: (1) be “instituted without any probable cause”;

(2) be “for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice”; and (3) terminate

favorably. Id. at 44. Here, Plaintiff fails to establish the first two elements.

To be protected by qualified immunity, an officer need not have actual

probable cause; “arguable” probable cause is sufficient. Grider v. City of Auburn,

Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). “Arguable probable cause exists where

reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge

as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed[.]” Id. (quotation

omitted). In the instant case, the inquiry is whether Defendant’s identification of the

driver as Plaintiff was reasonable, even if mistaken. Rushing v. Parker, 599 F.3d

1263, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010). This issue “must be viewed in light of the totality of

the circumstances.” Id.

Given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Defendant to

identify the white F-150 driver as Plaintiff. Defendant was familiar with Plaintiff’s

appearance, knew he drove a white F-150, was aware of Plaintiff’s habit of driving

on a suspended license, and knew Plaintiff had an outstanding warrant. Dkt. 57 at

22. A reasonable officer in the same circumstances, possessing the same knowledge,

could have identified the driver as Plaintiff, pursued him, and cited him. Thus, the

first element of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim—“instituted without any

probable cause”—fails. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 42.

Even if the Court were to find that Defendant lacked arguable probable cause

(which he did not), it would still hold the malicious prosecution claim deficient

because there is absolutely no evidence that Defendant pursued Plaintiff and cited

him for “a purpose other than bringing [Plaintiff] to justice.” Id. Plaintiff alleges in

deposition testimony that Defendant acted with malice because Defendant allegedly

lied in a deposition for a separate case. Dkt. 59-6 at 88–91. To support this allegation,

Plaintiff states that Defendant was stuck in a ditch on August 9 and that the Sumter

County Sheriff’s Office habitually lies to obtain arrest warrants against him. Id. at

90.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must rely on more than

conclusory allegations, denials, or statements unsupported by facts. Gonzalez v. Lee

Cnty., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is mandated

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party bears the burden of

proof. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Plaintiff cannot rely on the conclusory

allegations in his deposition. Plaintiff has the burden of proof on his malicious

prosecution claim, and he fails to make a factually-supported showing that the

second element of that cause of action is met.

Because Plaintiff fails to make an adequate showing that his constitutional

rights were violated, the Court need not determine whether the rights in question

were clearly established. Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. 57) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendant and against Plaintiff, terminate all pending deadlines, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on November 6, 2023.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Pro Se Party

Counsel of Record