Helm v. Duval County School Board

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

KYLE HELM, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-900-TJC-LLL

DUVAL COUNTY SCHOOL

BOARD,

Defendant.

ORDER

This case is again before the Court, this time in the context of a motion

for class certification. Plaintiffs, a group of parents and children challenging

Defendant Duval County School Board’s (DCSB) mask policy, filed their Motion

for Class Action Certification (Doc. 39), to which DCSB responded (Doc. 46),

Plaintiffs replied (Doc. 51), and DCSB filed a sur-reply (Doc. 54). Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint alleges that DCSB’s mask policy violated

Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. (Doc. 44). DCSB answered. (Doc. 45).

Plaintiffs seek certification of the following class:

[P]arents or legal guardians, who are residents of

Duval County, Florida, with children between the ages

of five (5) and eighteen (18), who attend or previously

attended a Duval County Public School between

August and December 2021, and were subject to the

Emergency Rule adopted August 23, 2021 (“Mask

Mandate”); but would have chosen to have their

children attend school unmasked without any pre-

conditions if given the option.

(Doc. 39 at 12).

All class actions must meet the prerequisites found in Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(a), which are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality,

and (4) adequacy of representation, and satisfy one of the three requirements

in Rule 23(b). A district court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine

whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. Brown v. Electrolux Home

Prod., Inc., 817 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011) (citation omitted)). The party seeking

class certification bears the burden of proof and must affirmatively show

compliance with Rule 23. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350.

Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden because a simple recital of the

elements of a class action is not enough for class certification. See id. Under

each 23(a) element, Plaintiffs state the law and then state that the element is

met. (Doc. 59 at 12–14). For example, Plaintiffs only support for the numerosity

requirement includes the following statement: “The claims belonging to the

Class are so numerous that joinder of all individual members is impractical.”

Id. at 13. Plaintiffs attempt to correct their deficiencies in their reply. Plaintiffs

state that they comprise thirty-nine individuals, and they provide affidavits of

eleven additional families who state that they have been harmed by DCSB’s

mask policy. (Docs. 51 at 1–2; 51-1). Plaintiffs assert that all eleven of these

families would be in the purported class. (Doc. 51 at 2). Plaintiffs argue that

numerosity is met because they have presented over forty potential class

members. Id. at 1–2 (citing Muzuco v. Re$ubmitIt, LLC, 297 F.R.D. 504, 514–

15 (S.D. Fla. 2013)). But Rule 23 does not include that bright-line rule. Rule 23

contemplates a more fact-specific and flexible approach. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).

Indeed, Plaintiffs’ case, Muzuco, discusses that courts “may also consider

factors such as the geographic diversity of the class members, the nature of the

action, the size of each plaintiff’s claim, judicial economy and the inconvenience

of trying individual lawsuits, and the ability of the individual class members to

institute individual lawsuits.” Muzuco, 297 F.R.D. at 515 (quotation marks and

citations omitted). Further, DCSB provides evidence that several Plaintiffs may

not even qualify for the class because their children either did not attend a

DCSB school or had a medical opt-out from the mask policy. (Docs. 46 at 8; 46-

1 at ¶¶ 4–9; 54 at 2). Plaintiffs’ deficiency in establishing the other Rule 23(a)

elements follow a similar theme.

Plaintiffs also offer less than a paragraph of discussion on Rule 23(b)(3)’s

predominance and superiority elements. See (Docs. 39 at 15; 51 at 3).

Predominance is one of the most demanding elements in Rule 23. See Vega v.

T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Even if the court can

identify common questions of law or fact, . . . [t]he predominance inquiry . . . is

far more demanding than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement.”) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). “[W]here . . . plaintiffs must still introduce a

great deal of individualized proof or argue a number of individualized legal

points to establish most or all of the elements of their individual claims, such

claims are not suitable for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .” Id.

(quoting Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated

in part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639

(2008)). Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to show that individual issues would

not predominate over common issues. For example, each Plaintiffs’ potential

damages likely will vary given the wide range of alleged injuries. Compare (Doc.

39 at 2–3 (stating their child was harmed because the child “suffers from severe

anxiety when forced to wear a mask”)) and id. at 3 (explaining child

academically regressed at school when wearing a mask) with id. at 5 (asserting

the child “became physically ill on the playground and vomited while being

compelled to wear her mask”). Additionally, Plaintiff parents’ injuries

inevitably will be different than Plaintiff children’s injuries. Plaintiffs have not

met their burden to show predominance, 1 Brown, 817 F.3d at 1240

1 Plaintiffs cite two cases in support of their argument that individualized

damages issues will not defeat class certification. (Doc. 51 at 2–3). These two

cases are easily distinguishable. In Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d

1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2012), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s

approval of a class action settlement, but only injunctive relief was sought.

Plaintiffs cite Sliwa for the proposition that because the evidence will not

(“[I]ndividual damages defeat predominance if computing them ‘will be so

complex, fact-specific, and difficult that the burden on the court system would

be simply intolerable.’”) (quoting Klay, 382 F.3d at 1260), or the other

requirements of 23(b)(3).

In sum, Plaintiffs have not affirmatively demonstrated their compliance

with all the Rule 23 requirements. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (“Rule 23 does

not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must

affirmatively demonstrate [] compliance with the Rule—that is, [the movant]

must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties,

common questions of law or fact, etc.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, it is

hereby

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Action Certification (Doc. 39) is DENIED

without prejudice.

2. The parties shall confer and file a Case Management Report no later

than October 20, 2022.

significantly change with more class members, certification is proper. (Doc. 51

at 3); Sliwa v. Bright House Networks, LLC, 333 F.R.D. 255, 279 (M.D. Fla.

2019) (“If, on the other hand, the addition of more plaintiffs leaves the quantum

of evidence introduced by the plaintiffs as a whole relatively undisturbed, then

common issues are likely to predominate.”) (quoting Brown, 817 F.3d at 1235).

But Plaintiffs fail to consider that more class members would require additional

proof of injuries and damages and Plaintiffs offer no common or non-

burdensome method of proving damages.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida the 3rd day of October,

2022.

\ Ww TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

= United States District Judge

ckm

Copies:

Counsel of record