Ratcliff v. Edge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

DAVID MARC RATCLIFF,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:22-cv-2782-TPB-CPT

ALEXANDER EDGE, et al.,

Defendants.

a

ORDER

This action is based on both the alleged use of excessive force, including

blows to Ratcliffs head and bites from “K-9 Yoda,” and the alleged failure to

intervene to stop the use of excessive force. Ratcliff sues two groups of

defendants: deputies of the Pinellas County Sheriffs Office (““PCSO

Defendants”) and officers of the Clearwater Police Department (“CPD

Defendants”). The defendants removed the action from state court.

I. BACKGROUND

Both groups of defendants move (Docs. 7 and 17) to dismiss the complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The PCSO Defendants

seek dismissal because (1) Ratcliff failed to timely effect service of process,

(2) no PCSO Defendant committed a constitutional violation, and (3) each PSCO

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The CPD Defendants seek

dismissal because (1) Ratcliff failed to timely effect service of process, (2) the

complaint is a prohibited “shotgun pleading,” and (3) both no CPD Defendant

committed a constitutional violation and each is entitled to qualified immunity.

An earlier order (Doc. 31) dismisses Defendant Extine because she was never

served but otherwise rejects dismissing the action based on untimely service.

Also, the earlier order (Doc. 31) notes (1) that, in the complaint, Ratcliff

refers to the existence of “video footage” taken by a bystander, by a police

helicopter, and by officers’ body cameras — evidence Ratcliff asserts will

support his claims; (2) that both groups of defendants move to dismiss (Docs. 7

and 17) and support their motions with the video footage referenced in the

complaint; (3) that the defendants request the court take judicial notice of the

state court records showing Ratcliff’s pending criminal charges that both

preceded his arrest and resulted from his arrest: (4) that Ratcliff does not object

to the defendants exhibits and, moreover, he attaches additional exhibits to his

opposition (Doc. 25) to the motions to dismiss; and (5) that, as a consequence,

under Rule 12(d) the motions to dismiss must proceed as motions for summary

judgment: “Tf, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be

treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”

Lastly, the earlier order (Doc. 31) (1) explains that this action will proceed

under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment;

(2) explains how a summary judgment under Rule 56 differs from a motion to

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dismiss under Rule 12; (3) cautions Ratcliff about the finality of summary

judgment; and (4) affords the parties an opportunity to supplement their

arguments. In accord with that order, Ratcliff and the two groups of defendants

filed their supplements. (Docs. 35-38, respectively) Consequently, this action is

ripe for decision on both of the converted motions for summary judgment.

(Docs. 7 and 17, respectively)

Hi, MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Entitlement to summary judgment depends on the undisputed facts.

Under Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Johns v. Jarrard, 927 F.2d 551, 555

(11th Cir. 1991). Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

the documents must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See generally,

Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642 (11th Cir. 1997); Jeffery v. Sarasota

White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995). Even though allegations in a pro

se complaint are held to a less stringent standard than a formal pleading

drafted by a lawyer (Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam);

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998)), the plaintiffs

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allegation must have factual support. “The mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”. Burger King

Corp, v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 13821 (11th Cir.) reh’g and suggestion for reh’g

en bane denied, 182 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 1999).

Once the movant presents evidence that, if not controverted, would entitle

the movant to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-moving

party to assert specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.

Anderson. v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Pennington v. City of

Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). If one party’s claim is implausible,

that party must present more persuasive facts than necessary to show that a

genuine factual issue exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24

(1986). See also Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 285 F.8d 962, 970

(11th Cir. 2002) (‘A court need not permit a case to go to a jury, however, when

the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon which the non-

movant relies, are ‘implausible.”). A material issue of fact is one that affects

the outcome of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the differing

versions of the truth. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Ratcliff and the defendants disagree on the amount of and the necessity

for the use of force. The defendants’ “... version of events (unsurprisingly)

differs substantially from [the plaintiff’s] version. When things are in such a

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posture, courts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion.”

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, “[w]hen opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so

that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of

the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550

U.S. at 380. See also Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253

(11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that for evidence to be discounted at summary

judgment, it must be more than simply self-serving or unsubstantiated; the

evidence must be “blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent,

or incredible as a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that could not

have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature’);

Both Ratcliff and all the defendants rely upon videos taken by a

bystander, by a police helicopter, and by officers’ body cameras. Under this

circumstance, the uncontested video footage of the incident controls, as Shaw v.

City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018), explains:

When considering the record on summary judgment “the evidence of the

nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in his favor.” Tolan [{v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 651 (2014)] (quotation marks

and alterations omitted). But in cases where a video in evidence

“obviously contradicts [the nonmovant’s] version of the facts, we accept

the video’s depiction instead of [the nonmovant’s] account,” Pourmoghani-

Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 13815 (11th Cir. 2010), and “view[ ] the

facts in the light depicted by the videotape,” Scott /v. Harris], 550 U.S. at

380-81, 127 S. Ct. at 1776 [(2007)].

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Accord Marantes v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 776 F. App’x 654, 665 (11th Cir. 2019)!

(“The video clearly contradicts Marantes’s claim that he was restrained and

subdued at the time. Accordingly, we are obligated to “view[ ] the facts in the

light depicted by the videotape.”) (quoting Scott) (brackets original); Butler v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-11097, 2021 WL 4279555, at *8 (11th Cir. Sept.

21, 2021) (holding that, based on the video of the cell extraction, “there is no

genuine dispute of fact concerning whether the officers were justified in using

force or whether they used only the amount of force necessary to handcuff

Butler”), cert. dented sub nom. Butler v. Dixon, 142 8. Ct. 1213 (2022).

Il. FACTS

Based on his alleged bank robbery spree in November, 2021, Ratcliff is

detained pending charges (1) in Hillsborough County for a November 18th bank

robbery while wearing a mask (Exhibit A, Doc. 7); (2) in Pinellas County for a

November 22nd bank robbery while wearing a mask during which he grabbed

$15,000 (Exhibit E—F, Doc. 7); and (8) in Pinellas County for a November 30th

bank robbery during which he took $3225 from the teller and during which he

implied that he had a gun (Exhibit B—C).2 The video from the police helicopter

1 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as

persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.

2 Based on the events immediately after the November 30th bank robbery, Ratcliff is

also charged with attempted carjacking, intentionally causing harm to a police dog, and

fleeing or eluding a law enforcement officer. (Exhibits B and D, Doc. 7) Also, the police report

for the November 22 bank robbery notes under “Aggravating/Mitigating Factors: just did 25

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tracks Ratcliff's vehicle from shortly after the last bank robbery and the pursuit

that involved both deputies from the Pinellas County Sheriffs Office and

officers from the Clearwater Police Department. The helicopter video shows

Ratcliff turning onto a residential street, park in a driveway (time: 11:08:06),

exit and run across the street, and attempt to carjack a truck but was thwarted

after struggling with the owner. A K-9 unit patrol car driven by Defendant

Dep. Edge passed the truck and stopped behind Ratcliff's car (11:08:58)

(Ratchiff's struggle with the truck owner was unseen by Dep. Edge likely

because it was occurring on the other side of the truck). Ratcliff abandoned

trying to carjack the truck and started running down the residential street.

When he was alerted by the helicopter that Ratcliff was fleeing, Dep. Edge

released his dog, “Yoda,” and both began to chase after Ratcliff (11:09:10) The

helicopter video shows Yoda run-down Ratcliff (11:09:16), who fights with the

dog, and six seconds (11:09:22) later Dep. Edge joined the fray. Dep. Edge’s

body camera shows that (before other officers arrive to assist) he attempts to

gain control of Ratcliff by punching Ratcliff and yelling at him to both stop

biting his dog and to put his hands behind his back. Ratcliff admits to biting

Yoda’s ear. (Doc. 35 at 7)

yrs prison for bank robbery.” (Exhibit E, Doc. 7) The Florida Department of Corrections

website has no record of Ratcliff, but the United States Bureau of Prisons’ website shows that

Ratcliff was released from imprisonment five months earlier on June 25, 2021, but neither the

federal conviction nor the term of imprisonment is disclosed.

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The video recordings from the helicopter, and from both Dep. Edge and

the other police body cameras,? show that Ratcliff continued to fight Yoda, that

Dep. Edge punched Ratcliff several times while yelling a Ratcliff to both stop

trying to hurt his dog and to put his hands behind his back, and that additional

officers arrived who also commanded Ratcliff to stop struggling and to put his

hands behind his back. Ultimately Ratcliff complied with the commands and

was handcuffed, after which Yoda released his hold.

According to the helicopter video, 1 minute 17 seconds elapsed from when

Yoda catches Ratcliff (11:09:16) until the handcuffs were secured (11:10:38).

Dep. Extine’s body camera video (marked as “Vehicle 8 Body Cam Video,”

Defendant’s Exhibit G, Doc. 7) shows that Ratcliff complied with the commands

and was handcuffed (11:10:32), three seconds later Yoda was ordered to release

his grip (11:10:35), and nine seconds later Yoda released (11:10:44).

IV. ANALYSIS

Affording the pro se complaint a generous interpretation, Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam), Ratcliff alleges three claims: (A) the

use of excessive force by Dep. Edge based on both his punching Ratcliff in the

head and his handling of his police dog; (B) the failure of all of the other law

3 Because the several videos are not perfectly synchronized, timing between the videos

are not exact to the second and, consequently, the time when a specific act occurs in one video

cannot be compared to the time that that same act or another act is depicted in another video.

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enforcement officers to intervene to stop Dep. Edge’s use of excessive force; and

(C) a state law battery claim against Dep. Edge. Ratcliff alleges that Dep. Edge

used constitutionally prohibited excessive force. To prevail on his claim against

the defendants, Ratcliff must prove both that the force used was excessive and

that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for

Dep. Edge’s use of excessive force. If the amount of force used was not

excessive, the inquiry ends and the defendants are entitled to summary

judgment. But if the amount of force was excessive, the defendants are still

entitled to summary judgment if they meet the requirements for qualified

immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional

right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other

hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.”). As discussed below, the defendants’ arguments for summary

judgment prevail because the force used was not unconstitutionally excessive.

A. Use of Excessive Force:

1. Fourth Amendment:

“...[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries

with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to

effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Nevertheless, the

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Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

also protects against the use of excessive force during an arrest. Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from

unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from

the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.”). “Reasonableness”

determines whether the use of force is excessive in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, as Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1169-70 (11th Cir. 2000)

(emphasis original), explains:

The Supreme Court has instructed that “all claims that law enforcement

officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an

arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’

standard.” Graham v, Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L.

Ed. 2d 448 (1989).

The reasonableness test is not based on the arresting officer’s subjective intent:

the standard is whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable under

the circumstances. “...[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case

is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without

regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

at 397.

Application of the reasonableness test ...“requires careful attention to the

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of

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the officers or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Moreover, by

necessity some deference is afforded to a police officer who makes an immediate

decision in a stressful situation. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody

allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving

— about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id., at

396-97.

The uncontroverted evidence shows that Ratcliff fled from police following

a bank robbery in which Ratcliff threaten his having a gun. Consequently, the

situation Dep. Edge faced was a potentially armed bank robber (1) who had

evaded police during a pursuit that involved members of both the Pinellas

County Sheriffs Office and the City of Clearwater Police Department, (2) who

had just attempted to carjack a truck, and (3) who was attempting to escape by

running down the street away from Dep. Edge. Given these facts, Dep. Edge

was fully justified in releasing Yoda to stop Ratcliff from escaping. See, e.g.,

Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining that the

use of a police dog to take-down a fleeing bank robber believed to be armed is

not constitutionally prohibited use of excessive force).

The primary basis for Ratcliff's excessive-force claim centers on three

actions by Dep. Edge: (1) repeatedly punching Ratcliff in the head, perhaps a

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half-dozen times, (2) continuing to encourage Yoda to bite him, and (3) pulling

on Yoda while the dog still had a firm grip on him. Because the first two

allegations of use of excessive force by Dep. Edge occurred while Ratcliff was

still fighting and not complying with commands to put his hands behind his

back — and importantly before Ratcliff was fully restrained in handcuffs — the

force employed by Dep. Edge was reasonable. Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1293

(recognizing that police officer’s “...not call[ing] off the canine until he had

handcuffed [the fleeing bank robber]” was justified because the officer

“reasonably believed that [the defendant] was armed and dangerous”). Lastly,

Dep. Edge’s pulling on Yoda was clearly part of his getting Yoda to release his

grip. As found above, Yoda released his grip approximately nine seconds after

the deputy’s command.

Any act that occurred after Yoda released his grip is irrelevant to

determining whether the force employed was unconstitutionally excessive.

Ratcliff assigns undue importance to Dep. Edge’s use of expletives directed at

him after Yoda released his grip. The videos show that Dep. Edge’s words were

a reply in kind to Ratcliffs expletives. Moreover, words cannot convert a use of

force from constitutionally reasonable to unconstitutionally excessive. Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“An officer’s evil intentions will not make a

Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force . □ . .”);

Kraus v. Martin Co. Sheriff's Office, 753 F. App’x 668, 674 (11th Cir. 2018)

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(“[W]ords alone do not transform an acceptable use of force into one undertaken

in bad faith.”); Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir. 1997) (“In this

inquiry, the officer’s intent, whether evil or good, is irrelevant.”). Likewise,

Ratcliff assigns ill-will, malice, or bad faith to officers shown in some of the

videos smiling, laughing, or “fist-bumping.” The defendants in this action are

not liable for actions by non-defendants and — even if some of the officers are

defendants — due to a lack of audio the relevant videos fail to disclose the

reason for those officers’ actions. This court will not speculate about the

officer's intent, nor will the court accept Ratcliff speculation.

2. Qualified Immunity:

Qualified immunity protects government officials from all but the more

egregious situations so that the public officials are free from meritless lawsuits.

“The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials to carry out their

discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability or harassing litigation,

protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly

violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Qualified immunity offers

complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities

if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson,

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311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U-S.

800, 818 (1982)).

A qualified immunity analysis is not necessary because, as determined

above, Dep. Edge’s use of force was neither unreasonable nor excessive. And

even if Ratcliff could show that constitutionally prohibited excessive force was

used, Dep. Edge would be entitled to qualified immunity because no caselaw at

the time of Ratcliffs arrest established that, under these circumstances, the use

of force was excessive. See Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d at 1419 (“...fU]nless a

controlling and factually similar case declares the official’s conduct

unconstitutional, an excessive-force plaintiff can overcome qualified immunity

only by showing that the official’s conduct lies so obviously at the very core of

what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the unlawfulness of the conduct

was readily apparent to the official, notwithstanding the lack of caselaw.”). To

the contrary, controlling caselaw advised that, under similar circumstances, the

use of a police dog to apprehend a fleeing bank robber believed to be armed is

not constitutionally prohibited use of excessive force. Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at

1292.

B. Failure to Intervene:

Other than Dep. Edge, Ratcliff sues each of the other defendant law

enforcement officers for their failure to intervene to stop Dep. Edge’s alleged

use of excessive force. “[I]f a police officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or

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refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked

beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section

1983.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Ensley v.

Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998)). Accord Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526

F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (“An officer who is present at the scene and

who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of

excessive force, can be held liable for his nonfeasance.”). However, “[t]o be held

liable, the officer must both be ‘in a position to intervene’ and ‘fail[] to do so.”

Sebastian, 918 F.2d at 1312 (citing Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208

F.3d 919, 924 (11th Cir. 2000)). A relevant consideration is whether the officer

had time to intervene, Marantes vu. Miami-Dade Cnty., 649 F. App’x 665, 672

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Priester, 208 F.3d at 925), and, as Brown v. City of

Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 740 n. 25 (11th Cir. 2010), explains, liability for

not intervening depends upon the timing of events: “Because the relevant

events happened so quickly, the record does not reflect any point at which

Anderson could have intervened to prevent Norris’s use of excessive force,

especially pepper spray, on Brown. Anderson accordingly is not liable for

failure to intervene in Norris’s use of force.” See also Baker v. City of Madison,

Alabama, 67 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[E]ven assuming Officer

Nunez’s use of the taser was excessive, Officer Hose did not witness Officer

Nunez’s use of the taser and thus did not have the ability to intervene to

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prevent that use of force. The body camera footage shows that Officer Hose

arrived at the scene more than two minutes after Officer Nunez fired his taser.

That alone is fatal to Baker’s claim.”).

First, as determined above, because Dep. Edge’s use of force was not

unconstitutionally prohibited as excessive force, no other law enforcement

officer had a duty to intervene. See Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1294 (“...[B]ecause

[Deputy] Lister did not violate Crenshaw’s right to be free from excessive force,

[Deputy] Merritt had no attendant obligation to intervene.”); Callwood v. Jones,

727 F. App’x 552, 560 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that “officers had no duty to

intervene” if the law did not clearly establish that the other officer used

excessive force). Second, the video recordings show that Dep. Edge’s punches

occurred before the defendant law enforcement officers arrived and,

nevertheless, before Ratcliff was securely handcuffed. See Mobley v. Palm

Beach Cty. Sheriff Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Florce applied

while the suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a

danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not

necessarily excessive.”). Consequently, no law enforcement officer is liable for

failing to intervene.

C. State Law Battery Claim:

The PCSO Defendants erroneously assert that Ratcliff alleges no state

law claim for battery. (Doc. 36 at 6) To the contrary, on page 5 of his complaint

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(Doc. 1, Attachment 1) Ratcliff asserts a claim under Section 784, Fla. Stat., “for

aggravated battery after he was clearly in custody.” In his supplemental

opposition he recognizes that under Section 768.28(9)(a), a state officer is

immune from “any action within the scope of his or her employment or function,

unless the officer ‘acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

(Doc. 35 at 20) Although Ratcliff is correct that no defendant has addressed the

state law claim, as determined above Dep. Edge’s actions were not contrary to

the immunity provided under Section 768.28(9)(a). Consequently, Ratcliff's

state law claim of battery fails as a matter of law.

V. CONCLUSION

Under Rule 56, a party is entitled to summary judgment if “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled toa

judgment as a matter of law.” The videos depict the facts relevant to Ratcliff

claims. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 381 (stating that the facts are “viewed...in

the light depicted by the videotape”). The video evidence conclusively shows

that Ratcliff was fighting Yoda and the police officers and he was initially

refusing to comply with the officer’s orders to put his hands behind his back.

Based on the videos, no reasonable juror would find that Dep. Edge’s use of

force was unreasonable under the circumstances, or to remove the negatives,

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any reasonable juror would find that Dep. Edge’s use of force was reasonable

under the circumstances.

Accordingly, the Defendants’ motions (Doc. 7 and 17) to dismiss,

converted to motions for summary judgment, are GRANTED. Ratcliff’s state

law battery claim is DENIED. The clerk must enter a judgment in favor of the

Defendants and CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on__4/%% _, 2093,

Wee.

‘THOMAS BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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