Opinion

Torres v. Pasco County Board of Commissioners

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Aug 4, 2022
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.9%

“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
  • emphasizing that “[o]nly a change in the law, or the facts upon which a decision is based, will justify a reconsideration of a previous order”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JERRI TORRES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:21-cv-892-TPB-JSS

PASCO COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the court’s order denying her motion to

compel (Dkt. 113) as moot (Dkt. 117). (Motion, Dkt. 118.) Defendant opposes the

Motion. (Dkt. 119.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED to the extent reconsidered below, and her motion to

compel (Dkt. 113) is otherwise DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff sued her former employer for sexual harassment, hostile work

environment, retaliation, and sex discrimination. (Dkt. 62.) At the request of the

parties, discovery in this matter has been repeatedly extended by the court, and closed

on July 5, 2022. (Dkts. 76, 90, 100, 107.)

Prior to the close of discovery, Plaintiff moved on June 20, 2022 for an order

declaring that service of five subpoenas on Defendant was valid and compelling

Defendant’s compliance with the subpoenas. (Dkt. 113.) On June 29, 2022,

Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, and represented that as of June 23,

2022, Defendant agreed to accept service of the subpoenas and provided its responses

to Plaintiff. (Dkt. 115 at 6–7, 9.) In light of Defendant’s representations, the court

denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Dkt. 113) and Plaintiff’s then-pending motion for

leave to file a reply brief in support of her motion to compel (Dkt. 116) as moot. (Dkt.

117.)

On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion seeking reconsideration of

the court’s order denying her motion to compel. (Dkt. 118.) With the Motion,

Plaintiff attached an excerpt of Defendant’s responses to the subpoenas (Dkt. 118-1),

which Plaintiff stated she received “about six-minutes” after filing her motion to

compel. (Dkt. 118 at 5; Dkts. 118-4, 118-5.) Plaintiff also reattached three of the

subpoenas (Dkt. 118-2) and correspondence with the clerk’s office reflecting the

timeline on which Plaintiff received the subpoenas. (Dkt. 118-3.) Plaintiff also

attached what she represents to be a public declaration from 1887 evidencing a “claim

of the territory” of Pasco County, purportedly to contradict Defendant’s claim that the

proper defendant in this action is Pasco County. (Dkt. 118-6); see also (Dkt. 119 at 1,

n.1.)

Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion on July 25, 2022. (Dkt.

119.) On July 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed a reply in further support of the Motion. (Dkt.

124.)

ANALYSIS

1. Reconsideration of the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel (Dkt. 117)

“[R]econsideration of a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be

employed sparingly.” Sussman v. Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 694

(M.D. Fla. 1994). A motion for reconsideration requires the moving party to show:

(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or

(3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v.

Shirley Inv. Properties, LLC, No. 8:13-cv-528-T-23MAP, 2014 WL 12623802, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 16, 2014); see Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Nu-Cape Const., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 680,

684–85 (M.D. Fla. 1996). A “change in the law, or the facts upon which a decision is

based, will justify a reconsideration of a previous order.” Sussman, 153 F.R.D. at 694

(citing Ware v. United States, No. 93-1172-CIV-T-17, 1994 WL 34173 (M.D.Fla.1994));

Kaplan v. Kaplan, No. 2:10-cv-237-FtM-36SPC, 2011 WL 13141502, at *1 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 14, 2011) (“A motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not merely

address issues litigated previously.”) (citation omitted). To “introduce previously

unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider,” the movant bears the burden to

show that “the evidence was not available during the pendency of the motion.”

Carruega v. Steve’s Painting, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-715-FTM-29CM, 2017 WL 3387228, at

*2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2017) (quoting Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th

Cir. 1997)); Leveille v. Upchurch, No. 3:19-cv-908-BJD-MCR, 2021 WL 1530730, at *3

(M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2021) (granting reconsideration of motion to compel). The

decision to grant a motion for reconsideration of a non-final order is committed to the

sound discretion of the court. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock,

993 F.2d 800, 806 (11th Cir. 1993).

Here, the court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated new evidence warranting

reconsideration of the court’s order denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel. The court

denied Plaintiff’s motion to compel as moot based on Defendant’s representation that

it had accepted service of the subpoenas and had provided its responses to Plaintiff.

(Dkt. 118.) With the instant Motion, Plaintiff has provided the court with an excerpt

of Defendant’s responses. See (Dkt. 118-1.) Plaintiff raises new issues as to the argued

inadequacy of Defendant’s responses to the subpoenas, which she did not (and could

not) have raised in her initial motion to compel that was filed before Defendant

responded. See Sussman, 153 F.R.D. at 694 (emphasizing that “[o]nly a change in the

law, or the facts upon which a decision is based, will justify a reconsideration of a

previous order”). As such, the court, in its discretion, grants Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration of its order denying Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Dkt. 117), and

reconsiders the motion in light of the additional facts and arguments Plaintiff submits

with the instant Motion. See Leveille, 2021 WL 1530730, at *3.

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Dkt. 113)

In the Motion, Plaintiff argues that certain of Defendant’s responses to the

subpoena requests are inadequate and seeks to have the court compel Defendant’s

compliance with those requests. (Dkts. 118, 124.) Defendant responds that Plaintiff’s

filings make “no decipherable argument as to why she contends the Court should

reconsider its ruling,” that Defendant “responded to Plaintiff’s subpoena[s] in a timely

fashion and exercised its right to object to the subpoena requests,” and that Plaintiff

has failed to confer regarding those objections. (Dkt. 119 at 5–6.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain

discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or

defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Relevancy is construed

“broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other

matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer

Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,

501 (1947)). However, Rule 26 is not an “unlimited license for fishing expeditions.”

Benz v. Crowley Logistics, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-728-J-25MCR, 2016 WL 11587289, at *2

(M.D. Fla. June 17, 2016) (quoting Belcher v. A & M Business Properties, Inc., No.: 8:10-

cv-2898-T-23AEP, 2015 WL 4527575, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2015)). Courts thus

require a threshold showing of relevancy by the party seeking discovery to avoid

arbitrary requests for discovery that does not bear on relevant issues. Id. (citing Salvato

v. Miley, No.: 5:12-cv-635-Oc-10PRL, 2013 WL 2712206, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 11,

2013)). Further, the burden rests on the moving party to initially offer proof that the

information sought is in fact relevant. Moore v. Lender Processing, No.: 3:12-cv-205-J-

32MCR, 2013 WL 2447948, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2013) (citations omitted).

The court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion and reply brief and it

appears that she contends that the documents sought in subpoena Request No. 2, are

relevant to the claims in her complaint.1 Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,

1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”). (Dkt. 124.)

Request No. 2 seeks “[p]hysical documents showing Barabara (sic) Hitzemann’s or

[D]efendant’s HR department’s sexual harassment investigations during Hitzemann’s

employment with the Defendant. Hitzemann stated ‘ten . . .’ investigations.” (Dkt.

113-1 at 5.) It appears Plaintiff is seeking evidence of all sexual harassment

investigations conducted by Ms. Hitzemann or Defendant during Ms. Hitzemann’s

employment with Defendant. Plaintiff maintains that the documents she seeks are

relevant to an alleged false statement made by Ms. Hitzemann during her deposition

on March 10, 2022 (Dkt. 105-1). (Dkt. 124.)

According to Plaintiff, Ms. Hitzemann testified during her deposition that she

had not taken action on a report charging Plaintiff with illegally recording and

intercepting communications. (Dkt. 124 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Ms.

Hitzemann’s statement was untrue because a Pasco County Sheriff’s report indicated

that an investigation had been conducted and Plaintiff was “exceptionally cleared” of

that charge. (Id. at 2–3.) Thus, Plaintiff argues that Ms. Hitzemann committed perjury

and the documents sought are relevant to her claim for a hostile work environment.

(Id. at 5.)

1 Plaintiff devoted nearly the entirety of her actual Motion to Compel (Dkt. 113) to arguing that service

of the subpoenas on Defendant was proper.

The documents Plaintiff seeks are not relevant to the claims in the complaint or

proportional to the needs of the case. Plaintiff’s request seeking the discovery of

documents “showing” all “sexual harassment investigations during Hitzemann’s

employment with the Defendant” as sought by Request No. 2 is overly broad and lacks

relevance. See Beaulieu v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 615-cv-2116-ORL40GJK, 2016

WL 2944048, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2016) (granting protective order where “areas

of inquiry are patently overbroad, not tailored to the issues in this case and not

proportional to the issues in this case”). Defendant states that it previously produced

documents related to its investigation into Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim and

Plaintiff has not challenged that assertion. See (Dkt. 118-1 (Defendant’s response to

Request No. 3).) Rather, Plaintiff broadly seeks documents from all “sexual

harassment investigations” during Ms. Hitzemann’s tenure. This request constitutes

an impermissible fishing expedition designed to allow Plaintiff to “roam in the shadow

zones of relevancy and to explore matters which do not presently appear germane on

the theory that they may conceivably become so.” Benz, 2016 WL 11587289, at *2

(quoting Henderson v. Holiday CVS, 269 F.R.D. 682, 687 (S.D. Fla. 2010)). This is

especially true given that Request No. 2 seeks documents related to “sexual

harassment investigations,” which would not appear to include an investigation into

a charge of illegally intercepting communications on which Plaintiff bases her

arguments of relevancy. See (Dkt. 124 at 4.) Thus, even liberally construing Plaintiff’s

arguments, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing the relevance of the

documents sought by Request No. 2. Further, the documents Plaintiff seeks in

subpoena Requests No. 1 and 4 likewise lack relevance, and Plaintiff has not met her

initial burden with respect to those requests. See, e.g., Benz, 2016 WL 11587289, at *3

(concluding plaintiff had not met her initial burden of showing how the information

sought is relevant to her claims); Jones, 2012 WL 3065384, at *2 (denying a motion to

compel when the moving party failed to make an adequate initial showing of

relevancy).

Additionally, Plaintiff devotes much of the instant Motion to explaining how

Defendant’s objections are simply “boilerplate-objections” that lack clarity. (Dkt. 118

at 6–7.) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(B), objections to discovery

requests must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including

the reasons.” Boilerplate objections are improper. Gibson v. Resort at Paradise Lakes,

LLC, No 8:16-cv-791-T-36AAS, 2017 WL 735457, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2017);

Bank v. Graham, No. 8:19-cv-415-T-35SPF, 2020 WL 2425732, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May

12, 2020) (overruling improper boilerplate objection to discovery request). However,

the initial burden rests on the moving party to establish relevancy. Moore, 2013 WL

2447948, at *2. “Only after this occurs, will the burden shift to the resisting party to

show specifically the reason for resisting the requested discovery.” Benz, 2016 WL

11587289, at *2 (citing Henderson, 269 F.R.D. at 686). Here, as explained above,

Plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden of establishing the relevancy of discovery

sought. Thus, the court has not considered the adequacy of Defendant’s objections.

Accordingly, itis ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the

court’s order denying her motion to compel (Dkt. 118) is GRANTED to the extent

reconsidered herein, and her motion to compel (Dkt. 113) 1s otherwise DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 4, 2022.

JUEIE $. SNEED

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Party

-9-

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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