noting that a court need not find “contumacious attitude [or] chronic failure” by a party before imposing sanctions under Rule 16(f)
How later courts described this case
- noting that a court need not find “contumacious attitude [or] chronic failure” by a party before imposing sanctions under Rule 16(f)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
LARYSSA RICE, individually, and as
Personal Representative for the Estate
of Travis Rice, deceased,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 3:20-cv-1206-BJD-PDB
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________________
ORDER
This cause came before the Court for a hearing on the Court’s Order to
Show Cause (Doc. 97) and for a pretrial conference at which the Court ruled on
Defendant Johnson’s motion in limine (Doc. 96).
Sanctions Under Rule 16(f)
Under Rule 16, a district court may impose sanctions up to and including
dismissal for a party’s failure “to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f). A “court has discretion to impose whichever sanction it
feels is appropriate under the circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory
committee notes to 1983 amendment. Sanctions under Rule 16(f) were
“designed to punish lawyers and parties for conduct [that] unreasonably delays
or otherwise interferes with the expeditious management of trial preparation.”
Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). See also Matter of
Baker, 744 F.2d 1438, 1440 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that a court need not find
“contumacious attitude [or] chronic failure” by a party before imposing
sanctions under Rule 16(f)).
As stated on the record, the Court imposes against attorneys Hill, Price,
Brown, and Mulhall sanctions in the amount of $100 each for their admitted
failure to timely file a joint pretrial statement in accordance with the Court’s
Third Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order. See Docs. 97, 99,
100, 103, 104. As stated on the record, this sanction is imposed against the
attorneys personally, not against their respective clients.
Motion in Limine
Defendant Johnson asks the Court to prohibit Plaintiff from using
“improper inflammatory language during the trial including, but not limited
to, such terms as ‘strangled’, ‘choked to death’, ‘murder’ or ‘murdered’.” Doc. 96
¶ 12. Defendant Johnson contends such language is not only inflammatory but
not accurate because Plaintiff’s “own medical expert could not come to a
conclusion as to . . . the exact mechanism of asphyxiation.” Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff
did not respond to the motion in limine. As such, the Court construes it as
unopposed. See M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(c).
2
Despite the motion in limine being unopposed, in consideration of the facts and
issues, the Court finds the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part. The
motion is granted to the extent Plaintiff may not characterize Travis Rice’s death as
a “murder” or call Defendant Johnson a “murderer.” Such language is inflammatory.
However, the motion is denied to the extent that words such as “choke” and “strangle”
will be permitted.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Attorneys Hill, Price, Brown, and Mulhall each shall submit to the
Clerk of Court the $100 fine assessed against them by June 22, 2023.
2. Defendant Johnson’s motion in limine (Doc. 96) is granted in
part and denied in part as stated on the record and in this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of June
2023.
fp.
PO Maw | | Aare
BRIAN/I, DAVIS
United States District Judge
Jax-6
Counsel of Record