Ford v. Antonides

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

TYREE FORD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-384-JES-KCD

KARA ANTONIDES, YESENIA

CASTRO, YALINA RODRIGUEZ,

AND KEVIN KARNES,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Tyree Ford (“Plaintiff”), a pretrial detainee at the Lee

County Jail, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff generally

alleges that he was unlawfully arrested after a traffic stop, was

not allowed to see a judicial officer upon demand, and has been

unlawfully charged with twenty felonies. Because Plaintiff

proceeds in forma pauperis (Doc. 7), his complaint is before the

Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

After careful consideration of Plaintiff’s allegations, the

Court dismisses his complaint as frivolous and for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

(i), (ii).

I. Complaint

On February 25, 2022, Plaintiff was traveling on Cape Coral

Parkway in Cape Coral, Florida. (Doc. 1 at 6). The tags on his

car “clearly displayed” that he was a “Traveler – not for hire.

Private Property.” (Id.) Nevertheless, he was pulled over by

defendant police officer Kara Antonides, who approached his window

and requested Plaintiff’s driver’s license. (Id.) Plaintiff

informed Defendant Antonides that he was a “traveler.” (Id.)

Defendant Antonides called for backup, and the police forced

Plaintiff out of his car. (Id.) The police continued to demand

a drivers license, and Plaintiff “continued to inform them that

[he] was a traveler, and [he] stated that [he] was a citizen of

the republic of the United States of America.” (Id.) The police

then arrested Plaintiff, “hypothecating [his] name and making

[him] a citizen of the U.S. Corporation.” (Id.)

After posting bond, Plaintiff went to the Clerk of Court’s

Office, “to invoke [his] jurisdiction and due process.” (Doc. 1

at 6). Defendant Yesenia Castro told Plaintiff that he “couldn’t

see a judge and nobody could see [him].” (Id.) Defendant

Castro’s supervisor, Defendant Yolanda Rodriguez, told him the

same and refused to bring Plaintiff before a judge. (Id.) When

Plaintiff asked to see Defendant Kevin Karnes, they told him that

he was unavailable and would not see him. (Id.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff left the Clerk’s Office, but sent

Defendants Castro and Rodriguez and non-defendant Linda Dogget a

“jurisdictional challenge” by notary presentment. (Doc. 1 at 7).

However, it was dishonored. (Id.) The Clerk’s office then issued

Plaintiff a certificate of non-response, a certificate of non-

performance, a certificate of default, and a certificate of

service. (Id.) He asserts that these “were all presented to

[him] by a notary which I recorded with the clerk of courts.”

(Id.) Plaintiff asserts that when he “went to record it in the

official records, they altered them and retaliated by issuing 20

capias warrants and charging me with 20 felonies.” (Id.)

Plaintiff now seeks to place Defendant Kara Antonides under

citizen’s arrest for an unlawful traffic stop and official

misconduct. (Doc. 1 at 8) He also seeks two million dollars for

loss of wages and psychological damages. (Id.)

II. Legal Standards

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

A federal district court is required to review a civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint

that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Specifically, the

section provides:

Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion

thereof, that may have been paid, the court

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court

determines that--

(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or

(B) the action or appeal-

(i) is frivolous or

malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be

granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who

is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, among other things, the

defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a

right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition,

where an affirmative defense would defeat a claim, it may be

dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd.,

915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).

The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted” has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of

section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards

in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”) That

is, although a complaint need not provide detailed factual

allegations, there “must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough facts

to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations

(as opposed to legal conclusions) in the complaint are viewed as

true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under

color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]”. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Therefore, to state a claim under section 1983, a

plaintiff must allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such

deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb

County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, where

a plaintiff seeks to impose liability on one who is not an active

participant in the alleged constitutional deprivation, that

plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal

connection between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional

deprivation. Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th

Cir. 1982).

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant

Kara Antonides.

Plaintiff does not explain how Defendant Antonides’ stop of

his car violated his civil rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth

Amendments. Even self-represented plaintiffs are required to

allege sufficient facts to support their claims, and the Court

will not assume facts that are not alleged. See GJR Investments,

Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)

(“Yet even in the case of pro se litigants this leniency does not

give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or

to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an

action[.]” (internal citations omitted)).

Instead of alleging facts showing that the stop of his car

was somehow improper (leading to a claim for false arrest or false

imprisonment), Plaintiff bases his claims against Defendant

Antonides on an argument that he was immune from the traffic stop

she initiated (and that eventually led to his arrest) because he

displayed a sign on his car informing her that he was a “Traveler

– Not for hire. Private Property.” (Doc. 1 at 6). This argument

is similar to those espoused by self-proclaimed “sovereign

citizens,” as explained in a 2019 law review article:

The most common type of Sovereign Citizen claim

encountered by local and state police, as well as federal

border patrol agents, is the “right to travel.” Citing

the Constitution, Supreme Court cases, and a plethora of

other sources, Sovereign Citizens believe they are not

required to have driver's licenses, license plates,

vehicle registration, or to stop at border or sobriety

checkpoints. Similar to other claims, Sovereign

Citizens discussing the “right to travel” place special

emphasis on the words being used. They differentiate

between a driver and a traveler; an automobile and a

motor vehicle; commercial and non-commercial; and public

versus private conveyances. Once a Sovereign Citizen

claims that he or she is merely a traveler or traveling,

he or she then uses federal and state cases to support

the “right to travel.” Sovereign Citizens also believe

the right to travel constitutes a complete bar on

government interference with travel in the absence of

probable cause or evidence that a victim has been harmed.

Caesar Kalinowski, IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen

Movement, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 167–68 (2019) (citations omitted).

These types of claims—that a plaintiff is entitled to different

treatment as a “sovereign citizen”—are routinely rejected by

federal courts as frivolous. See, e.g., United States v.

Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that so-

called “sovereign citizens” are individuals who believe they are

not subject to courts’ jurisdiction and that courts have summarily

rejected their legal theories as frivolous); United States v.

Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 761-67 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the

conduct of a “sovereign citizen” and collecting cases rejecting

the group's claims as frivolous, and recommending that “sovereign

citizen” arguments “be rejected summarily, however they are

presented.”); Reed v. Jones, No. 4:21CV3051, 2021 WL 2913023, at

*3 (D. Neb. July 12, 2021) (“sovereign citizen” argument that

motor-vehicle registration and licensing laws do not apply to

plaintiff rejected as frivolous); Trevino v. Florida, 687 F. App’x

861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of

1983 action based on sovereign citizens as frivolous and noting

that if those theories challenged the conviction, habeas was the

proper avenue of relief).

Nothing alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint even remotely

suggests that he is entitled to relief against Defendant Antonides

under recognized theories of relief. And, as noted, Plaintiff’s

sovereign citizen argument has been soundly rejected by federal

courts. Accordingly, all claims against Defendant Antonides are

dismissed from this action as frivolous and for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

B. Plaintiff does not state claims against Defendants

Yesenia Castro, Yalina Rodriguez, or Kevin Karnes.

Again, it is unclear the theory of relief Plaintiff asserts

against Defendants Castro, Rodriguez, and Karnes—all employees of

the Clerk of Court in Lee County. To the extent Plaintiff argues

that any of these defendants violated his rights to due process by

not immediately bringing him in front of a judge upon demand, the

complaint is completely without merit. To be clear, Plaintiff has

a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to be heard on the charges that were filed against him as a result

of the traffic stop. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976)(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the

opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.” (quotation omitted)). However, nothing in the

Constitution suggests that a defendant is entitled to an immediate

appearance before a judicial officer upon demand or that a state

employee’s refusal to acquiesce to that demand subjects that

employee to civil liability. And by complaining that he was

issued certificates of non-response, non-performance, default, and

service by the clerk’s office, Plaintiff acknowledges that he did

not appear before a judge in state court when provided the

opportunity to do so. (Doc. 1 at 7).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that the Clerk’s employees were

responsible for “charging him with 20 felonies” is illogical. The

state prosecutor, not employees of the clerk’s office are

responsible for filing charges against a defendant. See State v.

Greaux, 977 So. 2d 614 (Fla 4th DCA 2008) (“The prosecutor has the

sole discretion to charge and prosecute criminal acts.”). And to

the extent Plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully charged by

anyone, the Younger abstention doctrine prohibits federal courts

from interfering (through a section 1983 complaint) in a

plaintiff’s pending state criminal proceedings. See Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger and its progeny, federal

courts must abstain from interfering with an ongoing state criminal

proceeding when it implicates important state interests and there

is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise

constitutional challenges. See Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d

1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003). Considering whether Plaintiff has

been wrongfully charged would significantly interfere with his

pending state criminal proceedings. Moreover, the state courts

provide an adequate forum for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims,

and he has not alleged that any extraordinary circumstances exist

to justify this Court’s interference with his ongoing prosecution.

See Boyd v. Georgia, 512 F. App’x 915, 918 (11th Cir. 2013)

(affirming dismissal of section 1983 complaint because the

plaintiff’s “state criminal proceeding is ongoing, implicates and

important state interest, and will provide an adequate opportunity

for [Plaintiff] to raise constitutional challenges”); Turner v.

Broward Sheriff’s Office, 542 F. App’x 764, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2013)

(finding that abstention was appropriate in a section 1983 case

where plaintiff alleged false arrest because the plaintiff’s

“state criminal proceedings commenced prior to his filing a

complaint”).1

1 Generally, a district court will consider staying, rather

than dismissing, premature section 1983 claims. See Deakins v.

Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be

granted against Defendants Castro, Rodriguez, or Karnes, and these

defendants must be dismissed from this complaint. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

IV. Conclusion

The Court finds that all named defendants are dismissed from

this action for failure to state a claim against them on which

relief may be granted. With no remaining claims or defendants,

this action is dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Moreover, any claim that

challenges Plaintiff’s ongoing state criminal case is subject to

dismissal under Younger. Therefore, it is apparent from

Plaintiff’s pleadings that granting leave to amend would be futile.

Mitchell v. Thompson, 564 F. App’x 452, 456 (11th Cir. 2014)

(affirming denial of pro se plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

based on futility of amendment).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is DISMISSED as

frivolous and for failure to state a claim on which

Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 198 (1988) (holding that district courts

should stay federal claims for monetary relief when abstaining

from a parallel state proceeding). However, other reasons provide

cause to dismiss this case as frivolous and for failure to state

a claim on which relief may be granted. See discussion infra.

Accordingly, the Court will not stay the case pending resolution

of Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings.

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (i),

(ii).

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending

motions, close this case, and enter judgment

accordingly.

DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 26, 2022.

—_— ~ (2. _ f

AA) Pe,

JGHH E. STEELE

3 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTIMP-2

Copies to: Tyree Ford