Coker v. Warren

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BEFAITHFUL COKER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:22-cv-518-MMH-LLL

vs.

SLYVESTER WARREN, III, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on numerous motions to dismiss the

Third Amended and Restated Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 10;

TAC) filed by Plaintiff Befaithful Coker in this action. Coker filed a response

in opposition to each of the motions. The motions and responses are as follows:

Related

Defendant(s)1 Motion Response Count(s)

Northeast Florida

Newspaper, LLC d/b/a Lake Newspaper Response to

City Reporter and Motion, Doc. Newspaper, Count IX

Todd Wilson (Newspaper 152 Doc. 122

Defendants)

1 All Defendants except one, Stephen Douglas, have moved for dismissal. Coker filed

a motion for default judgment against Douglas on December 21, 2022. See Plaintiff’s Motion

for Default Judgment (Doc. 171).

2 The Newspaper Defendants also filed, with leave of Court, a reply in support of the

Newspaper Motion. See Reply Brief (Doc. 146; Newspaper Reply), filed September 16, 2022.

Robinson Response to

Kris Bradshaw Robinson Motion, Doc. Robinson, Doc. Count IX

49 123

Lake City, Columbia County

Chamber Response to

Chamber of Commerce and

Motion, Doc. Chamber, Doc. Count IX

Steve Smith (Chamber

53 124

Defendants)

Williams Response to

Ronald Williams Motion, Doc. Williams, Doc. Count IX

78 139

Columbia County Board of County Response to

County Commissioners (the Motion, Doc. County, Doc. Count IX

County) 79 138

Brown Response to

Counts VII

Tomi Brown Motion, Doc. Brown, Doc.

& IX

80 142

Foreman Response to

Joel Foreman Motion, Doc. Foreman, Doc. Count IX

81 141

City Council of Lake City

Florida; Christopher Todd

Counts I, II,

Sampson; Jake Hill; Eugene

City Motion, Response to V, VI, VII,

Jefferson; Stephen Witt;

Doc. 94 City, Doc. 140 VIII, IX and

Audrey Sikes; and Fred

XI

Koberlein, Jr. (City

Defendants)

Sylvester Warren, III;

Vanesa George; Glennel

Coalition Response to

Bowden; Nathan Gambles;

Motion, Doc. Coalition, Doc. Count IX3

and Justice and Equality

101 133

Coalition, Inc. (Coalition

Defendants)

Secretary Response to

Florida Secretary of State Counts VII

Motion, Doc. Secretary, Doc.

Cord Byrd (the Secretary) and IX

102 136

Sampson Response to

Christopher Todd Sampson

Motion, Doc. Sampson, Doc. Count IV

(individual capacity)

110 134

3 Although the Coalition Defendants are also named in Counts III and XI, their Motion

does not address those Counts.

Judge Fina Response to

Counts IX

Judge David Fina Motion, Doc. Judge Fina,

and X

131 Doc. 158

All moving Defendants seek dismissal of the claims against them pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) for failure to state

a claim. In addition, as specified in more detail below, certain Defendants

move to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).4 Upon review

of the Motions, Responses, and operative complaint, the Court finds that

dismissal of this case in its entirety is warranted.

I. Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1) — Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A motion to dismiss asserting a lack of standing is a challenge to the

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction properly considered under Rule 12(b)(1).

Townsend v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 2:05-cv-439-FtM-99DNF, 2007 WL

177857, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2007); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405

F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that standing “implicates [the Court’s]

subject matter jurisdiction”). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction

“‘empowered to hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United

4 Defendants Williams, Brown, Foreman, and the County also move to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4) based on insufficient process because Coker served them with a

version of the complaint that had been superseded at the time of service. See Williams

Motion at 10-13; County Motion at 10-13; Brown Motion at 12-14; Foreman Motion at 1-12.

Because the Court finds that the claims against these Defendants are due to be dismissed for

other reasons, the Court does not address this argument.

States as defined by Article III of the Constitution,’ and which have been

entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” See Univ.

of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor

v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). Article III of the

Constitution, by its plain language, limits the jurisdiction of federal courts (the

“judicial power” of the courts) to the consideration of Cases and Controversies.

Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, §

2, cl. 1; Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir.

2002)). The doctrine of standing “stems directly from Article III’s ‘case or

controversy’ requirement,” Bochese 405 F.3d at 974, and ensures that “federal

courts do not exceed their authority,” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 136

S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Indeed, standing “is

‘perhaps the most important’ jurisdictional doctrine.” Bochese, 405 F.3d at 974

(quoting Bischoff v. Osceola Cnty., Fla., 222 F.3d 874, 877–78 (11th Cir. 2000)

(additional citations omitted). In the absence of standing, a federal court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction and is “powerless to hear a case.” Id.; see also Univ.

of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 410 (“Simply put, once a federal court determines that it

is without subject matter jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.”).

In this action, Coker, “as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the

burden of establishing” that she has standing to pursue the claims she alleges

in the Third Amended Complaint. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. To do so, she

must establish each element of standing “‘in the same way as any other matter

on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and

degree of evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.’” See

Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 878 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

561 (1992)). As such, “when standing becomes an issue on a motion to dismiss,

general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may

be sufficient to show standing.” Id.; Kawa Orthodontics, LLP v. Sec'y, U.S.

Dep't of the Treasury, 773 F.3d 243, 245 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e presume the

plaintiff’s ‘general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to

support the claim.’”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).

The Eleventh Circuit has unequivocally instructed that “[u]nder settled

precedent, the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three

elements: the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, the defendant must

have caused that injury, and a favorable decision must be likely to redress it.”

See Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). Among these elements, the “foremost”

requirement of standing is the existence of an injury in fact. Id. (quoting Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). “An injury in fact

consists of ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is both ‘concrete and

particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id.

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To qualify as “concrete,” the injury must be

“real, and not abstract.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). To be

sufficiently “particularized,” the injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal

and individual way.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). To satisfy the

injury element of standing, a plaintiff must establish “[e]ach subsidiary element

of injury—a legally protected interest, concreteness, particularization, and

imminence. . .” Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, and Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560).

B. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the

Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr.,

Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable

inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610

F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some

minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d

1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific

facts are not necessary,” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 556).

A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations

omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory

allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading

as facts will not prevent dismissal” (citations and quotations omitted)).

Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are

not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Thus, in

ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint

contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Moreover, when the

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—

“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. (citation omitted). And, while “[p]ro

se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the

court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of

Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)5 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal

citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall,

610 F.3d at 706); see also Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-

69 (11th Cir. 2014).

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff Befaithful Coker, acting pro se, initiated this action on May 6,

2022. See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 1). A few days later,

Coker filed an Amended and Restated Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

(Doc. 3; Amended Complaint). On May 16, 2022, the Court struck the

Amended Complaint and provided Coker with the opportunity to file a second

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

amended complaint. See generally Order (Doc. 5). In the Order, the Court

explained the pleading requirements applicable in federal court, including that

a complaint must set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief, state each claim discretely and succinctly

without reliance on vague and ambiguous allegations, and avoid generalized

allegations lumping defendants together. Id. at 2-3. In addition, the Court

discussed the Eleventh Circuit’s prohibition on shotgun pleadings.

The Court found that the Amended Complaint constituted an

impermissible shotgun pleading because Coker improperly reincorporated all

allegations of all preceding counts into each successive count of her eleven-count

Amended Complaint. As a result, the Court faced “the onerous task of sifting

out irrelevancies in order to decide for itself which facts are relevant to a

particular cause of action asserted.” Id. at 5. In addition, the Amended

Complaint was “‘replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not

obviously connected to any particular cause of action.’” Id. at 5-6 (quoting

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir.

2015)). Indeed, Coker’s Amended Complaint spanned “92 pages, with 224

separate paragraphs and twenty additional pages of exhibits” and contained an

“over-abundance of extraneous details” which rendered the pleading

“excessively long and difficult to follow.” Id. at 6. The Court directed Coker

to file a second amended complaint and explained that she must “avoid the

shotgun pleading deficiencies set forth above and describe in sufficient detail

the factual basis for each of her claims and how each Defendant is responsible.”

Id. at 6-7. On June 2, 2022, Coker filed a second amended complaint, see

Second Amended and Restated Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. 8;

SAC), and a few days later, on June 7, 2022, she filed the Third Amended

Complaint.6 See generally TAC. Thus, at this time, the operative pleading is

the Third Amended Complaint.

In the Third Amended Complaint, Coker asserts several state and federal

claims against twenty-four Defendants over the span of eleven counts. See

generally TAC. The Third Amended Complaint is seventy-five pages long,

with over 150 paragraphs, plus numerous sub-paragraphs, and an additional

twenty-three pages of exhibits. For ease of reference, the Court summarizes

the eleven counts, causes of action and corresponding Defendants in the

following chart:

Count Cause of Action Named Defendants

Florida Whistleblower Act, Fla. City Council, Hill, Sampson,

I

Stat. § 112.3187 Sikes, and Koberlein

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Right to

II All City Defendants

Participate in Meetings

III Defamation Coalition Defendants

IV Defamation Sampson

6 Although Coker did not obtain leave of Court to file the Third Amended Complaint,

given her pro se status, the short timeframe between the filing of the second and third

amended complaint, and the early stage of the litigation, the Court declined to strike the

unauthorized filing.

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Right to Hold

V All City Defendants

Public Office

Hill, Sampson, Witt, Jefferson,

VI 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Due Process

Sikes, and Koberlein

52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, & City Council, Sikes, Brown, and

VII

10308, Qualifying Fee Secretary

52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304, &

VIII City Council

10308, Rezoned Candidate

IX 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Conspiracy All Defendants

42 U.S.C. § 1983, Right to Seek

X Judge Fina

Justice Through the Courts

Hill, Sampson, Witt, Jefferson,

Intentional Infliction of Emotional

XI Sikes, Koberlein, and Coalition

Distress

Defendants

Significantly, in the Third Amended Complaint Coker does not set forth

a comprehensive factual background section. Instead, the relevant facts are

spread throughout the Third Amended Complaint, interspersed between the

various counts. And Coker often fails to include or reincorporate the factual

allegations into each of the specific counts for which they appear to be relevant.

Coker also continues to use vague and conclusory allegations of wrongdoing

throughout her pleading. As a result, it is difficult to piece together a coherent

narrative of the events leading to this lawsuit, and once again, the Court “is

faced with the onerous task of sifting out irrelevancies in order to decide for

itself which facts are relevant to a particular cause of action asserted.” See

Order at 5.7 Nevertheless, as best the Court can discern, Coker’s claims are

premised on the following factual allegations.

III. Factual Background8

As described in the Third Amended Complaint, Coker is a “community

activist and volunteer known for organizing community events, and making

both public and protected disclosures concerning local government.” See TAC

¶ 5. According to Coker, over the span of 2021, she made various “disclosures”

to the City Council of Lake City, Florida, and to unidentified “state and federal

7 On this basis, several Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the Third

Amended Complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. Although the Court agrees that

the Third Amended Complaint continues to suffer from significant pleading defects, Coker

does appear to have attempted to comply in good faith with the Court’s prior directives.

Indeed, Coker corrects the most egregious of her shotgun pleading errors. Thus, were the

Court to dismiss Coker’s claims on non-merits, shotgun grounds, it does not appear that a

dismissal with prejudice would be warranted as Defendants request. See Betty K Agencies,

Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a dismissal with

prejudice “is an extreme sanction that may be properly imposed only when: ‘(1) a party engages

in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district

court specifically finds that lesser sanctions would not suffice’”). Significantly, despite the

pleading defects, Defendants were able to address Coker’s claims on their merits. As such,

the Court declines to dismiss Coker’s pleading on shotgun grounds and will proceed to consider

the merits of the challenges to her claims.

8 As stated above, in considering the Motions to Dismiss, “the court reviews a plaintiff’s

pro se allegations in a liberal fashion, accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true,

and evaluates all reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” See Freeman v. Fine, 820 F. App’x 836, 838 (11th Cir. 2020). As such, the

facts recited here are drawn from the Third Amended Complaint and may well differ from

those that ultimately could be proved.

The Court also notes that throughout her Responses to the Motions to Dismiss, Coker

includes numerous additional factual allegations that are not part of her pleading. The Court

does not include those facts here and will not consider them in resolving the Motions to

Dismiss. Coker cannot use her briefing “to add new allegations and argue that those new

assertions support [her] cause[s] of action.” See Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 816 F.3d 686,

705 (11th Cir. 2016).

agencies” concerning various acts of purported wrongdoing involving the City

Council. Id. ¶¶ 17-28. The details are vague, but the first disclosure

identified in the Third Amended Complaint is alleged to have occurred in

January of 2021. Id. ¶ 18. The last alleged disclosure for which a discernible

date is provided occurred in June 2021. See ¶ 22.

Although unclear, some of the purported disclosures appear to concern

allegedly improper business dealings between Defendant Jake Hill, who is a

councilmember, and Defendants Vanessa George, Nathan Gambles III, and

Sylvester Warren, III, who appear to have some connection to Defendant

Justice and Equality Coalition, Incorporated. Id. ¶¶ 18-20. Another alleged

disclosure relates to Coker’s view that Hill and another councilmember,

Defendant Eugene Jefferson, abused their office by writing letters in support of

Warren when he was facing criminal charges in 2006, and later when Warren

was seeking early termination of his supervised release in 2019. Id. ¶ 21, Ex.

B. Other disclosures pertain to the reinstatement of a “terminated HR

Director” who allegedly misrepresented facts in her background. Id. ¶¶ 23-25.

Coker also alleges that she made “disclosures” regarding “improperly formed

organizations” and members of the public with felony convictions being placed

on “publicly funded boards . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. This “disclosure” appears to

relate to Warren and Defendant Glennel Bowden in some way.

Coker alleges that the City Council retaliated against her for making

these disclosures by “denying her a position on the Planning and Zoning Board.”

See id. ¶¶ 11, 30. She also contends that Defendant Audrey Sikes, the City

Clerk, acting in retaliation, informed Bowden of Coker’s disclosures causing

Bowden to “publicize on social media his commitment to use all efforts to

prevent [Coker] from holding any office.” Id. ¶ 29. Coker asserts that at

“multiple meetings between December 2020, and November 1, 2021,” the

councilmembers (Witt, Jefferson, Hill, and Sampson) would fail to enforce the

Council’s decorum rules and allow Warren, George, Gambles, and Bowden to

“slander and defame” Coker and “hurl threats to her and her minor children

repeatedly . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 35-36. According to Coker, the City Council allowed

these violations of the decorum rules in retaliation against Coker for making

“protected disclosures.” Id. ¶ 40.

On October 4, 2021, the City Council announced a vacancy on the Council

“created by a resignation of the Vice Mayor.” Id. ¶ 61.b. The City Council

selected Defendant Stephen Douglas to fill the vacancy on October 13, 2021, but

Coker contends they did so improperly “via secret ballot.” Id. ¶¶ 93, 94.

According to a newspaper article incorporated into the Third Amended

Complaint, Coker filed a lawsuit in state court against the City Council

challenging the process they used to select Douglas. Id. ¶ 104. Coker alleges

that the City Council then withdrew its selection of Douglas and, according to

Coker, “Douglas made no objection.” Id. ¶ 94. At a meeting on October 26,

2021, the City Council again attempted to fill the vacancy and considered three

applicants: Coker, Douglas, and Ricky Jernigan. Id. ¶¶ 61.a., 95, Ex. A. After

several rounds of deadlocked voting, the City Council ultimately selected Coker

to fill the vacant seat by a vote of three (Jefferson, Hill, and Defendant Stephen

Witt) to one (Defendant Christopher Todd Sampson). Id. ¶ 61.a., Ex. A. Two

days later, Sampson exchanged emails with the City Attorney, Defendant Fred

Koberlein Jr., and Sikes, concerning the Council’s ability to reconsider Coker’s

appointment. See id. ¶ 95, Ex. C. Koberlein advised that the Council’s

procedures did not permit a motion for reconsideration of the vote. Id., Ex. C.

Sikes shared this information with Jefferson, Hill, and Witt. Id. ¶ 96.

According to Coker, on November 1, 2021, she “filed her Oath of Office

and scheduled necessary training and onboarding” with Sikes. Id. ¶¶ 61.f., 64,

98. Nevertheless, at its meeting on November 1, 2021, the City Council refused

to seat Coker. Id. ¶ 99. Rather, according to Coker, when Koberlein

presented a resolution to “memorialize [Coker’s] appointment,” Hill announced

that he had a “change of heart after learning [Coker] had a past” and voted

against the resolution. Id. ¶ 61.h., 67, 111. Coker incorporates a newspaper

article concerning the November 1, 2021 meeting into her Third Amended

Complaint. See id. ¶ 104. According to this article, titled “No seat for Coker

either,” the City Council failed to approve the resolution to seat Coker by a 2-2

vote, with Hill and Sampson “casting the dissenting votes.” Id.

Coker asserts that at this meeting Defendants Warren, George, and

Bowden made “boisterous, slanderous and defaming statements” that Coker

“was a prostitute, incapable of managing her financial affairs, possessed [a]

criminal background and other demeaning characterizations that were each

untrue, defaming and without the requisite [sic].” Id. ¶¶ 97, 99.9 In addition,

according to Coker, Defendant Steve Smith, representing Defendant Columbia

County Chamber of Commerce, spoke at the meeting and expressed his support

for Douglas. Id. ¶ 102. As set forth in the Third Amended Complaint, Smith

stated that Douglas “was the only candidate that looked like someone who

would garner support from the likes of a[n] Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos.” Id. ¶¶

102, 113. According to Coker, rather than conducting the “ministerial” or

“ceremonial” installation at the November 1, 2021 meeting, Sikes, Witt,

Jefferson, Sampson, and Koberlein “sat in silence . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 107-110, 112.

Coker maintains that the City Council and Hill “denied [Coker] the public office

9 According to the same incorporated newspaper article, Bowden said Coker “had

previously been arrested and had filed for bankruptcy in two states. Bowden said he didn’t

believe she should serve as the District 14 council representative.” See id. ¶ 104. The

newspaper reports it was this information that caused Hill to change his vote. Coker is

quoted in the newspaper as stating that she has “no shame for who I am and make no excuses

. . . . I am not ashamed of using legal remedies to live, that’s what our city needs.” Id.

after its [sic] selection on October 26, 2021 as retaliation for the protected

disclosures of gross waste and abuse of public offices.” Id. ¶ 37.

Based on the City Council’s refusal to seat her, Coker filed a petition for

a writ of mandamus in state court on November 8, 2021. See id. ¶ 61.i. That

same day, a state court judge issued an “Alternative Writ in Mandamus, and

Order Nisi in Prohibition.” Id. ¶ 61.j., Ex. D. The Writ required Sikes and the

City Council to “Show Cause within 20 days of the date of this Order as to why”

Coker’s petition should not be granted. Id., Ex. D. And the Writ stayed all

City Council proceedings related to filling the vacant seat pending a final

resolution of the petition. Id., Ex. D. Thereafter, the case was assigned to the

Honorable David Fina, a Florida circuit court judge, who is also a named

Defendant in this action. Id. ¶ 103. According to Coker, Judge Fina did not

require the City Council to adhere to the Writ. Id. ¶ 116.10 Defendant Kris

Robinson represented the City in that lawsuit, and Defendant Joel Foreman

represented Douglas, who moved to intervene in the matter. Id. ¶¶ 119, 120.

It appears Defendant Ron Williams, a Columbia County Commissioner, is

10 The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the defendants in Coker’s state court

action sought an extension of time to respond, and on December 13, 2021, filed a motion to

dismiss the petition. See Judge Fina Motion at 5 n.1, Ex. 2(b)-(d); U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v.

Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Courts may take judicial notice of

publicly filed documents, such as those in state court litigation, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.”);

see also Fed. R. Evid. 201.

included in this lawsuit primarily because he did not object to Foreman’s

representation of Douglas. Id. ¶ 125.11

On November 18, 2021, Defendant Todd Wilson published an editorial in

the Lake City Reporter, also a Defendant, taking the position that the City

Council should leave the seat vacant and wait for the next election. Id. ¶ 105,

Ex. F. In addition, the Coalition published statements on its Facebook page

urging the City Council not to seat Coker. Id. ¶¶ 97, 100, Ex. E. And Bowden

published on social media that “he would take any and all actions necessary to

prevent [Coker] from being seated . . . .” Id. ¶ 114. As of June 2, 2022, Coker

had not been seated on the City Council. Id. ¶ 117. Indeed, the Court takes

judicial notice of the fact that an election was held for the vacant seat in August

of 2022, and Coker was not elected. See Judge Fina Motion at 5 n.1, Ex. 3.12

Based on the foregoing, Coker asserts that she has “suffered damages as a direct

result of the Defendants’ policies, practices and actions,” including “monetary

losses . . . .” Id. ¶ 153. Coker seeks money damages and punitive damages as

11 According to Coker, Douglas was “an appointed member of an advisory board” to

Defendant Columbia County Board of County Commissioners (the County). Id. ¶ 93. And

Defendant Joel Foreman is the elected County attorney. Id.

12 Pursuant to Judge Fina’s request, see Judge Fina Motion at 5 n.1, Ex. 3, the Court

finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of this election and Coker’s loss as these are facts

that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also Atkins v. Sarasota Cnty., 457

F. Supp. 3d 1226, 1236 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (taking judicial notice of election results). Indeed,

although Coker makes vague allegations of election misconduct in her Response, she does not

dispute that according to the official results she lost her bid for the vacant City Council seat

in the August 2022 election. See Response to Judge Fina at 22-24.

to each count, and in several counts also requests injunctive relief “to prevent

Defendants from condoning, participating, and encouraging this behavior in the

future.” See, e.g., id. at 16, 20, 25, 38-39.

IV. Standing

A. Counts VII and VIII: Voting Rights Act

In Counts VII and VIII of the Third Amended Complaint, Coker asserts

claims under various statutory provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). In

Count VII, Coker contends that the City Charter imposes a qualifying fee on

candidates who seek a seat on the City Council and this fee places an “undue

burden” on candidates and “denies disproportionately the rights of black

candidates and more specifically female candidates.” See TAC ¶¶ 80, 82. She

contends that this fee deprived or attempted to deprive her of a right secured

under various provisions of the VRA. Id. ¶ 86. She asserts this claim against

the City Council, Sikes, Tomi Brown in her official capacity as the Columbia

County Supervisor of Elections, and the Florida Secretary of State.

In Count VIII, Coker alleges that on May 13, 2013, the City Council

changed the zoning for District 13 “immediately following a District 13 election

where a minority candidate . . . faced a non minority incumbent in District 13.”

Id. ¶¶ 88-89. Coker appears to contend that this revision violates the VRA

because it is a rezoning practice that has the effect “of reducing the

representation of minorities and minority women from holding public [office] in

violation of constitutional liberty to due process of law.” Id. ¶ 87. She asserts

this claim against the City Council alone.

The Defendants named in Counts VII and VIII move to dismiss these

claims for a variety of reasons, including a lack of standing. See City Motion

at 19 (arguing that Coker fails to allege a particularized injury relevant to

Counts VII and VIII); Secretary Motion at 3-5 (arguing that any injury is not

traceable to, or redressable by, the Secretary); Brown Motion at 6-11 (arguing

that Coker cannot establish any of the elements of standing as to Brown).

Because the Court finds that Coker fails to allege facts showing that she has

suffered a particularized injury from the purported wrongs alleged in these

Counts, the Court will dismiss Counts VII and VIII for lack of standing.

Coker lacks standing to assert her VRA claims because she fails to allege

the “foremost” of standing’s requirements: an injury in fact. See Trichell, 964

F.3d at 996. As stated above, an injury in fact is “‘an invasion of a legally

protected interest’ that is both ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560). Significantly, “[a] particularized injury is one that ‘affect[s] the plaintiff

in a personal and individual way.’” See Wood v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307,

1314 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548). Upon review of the

Third Amended Complaint, the Court can identify no discernible injury

particular to Coker from the wrongdoing alleged in Counts VII and VIII.

As to Count VII, Coker does not affirmatively allege that she was charged

a qualifying fee, much less when she was charged such a fee, by whom, or

whether she paid it. Coker vaguely asserts that the qualifying fee cannot be

waived, see TAC ¶ 80, but does not allege whether she requested a waiver, to

whom she made such a request, and whether it was denied.13 The Third

Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegations that at any time Coker, herself,

was unable to seek office due to the qualifying fee or that she faced an undue

burden in seeking office because of the fee, as opposed to Black female

candidates generally. See TAC ¶¶ 82, 84. Indeed, the facts alleged in the

Third Amended Complaint pertain to Coker’s successful selection for a vacant

City Council seat. Although the City Council later refused to seat her, Coker

does not allege that her ability or inability to pay the qualifying fee had any

connection to those events.14 And significantly, Coker does not allege that she

intends to run for office in the future and will be subject to a qualifying fee at

that time. Likewise, as to Count VIII, Coker does not allege that she was

injured by the rezoning that allegedly occurred in 2013, either as an impacted

candidate or as a voter in that district.

13 Notably, Coker also fails to allege whether she attempted to qualify via the petition

process in lieu of paying the qualifying fee as permitted by the City Charter. See Lake City,

Fla. Charter § 508.

14 While it appears Coker did later run for election to that seat, see supra note 12, there

are no allegations in the Third Amended Complaint pertaining to that election or how Coker

was able to qualify as a candidate.

Rather than allegations particular to her, Coker alleges undifferentiated,

generalized grievances in Counts VII and VIII about the purportedly

discriminatory effects of the City’s election practices. See, e.g., TAC ¶ 84

(alleging that the fee gives less opportunity to “minorities, and minority

women”); id. ¶ 86 (alleging that the fee places an “undue burden on candidates”);

id. ¶ 90 (alleging that the rezoning diminishes the voting rights of “any citizens

of the United States”). But “a generalized grievance, ‘no matter how sincere,’

cannot support standing.” See Wood, 981 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Hollingsworth

v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013)). While the actions alleged may have caused

a cognizable injury, Coker has not placed herself among the injured. See

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ test . . . requires that the party

seeking review be [her]self among the injured.” (citation omitted)). Absent any

particularized injury to Coker, she lacks standing to challenge these allegedly

discriminatory practices. Accordingly, Counts VII and VIII are due to be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.

B. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief15

The Court next turns to Coker’s demands for declaratory and injunctive

relief. Coker begins most counts with a statement that she “alleges this action

15 The Court notes that although some Defendants do challenge Coker’s standing as to

certain claims, no Defendant appears to challenge her standing to seek declaratory or

injunctive relief in particular. Nonetheless, as standing is a question of the Court’s

jurisdiction, it is not subject to waiver and the Court is obligated to consider it sua sponte

whenever it may be lacking. See Bischoff, 222 F.3d at 877-78.

for injunctive and declaratory relief . . . .” See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 31, 56, 87. In

addition, as stated above, she ends several counts with a vague demand for

injunctive relief. However, to the extent Coker seeks such relief, she lacks

standing to do so. Significantly, “standing ‘is not dispensed in gross,’” meaning

that a “‘plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and for each form of

relief that is sought.’” See JW ex rel. Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,

904 F.3d 1248, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe

Estates, 581 U.S. 433, 439 (2017)). “‘[T]o demonstrate that a case or

controversy exists to meet the Article III standing requirement when a plaintiff

is seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, a plaintiff must allege facts from

which it appears there is a substantial likelihood that [s]he will suffer injury in

the future.’” Worthy v. City of Phenix City, Ala., 930 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342,

1346 (11th Cir. 1999)). “Logically, ‘a prospective remedy will provide no relief

for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past.’” Church v.

City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Am. Postal

Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir. 1992)).

Here, Coker makes no attempt to allege a threat of future harm, much

less a real and immediate threat. Indeed, the harms described in the Third

Amended Complaint are entirely in the past. Notably, Coker does not seek an

injunction requiring the City Council to seat her, and indeed, the vacant seat to

which she was allegedly appointed has now been filled through the election in

August 2022. See Judge Fina Motion, Ex. 3. Nor does Coker allege that she

intends to seek a seat on the City Council in the future, or even attend a City

Council meeting. In sum, prospective relief is not available because Coker has

not alleged facts showing that she is likely to have another encounter with any

Defendant under the same or similar circumstances that gave rise to her past

injuries. See Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1215; see also Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm

Beach Cnty., No. 13-80437-CIV-MARRA, 2014 WL 12650695, at *2 (S.D. Fla.

Oct. 17, 2014) (explaining that “[i]njuries sustained from ‘past conduct’ will not

support a claim for declaratory relief absent a showing ‘that such conduct has

continued or will be repeated in the future’” (quoting Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d

1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985))). The Court can do no more than speculate about

whether or when the unique circumstances that led to this lawsuit could

reoccur. Because Coker has not pled sufficient facts to show any ongoing or

future harm, she cannot pursue her claims insofar as she seeks declaratory or

injunctive relief. See Maisonet v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., No. 22-10023,

2022 WL 4283560, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 16, 2022) (“Because declaratory and

injunctive relief necessarily do not redress past harm, standing for such claims

requires a showing of an ongoing or future injury.”).

V. Failure to State a Claim

A. Judge Fina

Next, the Court turns to Judge Fina’s Motion as the claims against Judge

Fina are subject to dismissal for reasons specific to him. Coker asserts two

claims against Judge Fina: conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count IX) and

deprivation of her “right to seek justice” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count X).

Significantly, Coker sues Judge Fina “in his official capacity as Judge of the

Third Circuit Judicial Court.” See TAC at 2. A lawsuit against a government

official in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the entity he

represents. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A]

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such it is no different

from a suit against the State itself.” (internal citation omitted)). In Florida,

the state court system, and therefore a state court judge acting in his official

capacity, are considered arms of the State of Florida. See Uberoi v. Supreme

Court of Florida, 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016); Badillo v. Thorpe, 158

F. App’x 208, 213-14 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, Coker’s § 1983 and § 1985 claims

against Judge Fina in his official capacity are treated as claims against the

State of Florida.

Section 1983 allows claims against any “person,” acting under color of

law, who deprives another of his or her constitutional or statutory rights. 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Similarly, § 1985 makes it unlawful for “two or more persons”

to conspire to interfere with civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In Will, the

Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a State can be considered a

“person” for purposes of § 1983 liability, and ultimately decided that “a State is

not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will, 491 U.S. at 64. The Will

Court further determined that “governmental entities that are considered ‘arms

of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes,” as well as state officials sued

in their official capacity are also not considered “persons” within the meaning

of § 1983. Id. at 70-71. This same analysis applies to the term “person” in §

1985. See Andela v. Univ. of Miami, 461 F. App’x 832, 837 (11th Cir. 2012);

Hayden v. Ala. Dep’t of Public Safety, 506 F. Supp. 2d 944, 949 (M.D. Ala. 2007)

(collecting cases); see also Cuyler v. Scriven, No. 6:11-cv-87-MEF, 2011 WL

861709, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2011). Because Judge Fina in his official

capacity is considered an “arm of the state,” and therefore, not a “person” under

these statutes, he cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 and § 1985.16

16 Judge Fina correctly asserts that, in his official capacity, he is also immune from

Coker’s claims for damages under the Eleventh Amendment. See Judge Fina Motion at 3;

Uberoi, 819 F.3d at 1313-14; Badillo, 158 F. App’x at 213; see also Cuyler, 2011 WL 861709,

at *2. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that the question of whether a statute

permits the cause of action it creates to be asserted against a State should be addressed before

the question of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. See Vermont Agency of

Natural Res. v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 779-80 (2000). As such, the Court finds it

appropriate to dismiss the claims against Judge Fina on the basis that in his official capacity

as an arm of the state of Florida he is not a “person” amenable to suit for damages under §

1983 or § 1985. The Court acknowledges that there are exceptions to both of these principles

that apply to requests for injunctive relief, but Coker does not specifically demand injunctive

Accordingly, Coker fails to state a claim for damages under § 1983 or § 1985

against Judge Fina in his official capacity as a state court judge, and as such,

the claims against him are due to be dismissed.17

B. Count IX: § 1985 Conspiracy

In the Third Amended Complaint, Coker asserts a claim for conspiracy

under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all Defendants. See TAC ¶¶ 91-92. 18

relief as to Count X, see TAC at 66, and as to Count IX, Coker does not allege facts sufficient

to support her standing to seek such relief, as explained above.

17 Even if Coker intended to assert her claims for damages against Judge Fina in his

individual capacity for actions taken under color of state law, her claims would still be subject

to dismissal. In his individual capacity, Judge Fina is entitled to absolute judicial immunity

for the acts of which Coker complains. Harris v. Deveaux, 780 F.2d 911, 914 (11th Cir. 1986);

see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,

1172 (11th Cir. 1985). The allegations against Judge Fina concern his handling of Coker’s

state court cases and there is nothing in the Third Amended Complaint that could support a

finding that Judge Fina acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Harris, 780 F.2d

at 914-16; see also Drees v. Ferguson, 396 F. App’x 656, 658 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A judge does

not act in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction’ when he acts erroneously, maliciously, or in

excess of his authority, but instead, only when he acts without subject-matter jurisdiction.”).

18 The Court notes that Defendants Williams, the County, Foreman, Brown, and the

Secretary move to dismiss Coker’s § 1985 conspiracy claim for lack of standing. These

Defendants argue that Coker fails to allege a particularized injury traceable to them. See

Williams Motion at 6-10; County Motion at 6-10; Foreman Motion at 6-10; Brown Motion at

6-11; Secretary Motion at 3-5. Upon review, the Court finds sufficient allegations to

demonstrate Coker’s standing to assert the conspiracy claim at this stage in the proceedings.

Coker alleges that Defendants conspired to prevent her from being seated as a City Council

member after she was appointed to the position. She alleges she suffered damages, including

lost earnings, as a result. Such injury would be redressable through a judgment

compensating Coker for her alleged damages. Although, for the reasons set forth below,

Coker’s vague and generalized allegations of conspiracy fail to state a claim, the Court finds

that they are sufficient, at this stage in the proceedings, to establish her standing to assert

this claim. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of

injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we

‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support

the claim.’” (citation omitted)). Indeed, Defendants’ arguments to the contrary appear to

conflate the merits of Coker’s claims with her standing to assert them. See Moody v. Holman,

887 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018) (“The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts

Although the Court will dismiss this claim against Judge Fina for the reasons

stated above, the Court next considers whether Coker has adequately stated a

claim for § 1985 conspiracy against the remaining Defendants.19 For the

reasons that follow, the answer is plainly that she has not.

As an initial matter, it is unclear under which subsection of § 1985 Coker

seeks to proceed. In the Third Amended Complaint, Coker quotes from the

statutory language of subsection (1). See TAC ¶ 92. Section 1985(1)

prohibits, in relevant part, conspiracies by two or more persons “to prevent, by

force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office,

trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any

duties thereof . . . .” Significantly, “[t]he purpose of this section is to proscribe

conspiracies that interfere with the performance of official duties by federal

officers.” See Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 929 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis

added). The allegations here do not involve a federal office, but rather an

alleged conspiracy to prevent Coker from being seated on the City Council of a

‘must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence of Article III standing.’” (quoting Ariz.

St. Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015)); see also Maisonet,

2022 WL 4283560, at *3. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Coker’s

conspiracy claim.

19 To the extent Coker asserts her § 1985 conspiracy claim against the “Florida

Secretary of State, Division of Elections,” see TAC at 2, 46, she does so in his official capacity

and as such, the claim is due to be dismissed for the same reasons stated above as to Judge

Fina. The Secretary of State in his official capacity is an arm of the State of Florida and

therefore not a “person” within the meaning of § 1985, and entitled to immunity under the

Eleventh Amendment regardless.

municipality, Lake City, Florida. As such, Coker cannot state a claim under §

1985(1).20

To the extent she asserts a claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3), as

Defendants appear to believe, Coker must allege facts demonstrating:

(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of

the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and

(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is

either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.

See Trawinski v. United Tech., 313 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation

omitted). Defendants assert that Coker fails to state a claim because she does

not allege sufficient facts demonstrating a meeting of the minds between the

alleged conspirators. See, e.g., City Motion at 21-22; Coalition Motion at 2-3;

Newspaper Motion at 2-3; Chamber Motion at 3; Robinson Motion at 3; Brown

Motion at 17; Foreman Motion at 14; Williams Motion at 15; County Motion at

15. This argument is well-taken.

“The core of a conspiracy claim is an agreement between the parties; thus,

where the plaintiff fails to allege an agreement, the pleading is deficient and

subject to dismissal.” See Mickens v. Tenth Judicial Circuit, 181 F. App’x 865,

876 (11th Cir. 2006). Although Coker generally asserts that Defendants

20 Section 1985(2) is plainly inapposite as it “applies only if the conspiracy attempted

to prevent the witness from attending or testifying in federal court.” Id. at 930.

engaged in a conspiracy, her Third Amended Complaint is largely devoid of

factual allegations from which one could plausibly infer the existence of an

agreement between the numerous Defendants allegedly involved. See

Kearson v. S. Bell Tel. & Telegraph Co., 763 F.2d 405, 407 (11th Cir. 1985) (“In

civil rights and conspiracy actions, conclusory, vague, and general allegations

of conspiracy may justify dismissal of a complaint.”); see also Mickens, 181 F.

App’x at 876. Nevertheless, even assuming the existence of an agreement

between some Defendants, the Newspaper Defendants correctly argue that

Coker cannot state a claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3) because she fails to

allege any facts demonstrating invidious discriminatory intent. See

Newspaper Reply at 2.

Significantly, “a claim under § 1985(3) requires . . . proof of invidious

discriminatory intent as well as the violation of a serious constitutional right

protected not just from official, but also from private encroachment.”

Trawinski, 313 F.3d at 1299; Kearson, 763 F.2d at 407. As such, to assert a

conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), Coker must allege “‘some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus’ behind the

defendant’s action taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” See Dean v.

Warren, 12 F.4th 1248, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria

Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993)). Here, setting aside the

question of whether Coker has any constitutionally protected right to hold

public office as she alleges, Coker does not contend that Defendants were

motivated by invidious discriminatory intent. Indeed, she does not include any

allegations in Count IX concerning the motivations of the numerous Defendants

involved in the alleged conspiracy.21 Reading the Third Amended Complaint

as a whole, it appears that some Defendants may have been opposed to Coker

due to her outspoken criticism of the City Council and its dealings with the

Coalition Defendants. But such motivations do not constitute “the requisite

racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory intent” necessary to state a

claim for conspiracy under § 1985(3). See White v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsborough

Cnty., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278-79 (M.D. Fla. 2007). In light of the foregoing,

Count IX is due to be dismissed.22

21 At most, Coker alleges that one Defendant spoke in favor of a different candidate

because that candidate “was the only candidate that looked like someone who would garner

support from the likes of a [sic] Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos.” See TAC ¶ 102. But this

allegation alone falls far short of raising a plausible inference that Defendants were opposed

to Coker due to class-based animus, especially given that Coker herself does not affirmatively

draw this conclusion in the Third Amended Complaint.

22 The Court notes that Defendant Stephen Douglas did not file his own motion to

dismiss and has not appeared in this action. See Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 148), filed

September 20, 2022. The § 1985 conspiracy is the sole claim against Douglas. Upon review,

the Court finds that Douglas is similarly situated to the moving Defendants, and the claim

against him is integrally related to the claims of the moving Defendants. Indeed, to the

extent Douglas took any actions ascribed to the conspiracy, he did so through his counsel,

Defendant Foreman. See TAC ¶¶ 93, 120, 122. As such, the Court finds it appropriate to

dismiss the conspiracy claim as to all Defendants, including Douglas. See Courboin v. Scott,

596 F. App’x 729, 735 (11th Cir. 2014) (“A district court may on its own motion dismiss an

action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position

similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally

related.”); see also Savales v. Waters, Case No. 3:19-cv-523-J-32PDB, 2020 WL 1138259, at *7

n.3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2020). For this reason, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc.

171) is due to be denied.

C. Counts II and V: § 1983 “Right to Participate in Meetings”

and “Right to Hold Public Office”

In Counts II and V, Coker asserts claims under § 1983 against the City

Council; Councilmembers Hill, Sampson, Witt, and Jefferson; Deputy

Supervisor of Elections and City Clerk Audrey Sikes; and City Attorney Fred

Koberlein Jr. In the caption of the Third Amended Complaint, Coker names

the individuals in both their personal and official capacities. See TAC at 1.23

In Count II, Coker alleges that these Defendants deprived her of her

“constitutional liberty interest into [sic] participate in democracy by attending

public meetings without the threat of harm and intimidation to either herself

or members of her family.” Id. ¶ 31. In support, Coker asserts that at

multiple City Council meetings Defendants failed to enforce the City Ordinance

on decorum and instead allowed private citizens to “slander and defame” Coker

publicly, and “to hurl threats to her and her minor children repeatedly . . . .”

Id. ¶¶ 35-36, 38. According to Coker, the City Council allowed the private

citizens to engage in this conduct “in retaliation” against Coker “for making

23 As explained above, by naming these individuals in their personal and official

capacities, Coker is asserting her claims against both the individuals and the city they

represent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). Unlike states,

municipalities are subject to liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). But municipal liability claims raise separate

issues that do not apply to claims against individuals. See Worthy, 930 F.3d at 1220 n.1

(noting the “morass” that usually accompanies § 1983 claims against municipalities).

Nevertheless, the City Defendants do not raise any arguments specific to municipal liability,

nor do they assert qualified immunity as a defense to the personal-capacity claims. As such,

the Court does not distinguish between the municipal and individual claims in the analysis

that follows.

protected disclosures.” Id. ¶ 40. In Count V, Coker alleges a deprivation of

“her constitutional liberty interest in holding public office.” Id. ¶ 56.

Although in Count V, Coker does not include any allegations of Defendants’

motivation, elsewhere in her pleading, Coker asserts that the City Council and

Hill “denied [Coker] the public office after its selection on October 26, 2021 as

retaliation for the protected disclosures of gross waste and abuse of public

offices.” Id. ¶ 37.

“The first task in a section 1983 suit is ‘to isolate the precise

constitutional violation with which [defendant] is charged.’” Jordan v. Mosley,

298 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.

137, 140 (1979)). In Counts II and V, Coker refers to her “constitutional liberty

interest” and “fundamental right[s],” see TAC ¶¶ 31, 34, 56, such that she

appears to be invoking substantive due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The

substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those rights that are

‘fundamental,’ that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”

(citation omitted)). Indeed, the City Defendants interpret these claims as

substantive due process claims and move to dismiss because Coker “has not

alleged a fundamental substantive constitutional right . . . .” See City Motion

at 15-16. In her Response, Coker does not identify the constitutional provision

under which she asserts these claims and does not otherwise directly respond

to the City’s argument. See Response to City Motion at 7. Instead, Coker

asserts that in Count II she alleges an interference with her “right to participate

in public meetings,” and in Count V she alleges a violation of her “right to hold

public office . . . .” Id.

The City Defendants are correct that Coker fails to state a substantive

due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court

does not view these claims as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Generally, Coker alleges that government officials retaliated against her for

criticizing the City Council. This conduct, to the extent it implicates the

Constitution at all, is governed by the First Amendment. Significantly, where

a different Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection against the sort of conduct complained of, that Amendment—not the

more generalized notion of substantive due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment—is the guide for analyzing the claim.” See Jordan, 298 F. App’x

at 805; see also Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313, 1326 (11th Cir. 2019); Velez

v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, regardless of Coker’s vague

references to liberty interests and fundamental rights, the Court is required to

analyze the claim for “what it actually is, not for what [Coker] would have it

be.” See McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560 (giving no weight to the label the plaintiff

gave his claim because the court’s responsibility “is to examine [the plaintiff’s]

cause of action for what it actually is, not for what [the plaintiff] would have it

be”).24

In light of the foregoing, the Court will analyze whether Coker has stated

a claim for First Amendment retaliation. “To state a claim for First

Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that [she] engaged in protected

speech, that the official’s conduct adversely affected the protected speech, and

that a causal connection exists between the speech and the official’s retaliatory

conduct.” See Echols, 913 F.3d at 1320. As to the “adverse effect” prong of the

analysis, courts consider “whether [the official’s] alleged conduct ‘would likely

deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights

. . . .’” Id. (quoting Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 481 (11th Cir. 2016)).

Significantly, the test is an objective one and trivial injuries, or those that

“amount to no more than de minimis inconvenience in the exercise of First

Amendment rights” are insufficient. See Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,

1252 (11th Cir. 2005). To demonstrate a causal connection, Coker must allege

facts giving rise to a plausible inference that the City Defendants “were

24 Notably, Coker’s failure to correctly recognize the nature of her claims is not a basis

for dismissal. See Torres v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 734 F. App’x 688, 691-92 (11th Cir. 2018)

(explaining that the liberal construction afforded pro se litigants “means that federal courts

must sometimes look beyond the labels used in a pro se party’s complaint and focus on the

content and substance of the allegations”); see also Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S.

10, 11 (2014) (holding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “do not countenance dismissal

of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted”).

subjectively motivated” to engage in the adverse action because of Coker’s

protected speech. See Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008).

Upon careful consideration, the Court finds that Coker’s allegations are

insufficient to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation.

In Count II, Coker alleges that at “multiple meetings” over the span of

nearly a year, the Councilmembers “sat quietly” while private citizens “hurl[ed]

threats” at Coker and her children. See TAC ¶ 36. Coker further asserts that

the City Council allowed these same private citizens to violate the decorum

policy at public meetings and “defame, threaten, harass, and intimidate” Coker

“in retaliation for making protected disclosures.” Id. ¶ 40. Notably, the Court

questions whether the City Defendants’ mere inaction in failing to enforce the

decorum policy is sufficient to support a claim for First Amendment retaliation.

See L.H. v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 666 F. App’x 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2016)

(“[A]llegations of inaction are not sufficient to establish an actionable claim for

retaliation.”). Regardless, even if inaction could support a retaliation claim

under some circumstances, the allegations here are inadequate. Significantly,

in Count II, Coker does not allege what was said that she contends was

threatening or defamatory, nor does she allege the frequency with which such

comments were made at any given meeting. Setting aside her merely

conclusory descriptions of the purported harassment, which are not entitled to

a presumption of truth, Coker has not alleged sufficient facts from which the

Court can infer anything more than de minimis harm.25

Even assuming Coker’s allegations are sufficient to demonstrate the

requisite adverse effect, Coker fails to include factual allegations from which

one can infer any causal connection between her protected conduct and the

failure to enforce the decorum policy. Although close temporal proximity can

give rise to an inference of causation, see Ranize v. Town of Lady Lake, Fla.,

No. 5:11–cv–646–Oc–32TBS, 2012 WL 4856749, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012),

here, the timing of the events alleged in the Third Amended Complaint

undermines any causal inference. Significantly, Coker alleges that the City

Council failed to enforce the decorum policy at meetings occurring before the

date of her first alleged “protected disclosures.” See TAC ¶ 36 (alleging a

failure to enforce the policy beginning in December 2020) and ¶ 18 (alleging a

disclosure on January 4, 2021, the earliest identifiable date of any alleged

disclosure). Moreover, Coker does not assert any facts connecting the City

Council’s failure to enforce the decorum policy to her specifically. For example,

Coker does not assert that the City Council had previously enforced the policy

25 Although the standard for “adverse effect” is an objective one, it is notable that Coker

does not allege that she was in any way deterred from attending meetings or speaking out as

a result of the City Council’s failure to enforce the decorum policy. See Bethel v. Town of

Loxley, 221 F. App’x 812, 813-14 (11th Cir. 2006). To the contrary, as set forth in the Third

Amended Complaint, it appears Coker continued to attend meetings regularly and to make

disclosures for months.

and stopped when she began making disclosures, or that the City Council

enforced the policy as to other individuals but not her. Coker’s allegations are

simply too vague and conclusory to give rise to a plausible causal connection

between her “disclosures” and the City Council’s failure to enforce the decorum

policy. As such, Count II is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

Similarly, as to Count V, the sequence of events between Coker’s

“disclosures” and the City Council’s refusal to seat her undermines any

inference of retaliation. 26 Coker alleges that she began making these

“disclosures” in January of 2021. See TAC ¶ 18. The last “disclosure” she

alleges with an identifiable date occurred in June of 2021. See TAC ¶ 22. The

City Council voted to appoint Coker to the vacant seat months later, on October

26, 2021. See TAC ¶ 61.a. Thus, it was well after Coker’s disclosures that the

City Council voted to appoint her to the vacant seat, undermining any inference

26 The Court notes that, in Count V, Coker does not actually allege that the refusal to

seat her was retaliatory. See TAC ¶¶ 56-61. Rather, that allegation is located in Count II.

See TAC ¶ 37. As such, the specific nature of the claim Coker intends to assert in Count V is

difficult to discern. In an abundance of caution, and in recognition of her pro se status, the

Court considers whether Coker has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for First

Amendment retaliation in Count V. However, to the extent Coker asserts this claim based

on her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, her claim fails for

the reasons discussed in the next section. Coker’s legal interest in holding the City Council

seat to which she was appointed, to the extent she had one, is governed by state law and City

ordinance. It does not implicate substantive due process. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.

1, 7 (1944) (“[A]n unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political office is not a

denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the due process clause.”); see also Houchens

v. Beshear, 850 F. App’x 340, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2021) (“The Supreme Court has not included

the right to maintain public employment as a substantive due process right specifically

protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . . This line of reasoning . . . naturally

extends from public employees to political appointees.”)

that it was these disclosures that then motivated the same City Council to deny

her the seat a few days later. Significantly, Coker does not allege that she

engaged in any protected speech between the date of her appointment and the

date the City Council changed course and refused to seat her. Indeed, Coker

alleges that Hill’s stated reason for changing his vote was because he learned

information about Coker’s “past.” Id. ¶ 67. According to the newspaper

article embedded in the Third Amended Complaint, the information concerned

Coker’s history of filing for bankruptcy and a prior arrest. See id. ¶ 104.

Coker does not allege that Hill’s stated reason was a pretext for a retaliatory

motive, and his decision to reverse course based on this information does not

implicate the First Amendment. Because Coker fails to allege facts

demonstrating any causal connection between her disclosures and the City

Defendants’ refusal to seat her on the Council, Count V is due to be dismissed

as well.

D. Count VI: § 1983 Due Process

In Count VI, Coker alleges that Defendants Sampson, Witt, Jefferson,

Hill, Sikes, and Koberlein violated her constitutional right to due process when

they refused to seat her on the City Council without following the procedures

set forth in the City Charter for removing a Councilmember from office. See

TAC ¶¶ 62, 67-68. Specifically, Coker alleges that these Defendants

“remove[d]” Coker “from her duly appointed official capacity,” without following

the process required under the City Charter. See TAC ¶ 68. Thus, Coker’s

claim is that by refusing to seat Coker on the City Council, after appointing her

to the position and receiving her “Oath of Office,” these Defendants deprived

Coker of her seat on the City Council without providing her constitutionally

adequate process. As such, it appears Coker is asserting a procedural due

process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. “A Section 1983 procedural

due process claim requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: ‘(1) a deprivation

of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and

(3) constitutionally-inadequate process.’” See Catron v. City of St. Petersburg,

658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d

1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)). Significantly, the type of interest implicated

impacts the type of process constitutionally required. See Campbell v. Pierce

Cnty., Ga., 741 F.2d 1342, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 1984).

The City Defendants appear to view Coker’s procedural due process claim

as pertaining to the deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest.

See City Motion at 15; see also TAC ¶ 62 (alleging a deprivation of her

“constitutional liberty to due process of law”). As such, the City asserts that

Coker cannot assert a procedural due process claim because post-deprivation

state court remedies were available. See City Motion at 16 (citing Cotton v.

Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2000)). And indeed, Coker alleges in the

Third Amended Complaint that she utilized at least one available state court

process by filing her petition for writ of mandamus. See TAC ¶ 61.i., Ex. D.

Coker does not respond to these arguments or otherwise dispute the City

Defendants’ characterization of her claim. While the Court questions whether

Coker is actually asserting the deprivation of a liberty interest in Count VI, to

the extent she is, the City Defendants are correct that such a claim is due to be

dismissed given the availability of state court remedies. See Cotton, 216 F.3d

at 1332-33.

Although Coker fails to state a procedural due process claim based on the

deprivation of a liberty interest, the Court also considers whether Coker has

properly alleged such a claim premised on the deprivation of a constitutionally

protected property interest, i.e., the public office to which she believes she was

entitled. Significantly, “[w]here a property interest is at stake, courts have

usually held that a pre-deprivation hearing may be required.” See Campbell,

741 F.2d at 1344 (emphasis added); see also Galbreath v. Hale Cnty. Ala.

Comm’n, 754 F. App’x 820, 827-28 (11th Cir. 2018). However, Coker’s claim

fails under this analysis as well because, as noted above, the Supreme Court

has determined that the “unlawful denial by state action of a right to state

political office is not a denial of a right of property or of liberty secured by the

due process clause.” See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944); see also

Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 576-77 (1900) (“The view that public office is

not property has been generally entertained in this country. . . . The decisions

are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and

not property as such.”); Houchens v. Beshear, 850 F. App’x 340, 343 (6th Cir.

2021) (“[P]ublic officers do not have a property interest in their positions.”);

Velez, 401 F.3d at 86-87. Indeed, the Florida Constitution explicitly states

that “[a] public office is a public trust.” See Fla. Const. art. II, sec. 8; see also

Israel v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv576-MW/MAF, 2020 WL 2129450, at *9-10 (N.D.

Fla. May 5, 2020) (“In Florida law, as in federal law, public service is a privilege,

not a right.”). As such, even assuming Coker was entitled to be seated on the

City Council as she contends, the purportedly wrongful deprivation of this seat

cannot form the basis of a procedural due process claim. Accordingly, Count

VI is due to be dismissed as well.

VI. State Claims

Having determined that Coker’s federal claims are due to be dismissed,

the Court next considers whether to continue to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. In Counts I, III, IV, and XI,

Coker asserts claims for relief under Florida state law. “The decision to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pend[e]nt state claims rests within the

discretion of the district court.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,

1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court may

decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state claim if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims

over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has

original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling

reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Notably, “[a]ny one of the section 1367(c) factors is

sufficient to give the district court discretion to dismiss a case's supplemental

state law claims.” Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743

(11th Cir. 2006). However, upon determining that it has the discretion under

§ 1367(c) to decline jurisdiction, “[a district court] should consider the

traditional rationales for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and

convenience in deciding whether or not to exercise that jurisdiction.” Palmer

v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th Cir. 1994). Upon

due consideration, the Court finds that judicial economy and convenience would

not be served by retaining jurisdiction over Coker’s state law claims. Thus, the

Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court has determined that the federal

claims in Counts II and V-X of the Third Amended Complaint, over which the

Court has original jurisdiction, are due to be dismissed. What remains are

uniquely state law claims that are best addressed by the state courts.

Although this case has been pending for some time, it has not progressed beyond

the motion to dismiss stage. The Court has not issued any dispositive rulings

pertaining to the state law claims, and discovery has been stayed since

December 2, 2022. See Order (Doc. 169). Thus, the procedural posture of the

case weighs in favor of declining jurisdiction to allow the case to proceed fully

in state court. Moreover, when, as here, the federal claims are dismissed prior

to trial, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “encouraged district courts

to dismiss any remaining state claims.” Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089; Busse v. Lee

Cnty., 317 F. App’x 968, 973-74 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Since the district court ‘had

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,' it therefore had the

discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Appellant's] state law

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Furthermore, we expressly encourage district

courts to take such action when all federal claims have been dismissed

pretrial.”). See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7

(1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before

trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction

doctrine- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity- will point toward

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”).

Upon consideration of the § 1367 factors and the “traditional rationales

for pendent jurisdiction, including judicial economy and convenience,” see

Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Coker’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly, Counts I,

III, IV, and XI of the Third Amended Complaint are due to be dismissed without

prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state court.27

In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 15, 49, 53, 78, 79, 80, 81, 94, 101, 102,

110, and 131) are GRANTED, in part, to the extent set forth in this

Order, and otherwise DENIED.

2. The VRA claims set forth in Counts VII and VIII are DISMISSED

without prejudice for lack of standing.

3. To the extent Coker seeks declaratory and injunctive relief in the

various counts of the Third Amended Complaint, her claims for such

relief are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of standing.

27 The Court notes that Coker will suffer no harm from the Court’s decision to decline

supplemental jurisdiction because federal law provides for the tolling of the state limitations

period while a state claim is pending in federal court. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)

provides that:

[t]he period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for

any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same

time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled

while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless

State law provides for a longer tolling period.

As such, even if the statute of limitations has otherwise run on Coker’s state law claims, Coker

has at least thirty days to refile her claims in state court. See Dukes v. Georgia, 212 F. App’x

916, 917-18 (11th Cir. 2006); Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1354

n.18 (M.D. Fla. 2015).

4. The claims for damages set forth in Counts II, V, VI, IX, and X are

DISMISSED.

5. The state law claims set forth in Counts I, III, IV, and XI are

DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling in the appropriate state

court.

6. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 171) is DENIED

without prejudice.

7. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment, terminate all

pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 2nd day of March,

2023.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Ie11

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