Kahl-Winter v. Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

RANDOLPH KAHL-WINTER, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:21-cv-631-BJD-PRL

LITA THOMAS and KAREN NILES

Defendants.

____________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, Randolph Kahl-Winter, Jr., an inmate of the Florida penal

system proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint for the

violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1; Compl.) against two

individuals identified as “mail room employees” at Sumter Correctional

Institution (SCI). Plaintiff alleges the mail room employees, Lita Thomas and

Karen Niles, “seized and detained” his incoming mail on April 22, 2021. Compl.

at 15. He is uncertain of the mail’s contents, but he believes it contained a

stimulus check from the IRS. Id. at 16.

Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the First,

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 3. He also cites in passing various

federal criminal statutes and provisions of the Florida Administrative Code

(FAC) he contends Defendants violated. Id. at 3, 14-15. Plaintiff alleges he

suffered mental anguish. Id. at 5. As relief, he seeks a declaratory judgment,

injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 21; Def. Mot.), which

Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 26; Pl. Resp.). In his response and through a separate

motion (Doc. 27; Pl. Mot.), Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his complaint.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s request to amend (Doc. 28; Def. Resp.), arguing

the proposed amended complaint is deficient and, thus, an amendment would

be futile. Without seeking leave to do so, Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 29).1 See

M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(d) (“Without leave, no party may file a reply to a response [to

a motion to amend].”).

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for a plaintiff’s “failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In

ruling on such a motion, the court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as

true, liberally construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not

accept as true legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

1 Even though Plaintiff’s reply was unauthorized, the Court will not strike it. In his

reply, Plaintiff merely reiterates what he asserts in his motion to amend and

proposed amended complaint. See generally Doc. 29.

2

Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Rule 8(a) demands “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. A

plaintiff should allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).

III. Analysis

A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: the

Eleventh Amendment bars any damages claims against them in their official

capacities; Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 and

under the criminal and state statutes and rules he references; and they are

entitled to qualified immunity. See Def. Mot. at 4-5, 10. Plaintiff does not

contest that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim for damages against

Defendants in their official capacities. See generally Pl. Resp. See also Jackson

v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Under the

Eleventh Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their official capacity

are immune from suit in federal court.”).

Plaintiff also does not contest that he fails to state a plausible claim

under criminal statutes or for the alleged violations of provisions of the FAC.2

2 Plaintiff cites the following criminal statutes: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 (“Conspiracy against

rights”), 242 (“Deprivation of rights under color of law”), 1702 (“Obstruction of

3

See generally Pl. Resp. See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)

(noting that state prison regulations are “not designed to confer rights on

inmates”); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“[P]rivate rights

of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”); Laster v.

CareConnect Health Inc., No. 1:20-cv-137 (LAG), 2020 WL 7486722, at *3 (M.D.

Ga. Dec. 10, 2020) (“[A]s a general matter, Title 18 is a federal criminal statute

which does not create civil liability or a private right of action.” (quoting

Morrell v. Lunceford, No. 09-00753-KD-C, 2011 WL 4025725, at *6 (S.D. Ala.

Aug. 18, 2011) (alteration in original)), aff’d, 852 F. App’x 476 (11th Cir. 2021).

Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion as to the alleged constitutional

violations. See Pl. Resp. at 1. He notes that Defendants did not address his

“core issue of ‘seizure’” of his mail. Id. In their motion, Defendants contend

Plaintiff does not “indicate which of his rights afforded by the First, Fourth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments Defendants deprived him of.” See Def. Mot.

at 6 (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not allege the violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights. See Compl. at 3. And, contrary to Defendants’ contention,

he does in fact indicate which rights afforded under the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments Defendants allegedly violated. Id. at 14-17. As to the

correspondence”), and 1708 (“Theft or receipt of stolen mail matter generally”). These

statutes provide for the imposition of criminal penalties—fines and imprisonment—

not private civil remedies.

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First Amendment, Plaintiff contends the interception of his mail constitutes

the obstruction of “the right to correspond”; as to the Fourth Amendment,

Plaintiff implies he has a right to privacy in his “private personal [mail],” and

that right was violated; and, as to the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff alleges

his private property was taken without the “minim[al] procedural safeguards”

to which he is entitled. Id. at 15, 17.

Despite Defendants’ misstatement about Plaintiff’s alleged

constitutional claims, because they invoke qualified immunity, the burden is

on Plaintiff to demonstrate he alleges the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right. This he cannot do. “The qualified immunity defense

shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “To be entitled to

qualified immunity, the defendant must first establish that he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority.” Gaines v. Wardynski, 871 F.3d

1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). If the defendant so shows, the

burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant violated his

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constitutional rights and at the time of the violation, those rights were clearly

established. Id.

Defendants note that Plaintiff alleges they were engaged in a

discretionary function at the relevant times. See Def. Mot. at 12. Plaintiff does

not dispute this. See generally Pl. Resp. Indeed, in his complaint, Plaintiff

alleges he sues Defendants Thomas and Niles because they were responsible

for the operation of the mail room and, under relevant provisions of the FAC,

were obligated to take certain precautions with respect to incoming mail. See

Compl. at 14-15. As such, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show he alleges the

violation of a constitutional right.

Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations and liberally construing them,

as this Court must, his allegations fall short of stating a constitutional

violation. As a preliminary matter, it appears Plaintiff names Defendants

Thomas and Niles solely because they were responsible for the operation of the

mail room, and not because they personally participated in allegedly

unconstitutional conduct. See id. at 4, 14. “It is well established in this Circuit

that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional

acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in

part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010).

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The standard for supervisory liability is “extremely rigorous.” Piazza v.

Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cottone, 326

F.3d at 1360). To state a claim against a prison official in his supervisory

capacity, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated

in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014). To the extent Defendants

did not personally interfere with or take Plaintiff’s mail, Plaintiff’s claim

against them fails.

To the extent Plaintiff contends Defendants Thomas and Niles

personally participated in a constitutional violation, his allegations are

conclusory and speculative. He asserts as follows: “On information and belief,

on or about April 22, 2021, without notification, or Plaintiff’s consent,

Defendant(s) seized and detained Plaintiff’s . . . correspondence.” See Compl.

at 15 (emphasis added). The only reason Plaintiff suspects anyone at the prison

interfered with his mail is because “he was notified by legal mail

correspondence that [he] should have received his U.S. Treasury/I.R.S.

correspondence about 2-3 weeks earlier.” Id. From these facts, Plaintiff

deduces that someone in the prison took his mail and any “obstruction/seizure

of U.S. mail correspondence . . . would have happened [in] the . . . mail room.”

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Id. at 4, 16. Speculation and conjecture, unsupported by factual allegations, do

not satisfy federal pleading standards. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported

by factual allegations.”).

Assuming arguendo that Defendants themselves “seized and detained

Plaintiff’s personal and private property correspondence,” as Plaintiff baldly

asserts, see Compl. at 15, his complaint remains deficient. Plaintiff’s claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment is not cognizable under § 1983. See Hudson

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (explaining a negligent or intentional

deprivation of personal property does not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment

due process violation “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is

available”). Plaintiff has an adequate postdeprivation remedy available to him

under state law: he can sue responsible prison officials for theft or conversion.

See Fla. Stat. § 772.11(1). See also Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th

Cir. 2009) (recognizing Florida’s civil cause of action for conversion provides an

adequate postdeprivation remedy when law enforcement officers seize or

retain personal property).

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim lacks merit as well. The Fourth

Amendment ensures “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

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Const. amend. IV. While prisoners do not “shed all constitutional rights at the

prison gate,” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, “imprisonment carries with it the

circumscription or loss of many significant rights,” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 524.

For instance, prisoners have no expectation of privacy in their personal effects.

Id. at 526 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable

searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.”).

Several courts have extended the Hudson reasoning in the context of

inmate mail. See, e.g., Robinson v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 851 F. App’x

289, 293 (3d Cir. 2021) (relying on Hudson, finding the plaintiff-inmate had

“no reasonable expectation of privacy to trigger Fourth Amendment

protections” with respect to the processing of non-privileged mail). See also

Marigny v. Hopkins Cnty. Jail Admin., No. 4:21-cv-P10-JHM, 2021 WL

4554493, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2021) (“[S]everal courts have held that the

Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and/or seizure of legal mail.”

(citing cases)).

A prisoner’s claim of interference with his mail—whether legal or not—

is more properly analyzed under the First Amendment. Indeed, “[m]ail is one

medium of free speech, and the right to send and receive mail exists under the

First Amendment.” See Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir.

2008). Prison officials may adopt policies regarding inmate mail, but policies

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that implicate an inmate’s First Amendment right must be “reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

However, isolated incidents of interference with an inmate’s incoming mail

generally will not establish a constitutional violation. See O’Connor v.

Carnahan, No. 3:09-cv-224-WS/EMT, 2014 WL 293457, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan.

27, 2014) (citing Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003)). See also

Dees v. Lamar, No. 2:20-cv-1326-LSC-GMB, 2021 WL 1953137, at *10 (N.D.

Ala. Mar. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1661195

(Apr. 28, 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff’s First Amendment mail interference

claim where he alleged the defendants, on one occasion, delayed delivering his

mail containing a money order). Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under

the First Amendment because he alleges Defendants interfered with his mail

on one occasion.

Because Plaintiff fails to allege facts that, accepted as true, permit the

reasonable inference his constitutional rights were violated, he does not

overcome his burden on qualified immunity, and Defendants’ motion is due to

be granted.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Plaintiff moves to amend his complaint to cure “any deficiencies or

vagueness.” Pl. Mot. at 1. He provides a proposed amended complaint (Doc. 27-

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2; Prop. Am. Compl.). In that, he names Defendants Thomas and Niles as well

as seven individuals he identifies merely as “John Does.” See Prop. Am. Compl.

at 2. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Thomas and Niles “withheld delivery

(seized)” from him a stimulus check in the amount of $1,400 on April 22, 2021.

Id. He further alleges they withheld another mailing containing a stimulus

check in July 2022, in “retaliation” for filing this lawsuit. Id. at 3. Plaintiff

contends Defendants Thomas’s and Niles’s conduct violated his rights under

the Fourth Amendment.3 Id. at 3-4.

Given the procedural posture of the case, Plaintiff may only amend with

the Court’s leave. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Although [l]eave to amend shall

be freely given when justice so requires, a motion to amend may be denied on

numerous grounds such as undue delay, undue prejudice to the defendants,

and futility of the amendment.” Haynes v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 793 F.3d

1246, 1250 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs.

of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s motion

to amend is due to be denied because amendment would be futile.

3 Plaintiff also cites Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989), a Supreme Court decision that

addressed whether California regulations restricting prisoners’ personal

correspondence were constitutional. See Prop. Am. Compl. at 4. Thus, liberally

construing Plaintiff’s filing, it appears he may also be suggesting, as he does in his

operative pleading, that Defendants Thomas and Niles violated his First Amendment

rights.

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In his proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the same

constitutional violations (the First and Fourth) based on essentially the same

facts as those alleged in his operative complaint. For the reasons addressed at

length previously in this Order, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under

§ 1983 based on the alleged withholding of mail on April 22, 2021. Accepting

as true Plaintiff’s new factual allegation—that Defendants Thomas and Niles

withheld mail from him a second time in July 2022, in retaliation for filing this

action—his claims still fail. His allegation of retaliation is conclusory, and two

isolated incidents of mail interference fail to demonstrate a First Amendment

violation. See Davis, 320 F.3d at 352 (finding two incidents of mail interference

did not state a plausible First Amendment violation where the plaintiff did not

allege “the establishment of an ongoing practice” of such conduct).

In short, Plaintiff alleges no new facts that would save his claims against

Defendants Thomas and Niles. And Plaintiff lodges no factual allegations

against the Doe Defendants. See Prop. Am. Compl. at 2-3. In fact, he contends

the Doe Defendants are “unknown at this time,” as are the actions they may

have undertaken that violated his rights. Id. at 2. The Eleventh Circuit has

consistently held that “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal

court,” unless a plaintiff describes a John Doe defendant with such

particularity that he or she can be identified and served. See Richardson v.

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Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of a John Doe

defendant where the plaintiff failed to identify or describe the individual

“guard” allegedly involved); Williams v. DeKalb Cnty. Jail, 638 F. App’x 976,

976-77 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A fictitious name . . . is insufficient to sustain a cause

of action.”). Not only does Plaintiff not identify the John Doe Defendants with

any particularity, but he concedes he does not know “at this time” what

unconstitutional actions they may have taken if any. As such, his attempt to

save his complaint by trying to join unidentified individuals as Defendants

fails.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 27) is DENIED.

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close the case.

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DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of

March 2023.

Mh . / \ .

bras), Parr

BRIAN. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Randolph Kahl-Winter, Jr.

Counsel of Record

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