Longino v. Masters

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

SAMUEL LONGINO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:23-cv-164-JES-KCD

MELINDA MASTERS, Facility

Administrator, JON P.

CARNER, Assistant Facility

Administrator, COURTNEY

JONES, Clinical Director,

and KERI FITZPATRICK,

Recreation Therapist,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Samuel Longino, a civilly-committed resident of the Florida

Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”), commenced this action by filing

a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1).

Longino alleges that the FCCC does not have a constitutionally

adequate law library, does not employ legally-trained computer

technicians, and does not allow other residents to assist him with

his legal work. The complaint is now before the Court for initial

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After careful review,

the Court dismisses Longino’s complaint for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

I. Complaint

In his complaint, Longino generally contends that he does not

have adequate access to a law library or legal assistance at the

FCCC. (Doc. 1). He asserts that the FCCC’s computer lab, which

functions as the only legal library, has only twenty computer

workplaces to accommodate approximately 569 residents. (Id. at

9, ¶¶ 39, 41). Only ten of the computers are designated as legal

computers, with five designated for research and the other five

for writing. (Id. ¶ 42). Defendant Fitzpatrick, who is not

trained in the law, runs the computer lab. (Id. ¶ 45). Longino

is allowed, on average, four and a half hours per week in the

computer lab to conduct legal research and draft legal documents.

(Id. ¶ 44). He cannot mix and match legal research and writing

time. Rather, if he completes his legal research within his

designated time period, he must wait until his next lab session to

do his legal writing. (Id. at 10, ¶ 47). Residents who work in

the computer lab are untrained in the law and forbidden from

helping other residents. (Id. ¶ 49). Moreover, the defendants

have a policy prohibiting residents from providing fellow

residents with legal assistance of any kind. (Id. ¶¶ 48, 56).

Longino asserts that on two separate occasions, his pleadings

were dismissed “because they were deemed to be legally insufficient

for lack of enough time to conduct adequate, effective, and

meaningful legal research.” (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 11). In the first

instance, the state court denied Longino’s petition for a belated

appeal and/or writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 4, ¶ 14). Next, he

argues that he is unsure how to exhaust his administrative remedies

and is, therefore, unable to file a habeas corpus petition under

Florida Statute § 394.9214 of the Jimmy Ryce Act. (Id. at 7, ¶

1

29). He does not identify any state habeas petition that was

actually dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

In addition to the claims alleging a First Amendment denial

of access to the courts, Longino brings claims under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments and state-law negligence claims. (Doc.

1 at 10–13). Longino seeks both damages and injunctive relief.

(Id. at 14–17).

II. Legal Standards

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)2

Longino was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Doc. 12). A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

1

The Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually

Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care Act, Fla. Stat. 394.910–

394.932, provides for the confinement of certain sexual offenders

who are found likely to engage in future acts of sexual violence

if they are not held in a secure facility for long-term control,

care, and treatment. Under Florida Statute § 394.9215(1)(a), a

civilly committed person may file a petition for habeas corpus in

state court alleging that his conditions of confinement violate a

statutory or constitutional right.

2 Despite Longino’s non-prisoner status, this complaint is

subject to initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See

Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (recognizing

that the district court did not err when it dismissed a complaint

filed by a civil detainee for failure to state a claim under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the

section provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the

defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a

right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,

where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be

dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd.,

915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of

section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards

in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”). That

is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual

allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts

to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations

(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as

true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the Court must construe the plaintiff’s pro se

allegations liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on persons who, under

color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under section 1983, a

plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such

deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb

County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, where

a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on one who is not an active

participant in the alleged constitutional deprivation, that

plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional

deprivation. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th

Cir. 1982)

III. Discussion

A. Longino has not stated a First Amendment claim.3

Longino generally alleges that his right to access the courts

has been impeded by the defendants’ restrictions on the amount of

3

This section addresses Longino’s First and Eighth Amendment

claims. Longino asserts that the defendants have subjected him to

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment because

they do not allow him sufficient time in the computer lab to

conduct research and draft legal documents. (Doc. 1 at 11–13, ¶¶

54–63). He also asserts that Defendants Masters, Carner, Jones,

and Fitzpatrick subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment by

putting a rule in place forbidding him to seek legal assistance

from fellow residents. (Id. at 12, ¶ 57). He asserts that

Defendant Fitzpatrick subjected him to cruel and unusual

punishment by refusing to hire computer lab workers who are trained

in the law to assist him with his legal work. (Id. at 11, ¶ 56).

The Eighth Amendment applies to prisoners, not civilly committed

residents. But Longino may raise “cruel and unusual punishment”

claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants him rights

that are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections

available to a convicted prisoner.” City of Revere v.

Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Even so,

“only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (internal quotations

omitted). The types of claims raised here do not involve the

infliction of pain or denial of medical care generally associated

with Eighth Amendment violations. Rather, these claims focus on

Plaintiff’s alleged inability to effectively litigate his cases,

and they arise under the First Amendment. Therefore, the Court

addresses them as First Amendment claims, as made applicable to

the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

time the residents may spend in the legal library at the FCCC. He

also alleges that the FCCC does not hire legal assistants who are

trained in the law or allow other FCCC residents to provide him

with legal assistance.

The interference with an inmate's access to the courts is a

violation of a First Amendment right actionable under section 1983.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). However, a confined

individual does not have a freestanding right to a law library or

other forms of legal assistance. Id. at 350. Rather, to state

an access-to-the-courts claim (“access claim”), any alleged

infringement of Longino’s right to access the courts “must have

frustrated or impeded [his] efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal

claim.” Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998).

However, conclusory allegations of injury or prejudice are

insufficient. “[A]n inmate cannot establish relevant actual

injury simply by establishing that his prison’s law library or

legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.”

Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Rather, “the right is ancillary to the

underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered

injury by being shut out of court.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Neither of Longino’s allegations of injury

provide standing for his First Amendment claims.

Longino first asserts that he was denied a bench trial at a

January 27, 2017 probable cause hearing. (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 4).

Longino’s court-appointed attorney “declared in open court” that

she planned to appeal the denial. (Id. ¶ 16). She wrote Longino

a letter assuring that she would submit his case for appeal. (Id.

¶ 17). After more than four years passed, Longino wrote a letter

to the Clerk of Court for the Third District Court of Appeal and

was told that no appeal had been filed. (Id. at 5, ¶¶ 20–21).

Thereafter, Longino’s petition for a belated appeal was denied.

(Id. at 4, ¶ 14). Longino asserts that “had Defendants made legal

assistance available to Plaintiff by persons trained in the law to

adequately, effectively, and meaningfully assist him in the

preparation of drafting his petition for a belated appeal and/or

writ of habeas corpus, it would not have been dismissed.” (Id. ¶

22).

Longino’s conclusory assertion of injury from the denial of

his request for a belated appeal is insufficient to establish

standing for a First Amendment claim. Longino does not assert

that he was prevented from filing a petition for a belated appeal

in state court or that the denial of the petition was “for failure

to satisfy some technical requirement which, because of

deficiencies in the [FCCC’s] legal assistance facilities, he could

not have known.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Nor does he advise this

Court of the specific issue he wished to research or raise in his

petition for belated appeal but was prevented from doing so by his

limited access to the FCCC legal library. Instead, he argues that

he did not file a very good petition for belated appeal and that—

if provided access to more legal assistance—he might have been

able to draft a better one. But there is no constitutional mandate

suggesting “that the State must enable the prisoner . . . to

litigate effectively once in court.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354

(emphasis supplied); see also id. at 360 (“[T]he Constitution does

not require that prisoners . . . be able to conduct generalized

research, but only that they be able to present their grievances

to the courts—a more limited capability that can be produced by a

much more limited degree of legal assistance.”) Simply put,

Longino offers nothing, beyond speculation and hope, suggesting

that the Third DCA would have reached a different decision on his

petition for a belated appeal had he been provided more time in

4

the FCCC legal library or access to a legal assistant.

Likewise, Petitioner now argues that he would like to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, challenging the

4

A review of the state court website does not support a

conclusion that Plaintiff has been “shut out” of state court in

any manner by the lack of an adequate legal library at the FCCC.

See https://www2.miamidadeclerk.gov/cjis/CaseSearch.aspx (search:

Longino, Samuel). Even after the January 17, 2017 probable cause

hearing, the state court found that Plaintiff continued to satisfy

the criteria for a sexually violent predator at least twelve more

times, the latest as recently as September 13, 2023. (See State

Case No. 13-2005-CF-031485-001 at docket entries 277, 287, 283,

299, 300, 301, 307, 313, 318, 333, 339, 341, 345). And in the

hearings preceding those findings, Petitioner was represented by

counsel. (See id at docket entries 299, 300, 301, 319, 324, 325,

326, 334, 335, 336).

conditions of his confinement, but he cannot do so because he is

not sure what “exhaustion of administrative remedies” means under

Florida Statute § 394.9215 and he is not “sure what exactly it is

he is supposed to do before filing his habeas corpus petition.”

5

(Doc. 1 at 7, ¶ 28). He asserts that, had he been able to file a

habeas corpus petition under section 394.9215 of the Jimmy Ryce

Act, he “would have been . . . released from the custody of the

Department of Children and Family Services.” (Id. ¶ 30).

Petitioner does not identify any unconstitutional or illegal

condition of confinement he would challenge in a petition for writ

of habeas corpus if he knew how to exhaust his administrative

5

Section 394.9215, titled “Right to habeas corpus,” provides

in subsection (1)(a):

At any time after exhausting all

administrative remedies, a person held in a

secure facility under this part may file a

petition for habeas corpus in the circuit

court for the county in which the facility is

located alleging that:

1. The person’s conditions of confinement

violate a statutory right under state law or

a constitutional right under the State

Constitution or the United States

Constitution; or

2. The facility in which the person is

confined is not an appropriate secure

facility, as that term is used in s. 394.915.

Plaintiff does not indicate under which provision he wishes to

file or explain how he cannot research this statute during the

four and a half hours per week he is allowed access to legal

research.

remedies, nor does he assert that the FCCC “is not an appropriate

secure facility” such that a state habeas petition is appropriate.

Therefore, he merely speculates that if he knew how to exhaust his

administrative remedies, he could file a successful habeas

petition. But this conclusory statement, without a description

of an actual unconstitutional condition, is insufficient to state

a First Amendment access claim. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415

(“[T]he underlying cause of action [undergirding an access claim],

whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described

in the complaint[.]”).

Both Longino’s unsuccessful request for a belated appeal and

his unsupported claim that he would like to file a state habeas

petition are insufficient to support a finding that he has standing

to bring any First Amendment access claim, and those claims are

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Longino has not stated an Equal Protection claim.

Longino alleges that the defendants “denied Plaintiff equal

protection of the law by allotting him less time in the computer

lab to do legal work, and allotting Level 5 residents more time in

the computer lab to do legal work.” (Doc. 1 at 13, ¶ 64). In

other words, it appears that FCCC residents who complete a higher

level of psychiatric care are allowed more time in the computer

lab.

To plead an equal-protection claim, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) that he has been treated differently than “similarly situated”

individuals; and (2) that the discrimination is based upon a

constitutionally impermissible basis, such as race, religion,

national origin, or some other protected right. Sweet v. Sec’y

Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006). The equal

protection clause prohibits only intentional discrimination. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

Here, Longino alleges that he is treated differently than

other FCCC residents because he is allowed fewer hours to access

the computer lab. However, the difference in treatment is based

upon the residents’ treatment levels, which is not a

constitutionally impermissible basis for discrimination. Thus,

Longino has not stated an equal protection claim, and it is

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

C. The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over Longino’s negligence claims.

Finally, Longino asserts that Defendants Masters, Carner, and

Jones failed to supervise Defendant Fitzpatrick to ensure that she

did not frustrate or impede his access to the courts. (Doc. 1 at

10–11, ¶ 52). He asserts that Defendants Masters, Carner, and

Jones “neglected to rectify the deficiencies that exist in the

computer lab when they were apprised of them (the deficiencies) by

the Plaintiff in his cover letter accompanying his proposal for a

facility law library.” (Id. ¶ 53). These claims sound in

negligence, which is a state-law action.

Because all of Longino’s federal claims are dismissed, the

Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over his state-law

negligence claims and dismisses them without prejudice to Longino

raising them in state court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohil,

484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (recognizing that “when the federal-law

claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and

only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the

exercise of jurisdiction”).

IV. Conclusion

Generally, the Court grants a pro se plaintiff an opportunity

to amend before dismissing a case if it appears that a more

carefully drafted complaint might state a claim. Silberman v.

Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019). However,

leave to amend is unnecessary when further amendment would be

futile. Id. at 1133. Even with amendment, Longino’s access

claims would fail because he has not identified an underlying claim

that was frustrated by the defendants’ restrictions, and “[t]he

mere inability of a prisoner to access the law library is not, in

itself, an unconstitutional impediment.” Akins v. United States,

204 F.3d 1086, 1090 (11th Cir. 2000). Further, Longino has not

shown that the FCCC’s rule basing the residents’ time in the

computer lab on their care level implicates the Equal Protection

Clause. Longino cannot cure these deficiencies by amendment, and

the complaint is therefore dismissed without prejudice.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. The constitutional claims raised in Longino’s 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint are DISMISSED for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

2. The Court declines to exercise Jurisdiction over

Longino’s state-law negligence claims, and they are

DISMISSED without prejudice to Longino raising them in

state court.

3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to deny any pending motions as

moot, close this case, and enter judgment accordingly.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on November Ist, 2023.

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ade E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies to: Samuel Longino