The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MAT S. BAYSA,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 8:17-cv-434-WFJ-SPF
CHARLES REDINGER,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
MEMORANDUM ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND FINAL JUDGMENT
The Court files this memorandum order and final judgment outlining the
grounds for dismissal of Mr. Baysa’s complaint based on his failure to prosecute
and his violation of the Court’s orders. The matter is fairly complicated factually
and requires the relevant case history outlined below.
BACKGROUND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FIRST APPEAL:
Mr. Baysa was represented by counsel at the time he filed a multi-count
complaint against Deputies Charles Redinger and Stephanie Archer of the Pinellas
County Sheriff’s Office. Docs. 1, 23. He also sued the Pinellas Sheriff in his
official capacity in a Monell claim.1 In addition to state law claims not relevant
here, Plaintiff brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest,
excessive force during lawful arrest, and excessive force during unlawful arrest.
The last claim was subsumed by the false arrest claim, per Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.
3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000).
The facts arose concerning a late-night dispute at the Derby Lane poker
room in Saint Petersburg, Florida. Detailed facts of the incident are set out in this
Court’s order found at docket 70. Mr. Baysa was arrested there, and faced state
criminal charges arising from the incident, which he took to trial and received
acquittals from the jury. These civil rights claims then resulted.
After extensive discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. Docs. 42–50. The parties filed considerable record evidence and
depositions in favor of their cross motions. Id. The Court granted the defense
motions on all counts and specifically found on the false arrest claim that there was
probable cause to arrest Mr. Baysa for trespass. Doc. 70 at 15. Mr. Baysa’s
lawyer appealed. Doc. 81.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Doc. 88; Baysa
v. Gualtieri, 786 F. App’x 941 (11th Cir. 2019). The appellate court first turned to
the false arrest claim and analyzed the record and the applicable law. 786 F. App’x
1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
at 944–45. In its discussion and review, the Court of Appeals held that probable
cause to arrest Mr. Baysa did exist. Id. The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed on the
merits the summary judgment ruling in favor of the deputies on the false arrest
claim. Id.
On the claim of excessive force during the arrest, the Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded for reconsideration. Id. at 945–47. The Eleventh Circuit
instructed the undersigned to reconsider the record in a light not dependent or
overly reliant upon Mr. Baysa’s criminal trial court testimony. Id. Remanded for
consideration were 1) the excessive force arrest claim against the deputies and 2)
the related Monell claim against the Sheriff. Id. at 947–48. The state law claims
were affirmed as they were not preserved for review. Id. at 943 n.1.
UPON REMAND AND THE SECOND APPEAL:
Upon remand the undersigned set the case for trial on the remaining claims:
the excessive force arrest claim and the Monell claim against the Sheriff in his
official capacity. Doc. 94. The defense moved for summary judgment, Doc. 95,
which was opposed with full briefing by Mr. Baysa’s counsel. Docs. 97, 100. The
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Deputy Redinger’s colleague, Deputy
Stephanie Archer. Doc. 106. Deputy Archer had little involvement in the physical
arrest. Id. at 4–9. The Court denied the defense summary judgment motion for
Deputy Redinger. Id. at 9. This portion of the summary judgment order ruling
against Deputy Redinger was not detailed. The undersigned mistakenly thought
that the prior Eleventh Circuit record and opinion, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s
command of the facts in appellee’s brief and cross-appeal, would buttress this
ruling.
In a stipulation signed by all counsel, Plaintiff dismissed with prejudice the
Monell claim against the Sheriff. Doc. 107. The stipulation stated the dismissal
“would be in the best interest to [an] efficient and proper resolution of this case.”
Deputy Redinger, as the sole remaining defendant, then appealed based upon a
failure to grant his summary judgment motion on qualified immunity. Doc. 111
(notice of appeal filed 2/28/20).
On May 4, 2020, Mr. Baysa’s lawyers filed in the pending appeal a motion
to withdraw as counsel. Baysa v. Redinger, No. 20-10824 (11th Cir.). The motion
stated that Mr. Baysa’s counsel “has had to deal with a volatile client who refuses
to accept and follow his counsel and advice, but instead sees fit to verbally attack
the undersigned [lawyer], call him names, and threaten to file a frivolous Florida
Bar Complaint against him.” Mot. to withdraw at 3. The motion noted that Mr.
Baysa had refused on multiple times to consider a significant settlement range and
that he “has chosen to conduct himself in a demeaning and nefarious manner”
causing irreconcilable differences between client and lawyer. Id. Mr. Baysa’s
lawyer stated that he expected administrative litigation with Mr. Baysa and
anticipated commencing an adversarial legal process with him. Id. at 4. The
Eleventh Circuit granted the motion to withdraw on June 1, 2020.
Mr. Baysa sought several extensions of time in the Eleventh Circuit and
received a total of four extensions to file his appellee’s brief. The final due date
was January 7, 2021, but Mr. Baysa never filed an answer brief. Mr. Baysa also
could have sought a cross-appeal on the Deputy Archer ruling under Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3) and 28.1. This failure to brief the direct appeal, and
to address on cross-appeal this Court’s decision against Mr. Baysa as to Deputy
Archer, left this Court’s short denial of Deputy Redinger’s qualified immunity
unsupported on appeal.
On October 16, 2020, Mr. Baysa filed in the Eleventh Circuit a motion to
stay the appeal, requesting that the appellate court order his former lawyers to turn
over their case files and give him an attorneys’ fee refund. He expressed
displeasure with his lawyers’ strategies and took umbrage at the lawyers’ request
for a trial fee. Mot. to stay at 2–3. Mr. Baysa noted that his Florida Bar grievance
against them was denied, despite his contacting the Bar President “on numerous
occasions.” Id. at 5. The motion was pejorative and suggested the State Attorney
on his criminal case had possible unethical connections to then-President Trump
and Attorney General Barr. Id. at 7–8. Notably absent from this pleading was any
allegation that his former lawyers conspired with the present defense attorney to
sabotage his case and defraud the courts. The Eleventh Circuit denied this motion
on November 6, 2020, but sua sponte afforded Mr. Baysa his fourth and last
extension of time to file an appellee’s brief. As noted above, this time expired
without Mr. Baysa filing any brief.
On November 11, 2020, Mr. Baysa filed with the Eleventh Circuit a 14-page
motion to reconsider his motion to stay. Again, no mention was made of any
putative lawyer conspiracy to commit fraud and sabotage his case. The Court of
Appeals denied this motion on December 11, 2020.
With no appellee brief being filed, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on Deputy
Redinger’s appeal, vacating and remanding the order that denied Redinger’s
qualified immunity claim. Doc. 118; Baysa v. Redinger, 851 F. App’x 175 (11th
Cir. 2021). The Eleventh Circuit held that the summary judgment order did not
sufficiently address the legal and factual standards required for appellate review,
and remanded “with instructions for the district court to enter a new order that
details the legal analysis used to reach its conclusion regarding the deputy’s
qualified immunity issue on summary judgment.” 851 F. App’x at 177 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
UPON REMAND AND THIRD APPEAL:
Upon remand this Court held a status conference on August 24, 2021. Doc.
160. Mr. Baysa affirmed that he would be proceeding pro se. Id. at 3. The Court
cautioned him against representing himself but reminded him that the rules of law
would apply to his pro se representation just like they would to an attorney. Id. at
3–4. The Court also cautioned Mr. Baysa that he might have to file a brief on the
merits in the likely event that Deputy Redinger appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.
Id. at 8.
At this status conference Mr. Baysa complained that the arrest report of the
arresting officer—Deputy Redinger—was not in the record. Id. at 4, 9. In this
regard he stated: “I don’t know whether my former attorneys and [defense counsel]
are playing games or whatnot.” Id. at 9. Deputy Redinger had been deposed in the
matter, and although the lengthy and detailed summary judgment record had long
been closed, defense counsel offered to place the arrest report into the record and
did so later that afternoon. Id. at 10–11; Doc. 130. Mr. Baysa then stated that he
had three or four additional documents to introduce into the record. Doc. 160 at
11. The Court granted Mr. Baysa leave to “file anything like that you want….I’m
going to give you two weeks to get on file, two weeks whatever you deem
pertinent.” Id. at 12. The Court gave Mr. Baysa full leave to file any documents or
rebuttal and cautioned Mr. Baysa to adhere to the deadline as there was a remand
from the Court of Appeals that had to be attended to “because I have some people
in Atlanta who are looking over my shoulder.” Id. at 14–15.
Unfortunately, Mr. Baysa filed nothing on the merits in the time allotted. Nor did
Mr. Baysa take any action in response to Deputy’s Redinger’s arrest report which
defense counsel had filed that day, Doc. 130, at Mr. Baysa’s instance.
Nine days after this hearing, Mr. Baysa filed in this Court a motion to
compel his former attorneys to return his case file and refund his fee. Doc. 132.
Mr. Baysa complained of his attorneys’ “half-assed appeal” on his behalf and
noted that his Florida Bar grievance against them proved fruitless. Id. at 3. He
stated they were “exploitative and gluttonous.” Id. at 4. He also noted that the
panel of the Eleventh Circuit (whom he described as “two appointees by the
MAGA MAN”) had previously denied this same relief he sought against his
former lawyers. Id. In this motion Mr. Baysa also stated that he would soon file a
motion against present defense counsel, establishing that present defense counsel
was engaged in a scheme or contrivance with his former lawyers in “serious
misconduct backed with clear and convincing evidence.” Id. This motion was
never filed.
The undersigned denied Mr. Baysa’s motion to compel his former lawyers to
turn over their case files and refund his attorneys’ fee. Doc. 135. The Court noted
that Mr. Baysa had previously sought relief from the Florida Bar and from the
Eleventh Circuit on this same issue. The Court stated that this task is one of the
roles of the Florida Bar and that Mr. Baysa might consider filing a replevin action.
Id. The Court stated that it does not adjudicate disputes between client and former
counsel except in rare occasions not presented in this case. Id. The Court enlarged
the schedule to permit Mr. Baysa, once again, additional time to file any materials,
extending the deadline to 14 days from the Court’s order—until September 20,
2021. Doc. 136. The Court also stated that it “reiterates its respectful suggestion
that Mr. Baysa attempt to get counsel on his case. Bay Area Volunteer Legal
Services might provide assistance for free.” Id. The Court had earlier referred Mr.
Baysa to helpful materials for pro se litigants on the court web site. Doc. 121 at 1–
2 n.1.
The Court twice granted Mr. Baysa leave and extensions to supplement the
record. Despite his stated intention to file a motion showing a conspiracy between
his former counsel and the present defense lawyer, Mr. Baysa filed nothing in the
time twice extended.
Without the benefit of Mr. Baysa’s promised supplemental filing, on
October 15, 2021, this Court filed its order on remand as instructed by the Eleventh
Circuit. Doc. 137. In that order, the Court denied Deputy Redinger’s motion for
summary judgment on the remaining count—excessive force arrest—based upon
qualified immunity. Id. That same day, the Court set the excessive force count for
trial, but Deputy Redinger once again appealed. Docs. 138, 139.
THE THIRD APPEAL:
The sole remaining count before the undersigned and the subject of this third
appeal was the excessive force arrest count. Deputy Redinger filed his appellate
brief on January 21, 2022, arguing in favor of qualified immunity. Baysa v.
Redinger, No. 21-13943 (11th Cir.). Mr. Baysa never filed an appellee’s brief.
On March 30, 2022, Mr. Baysa filed in the Eleventh Circuit a motion for extension
of time to file his appellee’s brief. The motion for extension of time contained
pejorative language and attached the arrest report of Deputy Redinger. Mr. Baysa
stated that “it is highly likely that the two conflicted, exploitative, and gluttonous
[Mr. Baysa’s] attorneys struck a backroom deal with their equally corrupt
counterpart [the defense lawyer].” Mot. to extend time at 3 n.5 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Eleventh Circuit Clerk took no action on the motion because
it was untimely.
In May and June 2022, Mr. Baysa filed three more pleadings before the
Eleventh Circuit. On June 10, he filed a “Motion to Vacate Judge Jung’s Ruling as
to My False Arrest Claims Against Archer and Redinger III.” In this pleading he
suggested that his former lawyers had cited Deputy Redinger’s arrest report to the
undersigned but had not filed it. Mot. to vacate at 4. Deputy Redinger responded
to this motion to vacate on the merits, on June 21, 2022.
These appellate Baysa pleadings contained unfortunate demeaning language,
referring to Mr. Baysa’s prior lawyers as “Darkness” and “L’il Judas” and referring
to Deputy Redinger’s counsel as “Slim Shady” and Deputy Stephanie Archer as
“Redinger’s sidepiece.” Mot. to vacate filed 6/10/22 at 10, 16. He suggested the
State Attorney “BIG BERNIE” was involved in corruption. Id. at 11. He cursed
and was disrespectful to appellate and district court judges. Id. at 17. He used the
sobriquet “MAGA KING’S appointee” when referring to the undersigned. Id. at 8.
In a pleading filed in the Eleventh Circuit on June 16, 2022, which appears
to be a duplicate, Mr. Baysa again sought vacatur of the prior 2018 order of the
district court and appellate affirmance finding no liability for false arrest. He also
repeated his request from the second appeal that the appellate court order him a
refund of his attorneys’ fees, this time because the lawyers were conspirators. He
argued that these lawyers “deceived/hoodwinked/bamboozled” the district court
and the affirming panel of the Eleventh Circuit into thinking there was probable
cause to arrest him for trespass at the Derby Lane poker room. Suppl. to Mot. to
vacate filed 6/16/22 at 10.
On July 27, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Court’s finding that
Deputy Redinger had not established a qualified immunity defense on the
excessive force arrest claim. Doc. 149; Baysa v. Sheriff of Pinellas Cnty., 2022
WL 2974110 (11th Cir. July 27, 2022) (unpublished). The Court of Appeals
expressly held “Baysa’s Motion to vacate Judge Jung’s Rulings as to My False
Arrest Claims against Archer and Redinger III is DENIED.” Id. at *2 n.1.
PRIOR TO THE 2022 REMAND:
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s July 2022 remand, and five months into the
third appeal, on May 3, 2022, Mr. Baysa filed in this Court a motion to vacate its
prior order of October 24, 2018. Doc. 144. The 2018 order, Doc. 70, was the
subject of the first appeal. Doc. 81. Mr. Baysa sought to vacate the 2018 ruling
finding probable cause to arrest, which the Eleventh Circuit had expressly affirmed
by opinion in that first appeal, see 786 F. App’x at 944–45—the same relief that
the Eleventh Circuit denied in July 2022 in the most recent appeal. See Baysa,
2022 WL 2974110, at *2 n.1.
This motion to vacate filed in this Court was 42 pages long plus 19 pages of
attachments. Doc. 144. The motion sought to bring back into the case Deputy
Stephanie Archer, who had been out of the case for two years. The motion urged
the undersigned to vacate the 2018 order finding probable cause to arrest, because
the order was “CLEARLY OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD by my former
attorneys….along with the defendants’ attorney….” Id. at 2. Mr. Baysa’s motion
was again hindered by his use of the pejorative, referring to his two former lawyers
as “Darkness and Lil Judas,” id. at 3 n.2, 10, defense counsel as “Slim Shady,” id.
at 10, 15, and referring to the district judge as “MAGA MAN’S appointee.” Id. at
5. The motion noted that the defendant Sheriff “rubbed shoulders and did photo
ops” with “the ORANGE GUY” during the time of the George Floyd protests. Id.
The motion acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit, substantively and on the
merits, had affirmed the 2018 ruling that he now wanted vacated. Id. at 7–8.
In essence Mr. Baysa argued that some documents were not employed by his
attorneys or defense counsel. They were “concealed.” Id. at 8. These items were
documents Mr. Baysa would have been aware of in 2018 or earlier. Id. The
motion suggested as a reason for this failure: “It is highly likely that the two
[Baysa] attorneys who revere Mammon struck a backroom deal with their equally
corrupt counterpart in [defense lawyer] Slim Shady.” Id. at 10. This concealment
scheme “hoodwinked” the courts and prevented a full explication of Plaintiff’s
case four years prior. Id. at 10–11.
The motion to vacate cited a number of Florida Bar regulations violated by
these lawyers. It cited as “the smoking gun” the Deputy Redinger’s report which
was written after “he, his backup and the two Derby Lane guards mauled me like a
pack of super hungry hyenas.” Id. at 11. The motion suggests Deputy Redinger’s
report was untrue and was “creative writing.” Id. at 13. Mr. Baysa stated the
report falsely portrayed him “as a Brown Savage.” Id. at 14. He reiterated that his
lawyers were “conflicted, exploitative, and gluttonous.” Id. Although labeled a
“smoking gun” and false, the police report (in the record at docket 130) does not
cast doubt on the prior ruling about probable cause to arrest, nor does Mr. Baysa’s
motion suggest why defense counsel’s failure to file the report earlier was
conspiratorial.
Mr. Baysa expressed in florid terms his anger with the situation and his
frustration with it. He did not state grounds for a fraudulent scheme being
perpetrated on the Court. And apparently the Florida Bar agreed in not sustaining
his grievance along the same lines.
When this motion to vacate was filed, the case was still on appeal and was
not remanded until two months later. On May 9, 2022, this Court denied the
motion explaining that the matter was presently on appeal and outside the lower
court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 147. The Eleventh Circuit then denied the very similar
motion in its July 2022 opinion as noted above.
AFTER 2022 REMAND:
On the July 2022 remand, the undersigned set the much-delayed trial for
September 2022. The Court set a pretrial conference for August 25, 2022 and
issued a supplement to the case management and scheduling order. Doc. 151.
This new case management order adopted and supplemented a prior order, Doc.
94. This operative order required the parties by mid-August to meet, confer, and
exchange exhibit and witness lists, and to file a joint pretrial statement. Doc. 151
at 1. It required the parties to submit proposed voir dire questions and proposed
jury instructions and verdict forms, referring the parties to the local rule that set
forth these requirements. Id. The order cautioned the parties that “[f]ailure to
comply with this order will result in case sanctions.” Id. at 4.
Mr. Baysa did not refile his previously filed and twice denied motion for
vacatur of the prior rulings. On August 5, 2022, he filed a motion for an
evidentiary hearing on his previously denied motion and requested that the
previously denied motion be heard on the merits. Doc. 152. He noted that Deputy
Redinger’s counsel opposed the motion and this counsel had insisted that the
parties “should start working on joint pre-trial statements.” Id. at 1 n.1. The
motion for hearing alleged a fraudulent scheme between all counsel and cited as
proof “the smoking gun (i.e, Redinger’s arrest report).” Id. at 2. The Court denied
this without comment on August 15, 2022. Doc. 153.
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Redinger’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss
because Mr. Baysa was refusing to prepare for trial as ordered by the pretrial order.
Doc. 154 and attachments. Regrettably the motion showed Mr. Baysa was refusing
to meet and confer with counsel and prepare the case for trial as ordered.
Mr. Baysa refused multiple requests of defense counsel to comply. Mr.
Baysa stated, “The meeting you’re referring to isn’t going to take place because
Jung needs to correct his erroneous ruling as to my false arrest claims against your
two clients…. You can’t fucking cheat and claim innocence thereafter Slim Shady.
You, Darkness and Lil Judas are on the spotlight [smile face emoji].” Doc. 154-1
at 1. “Simply put, I will not comply with the pretrial mandates….” Doc. 154-2 at
1. Mr. Baysa would not meet, confer, participate in a joint pretrial statement, or
identify witnesses or exhibits. Mr. Baysa’s responses to these attempts to
cooperate were pejorative. He repeatedly referred to the lawyers by insulting,
obliquely racial names, made various reputational and similar threats, etc., and
ended one email with “Understand Spanish Inquisition, Dude?” Docs. 154-1–154-
5. Mr. Baysa stated to counsel that if the undersigned did not grant his request for
an evidentiary hearing, “ a recusal motion will follow.” Doc. 154-4 at 1. No
recusal motion was filed.
Defense counsel did not treat Mr. Baysa with disrespect in these emails. He
sent several very plain requests, and made a number of phone calls, in an attempt
to get compliance with the pretrial order. Doc. 154-5 at 2–3. Although Mr. Baysa
sent 25 various emails to defense counsel, he clearly declined to comply with the
plain terms of the pretrial order, nor would he provide a substantive response to
draft joint pretrial statements that counsel provided him. Id. Due to Mr. Baysa’s
refusal to confer about pretrial matters, Deputy Redinger’s counsel had to file an
individual pretrial statement, not a joint pretrial statement as the Court ordered.
Doc. 155. Mr. Baysa defied the pretrial order entirely.
In response to Mr. Baysa’s defalcation, the Court issued a show cause order
requiring Mr. Baysa to show cause in writing no later than August 30, 2022, why
the matter should not be dismissed for failure to comply with the pretrial order.
Doc. 156. Due to matters that developed at the August pretrial conference, the
case never reached that point.
The Court held a pretrial conference as scheduled, on August 25, 2022.
Doc. 163. Mr. Baysa stated that the Court should consider and grant his motion to
vacate filed in May 2022. Id. at 4. The Court noted that the motion had been
denied (order at docket 147) and that a motion “doesn’t relieve you of your duties
to comply with the pretrial order.” Id. Mr. Baysa interrupted the Court at that
point, and frequently talked over the Court thereafter. Mr. Baysa asked for a ruling
on the merits and that considerations of res judicata were inapt. Id. at 5. Mr.
Baysa argued that he desired a hearing on the motion and that his former counsel
and the present defense counsel excluded from consideration the Redinger arrest
report. Id. He also stressed that the State Attorney on the underlying arrest
“committed prosecutorial misconduct by, you know, getting so crazy asserting
after warning and violating rule 3.191, paragraph O.” Id. The Court then noted
that the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the issue on probable cause to arrest. Id. Mr.
Baysa stated ‘”I don’t see that.” Id. Mr. Baysa at this time may have been
referring to the 2022 litigation in the Court of Appeals rather than the affirmance
on the merits of the arrest probable cause issue four years earlier in the case.
Mr. Baysa remonstrated that “there is no finding of facts or anything like
that whether my allegation as to as to my former attorneys and opposing counsel,
you know, is legitimate.” Id. at 6. The following exchange then occurred at the
hearing:
THE COURT: All right, Well, I denied it. So I ruled it out based upon
where this case is. So we’re not going – you lose on that motion, Mr.
Baysa.
MR. BAYSA: No, Sir.
THE COURT: Well, yes, sir. Yes, sir. I denied it. It’s denied. I’m
not going to hear it. Your motion is denied. We are set for trial on
what’s left of this case which is your claim against Redinger for
excessive force, as the Eleventh Circuit sent down here.
Now, do you intend to participate in this matter, and what are we going
to do about your failure to participate in the pretrial conference?
. . . .
Did you participate in that? Did you follow my Order there?
MR. BAYSA: No, I did not.
Id. at 6–7.
The Court does not intend in this memorandum order to repeat the entire
unfortunate colloquy with Mr. Baysa that occurred at the August pretrial
conference. A copy of this transcript (Doc. 163) is attached here as an appendix
for ease of review. Suffice it to say, Mr. Baysa was unwilling and unprepared to
proceed for trial after remand, unless the undersigned would revisit and change a
ruling that Mr. Baysa admitted was made “many years ago.” See id. at 7. He
argued that this ruling must be revisited due to an unspecified, speculative but
fraudulent conspiracy of his prior counsel and present defense counsel to
deliberately sabotage his prior counts.
Mr. Baysa admitted that he did not obey the Court’s pretrial order “because
of my stance.” Id. at 7, 9. Mr. Baysa stated that he did not participate because the
Court should revisit the prior ruling. Mr. Baysa talked over, or interrupted, the
Court repeatedly and would not discuss the preparation for trial, or his lack thereof.
Id. at 8–9. Finally, the matter devolved to:
THE COURT: No, I’m not going to answer any interrogatories or make
any ruling that you desire. My question to you is simple, do you intend
to meet-and-confer, exchange witness and exhibit lists for the trial – on
the trial that is upcoming and issues upcoming presently in the case?
The answer is yes or no.
MR. BAYSA: No, on the grounds that you must entertain my fraud on
the Court motion first.
Id. at 10–11.
The pretrial conference deteriorated further. Mr. Baysa continued to
interrupt and talk over the Court despite being instructed not to do so. Id. at 8, 12
(“Mr. Baysa continues to talk over the Court”); see also id. at 4, 9, 10, 14 (“Mr.
Baysa continues to interrupt Judge Jung”), 15. He made clear that he was not
prepared to try the case that was set for trial by the remand. He stated that the
undersigned was duty bound to report the conspiring attorneys to the appropriate
authority for fraud. Id. at 12. The Court instructed Mr. Baysa to cease discussing
his motion to resurrect counts, and to focus on the upcoming trial setting, upon
pain of dismissal if he continued. Id. at 8–12. The Court repeated this instruction
several times. Id. at 14. Unfortunately, Mr. Baysa declined to follow this
instruction and demanded the trial be on his other claims—that were resolved years
prior but were the subject of the putative fraud conspiracy between his former
counsel and defense counsel. Id. at 15 (MR. BAYSA: “You can’t just, oh, narrow
the issues and, like, Mr. Baysa is a piece of shit and he wants to sever the excessive
force case. I mean for God sakes they excluded evidence, critical evidence, you
know. For you just to ignore that, that they did something like that, which is the
foundation of, you know, candid tribunal. They had a duty to disclose.”).
Mr. Baysa argued that his former attorneys conspired with Deputy
Redinger’s lawyer to commit fraud upon the Court by excluding Redinger’s arrest
report from the record. Id. at 14. But the record was supplemented with this report
as early as one year prior, and Mr. Baysa was given leave then to file pleadings
regarding the report, which he did not do. And the report supported no such
conspiracy allegation. After this and after several more attempts, the Court
dismissed the case. Id. at 15.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Pro se litigants who ignore discovery orders are subject to sanctions like any
other litigant. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). The severe
sanction of dismissal is warranted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) when a party’s
failure to comply evinces a refusal to acknowledge the court’s authority and no
willingness to comply with court orders. Id. In other words, the refusal must be
willful and intentional. Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985);
see generally Haji v. NCR Corp., 834 F. App’x 562, 563 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing
Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 641 (1976)).
These tests are met here.
A court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to obey a court
order or rule. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962). The court
possesses inherent authority to manage its docket. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V
Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
In this instance there was contumacious refusal to comply, and no lesser
sanctions or alternatives to dismissal. The matter had been remanded to this Court
for trial on the remaining count. The counts that Mr. Baysa wanted reopened
under his conspiracy theory were long-ago resolved, including by an appeal to the
Eleventh Circuit who ruled and expressly affirmed on Mr. Baysa’s main
contention—the false arrest count—and had recently denied a motion that Mr.
Baysa thereafter demanded be granted before he would proceed. The trial setting
on the remand was something Plaintiff Mr. Baysa showed by both words and
conduct that he did not intend to participate in.
The Court showed patience with Mr. Baysa. Mr. Baysa declined to
participate in the pretrial preparation for the upcoming jury trial and declined to
follow the Court’s written instructions in that regard. He stated so at the hearing
and defied the Court’s clear verbal orders at the hearing as well. It was his case to
prosecute, and he declined to do so.
Despite being forewarned first by the defense motion to dismiss for
intentional failure to comply with the pretrial order, and then repeatedly by the
Court, Mr. Baysa willfully and intentionally participated in his refusal to proceed
on the matter at hand. The dismissal came after 15 pages of transcript with the
Court constantly seeking to direct him to the upcoming trial of his case. Mr. Baysa
knowingly defied the Court’s orders and failed to prosecute his case. The case is
dismissed. The Clerk will enter final judgment for Defendants and close this file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on October 18, 2022.
mb, —
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of record
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