Hall v. Seargeant Samuels

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

PATRICK HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:23-cv-414-JES-NPM

SAMUELS, RICHARD MCMANUS,

MARIE WYNN, AND JOHN DOE,

DefendantS.

_____________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff Patrick Hall, a prisoner of the Florida Department

of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil

rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). The Court

directed Plaintiff to amend his complaint (Doc. 5), and his amended

complaint is currently before the Court for initial screening.

(Doc. 6).

After carefully considering Plaintiff’s allegations, the

Court dismisses his amended complaint for failure to state a claim

on which relief can be granted. Plaintiff may file a second

amended complaint raising only Eighth Amendment excessive force

claims against Defendants Samuels and Doe.

I. Amended Complaint

The allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are not

presented in chronological order, and the complaint contains

numerous typographical errors that make it difficult to determine

whether Petitioner has stated a claim. However, the Court

liberally construes the pro se amended complaint as best it is

able so as to present Plaintiff’s allegations logically and

chronologically.1 In addition, for the purpose of screening, the

Court accepts all factual allegations (but not legal conclusions)

as true.

Plaintiff alleges the following: On either June 12, 13 or

June 22 of 2020, 2 while being held at Desoto Correctional

Institution, he was “beaten by Sgt. Samuels and John Doe using

unnecessary force” during a psychological emergency. (Doc. 6 at

5, 9). Plaintiff was pushed into the wall while his hands were

cuffed behind his back, and he hit his face and head. (Id. at 7).

Defendants Samuels and Doe slammed Plaintiff to the floor twice

1 Even though the Court must liberally construe a pro se

complaint, neither the Court nor a defendant is required to read

between the lines or comb through pages of attachments to fashion

a claim on a plaintiff’s behalf. See GJR Investments, Inc. v.

County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Yet

even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not give

a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or

to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action[.]”) (citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges facts that are

untethered to either cause of action alleged in the amended

complaint (i.e., that he has unfairly been labeled a “snitch” and

has been threatened by other inmates). To the extent Plaintiff

intended to raise additional claims based upon these allegations,

those claims are dismissed under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2 The amended complaint inconsistently alleges the date and

time of the beating.

and Defendant Samuels stated “let’s take him down” before the

second slam. (Id.) Defendants Samuels and Doe kicked, kneed,

punched, and elbowed Plaintiff’s back, legs and ribs without

justification. (Id.) Plaintiff screamed for help, and another

officer looked around the corner of the officer station wall and

pointed to the camera. (Id.) Plaintiff was then thrown into a

wheelchair while his hands were still cuffed behind his back, and

he heard a snapping sound in his left shoulder. (Id. at 8).

Plaintiff still experiences extreme emotional and physical pain

from the attack, but his sick call requests have resulted only in

ibuprofen and a July 2023 x-ray at Martin Correctional Institution.

(Id.) The experience has caused him “serious physical [and]

emotional problems to this day.” (Id.)

Plaintiff also alleges that, on June 22, 2022, at

approximately 4:30 pm, he was pulled from his cell for a

disciplinary proceeding.3 (Doc. 6 at 5). He was never served

with a disciplinary report before that date. (Id.) Defendants

Captain McManis and Classification Officer Marie Wynn verbally

told him “you know what this is,” which Plaintiff interpreted to

mean “the covering of the unnecessary force used by other named

defendants[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that “[b]y doing this the

3 The Court will assume that Plaintiff intended to write “June

22, 2020” as that is the date on a disciplinary report attached to

the complaint. (Doc. 6-1 at 6).

above named defendants violated Patrick Hall’s due process.”

(Id.) Officer Landry advised Defendants McManis and Wynn that

“they should not give [Plaintiff] a disciplinary report.” (Id.

at 6). He asserts that “[b]oth McManis and Wynn are liable for

trying to cover the unjustified unprovoked aggravated battery

[and] assault on Patrick Hall.” (Id.) Plaintiff was charged with

disorderly conduct and pleaded guilty. (Doc. 6-1 at 6). He

received 30 days of disciplinary confinement, followed by 30 days

of probation. (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks a jury trial and monetary damages against

each defendant. (Doc. 6 at 9).

II. Legal standard

A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In essence, section

1915(e)(2) is a screening process to be applied sua sponte and at

any time during the proceedings. The mandatory language of 28

U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis. The

section provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines

that-

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In making these determinations, all

factual allegations in the complaint are viewed as true. Brown

v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the

Court must liberally construe the plaintiff’s pro se allegations.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are

immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly

does not exist. Id. at 327.

Dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii) for failure to

state a claim are governed by the same standard as Rule 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112

F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint

may be dismissed if the facts as pleaded do not state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (retiring the “no set of facts”

language previously used to describe the motion to dismiss standard

and determining that because the plaintiffs had not “nudged their

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” their

complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not adequately allege

an excessive force claim.

Plaintiff asserts, without further explanation, that the

force used against him by Defendants Samuels and Doe was

unnecessary and excessive. (Doc. 6 at 7). The core inquiry in

an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is whether force was

applied in a “good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline”

or “maliciously or sadistically” to cause harm. Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). The following must be considered

to answer that question: (1) the need for force; (2) “the

relationship between the need and the amount of force that was

used”; (3) “the extent of the injury inflicted”; (4) “the threat

to the safety of staff and inmates”; and (5) “any efforts made to

temper the severity” of the force. Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s allegations in his

amended complaint are insufficient for meaningful consideration of

the Whitley and Cockrell factors or to survive screening under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Though Plaintiff alleges, without explanation, that the force

used against him was unnecessary, he also alleges that he was

charged with disorderly conduct and that he pleaded guilty to the

charge—relevant facts for the Courts to consider when determining

whether a plaintiff has alleged a plausible excessive force claim

under Whitley. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (explaining that only

a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a

motion to dismiss). Without context surrounding his altercation

with Defendants Samuels and Doe, Plaintiff has not “nudged” his

excessive force claim “across the line from conceivable to

plausible.” Id. at 544, 555, 570(“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]”) (internal quotation

and citation omitted).

Because the bare facts alleged in Plaintiff’s amended

complaint do not state a plausible excessive force claim, he must

file a second amended complaint if he wishes to proceed on his

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Samuels

and Doe.

B. Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state a

Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim.

Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that he was not served with

a disciplinary report prior to the day of his hearing suggests an

allegation of inadequate due process following a false

disciplinary charge. Notably, the filing of a false disciplinary

charge, standing alone, does not state a constitutional claim.

The Constitution requires only that the plaintiff be afforded due

process at the institutional hearing (on the allegedly false

charge), which represents the plaintiff’s opportunity to expose

falsities or inaccuracies. See Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949,

952 (2d Cir. 1986) (recognizing that the protections from actions

such as false disciplinary reports are found in “the procedural

due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell”).

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the United States

Supreme Court described the minimum procedural due process

requirements for prisoners who receive discipline that results in

the loss of good-time credits or the imposition of solitary

confinement. These protections include advance written notice of

the charges, adequate time to prepare a defense, an opportunity to

present witnesses and evidence, and a written statement by the

factfinder explaining the reasons for the decision. Id. In

addition, the decision-maker must be sufficiently impartial so as

not to present “a hazard of arbitrary decision making.” Id. at

571.

Although Plaintiff complains that he did not receive advance

notice of the disciplinary hearing and suggests that he was unable

to properly prepare a defense,4 a defendant’s mere failure to

4 The disciplinary report attached to Plaintiff’s complaint

states that he was charged with disorderly conduct, declined staff

comply with these procedural protections does not give rise to a

due process claim in every situation. The Supreme Court has

explained that Wolff due process claims are limited to situations

where a defendant’s actions caused an “atypical significant

deprivation” in which a State might conceivably have created a

liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).

In other words, a defendant’s failure to follow each Wolff

procedural requirement violates the Constitution only when the

failure resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s interest in

life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

220 (2009) (“The 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects

persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and

those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish

that one of these interests is at stake.”).

In this case, after being found guilty of disorderly conduct,

Plaintiff received 30 days in disciplinary confinement followed by

30 days’ probation. (Doc. 6-1 at 6). In Sandin, the Supreme

Court explained that “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response

to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters

imposed by a court of law” and that “though concededly punitive,

[disciplinary confinement] does not present a dramatic departure

from the basic conditions of [a prisoner’s] sentence.” 515 U.S.

assistance, pleaded guilty to the charge, and received thirty days

of disciplinary confinement. (Doc. 6-1 at 6)

at 485. Therefore, the Supreme Court found that a prisoner’s 30-

day sentence to discipline in segregated confinement “did not

present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a

State might conceivably create a liberty interest.” (Id. at 486).

The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s amended complaint do not

rise to the level of a due process violation. As noted, even

accepting Plaintiff’s allegation that one (or all) of the

defendants filed a false disciplinary report, a false charge, in

and of itself, does not state a constitutional claim. In addition,

Plaintiff’s sentence of disciplinary confinement and probation

“was within the range of confinement to be normally expected” by

a prisoner in the Department of Corrections and did not implicate

the Due Process Clause. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. Because

Plaintiff’s due process allegations do not state a claim upon which

relief can be granted, they are dismissed. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim on which relief

may be granted and all claims are dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Generally, a pro se plaintiff is given one

opportunity to amend his complaint before dismissal. Plaintiff

has already had an opportunity to amend his complaint. (Doc. 5).

Nevertheless, he proceeds pro so, and the Court finds that further

leniency is warranted in this case. See Silberman v. Miami Dade

Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that

“in some situations, [an additional chance to amend] may be

warranted in recognition of the difficulty of proceeding pro se”).

Therefore, Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint raising

and clarifying his Eighth Amendment excessive force claims.

However, further amendment of Plaintiff’s due process claims as

they relate to the disciplinary proceedings would be futile, and

those claims are dismissed without leave to amend. See Cockrell

v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend

a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be

properly dismissed.”).

Plaintiff should be aware that an amended complaint

supersedes the filing of the initial complaint and becomes the

operative pleading. Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d

1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, Plaintiff’s second amended

complaint must be complete, including all related claims he wishes

to raise, and must not refer to the initial or amended complaints.

Additionally, any supporting documents should be included with the

second amended complaint and marked as exhibits. Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint will be subject to screening under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed for failure

to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28

U.S.C. § 1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii).

2. Within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of this Order, Plaintiff may

file a second amended complaint raising only Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants

Samuels and Doe. If Plaintiff does not timely file a

second amended complaint, this case will be dismissed by

separate order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 17, 2023.

Q = pf

J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies to: Patrick Hall

Encl: prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint form