Briggs v. Columbia County Sheriffs Office/Jail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SPENCER L. BRIGGS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1089-MMH-LLL

COLUMBIA COUNTY SHERIFF’S

OFFICE/JAIL, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Spencer L. Briggs, a pretrial detainee at the Columbia County

Jail, initiated this action on September 11, 2023, by filing a pro se Complaint

for Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint; Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with

exhibits (Doc. 1-1). Briggs names as Defendants: (1) the Columbia County

Sheriff’s Office/Jail; (2) Sheriff Mark Hunter; (3) Lieutenant Cedric May; and

(4) County Commissioner Ron Williams. Complaint at 1-3. In the Complaint,

he alleges staff at Columbia County Jail only allow recreation once a week,

during which inmates “are handcuffed[,] shackled and blackboxed. . . .” Id. at

4. Briggs further asserts that inmates are charged for medical treatment. Id.

at 5. He alleges that he has complained “about medical and mental health

problems,” but Lieutenant May denied his grievances. Id. Briggs asks for “the

jail to be fixed . . . and for us to be able to have real recreation not cuffed[,] to

fix the grievance procedure here [and] for the guards to stop putting thier [sic]

hands on us. . . .” Id. He also requests monetary relief. Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

1 Briggs requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 2).

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at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

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A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Briggs’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air

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Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted),

overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709)).

Liberally read, Briggs’s Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim

against Defendants. First, the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office/Jail is not an

entity subject to suit. See Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F.

App’x 696, 701 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Florida law has not established Sheriff’s

offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued.”);3 Monroe v.

Charlotte Cnty. Jail, No. 2:15-cv-729-FtM-99MRM, 2015 WL 7777521, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2015) (“The jail is not an actionable legal entity because it

does not enjoy a separate legal existence independent of the County or the

Sheriff’s Office.”).4 In addition, as to Commissioner Williams and Lieutenant

May, Briggs has not alleged sufficient facts to establish his entitlement to

relief. His claims are conclusory in nature and devoid of facts that would allow

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

4 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

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the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Commissioner Williams and

Lieutenant May violated Briggs’s constitutional rights. Indeed, Briggs pleads

no facts connecting Commissioner Williams to the alleged constitutional

violations. And Briggs’s allegations against Lieutenant May are largely

conclusory. See Complaint at 5 (“I asked for a formal grievance and was

imediatly [sic] place in suicide watch for a week cuz [sic] of Nurse Erin Alfred

and LT May. . . .”). To the extent Briggs complains about Lieutenant May’s

response to his grievances, not addressing a grievance in the manner a prisoner

would like, without more, does not render an individual liable for the

underlying constitutional violation. See Mathews v. Moss, 506 F. App’x 981,

984 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim because he

merely “alleged that his prison grievances were either ignored or wrongly

decided or that prison officials did not properly follow the prison’s own

grievance procedures”); Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF, 2013

WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (unpublished) (“[F]iling a grievance

with a supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable

for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance,

even when the grievance is denied.” (collecting cases)).

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Moreover, it appears Briggs sues Sheriff Hunter based on his

supervisory position. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[i]t is well

established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983

for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th

Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d

701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory conduct,

a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated in the

unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014).

Causation “may be established and supervisory

liability imposed where the supervisor’s improper

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights.” Id.[5] (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff can

also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation

of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[6] 923 F.3d at 957.

“Either way, though, to prove that a policy or its

absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must

point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior

misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation

omitted). And allegations of a single incident of

unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for

5 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

6 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).

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supervisory liability, even when the conduct involves

several subordinates. Id. at 957-58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022). Briggs has not alleged

that Sheriff Hunter was personally involved in or causally connected to the

alleged violations of his rights. As such, he fails to state a claim for relief

against Sheriff Hunter.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

October, 2023.

United States District Judge

Jax-9 10/30

Spencer L. Briggs, #22004606