Hall v. Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

WENDALL HALL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-320-JES-KCD

COURTNEY JONES AND

H. HOUSTON,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This cause is before the Court on consideration of a motion

to dismiss filed by Defendants Courtney Jones and H. Houston (Doc.

19) and Plaintiff Wendall Hall’s response in opposition to the

motion. (Doc. 20). After careful consideration of the Complaint

and Hall’s response, the Court grants the defendants’ motion and

dismisses this case without prejudice as premature and failing to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

I. Background and Pleadings

Hall, a resident of the Florida Civil Commitment Center

(“FCCC”), initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Hall alleges the

following in his complaint:1 On April 18, 2022, Hall received a

1 The Court presents the facts as alleged in Hall’s complaint

(Doc. 1), and at this stage, his factual allegations are accepted

as true. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453

behavior management report (“DR”) charging him with disorderly

conduct. (Doc. 1 at 3, ¶ 4). Captain King noted on the DR that

Hall wanted to attend the DR hearing. (Id. at 4, ¶ 5). Later

though, Hall was directed to return the DR because it contained an

error. (Id. ¶ 6). Hall returned the DR and was told that a

corrected DR would “include all the previous statements and

information” from the earlier one. (Id. ¶ 7). He never signed a

refusal stating that he would not attend the DR hearing to be held

on April 27, 2022, and he did not inform staff that he would not

attend the hearing. (Id. ¶ 8).

On April 27, 2022, Hall resided in Sea Dorm. (Doc. 1 at 4,

¶ 9). No notice was posted in the dorm that Hall was supposed to

attend the DR hearing. (Id.) No official called him to attend

the meeting, and the intercom system in Sea Dorm was malfunctioning

on that day, causing announcements to come through unclearly.

(Id. at 5, ¶ 11). Therefore, Hall did not hear his name called

(2006) (stating that on a motion to dismiss, the court must “accept

as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”). The

“tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And even in the case

of pro se litigants, the court does not have “license to serve as

de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs. V. Cnty. Of

Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d

701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, as best it is able, the

Court extracts Hall’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” from his

complaint to “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 679.

for the DR hearing. (Id. ¶ 11). Hall also asserts, without

explanation, that the FCCC staff “never informed [him] twice of

the time of the DR hearing on April 27, 2022.” (Id. ¶ 12).

Hall went to the DR hearing room at 9:00 am, but because no

official was present in the hearing room and the lights were off,

he went back to his dormitory and took a shower. (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶

13). After his shower, he applied shaving cream to his face.

(Id.) The shaving cream began to burn his face. (Id. at 6, ¶

14). Thereafter, an FCCC officer came to Hall’s room and asked

whether he wanted to attend the DR hearing. (Id.) Hall told him

that he wanted to attend, but would need a “few minutes” to take

off the shaving cream and apply medicated ointment to his face.

(Id. ¶ 15). The official told Hall that he would alert the DR

team that he needed some time to attend the hearing. (Id. ¶ 16).

Hall waited fifteen minutes to remove the shaving cream and then

applied ointment, put on clothing, and went to the DR hearing room.

(Id. at 6–7, ¶ 17). However, when he arrived, nobody was there.

(Id. at 7, ¶ 18). Hall assumed the hearing had been rescheduled.

(Id.) However, Defendants Jones and Houston conducted the hearing

without Hall’s presence, found him guilty of disorderly conduct,

and restarted his CARE level at level three as a sanction. (Id.

at 9, ¶ 19).

Hall asserts that the defendants violated procedural due

process by holding the hearing without his presence, which has

caused him “severe mental anguish, mental distress and severe

depression.” (Doc. 1 at 8, ¶ 19). He claims that he would have

obtained a CARE level 4 on May 1, 2022 if he had not received the

DR for disorderly conduct and that he is not allowed to possess a

personal television or obtain a job, which are privileges afforded

to residents at CARE level 4. (Id. at 8–9, ¶ 19).2 He also

alleges that the State Attorney could use the DR as proof to show

the civil commitment court that Hall’s mental condition has not

changed, which could extend his civil commitment. (Id. at 9, ¶

20). Hall seeks five million dollars in compensatory damages and

another five million dollars in punitive damages. (Id. at 11, ¶

25). He also seeks to have his DR overturned. (Id. ¶ 27).

The defendants move to dismiss this action for two primary

reasons. (Doc. 19). First, they argue that Hall’s claims are

premature because he has not alleged that the disciplinary charges

terminated in his favor. (Id. at 6–7). Next, they assert that

Hall has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he was deprived

of a protected liberty interest arising from the Due Process

Clause. (Id. at 7–8). Hall has filed a response to the motion,

in which he generally asserts that it should not be granted.3

(Doc. 20).

2 Hall asserts that he needed to remain “DR free for 6 months

as a care level 3” to be entitled to the privileges afforded those

in care level 4. (Doc. 1 at 9–10).

3 Very little of Hall’s 14-page response consists of arguments

II. Standard of Review

On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all the

allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372

F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Further, this Court favors

the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations

in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901

F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion to dismiss, the

facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable inferences

therefrom are taken as true.”) However, the Supreme Court has

explained that factual allegations must be more than speculative

as follows:

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, courts are not

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

directed at those raised by the defendants. (Doc. 20). The

remainder can loosely be described as legal argument that consists

primarily of relevant and non-relevant case citations and text cut

and pasted from court opinions.

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,

referring to its earlier decision in Twombly, set forth a two-

pronged approach to evaluating motions to dismiss. First, a

reviewing court must determine whether a plaintiff’s allegation is

merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not entitled to an

assumption of truth. Next, the court must determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for relief that is

plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Evaluating a

complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is “a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id.

III. Discussion

A. Hall’s civil rights complaint is subject to dismissal as

premature.

The defendants argue that Hall’s complaint is premature

because he has not alleged that the DR was terminated in his favor.

(Doc. 19 at 7). They cite Middle District of Florida cases

Kleparek v. Florida Civil Commitment Center, No. 2:13-cv-490-FtM-

38CM, 2014 WL 7218881 (M.D, Fla. Dec. 17, 2014) and Douse v. Budz,

No. 2:09-cv-596-FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 3256328 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2009)

to support their arguments.4 Upon review of the complaint and

4

In Kleparek, the plaintiff sought only injunctive relief

(the expungement of the DR), and in Douse, the plaintiff alleged

that the disciplinary report had been completely fabricated by the

defendants, which implicated the supreme court holdings in Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisak, 520 U.S. 641

caselaw applicable to prisoners who allege due process violations

in prison disciplinary proceedings, the Court concludes that

Hall’s complaint must be dismissed without prejudice as premature

because success on this claim would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his punishment.5

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a state

prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable in a § 1983 action

if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. 477,487

(1994). The Supreme Court later expanded the Heck bar to a

(1997). While these cases are instructive, neither mandates

automatic dismissal of this case.

5 The Court recognizes that Hall is not a prisoner. And the

Supreme Court has concluded that, as a general rule, civil

detainees are “entitled to more considerate treatment and

conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of

confinement are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.

307, 322 (1982). Indeed, the involuntarily civilly committed have

liberty interests under the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom

from unreasonable bodily restraints, and such minimally adequate

training as might be required to ensure safety and freedom from

restraint. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly held that

“Youngberg establishes that the due process rights of the

involuntarily civilly committed are at least as extensive as the

Eighth Amendment rights of the criminally institutionalized, and

therefore, relevant case law in the Eighth Amendment context also

serves to set forth the contours of the due process rights of the

civilly committed.” Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863

(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041

(11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the case

law that has developed in the prison context also sets forth the

contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed. Id.

prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary proceedings. See Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997). In Balisok, the Court held

that a prisoner’s claim “for declaratory relief and money damages,

based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the

decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the

punishment imposed, is not cognizable under § 1983.” Id. at 648.

A plaintiff need not seek only monetary damages or the

reinstatement of good time credits for Heck to apply; the test is

whether a civil judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would necessarily

negate the underlying punishment. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d

1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). See also Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d

488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) (“It is irrelevant that [the plaintiff]

disclaims any intention of challenging his conviction; if he makes

allegations that are inconsistent with the conviction's having

been valid, Heck kicks in and bars his civil suit.”).

Here, Hall alleges that he was deprived of due process after

receiving a DR and seeks damages for the punishment that was

imposed in the disciplinary proceeding as well as expungement of

the DR. As noted by the defendants, Hall does not assert that the

DR at issue in this case has been overturned administratively, in

state court, or through federal habeas relief. A finding that

Hall did not receive due process in this action would be

inconsistent with the punishment imposed on him in the disciplinary

proceeding—the re-start of his CARE level. Therefore, Hall’s §

1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok unless,

and until, Hall has the disciplinary report overturned, which he

does not allege has occurred. State differently, success on this

claim necessarily implies the invalidity of the penalty imposed on

Hall, and therefore his complaint is subject to dismissal as

premature.

B. Hall has not stated a procedural due process claim.

The defendants alternatively argue that even if Hall can bring

this claim in a section 1983 complaint without first having his DR

overturned, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted. (Doc. 19 at 7).

Specifically, the defendants argue that Hall was not deprived of

a protected liberty or property interest as a result of receiving

the DR. (Id.) The Court agrees.

In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the United States

Supreme Court described the minimum due process requirements for

prisoners who receive discipline that results in the loss of good-

time credits or the imposition of solitary confinement. These

protections include advance written notice of the charges,

adequate time to prepare a defense, an opportunity to present

witnesses and evidence, and a written statement by the factfinder

explaining the reasons for the decision. Id. Here, Hall asserts

that the defendants violated Wolff because he did not have an

opportunity to present witnesses and evidence at the hearing on

his DR, presumably because he was unaware of the precise time the

hearing would occur. Moreover, when he was eventually notified,

the defendants did not allow him sufficient time to remove the

shaving cream from his face and apply ointment before holding the

hearing without him present.

However, a defendant’s failure to follow each Wolff

procedural requirement violates the Constitution only when the

failure results in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s interest in

life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

221 (2005) (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or

property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection

must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”) Thus,

the threshold question for any due process claim is whether the

plaintiff was deprived of the type of “life, liberty, or property”

interests protected by the due process clause. Kentucky v. Dep’t

of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).

Hall asserts that he has alleged a constitutionally protected

liberty interest because FCCC detainees with recent DRs are not

allowed the same privileges at the FCCC (such as owning a personal

television or getting a paid job) as detainees who do not receive

DRs. (Doc. 1 at 10). Specifically, based on the allegations in

the complaint, the DR caused Hall’s CARE level to restart at the

beginning of level three, even though his CARE level was due to

increase from three to four in less than a month. He asserts that

a resident must go six months without a DR to receive the increased

privileges attendant with CARE level four. (Id. at 9). Under

these alleged facts, Hall was—at most—delayed from receiving his

CARE level 4 for a little more than five months.6

Hall’s temporary delay of his rights to seek paid employment

at the FCCC and to possess a personal television—privileges

presumably allowed at CARE level 4, but not level 3—does not evince

a denial of adequate food, exercise, medical care, sanitation, or

any other circumstance that, in the Court’s view, would constitute

an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary

incidents of resident life at the FCCC. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at

486 (finding that two 30-day periods of administrative confinement

did not implicate a liberty interest because it was not an

“atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest.”); Thompson, 490 U.S. at

460 (concluding that an inmate does not have a protected interest

in visitation arising from the Due Process Clause); Moore v.

6 Hall also speculates that the discipline reports could be

used in the future to deny his release from the FCCC. (Doc. 1 at

9). However, this is not the type of liberty interested protected

by, and requiring, a Wolff-style hearing. See Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (rejecting a prisoner's due process claim

for failure to allege a liberty interest, in part, because “[t]he

chance that a finding of misconduct will alter the balance is

simply too attenuated to invoke the procedural guarantees of the

Due Process Clause[.]”).

Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding no loss of

liberty or property when prisoner received as part of his

disciplinary punishment a two-week loss of commissary privileges);

Walker v. Loman, No. 06–0896–WKW, 2006 WL 3327663, at *1, *3 (M.D.

Ala. Nov. 15, 2006) (holding the 90-day loss of store, telephone

and visitation privileges, recommended custody increase, and

referral for possible free-world prosecution did not result in the

deprivation of a liberty interest).

Simply put, the sanction imposed on Hall as a result of the

DR (a restart at CARE level three) did not implicate due process

concerns. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Hall has

not shown the existence of a protected liberty interest, and as a

result, he does not state a procedural due process claim.7 Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

IV. Conclusion

Hall’s complaint is both premature and fails to state a claim

on which relief may be granted. The Court will not order an

7 More than six months have passed since Plaintiff received

the DR at issue. As a result, Plaintiff is no longer on a reduced

CARE level as a result of the DR. Because this case is dismissed

as premature and for failure to state a claim, the Court will not

consider whether Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief is now

moot. Nor will the Court consider whether the defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities on

the basis that no clearly established Supreme Court or Eleventh

Circuit case suggests that a reduction in a civilly committed

plaintiff’s privileges (or extension of a lower CARE level)

implicates the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution.

amended complaint because—-even liberally construed-the allegations

raised in the complaint do not present a situation “[w]here it

appears a more carefully drafted complaint might state a claim.”

See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. The motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) filed by Defendants

Courtney Jones and H. Houston is GRANTED as to all claims

raised in the complaint.

2. With no remaining claims or defendants, the Clerk is

directed to terminate any pending motions, close this

case, and enter judgment accordingly.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on the 9th day

of June 2023,

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J9GHN E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-2

Copies to: Wendall Hall, counsel of record