Head v. Bernard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DERIEL HEAD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-279-MMH-PDB

C.D. BERNARD, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Deriel Head, a former inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC),1 initiated this action on March 14, 2022, by filing a pro se

Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc. 1)2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He

proceeds on an Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 17) with attachments (Doc. 17-

1). In the AC, Head names the following Defendants: (1) Officer C.D. Bernard;

(2) Officer J. Smith; (3) Officer S. Stevenson; (4) Officer C.D. Dinkins; and (5)

Sergeant J.J. Lloyd. He alleges that Defendants, employees of the Jacksonville

1 The Florida Department of Corrections’ website shows Head was released

from custody on February 1, 2023. See Offender Search, Florida Department of

Corrections, (last visited July 20, 2023).

2 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

Sheriff’s Office, violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during

a traffic stop on September 8, 2021. AC at 5; Doc. 17-1 at 1. Head requests

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. AC at 7. This

matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Motion; Doc. 19).

Head filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See Response (Doc. 20). The

Motion is ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

Head argues that Defendants stopped and searched his vehicle without

probable cause in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments. AC at 5. He further contends that Defendants’ illegal stop

resulted in his false arrest and imprisonment. Id.; Doc. 17-1 at 1. As to the

specific facts underlying his claims, Head asserts that on September 8, 2021,

at 10:48 p.m., Officer Bernard conducted a traffic stop of Head’s vehicle

3 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the

AC as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to Head, and accept

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Hill v. White, 321

F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th

Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here are drawn from the AC, and may well differ

from those that ultimately can be proved.

2

because it had an inoperable passenger side taillight.4 AC at 5-6. Head was the

driver and registered owner of the vehicle. Id. at 6. According to Head, he and

his passenger, April Borden, provided their driver’s licenses to Officer Bernard.

Id. Officer Bernard conducted criminal history checks, which revealed that

Borden had “a history of drug arrest.” Id. Head alleges that Officer Bernard

then asked twice for permission to search Head’s vehicle. Id.; Doc. 17-1 at 5.

Head declined and asked, “what[’]s your probable cause.” AC at 6. According

to Head, Officer Bernard responded with “a threat of force” and requested a

narcotics K9 unit. Id.; Doc. 17-1 at 5.

Head alleges that “while [Officer Bernard] was conducting [] [the] traffic

stop investigation,” K9 Officer Stevenson arrived at the scene. AC at 6. Head

and Borden were asked to step out of the vehicle, so Officer Stevenson could

conduct a K9 drug sniff. Id.; Doc. 17-1 at 4. When Borden stepped out of Head’s

vehicle, “a clear glass pipe with burnt drug residue fell out of [her] clothing.”

Doc. 17-1 at 4. Upon seeing the paraphernalia, Officer Bernard detained Head

4 In the AC, Head largely duplicates Officer Bernard’s written statements from

the arrest and booking report, which Head attaches as an exhibit to the AC, and

alternates between a first-person perspective as Officer Bernard and a third-person

perspective. For example, he states that “Officer C.D. Bernard . . . say[s] he observed

Plaintiff’s vehicle travelling southbound with the rear passenger taillight inoperable.

I activated my emergency equipment and conducted a traffic stop. I made contact

with the suspect (Deriel Head) Plaintiff who is the driver and registered owner of the

vehicle.” AC at 6.

3

and Borden in the back of his patrol vehicle. Id. While Officer Bernard searched

the vehicle for additional drug materials, he found a “white rock substance that

appeared to be crack cocaine” in Head’s wallet. Id. Officer Smith searched the

center console of the vehicle and found another “white rock substance.” Id. The

substances field tested positive for crack cocaine. Id. Officer Bernard then

advised Head of his Miranda5 rights, and Head stated, “there was no crack

rock in his wallet or in his vehicle.” Id. at 4. He alleges that the “incident”

occurred at 10:48 p.m.; Officer Bernard wrote a traffic citation at 11:02 p.m.

and arrested Head at 11:30 p.m. Id. at 4-5. Head asserts that Officer Dinkins

“approved and searched [the] vehicle,” while Sergeant Lloyd “was notified of

the vehicle [to] be forfeited.” Id.

The exhibits attached to the AC reflect that on September 21, 2021, the

State of Florida (State) charged Head with possession of cocaine in violation of

section 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2021). Id. at 14. The State entered a

nolle prosequi of Head’s case on October 21, 2021. Id. at 16.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

4

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

5

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and

original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-

69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d

1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized

in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

6

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In their Motion, Defendants argue that Head’s claims against them

should be dismissed because: (1) Officer Bernard had probable cause to stop

and arrest Head; (2) Head fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted against Sergeant Lloyd, Officer Stevenson, and Officer Dinkins; (3)

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the AC is a shotgun

pleading. See Motion at 7-24. In response, Head asserts that Defendants

detained him without probable cause, and as a result, they falsely arrested and

imprisoned him. See Response at 2-28.

V. Applicable Law

“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under

the color of state law.” See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303

(11th Cir. 2001). Head alleges that Defendants are liable under § 1983 because

they violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. AC at 5; Doc. 17-1 at

1. Initially, the Court finds that while the AC references the Fourteenth

Amendment, Head has not “laid out the elements and stated a claim under

that amendment.” Signature Pharmacy, Inc. v. P. David Soares, No. 6:08-cv-

7

1853-Orl-31GJK, 2012 WL 1631681, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2012).6 Moreover,

like the Plaintiff in Signature Pharmacy, “it does not appear that [Head] could

have proceeded under the Fourteenth Amendment even if [ ]he[ ] had wished

to do so.” Id.

Clearly, the gravamen of the Amended Complaint was

the allegedly improper . . . seizures for which the

Defendants were responsible. The right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by the

Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, and

where a particular Amendment provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection against a

particular sort of government behavior, that

Amendment, not the more generalized notion of

substantive due process found in the Fourteenth

Amendment, must be the guide for analyzing the

claim. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273, 114 S. Ct.

807, 127 L. Ed.2d 114 (1994). Thus, as to the

allegations made in the Amended Complaint, a

Fourteenth Amendment claim would have been

improper.

Id. The case before the Court here is no different. Accordingly, to the extent

that Head raises an independent Fourteenth Amendment claim, the Motion is

due to be granted.

6 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

8

VI. Probable Cause Bars Head’s Fourth Amendment Claims

In their Motion, Defendants argue that Head’s claims fail because the

AC establishes, on its face, “probable cause for the vehicle stop, the reason and

reasonableness for the detention, and probable cause for both the warrantless

search of the vehicle and [Head’s] arrest.” Motion at 14-15. A search or “[a]n

arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the [Fourth

Amendment] and can underpin a § 1983 claim . . . .” Brown v. City of

Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Jones v. Brown, 649 F.

App’x 889, 890 (11th Cir. 2016).7 The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth

Amendment purposes. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007).

7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

9

However, the inquiry is not simply whether a suspect has been seized, but

whether the seizure was unreasonable. Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260,

1266 (11th Cir. 2007). A traffic stop is reasonable if it is based upon probable

cause or supported by reasonable suspicion in accordance with Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968). See United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.

2008). The Court notes that “an officer’s motive in making the traffic stop does

not invalidate what is otherwise ‘objectively justifiable behavior under the

Fourth Amendment.’” United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir.

1999) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996)); see also Lee

v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992))

(“Quite simply, ‘[t]he validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense

announced by the officer at the time of the arrest.’”).

Probable cause exists if an arrest is objectively reasonable in view of the

totality of the circumstances. Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir.

2003) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that

“probable cause exists when the facts, considering the totality of the

circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer,

establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Washington

10

v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898-99 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting District of Columbia

v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)) (original alteration omitted). In

determining the existence of probable cause, a court must “‘ask whether a

reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there was a substantial chance of

criminal activity.’” Id. at 902 (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588) (alteration in

original).8 Notably, “[t]he existence of probable cause bars a Fourth

Amendment false-arrest claim.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th

Cir. 2021).

“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause

and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.”

Bradley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation, citation,

and original alteration omitted). Nevertheless, “it requires ‘a minimal level of

objective justification for making the stop.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). Reasonable suspicion exists “when a law

enforcement officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the

particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Navarette v. California, 572

8 In Washington, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an older standard that required

“‘facts and circumstances . . . [that] would cause a prudent person to believe . . . that

the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” 25 F.4th

at 899, 902 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Hardigree v. Lofton,

992 F.3d 1216, 1230 (11th Cir. 2021)).

11

U.S. 393, 396 (2014) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18

(1981)). “Criminal activity includes even minor traffic violations.” United

States v. Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United States

v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003)). Similar to probable

cause, determining whether reasonable suspicion existed in a given case

depends on the totality of the circumstances. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397. More

than a mere “hunch” is required to create reasonable suspicion, but as noted

above, “the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than

proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’

than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow,

490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

A. Traffic Stop

Defendants argue that Officer Bernard had probable cause to stop

Head’s vehicle because it had an inoperable taillight. Motion at 10. According

to Defendants, once an officer has validly detained a driver, he may conduct “‘a

variety of checks on the driver and his car, including questioning the driver

about the traffic violation, requesting consent to search the car, and running a

computer check for outstanding warrants.’” Id. at 11 (quoting Simmons, 172

F.3d at 778 (emphasis omitted)). They contend that the traffic offense and the

12

ordinary inquiries incident to a stop for such an offense justified the duration

of the detention in this case. Id. at 13. Moreover, Defendants assert that

although an officer may not continue to detain a driver after he has completed

a valid traffic stop solely to await the arrival of a K9 unit, Head fails to allege

that occurred here. Id. at 11.

Head responds that Officer Bernard did not have probable cause to

conduct a traffic stop. Response at 9. He contends that Officer Bernard never

determined whether his vehicle was unsafe to operate, a requirement to

demonstrate a violation of Florida Statutes section 316.610(1), which Head

argues should be read in conjunction with Florida Statutes section 316.221(1).

Id. at 11-12. Head maintains that the vehicle’s taillights “displayed red lights

from both side[s] that emit [] 1000 feet from the rear.” Id. at 11. Therefore, he

asserts that he did not commit a traffic violation. Id. According to Head, Officer

Bernard also impermissibly prolonged the stop when he diverted away from its

initial purpose to investigate another crime without reasonable suspicion. Id.

at 6.

The Court initially notes that it is unclear why Head cites to section

316.610 as Officer Bernard did not stop him or issue him a citation for a

violation of that statutory section. See AC at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 12. Officer Bernard

13

instead stopped Head because his vehicle had an inoperable taillight in

violation of section 316.221(1). AC at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 8. To support his

argument, Head cites Paul v. State, 991 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

Response at 11. However, section 316.610, not section 316.221(1), provided the

basis for stopping the driver in Paul. 991 So. 2d at 405. As such, the facts of

that case are inapposite, and the Court declines to apply section 316.221(1) in

the manner that Head suggests.

Here, the Court finds that the facts as pled by Head establish that Officer

Bernard had a legal basis to conduct a traffic stop for an inoperable taillight.

Driving at night without at least two lit taillights is a violation of Florida law.

See §§ 316.217(1)(a), 316.221(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). According to the AC and the

arrest and booking report, Officer Bernard observed Head’s vehicle “travelling

southbound with the rear passenger taillight inoperable” at 10:48 p.m. AC at

5-6; Doc. 17-1 at 8. Therefore, Officer Bernard had probable cause to support a

traffic stop of Head’s vehicle for an inoperable taillight.

Importantly, in the AC, Head does not even attempt to allege that the

passenger taillight of his vehicle was operable, contrary to Officer Bernard’s

observation. See generally AC; Doc. 17-1. While he appears to make such an

allegation in response to the Defendants’ Motion, he may not amend his AC in

14

a response to a motion to dismiss, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Huls v. Llabona, 437

F. App’x 830, 832 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that a plaintiff cannot raise new

arguments in a response to a motion to dismiss and instead must seek leave to

amend his complaint); Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959

(11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the district court properly refused to consider

contracts referred to in a response to a motion to dismiss which were not

mentioned in the amended complaint). Further, to the extent Head contends

in his Response that Officer Bernard used the inoperable taillight as a pretext

to stop Head’s vehicle and search it for evidence of another crime, the

subjective motivation of Officer Bernard is immaterial to the Court’s analysis.

See Bradley, 10 F.4th at 1239 (noting that the officer’s subjective purpose for

conducting a stop is immaterial, “[the court] need only consider whether, given

the totality of the circumstances, an objective and particularized basis for the

stop existed”). The facts as pled in the AC demonstrate that Officer Bernard

had probable cause to stop Head’s vehicle for a violation of Florida law.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted on this basis.

Turning to whether the stop was unreasonably prolonged, the Court

notes that “[u]nder Terry v. Ohio, an officer’s investigation of a traffic stop

must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

15

interference in the first place.’” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106

(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). For this reason, Terry stops

must be of a limited duration and “[t]he stop ‘may not last ‘any longer than

necessary to process the traffic violation’ unless there is articulable suspicion

of other illegal activity.’” Id. (citing United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274,

1277 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Head’s timeline of the stop is identical to the facts outlined in the arrest

and booking report and traffic citation. In his affidavit, Officer Bernard states

that at 10:48 p.m., he observed Head’s vehicle with an inoperable taillight,

activated his emergency equipment, and conducted a traffic stop. Doc. 17-1 at

8; see AC at 5-6. In the report, Officer Bernard lists Head’s time of arrest as

11:30 p.m. Doc. 17-1 at 4, 7. According to both Head and the information on the

traffic citation, Officer Bernard wrote the citation at 11:02 p.m. Doc. 17-1 at 5,

12. Head does not identify any other times in the AC and asserts only his

conclusory statement that Defendants “prolonged [the] traffic stop.” AC at 5.

Based on Head’s factual allegations, the time between Officer Bernard

initiating the stop and arresting Head amounted to forty-two minutes. During

that time, Officer Bernard made contact with Head and Borden, obtained their

driver’s licenses, conducted criminal history checks, and wrote the traffic

16

citation. Id. at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 5. Even drawing all inferences in Head’s favor,

these activities were relevant to the initial reason for the stop or to ensure

officer safety. See United States v. Braddy, 11 F.4th 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021)

(recognizing ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop typically include

“checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding

warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and

proof of insurance”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Purcell, 236 F.3d

at 1278 (“The request for criminal histories as part of a routine computer check

is justified for officer safety.”).

Officer Bernard also asked Head for permission to search the vehicle,

requested a K9 unit, and asked Head and Borden to exit the vehicle for a drug

sniff. These activities arguably did not relate to the stop for an inoperable

taillight. However, Head neither alleges that Officer Bernard issued the

citation before asking to search the vehicle, nor that Officer Bernard should

have reasonably completed the traffic stop before making that inquiry. Rather,

Head asserts that K9 Officer Stevenson arrived “[w]hile [Officer Bernard] was

conducting [the] traffic stop investigation.” AC at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 8. In addition,

once Borden voluntarily exited the vehicle and the clear glass pipe with burnt

drug residue fell from her clothes, Officer Bernard developed sufficient

17

reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, such as use or possession of

drug paraphernalia in violation of Florida Statutes section 893.147(1) to

prolong the stop. Doc. 17-1 at 8. As such, Head has failed to plead facts

sufficient to nudge his conclusory claim of a prolonged stop or unlawful seizure

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted on this basis.

B. Search

Defendants’ argument regarding probable cause to support the search of

Head’s vehicle lacks specificity. See Motion at 7-15. Nevertheless, they assert

that “the face of the Amended Complaint demonstrates each and every

necessary element establishing . . . probable cause for [] the warrantless search

of the vehicle.” Id. at 14-15. Later in the Motion, to support their qualified

immunity argument, Defendants contend the automobile exception and search

incident to arrest provide justifications for the search. Id. at 17-22. Head

argues that neither exception applies to this case. Response at 24-26.

The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “[t]he basic premise of search

and seizure doctrine is that searches undertaken without a warrant issued

upon probable cause are ‘per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—

subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’”

18

United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1408 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). One of those “well-established

exceptions” is the automobile exception. Id. at 1408-09. Under this exception,

“‘police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have

probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.’” United States

v. Delva, 922 F.3d 1228, 1243 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting California v. Acevedo,

500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)) (remaining citation omitted); see also United States

v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007). For the automobile exception

to apply, “‘(1) the automobile must be readily mobile, and (2) there must be

probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’”

Delva, 922 F.3d at 1243 (quoting United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1299-

300 (11th Cir. 2011)). Probable cause for the warrantless search of an

automobile exists “when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in the vehicle.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted);

see also United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261-62 (11th Cir. 2006). And

a vehicle is “readily mobile” if it is “operational.” Tamari, 454 F.3d at 1261.

Based on Head’s own allegations as pled in the AC, probable cause

supported the search without a warrant of Head’s vehicle. Officer Bernard

conducted a criminal history check of Borden, which revealed her “history of

19

drug arrest.” AC at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 8. And, when Borden stepped out of the

vehicle, “a clear glass pipe with burnt drug residue fell out of [her] clothing.”

Doc. 17-1 at 4, 8. At that point, Officer Bernard had sufficient probable cause

based on the presence of drug paraphernalia and Borden’s history of drug

arrest to suspect that the vehicle contained additional contraband. Further,

the vehicle was operational as Officer Bernard had recently pulled the vehicle

over for an inoperable taillight. AC at 5-6; Doc. 17-1 at 8. Head does not plead

any facts to the contrary in his AC. As such, the automobile exception applies,

and the Motion is due to be granted on this basis. The Court therefore need not

evaluate the lawfulness of the search as one incident to arrest.

C. Arrest

In their Motion, Defendants argue that Officer Bernard had probable

cause to arrest Head for possession of a controlled substance when he found a

“white rock substance” in Head’s wallet. Motion at 13. They contend that to the

extent Head attempts to allege no probable cause existed for the arrest because

Officer Bernard discovered the substance during an illegal search, his

argument fails as a matter of law because the exclusionary rule does not apply

in civil suits against police officers. Id. at 13-14. In response, Head again

20

contends that Officer Bernard did not have probable cause to arrest him.

Response at 27.

A claim of false arrest or imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment

concerns seizures without legal process, such as warrantless arrests.” Williams

v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 388-89 (2007)). If an officer had probable cause for an arrest, the

arrestee may not later sue the officer under a theory of false arrest. Brown, 608

F.3d at 734; see also Wood, 323 F.3d at 878 (“An arrest does not violate the

Fourth Amendment if a police officer has probable cause for the arrest.”).

Here, based on the facts that Head alleges in the AC, Officer Bernard

had probable cause to arrest Head for possession of cocaine in violation of

section 893.13(6)(a). As he states in the AC, during Officer Bernard’s search of

the vehicle, he discovered a white rock substance in Head’s brown wallet. Doc.

17-1 at 4, 8. Notably, Officer Bernard observed Head remove his license from

that same wallet at the beginning of the traffic stop. AC at 6; Doc. 17-1 at 8.

The substance field tested positive for crack cocaine. Doc. 17-1 at 4, 8. As such,

probable cause existed to arrest Head for possession of cocaine. The fact that

the State subsequently entered a nolle prosequi “is of no consequence in

determining the validity of the arrest itself.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d

21

1508, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990). Because the Court finds that Head has not stated

a plausible false arrest claim, his claim for false imprisonment also fails. See

Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that plaintiff's

claim for false imprisonment failed where defendant officer had probable cause

to arrest him). Therefore, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted.?

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendants C.D. Bernard, J. Smith, S. Stevenson, C.D. Dinkins,

and J.J. Lloyd’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff Deriel Head’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 17) is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 28th day of

July, 2028.

United States District Judge

9 Because the claims against Defendants are due to be dismissed on this basis,

the Court need not address the Defendants’ remaining arguments.

22

Jax-9 7/20

c: Deriel Head, #302012

Counsel of record

23