Opinion

White v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Duval County)

Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed: Nov 14, 2022
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 19.9%

noting that to provide the state with the opportunity to rule on and correct alleged violations of a prisoner’s federal rights, “the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”

How later courts described this case

noting that to provide the state with the opportunity to rule on and correct alleged violations of a prisoner’s federal rights, “the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”
“And because counsel’s conduct is presumed reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.”
stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”
recognizing that vague, conclusory, speculative, or unsupported claims cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CASIE LANEE WHITE,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-1297-MMH-PDB

SECRETARY, FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Casie Lanee White, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action on October 11, 2019, by filing a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Petition; Doc. 1).1 In the Petition,

White challenges a 2015 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of

conviction for second-degree murder. She raises eleven grounds for relief. See

Petition at 5-14. Respondents submitted a memorandum in opposition to the

Petition. See Response (Doc. 5). They also submitted exhibits. See Docs. 6-1

through 6-5. White filed a brief in reply. See Reply (Doc. 8). This action is ripe

for review.

1 For purposes of reference to pleadings and exhibits, the Court will cite the

document page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system.

II. Relevant Procedural History

On March 5, 2014, the State of Florida charged White by information

with second-degree murder (count one). Doc. 6-1 at 42. On February 12, 2015,

at the conclusion of a trial, the jury found White guilty of count one with the

special finding that she carried, displayed, used, threatened to use, or

attempted to use a weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at 121-

22. On March 20, 2015, the trial court sentenced White to a term of life in

prison. Id. at 132-37.

On direct appeal, White, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial

brief, arguing the trial court erred when it denied White’s request for a

special jury instruction, and the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied White’s motion for a continuance. Doc. 6-4 at 271-304. The State filed

an answer brief. Id. at 306-40. White filed a reply brief. Id. at 342-57. The

First DCA per curiam affirmed White’s conviction and sentence without a

written opinion on January 5, 2017, id. at 359, and issued the mandate on

January 23, 2017, id. at 361.

On March 29, 2018, White filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief

pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Id. at 380-405. In her

Rule 3.850 Motion, White alleged counsel was ineffective when he failed to:

present “a reasonable hypothesis of innocence” (ground one); move for

immunity based on Stand Your Ground2 (ground two); present exculpatory

DNA evidence and suppress the murder weapon (ground three); subpoena

DNA tests of White’s clothes and the victim’s fingernail clippings (ground

four); retain a mental health expert to evaluate White (ground five);

“aggressively” cross-examine State witness Andre Davis (ground six);

investigate and present a viable defense of innocence (ground seven); and

have White testify at trial (ground eight). Id. at 380-400. White also alleged

the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a

continuance (ground nine), and the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors

resulted in an unfair trial (ground ten). Id. at 400-04. On May 27, 2018, the

postconviction court summarily denied relief on all grounds. Id. at 406-09;

Doc. 6-5 at 1-12. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of relief

without a written opinion on September 9, 2019, id. at 249, and issued the

mandate on October 7, 2019, id. at 252.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

This action was timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

2 Fla. Stat. § 776.032.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to

establish the need for a federal evidentiary hearing. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th Cir. 2011). “In deciding whether to

grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a

hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s factual allegations,

which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007); Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834

F.3d 1299, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2016). “It follows that if the record refutes the

applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district

court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at

474. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before

the Court. Because the Court can “adequately assess [White’s] claim[s]

without further factual development,” Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal petition for habeas corpus. See Ledford v.

Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir.

2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief

functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal

justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.’” Id. (quoting Greene

v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (quotation marks omitted)). As such, federal

habeas review of final state court decisions is “‘greatly circumscribed’ and

‘highly deferential.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th

Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state

court decision, if any, that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Marshall

v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state

court need not issue a written opinion explaining its rationale in order for the

state court’s decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). Where the state court’s

adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, the United

States Supreme Court has instructed:

[T]he federal court should “look through” the

unexplained decision to the last related state-court

decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It

should then presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.

Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). The presumption may be

rebutted by showing that the higher state court’s adjudication most likely

relied on different grounds than the lower state court’s reasoned decision,

such as persuasive alternative grounds that were briefed or argued to the

higher court or obvious in the record it reviewed. Id. at 1192, 1196.

If the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, § 2254(d)

bars relitigation of the claim unless the state court’s decision (1) “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or

(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

Richter, 562 U.S. at 97-98. The Eleventh Circuit describes the limited scope

of federal review pursuant to § 2254 as follows:

First, § 2254(d)(1) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous legal conclusions. As

explained by the Supreme Court in Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d

389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) consists of two distinct

clauses: a “contrary to” clause and an “unreasonable

application” clause. The “contrary to” clause allows

for relief only “if the state court arrives at a

conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court

decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id.

at 413, 120 S. Ct. at 1523 (plurality opinion). The

“unreasonable application” clause allows for relief

only “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to

the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

Second, § 2254(d)(2) provides for federal review for

claims of state courts’ erroneous factual

determinations. Section 2254(d)(2) allows federal

courts to grant relief only if the state court’s denial of

the petitioner’s claim “was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has not yet defined §

2254(d)(2)’s “precise relationship” to § 2254(e)(1),

which imposes a burden on the petitioner to rebut the

state court’s factual findings “by clear and convincing

evidence.” See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. ---, ---, 134 S.

Ct. 10, 15, 187 L.Ed.2d 348 (2013); accord Brumfield

v. Cain, 576 U.S. ---, ---, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2282, 192

L.Ed.2d 356 (2015). Whatever that “precise

relationship” may be, “‘a state-court factual

determination is not unreasonable merely because

the federal habeas court would have reached a

different conclusion in the first instance.’” Titlow, 571

U.S. at ---, 134 S. Ct. at 15 (quoting Wood v. Allen,

558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d

738 (2010)).

Tharpe v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1323, 1337 (11th Cir. 2016). Also, deferential

review under § 2254(d) generally is limited to the record that was before the

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster,

563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011) (stating the language in § 2254(d)(1) “requires an

examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made”).

Thus, “AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for

prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court.” Burt v. Titlow,

134 S. Ct. 10, 16 (2013). “Federal courts may grant habeas relief only when a

state court blundered in a manner so ‘well understood and comprehended in

existing law’ and ‘was so lacking in justification’ that ‘there is no possibility

fairminded jurists could disagree.’” Tharpe, 834 F.3d at 1338 (quoting

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102-03). This standard is “meant to be” a “difficult” one

to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Thus, to the extent that the petitioner’s

claims were adjudicated on the merits in the state courts, they must be

evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense attorney’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per

curiam) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003), and Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that “counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” [Strickland,] 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. A court considering a claim of ineffective

assistance must apply a “strong presumption” that

counsel’s representation was within the “wide range”

of reasonable professional assistance. Id., at 689, 104

S. Ct. 2052. The challenger’s burden is to show “that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Id., at 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052.

With respect to prejudice, a challenger must

demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 694, 104 S. Ct.

2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had

some conceivable effect on the outcome of the

proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Counsel’s

errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “the absence of

any iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the Strickland test

before the other.” Ward, 592 F.3d at 1163. Since both prongs of the two-part

Strickland test must be satisfied to show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a

court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot meet

the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id. (citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d

1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in Strickland: “If it is easier to dispose

of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which

we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 697.

A state court’s adjudication of an ineffectiveness claim is accorded great

deference.

“[T]he standard for judging counsel’s representation

is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788. But “[e]stablishing that a state

court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable

under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are

both highly deferential, and when the two apply in

tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (citations and

quotation marks omitted). “The question is not

whether a federal court believes the state court’s

determination under the Strickland standard was

incorrect but whether that determination was

unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S. Ct.

1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009) (quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,”

then a federal court may not disturb a state-court

decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at ---,

131 S. Ct. at 788.

Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1248 (11th Cir. 2014); Knowles v.

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). In other words, “[i]n addition to the

deference to counsel’s performance mandated by Strickland, the AEDPA adds

another layer of deference — this one to a state court’s decision — when we

are considering whether to grant federal habeas relief from a state court’s

decision.” Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). As

such, “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).

VI. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Ground One3

As Ground One, White alleges that the trial court erred when it denied

her request for a special jury instruction defining the term “weapon” as an

instrument of attack or defense in combat or a means used to defend against

or defeat another. Petition at 5. White raised a substantially similar claim on

direct appeal, Doc. 6-4 at 287-90; the State filed an answer brief, id. at 312-

18; and the First DCA per curiam affirmed White’s conviction without a

written opinion, id. at 359.

Respondents argue that White failed to properly exhaust her claim

because she did not articulate a federal constitutional basis for the claim in

3 White does not provide specific facts to support the various grounds for

relief raised in her Petition, and she does not adopt the corresponding grounds

asserted on direct appeal or in her Rule 3.850 Motion. See generally Petition.

Nevertheless, the Court will consider the claims as set forth in the corresponding

grounds on direct appeal or in her Rule 3.850 Motion.

her initial brief. Response at 8. According to Respondents, because White

cannot return to state court to properly exhaust the claim, it is procedurally

defaulted. Id. Upon review of the record, the Court concludes that White has

not exhausted this claim, and that it is procedurally barred. In her initial

brief, White argued that the trial court did not comply with Florida law when

it denied her request for a special jury instruction. Doc. 6-4 at 287-90. She did

not allege the trial court violated her federal constitutional rights. Therefore,

White failed to fairly present the claim to the state court, which deprived the

state court of a meaningful opportunity to review the claim. See Baldwin v.

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (noting that to provide the state with the

opportunity to rule on and correct alleged violations of a prisoner’s federal

rights, “the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state

court . . . thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim”)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Because any future attempt to exhaust

this claim would be futile, it is procedurally defaulted. White has alleged

neither cause and prejudice nor a miscarriage of justice to overcome her

failure to exhaust. Accordingly, the claim for relief in Ground One is due to be

denied because White failed to exhaust it.

Nevertheless, even if White fairly presented a federal claim to the state

court, she still is not entitled to relief. In its appellate brief, the State

addressed the claim on the merits, Doc. 6-4 at 312-18; therefore, the appellate

court may have affirmed White’s conviction based on the argument presented

by the State. If the appellate court addressed the merits of the claim, the

state court’s adjudication is entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a

review of the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the

state court’s adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established

federal law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore,

White is not entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. “State court jury

instructions ordinarily comprise issues of state law and are not subject to

federal habeas corpus review absent fundamental unfairness.” Jones v.

Kemp, 794 F.2d 1536, 1540 (11th Cir. 1986). To establish fundamental

unfairness, the petitioner must demonstrate “the error ‘so infected the entire

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Jacobs v. Singletary,

952 F.2d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 154 (1977)). “An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to

be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155.

In such cases, the burden of the petitioner is “especially heavy.” Id.

Here, White requested the following instruction related to the felony

reclassification of the offense:4

A “weapon” is legally defined as an instrument of

attack or defense in combat or a means used to

defend against or defeat another.

Doc. 6-4 at 97. The trial court denied White’s request, finding the standard

jury instructions appropriately defined the term. Doc. 6-3 at 364. The jury

was instructed as follows:

If you find that CASIE LANEE WHITE committed

Second Degree Murder and you also find beyond a

reasonable doubt that during the commission of the

crime she personally carried, displayed, used,

threatened to use, or attempted to use a weapon, you

should find her guilty of Second Degree Murder with

a weapon.

4 Florida Statutes section 775.087(1) provides that “whenever a person is

charged with a felony . . . and during the commission of such felony the defendant

carries, displays, uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm,

. . . the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified . . . [i]n the case

of a felony of the first degree, to a life felony.”

A ”weapon” is legally defined to mean any object that

could be used to cause death or inflict serious bodily

harm.

Doc. 6-1 at 103. Florida law presumes standard jury instructions are correct,

and they are preferred over special instructions. Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d

747, 755 (Fla. 2001). White has not demonstrated that the omission of her

requested special instruction rendered her trial fundamentally unfair or that

her conviction violates due process. Based on the record, the Court finds

White is not entitled to federal habeas relief on Ground One.

B. Grounds Two and Eleven

In Grounds Two and Eleven, White contends the trial court abused its

discretion by denying her motion for continuance. Petition at 7, 14. According

to White, counsel filed a motion for continuance on February 2, 2015, stating

that he had received the case only three weeks ago, and he needed to locate

and depose witnesses. Doc. 6-4 at 401. The trial court denied the motion. Id.

Counsel renewed the motion at jury selection, and the trial court again

denied it. Petition at 7. White raised a substantially similar claim on direct

appeal, Doc. 6-4 at 291-302; the State filed an answer brief, id. at 318-39; and

the First DCA per curiam affirmed White’s conviction without a written

opinion, id. at 359.

Respondents argue that White did not properly exhaust her claim

because counsel failed to articulate any federal constitutional basis for the

claim when he moved for a continuance. Response at 9. According to

Respondents, because White did not raise the federal nature of her claim

before the trial court, the First DCA could not consider it as a federal claim

on direct appeal. Id.

The record shows that counsel filed a written motion for continuance in

the trial court, which asserted that “[b]ased on the status of discovery . . . the

undersigned attorney cannot effectively represent Defendant at trial as it is

currently set.” Doc. 6-1 at 67. In support of her claim of trial court error on

direct appeal, White further argued that the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel comprises the right to prepared counsel, and counsel should be

afforded a reasonable time to prepare for trial. Doc. 6-4 at 291. Such

arguments alerted the state court to the federal nature of her claim, which

was premised on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, the

Court finds White properly exhausted her claim.

In its appellate brief, the State addressed the claim on the merits, Doc.

6-4 at 318-39; therefore, the appellate court may have affirmed White’s

conviction based on the argument presented by the State. If the appellate

court addressed the merits of the claim, the state court’s adjudication is

entitled to deference under AEDPA. After a review of the record and the

applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s adjudication of this

claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, did not involve an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and was not

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, White is not entitled to

relief on the basis of this claim.

Even assuming the appellate court’s adjudication of the claim is not

entitled to deference, the claim is without merit. The decision of whether to

grant a motion for continuance is committed to the discretion of the trial

court. Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002).

To establish that the denial of a continuance amounted to reversible error, “a

defendant must show that the denial caused specific substantial prejudice.”

Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, White has not shown that the trial court’s denial of a continuance

resulted in prejudice. Counsel filed a motion for continuance on February 2,

2015, approximately one week before jury selection scheduled for February 9,

2015. Doc. 6-2 at 26-27. Counsel sought a continuance to obtain current

addresses for and to depose four State witnesses. Id. The prosecutor

responded that he had been unable to obtain current addresses for the

witnesses, and he therefore could not locate the witnesses. Id. at 28-30.

Notably, none of these witnesses testified at trial.

Counsel renewed his motion for continuance on the day of jury

selection, arguing that he needed to re-depose a State witness, Hendricks,

who changed his testimony. Doc. 6-4 at 264-65. Hendricks initially gave a

sworn statement that White said she hit the victim; however, during his

deposition testimony, he did not remember that White made any statements.

Id. at 265-66. When the prosecutor met with Hendricks before trial,

Hendricks remembered that White made the statement. Id. The trial court

denied the motion, but ordered the State to make Hendricks available to the

defense before trial. Id. at 268. Ultimately, the State did not call Hendricks

as a witness at trial. Doc. 6-2 at 319-25. Neither White nor defense counsel

articulated any specific prejudice that would result from the State not calling

the above witnesses. The Court finds the trial court’s denial of a continuance

did not cause specific substantial prejudice where the State could not locate

and did not call the witnesses that counsel sought to depose. Accordingly,

White is not entitled to federal habeas relief on Grounds Two and Eleven.

C. Grounds Three and Nine

As Ground Three, White alleges counsel was ineffective when he failed

to present a “reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Petition at 8. According to

White, counsel should have presented evidence that someone else killed the

victim because “it was highly unlikely that [White] was the perpetrator of the

crime, and in fact, it was more reasonable to believe that someone else

actually killed the victim after [White] left the residence.” Doc. 6-4 at 381. In

Ground Nine, White similarly argues that counsel was ineffective when he

failed to investigate or present a defense of innocence. Petition at 13; Doc. 6-4

at 396-98.

White raised substantially similar claims as grounds one and seven of

her Rule 3.850 Motion. Doc. 6-4 at 381-83, 396-98. In denying relief on

ground one, the postconviction court stated in pertinent part:

Defendant alleges counsel was ineffective for

failing to present “a reasonable hypothesis of

innocence [to the] jury.” Specifically, Defendant avers

she hit the victim three to four times with an

unknown object, likely a vase, after the victim would

not let her leave and swung at Defendant. Defendant

maintains the victim was alive when she left and that

it is more reasonable to believe someone else killed

the victim after she left. To support this theory,

Defendant cites the medical examiner’s testimony

that the victim was bludgeoned at least ten times,

evidence that there was one small droplet of blood on

the vase, and that detectives saw no blood on

Defendant’s clothes despite a large amount of blood

spatter on the wall. Defendant avers this was enough

to have the vase excluded as the murder weapon.

Defendant further suggests that she was 5’3, weighed

only 140 pounds, and did not possess the strength

necessary to sever the victim’s neck from his spinal

cord. Defendant maintains the police never conducted

a DNA analysis of [] the victim’s fingernails to

determine whether he had been in an altercation

with someone else that night.

Counsel indeed questioned witnesses to

suggest, and argued in closing arguments, that it was

possible another person came into the victim’s house

after Defendant left and killed him. Moreover,

Defendant’s own statement during her interview

suggested she was afraid Rodney Horton (“Horton”),

who was at the house with them earlier in the night

wanted to rob the victim of his money and

prescription medications and that Horton made the

victim feel uncomfortable. Counsel’s arguments were

clear enough that the State attempted to dispel the

implication during its closing argument before

counsel had even made his argument.

Counsel also made sure to highlight the

“conflicting” evidence that the room was so bloody

and the murder weapon was so bloody that it created

cast off, but no blood was found on Defendant’s

clothes, people did not see blood on the victim, and

only a drop of blood was found on the item the State

alleged to be the murder weapon. Counsel

highlighted the fact that no DNA evidence tested

from the crime matched Defendant. Moreover,

contrary to Defendant[‘s] assertion that counsel did

not argue her innocence based on the fact that the

police never submitted the victim’s fingernail

clippings for DNA analysis, this Court finds counsel

adequately highlighted this issue.

As for Defendant’s argument that she was

physically unable to render the injuries to Defendant,

this Court finds there to be conflicting evidence.

During her interview, she stated she was 5’3 and

weighed approximately 150 pounds. At the time of

his death, the victim was only 5’2 and weighed only

140 pounds. Thus, Defendant would have been of

similar stature to the victim. Moreover, the State

presented evidence that Defendant was not in great

health and had back issues. [] [T]he medical

examiner did not testify that Defendant’s neck was

severed from his spinal cord, but that he suffered an

atlanto-occipital dislocation where the muscles and

ligaments holding the neck are injured. The same

expert, moreover, did testify that he was not able to

tell how much force would be required to cause each

of the victim’s injuries. [] [C]ounsel made sure to

elicit testimony from this witness that he did not

know what material the vase was made of or whether

it would be strong enough to fracture a skull and not

break. Counsel further elicited testimony and made

argument regarding whether the vase was indeed

strong enough to hit objects and not break or crack.

Accordingly, this Court finds counsel was not

deficient for allegedly failing to present a theory of

defense when he indeed highlighted this evidence for

the jury. Despite these “conflicts” as trial counsel

referred to them in his closing argument, this Court

finds it was not enough to have the items excluded

from the trial. This specific allegation is discussed in

more detail [] in Ground Three. Moreover, as counsel

presented these issues to the jury, this Court finds no

reasonable probability the result of the proceeding

would have been different if counsel had instead

framed his arguments around Defendant’s innocence

rather than the State’s failure to meet its burden of

proving Defendant committed the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Defendant is, therefore, not

entitled to relief on this Ground.

Id. at 407-09 (record citations omitted). The postconviction court also denied

relief on Ground Seven, explaining:

Defendant claims counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate and present a viable defense,

despite Defendant telling counsel that she was

innocent. This Court finds these allegations to be the

same as alleged in Ground One and adopts its

analysis from above to deny this Ground.

Doc. 6-5 at 9. The First DCA per curiam affirmed the denials of relief without

a written opinion. Id. at 249.

To the extent that the First DCA denied these claims on the merits,5

the Court will address the claims in accordance with the deferential standard

for federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the

record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of these claims was not contrary to clearly established federal

law, did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal

law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

5 Throughout this Order, in looking through the appellate court’s per curiam

affirmance to the circuit court’s “relevant rationale,” the Court presumes that the

appellate court “adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1194.

of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, White is

not entitled to relief on the basis of these claims.

Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of these claims

is not entitled to deference, they are without merit because the record

supports the postconviction court’s conclusion. Counsel pursued a defense

that focused on the deficiencies in the State’s evidence and law enforcement’s

investigation. During opening statements, counsel asked the jury to pay

attention to what the witnesses cannot testify to, as well as “gaps in the

evidence[,] what was not said, what is not known, [and] what was not done

during the course of this investigation.” Doc. 6-2 at 255. Counsel pursued this

defense throughout his cross-examination of State witnesses, specifically

highlighting the gaps in law enforcement’s investigation of physical evidence.

Doc. 6-2 at 31-32, 37-38, 70, 97, 267-68, 273-74, 277-80, 307, 338-39, 348-49.

During closing arguments, counsel asserted that the State had presented

insufficient evidence that White acted with “ill will, hatred, spite, [and] evil

intent.” Doc. 6-3 at 436-39. He also identified weaknesses in the physical

evidence, including the small amount of blood on the vase and the absence of

blood on White’s clothes. Id. at 450-63. Accordingly, counsel was not deficient

when he presented a defense that emphasized the evidentiary deficiencies

identified by White.

Even if counsel performed deficiently, White has not shown any

resulting prejudice. She has not shown that a reasonable probability exists

that the outcome of the case would have been different if counsel had acted as

White claims he should have. Her ineffectiveness claim is without merit

because she has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting prejudice.

Therefore, White is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims in

Grounds Three and Nine.

D. Ground Four

Next, White asserts counsel was ineffective when he failed to move for

immunity based on Stand Your Ground. Petition at 10. According to White,

she and the victim argued on the evening of the murder. Doc. 6-4 at 384.

White attempted to leave the house through a window, but the victim pulled

her back inside. Id. The victim allegedly swung at White, so White used a

glass vase to hit the victim. Id. White maintains the victim was alive when

she left the house, and she only hit the victim in self-defense. Id.

White raised a similar claim as ground two of her Rule 3.850 Motion.

Id. at 384-86. In denying relief, the postconviction court explained:

Defendant next asserts counsel acted

deficiently in failing to file for immunity from the

charge based on Florida’s Stand Your Ground law.

Defendant again suggests she tried to leave the

apartment through a window, but the victim pulled

her back in and swung at her, causing her to grab an

object and swing back, hitting Defendant three or

four times. Defendant suggests she grabbed the

object out of fear and used it to defend herself.

Defendant concludes that if counsel had filed such a

pretrial motion to dismiss, the charges against her

would have been dismissed before trial or at trial she

could have presented the evidence and had the jury

find her not guilty or guilty of a lesser charge.

Pursuant to sections 776.032(1), 776.012(1),

and 776.013(3), Florida Statutes, a defendant may

seek statutory immunity from prosecution based on

the justified use of force in self-defense. A defendant

bears the burden of establishing his or her

entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the

evidence. Early v. State, 223 So. 3d 1023, 1024 (Fla.

1st DCA 2017). The trial court must weigh the

credibility of the witnesses and evidence and make

findings of fact on a substantial, competent basis.

Mederos v. State, 102 So. 3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA

2012) (citing Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2008)).

Counsel, however, cannot be held ineffective for

failing to raise a meritless argument or motion.

Campbell v. State, 139 So. 3d 490, 498 (Fla. 2d DCA

2014). If the facts contained within the record in

conjunction with case law demonstrate a particular

motion would not have been successful, then the

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to

file said motion must fail. State v. Freeman, 796 So.

2d 547, 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

Here, Defendant’s own statements during her

police interview would have rendered such a motion

meritless. Initially, Defendant lied and claimed she

was not at the victim’s the night of his death. After

the police confronted her and stated they had

evidence she was in Jacksonville with the victim that

night, Defendant then admitted she had an

“altercation” [with] the victim that night and

expressed that she was “defending herself.” However,

Defendant never expressed being in fear of her life,

but rather discussed being angry and in a rage and

repeatedly stat[ed] that she would not allow another

person to put their hands on her and not fight back.

Defendant stated at the time of the altercation she

“obviously” thought the victim “needed his [butt]

whooped.” Importantly, Defendant’s own assertions

never indicated a threat to her life. Defendant never

alleged the victim had any kind of weapon or caused

any type of serious injury to her; rather, Defendant

only state[d] that he pulled her back as she

attempted to leave and that he attempted to swing at

her but missed. Indeed, Defendant reported

sustaining no serious injuries. While Defendant

repeatedly says she remembered hitting him three or

four times, she also stated that she probably did not

stop hitting him until something “clicked in her

head.” Additionally, the evidence showed she hit him

at least seven or ten times and with enough force to

cause skull fractures, rib fractures, an atlanto-

occipital dislocation, and eventually death.

Moreover, the State had evidence Defendant

and the victim were arguing earlier in the day. The

State further had a witness who saw Defendant after

the incident and overheard her telling her father that

she “hit him upside the head” and took his

belongings. That same witness observed Defendant

burning her flip flops the following day. Considering

all the evidence the State had, particularly

Defendant’s own statements, this Court finds a Stand

Your Ground motion to dismiss motion would have

been denied. Accordingly, counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to file such a motion, and

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this ground.

Id. at 409; Doc. 6-5 at 1-2 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per

curiam affirmed the denial of relief without a written opinion. Doc. 6-5 at

249.

To the extent that the First DCA denied this claim on the merits, the

Court will address the claim in accordance with the deferential standard for

federal court review of state court adjudications. After a review of the record

and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law,

did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,

and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. Therefore, White is not

entitled to relief on the basis of this claim.

Nevertheless, even if the appellate court’s adjudication of this claim is

not entitled to deference, White’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit

because the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion. Counsel

cannot be deficient when he fails to raise a meritless argument. See Pinkney

v. Sec’y, DOC, 876 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[A]n attorney will not

be held to have performed deficiently for failing to perform a futile act, one

that would not have gotten his client any relief.”). As such, White has failed

to carry her burden of showing that her counsel’s representation fell outside

that range of reasonably professional assistance. Even assuming arguendo

deficient performance by counsel, White has not shown any resulting

prejudice. She has not shown that a reasonable probability exists that the

outcome of the case would have been different if counsel had filed a motion to

dismiss based on Stand Your Ground. Her ineffectiveness claim is without

merit because she has shown neither deficient performance nor resulting

prejudice. Accordingly, White is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the

claim in Ground Four.

E. Ground Five

In Ground Five, White alleges counsel was ineffective when he failed to

present exculpatory DNA evidence and suppress the murder weapon, a glass

vase. Petition at 12. According to White, DNA tests on the vase produced

inconclusive results, and the vase did not have any chips or cracks. Doc. 6-4

at 387. White contends that counsel should have moved to suppress the vase

because the evidence did not suggest it was the murder weapon and retained

a DNA expert to examine the vase. Id. at 388.

White raised a substantially similar claim as ground three of her Rule

3.850 Motion. Id. at 387-89. The postconviction court denied relief, stating in

pertinent part:

Defendant avers counsel was ineffective for

failing to present exculpatory DNA evidence and

failing to suppress the murder weapon. Defendant

states the DNA results on the murder weapon were

inconclusive in that it did not contain enough DNA to

determine to whom the DNA belonged. Defendant

further notes the vase was not cracked or chipped

despite the damage to the victim and the seven to ten

blows [that] the State’s experts opined the vase hit

the victim. Defendant suggests that the vase should,

thus, have been excluded, alleging it was prejudicial

to the Defendant because evidence suggested it was

not the murder weapon.

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

provided by law.” § 90.402, Fla. Stat. Such evidence is

inadmissible if “its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” §

90.403, Fla. Stat. “Most evidence that is admitted will

be prejudicial or damaging to the part[y] against

whom it is offered. The question under the statute is

not prejudice but instead, unfair prejudice.” State v.

Williams, 992 So. 2d 330, 334 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).

As discussed in Ground One, counsel indeed

elicited and highlighted the testimony that there was

no evidence of Defendant’s DNA on the vase and

regarding the improbability of the vase being able to

cause the victim’s injuries without breaking. Counsel

did not, however, attempt to exclude the vase based

on these arguments or the other arguments outlined

in Ground One. However, this Court finds such a

motion would have been meritless as the probative

value of the vase was not substantially outweighed by

prejudice.

Most importantly, during her police interview,

Defendant repeatedly stated that she hit the victim

with the vase. Moreover, the vase was found just

outside the residence and had blood on it, of which

the victim could not be included or excluded as the

source. Additionally, the medical examiner stated

that he could not say it was the murder weapon but

could not exclude it as such either. Thus, this Court

finds this argument for exclusion to be meritless and

finds counsel consequently cannot be deemed

deficient for failing to seek the exclusion.

In this Ground, Defendant further suggests

counsel should have [had] an independent expert

examine the vase for DNA, stating that if the DNA

showed any relationship to Defendant, the State

would have presented such. Defendant further

suggests her constitutional rights were violated

because the State had an obligation to include

exculpatory evidence which showed someone else

may have committed the crime.

Initially, this Court notes it is pure speculation

to assert another expert would have been able to

obtain enough DNA to determine whose DNA was on

the vase when the analyst at Florida Department of

Law Enforcement could not. Such speculation cannot

warrant relief. See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944,

951 (Fla. 2000) (“Postconviction relief cannot be

based on speculation or possibility.”). Moreover, this

Court finds no prejudice as counsel used the lack of

DNA results tying Defendant to the crime to advance

his arguments. This Court further does not find

Defendant’s constitutional rights were violated in any

way. The State is not mandated to present

exculpatory information to the jury unless failing to

do so would be misleading. Here, however, the State

indeed presented to the jury that there was no DNA

found on the handle of the vase and that Defendant

was excluded as the source of the blood found on the

vase.

Additionally, as to both portions of this claim,

this Court notes Defendant stated under oath that

there were no other witnesses or evidence that she

wished for counsel to present on her behalf. Where a

defendant has agreed with counsel’s trial strategy

regarding witnesses, he cannot later claim ineffective

assistance based on counsel’s failure to call a witness

known to him and counsel prior to trial. See Thomas

v. State, 838 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 2003) (“Therefore,

Defendant agreed to this course of action, and may

not now attempt to claim ineffective assistance based

upon his own decision.”); Russ v. State, 937 So. 2d

1199, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“[W]here an

appellant makes a clearly and wholly inconsistent

affirmance which contradicts his later postconviction

claim, such claim may be summarily denied.”).

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to relief on this

Ground.

Doc. 6-5 at 3-5 (record citations omitted). The First DCA per curiam affirmed

the denial of relief without a written opinion. Id. at 249.