Huggins v. School District of Manatee County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

ARTHUR HUGGINS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:22-cv-1183-WFJ-TGW

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF MANATEE

COUNTY; MANATEE COUNTY

SCHOOL BOARD; CYNTHIA

SAUNDERS, in her official and

individual capacities; PAUL DAMICO,

in his and individual official capacities;

MIKE BARBER, in his official and

individual capacities; and ADAM

WOOLARD, in his official and

individual capacities,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on four Motions to Dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for a More Definite Statement filed by Defendants Mike Barber, Paul

Damico, Cynthia Saunders, and the School Board of Manatee County.1 Dkts. 10,

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1 Though the case caption lists the School District of Manatee County and the Manatee County

School Board as separate defendants, defense counsel indicated that these named Defendants are

one and the same entity, properly identified as the School Board of Manatee County. Dkt. 1 at 1

n.1. The Court agrees.

11, 12, 13. Plaintiff Arthur Huggins filed responses to each motion. Dkts. 26, 27,

28, 29. Upon careful consideration, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendants’ motions. Specifically, Defendants’ motions are granted in that they

seek a more definite statement.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a Black resident of Bradenton, Florida. Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 5, 87. The city

of Bradenton sits in Manatee County, where public schools are governed by

Defendant School Board of Manatee County (the “School Board”). The School

Board is headed by Defendant Superintendent Cynthia Saunders. Id. ¶ 8.

Defendant Paul Damico serves as the School Board’s Chief of Security, and

Defendant Mike Barber is employed as the School Board’s Communications

Director. Id. ¶ 9−10. Defendant Adam Wollard,2 a police officer for the Bradenton

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Police Department, provided security at the School Board’s meetings during the

time period relevant to this action. Id. ¶ 11.

As an active community leader, Plaintiff regularly attended the School

Board’s 2019 meetings to voice his opinions on community issues. Id. ¶¶ 30−31.

Plaintiff contends that, upon realizing that its 2019 meetings were largely attended

by Black citizens, the School District began to increase security measures by

installing metal detectors, increasing police presence, and requiring bag checks in

2 Defendant Wollard’s surname is misspelled in the case caption. See Dkt. 24.

an effort to dissuade Black citizens from attending. Id. ¶¶ 19, 34. Plaintiff also

contends that the School Board used police officers to intimidate Black citizens

and moved the public comment portion of its meetings to the end of each

meeting’s agenda to deter Black citizens from speaking. Id. ¶ 19. Around this time,

Plaintiff publicly criticized the School Board in an interview with a local news

station. Id. ¶¶ 36−37.

On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff attended a four-hour meeting held by the

School Board. Id. ¶¶ 20−21. After experiencing back pain, Plaintiff chose to stand

against a wall during the meeting. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims he was then approached

by Mr. Damico, the School Board’s Chief of Security, who told Plaintiff that he

needed to “either have a seat or leave the meeting.” Id. ¶ 23. Though Plaintiff

contends that he informed Mr. Damico of his back pain, Mr. Damico notified

Officer Wollard of Plaintiff’s refusal to find a seat. Id. ¶¶ 24−25. Upon being asked

to leave the meeting room by Officer Wollard, Plaintiff complied and exited to the

building’s main lobby. Id. ¶¶ 26−27. While standing in the lobby, Plaintiff

contends that Officer Wollard placed a hand on his back and forced him out of the

building. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff was not allowed to return to the meeting to make a

public comment. Id. ¶ 28.

One month later, the School Board held an executive session to discuss

safety and security. Id. ¶ 39. There, the School Board watched a video containing

footage of “citizens and board members engaged in violent confrontations” during

recent public meetings. Id. ¶ 41. The video included footage of Plaintiff being

removed from the November 12th meeting. Id. ¶ 40. Mr. Barber, the School

Board’s Communications Director, allegedly provided the video to the Sarasota

Herald Tribune for publication. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff asserts that the video has

remained published online since December 27, 2019. Id.

In April 2022, based on the above allegations, Plaintiff filed the present

lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in and for Manatee

County, Florida. Dkt. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on May 23,

2022. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges ten counts. Though misnumbered,3 the

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Court will refer to the counts as Plaintiff has labeled them. Count 1 asserts a claim

of false imprisonment against the School Board, Ms. Saunders, Mr. Damico, and

Officer Wollard. Dkt. 1-1 ¶¶ 43−48. Count 2 is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 false

imprisonment claim against the same four Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 49−56. In Count 3,

Plaintiff brings an assault claim against Mr. Damico and Officer Wollard. Id. ¶¶

57−60. Count 4 is a battery claim against the School Board based on a theory of

vicarious liability. Id. ¶¶ 61−66. Plaintiff’s Count 5 asserts a § 1983 free speech

claim against the School Board, Ms. Saunders, Mr. Damico, and Officer Wollard.

3 Plaintiff’s Complaint begins with a Count 1 and concludes with two claims labeled Count 12,

which the Court will refer to as Counts 12a and 12b. The Complaint does not contain a Count 7,

9, or 10.

Id. ¶¶ 67−78. In Count 6, Plaintiff brings a separate § 1983 free speech claim

against Mr. Barber. Id. ¶¶ 79−83.

Next, Count 8 is a § 1983 claim against the School Board for violating

Plaintiff’s equal protection rights. Id. ¶¶ 84−93. Following Count 8, Plaintiff’s

Count 11 asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim against all Defendants for violating

Plaintiff’s right to full and equal benefits under the law. Id. ¶¶ 94−98. In Count

12a, Plaintiff brings a claim of government retaliation against all Defendants

pursuant to § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 99−110. Finally, Plaintiff’s Count 12b is a claim against

the School Board for violating section 286.0114, Florida Statutes. Id. ¶¶ 111−16.

Defendants Mike Barber, Paul Damico, Cynthia Saunders, and the School

Board now separately move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and failure to comply

with the pleading requirements of Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b). Dkts. 10, 11, 12, 13.

Alternatively, they move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its

face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard does not require

detailed factual allegations but demands more than an unadorned accusation. Id. In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint’s factual allegations are

accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage

v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

Relatedly, Rules 8 and 10 establish the minimum pleading requirements for

a complaint. Under the notice pleading standards set forth in Rule 8, a complaint

must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To comply with Rule 10, a plaintiff must

also bring its claims in separate, numbered paragraphs, with each claim “limited as

far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). A

complaint that violates either of these pleading rules is often disparagingly called a

“shotgun pleading.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313,

1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Dismissal of such a pleading is warranted under Rules

8(a)(2) and 10(b) when “it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact

are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Id. at 1325 (emphasis in

original).

In addition to moving to dismiss for failure to comply with pleading

requirements, a defendant facing a shotgun pleading may move for a more definite

statement under Rule 12(e). Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir.

2021) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). In exercising the discretion afforded to it by Rule

12(e), a court may order a plaintiff to file a more definite statement after

concluding that his complaint is too vague. Id. (Tjoflat, J., concurring).

ANALYSIS

In each of their motions, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s Complaint

constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading. Dkt. 10 at 13−16; Dkt. 11 at 19−22;

Dkt. 12 at 18−22; Dkt. 13 at 18−23. The Eleventh Circuit has identified four types

of shotgun pleadings: (1) complaints in which each count adopts the allegations of

all preceding counts; (2) complaints that are “replete with conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts”; (3) complaints that fail to separate each cause of action into

separate counts; and (4) complaints that assert multiple claims against multiple

defendants without specifying which defendant is responsible for which acts.

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321−23. No matter the type, all shotgun pleadings exhibit

the unifying characteristic of failing to give defendants adequate notice of the

claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. at 1320.

With this understanding, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint amounts to a

shotgun pleading for at least two reasons.

First, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to separate each cause of action into

separate counts. While Plaintiff’s Count 1 false imprisonment claim asserts

violations of two Florida constitutional provisions, Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 45, Plaintiff appears

to actually base Count 1 upon Florida tort law, see, e.g., Dkt. 29 at 5 (citing Florida

tort cases). Because claims under Florida constitutional provisions and Florida tort

law are distinct causes of action, Plaintiff must clarify the legal basis underlying

Count 1 to give Defendants adequate notice of the claims against them. See

Reynolds v. City of Daytona Beach, No. 6:18-cv-1921-Orl-28LRH, 2019 WL

2412433, at *10 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2019) (discussing dismissal of plaintiff’s prior

complaint for failure to clarify whether her false arrest claim was brought pursuant

to the Florida Constitution or Florida tort law); see also C.F.C. v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., 349 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1266−67 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (analyzing false

imprisonment claims brought separately under the Florida Constitution and Florida

tort law).

Plaintiff’s Counts 2, 5, 6, 8, and 12a present similar issues, as Plaintiff

alleges multiple violations of the Florida Constitution and/or United States

Constitution within each of these § 1983 claims. Count 2 asserts violations of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 52, while Counts 5 and 6 both

allege violations of the Florida Constitution and the First Amendment, id. ¶¶ 69,

81. Likewise, in Counts 8 and 12a, Plaintiff claims violations of First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 87, 107. Plaintiff’s conflation of legal bases in

these counts fails to afford Defendants sufficient notice of the claims against them.

Plaintiff must replead his Complaint such that each count represents a single claim.

Second, while Plaintiff contends that his suit is against Ms. Saunders, Mr.

Damico, Mr. Barber, and Officer Wollard in both their official and individual

capacities, Dkt 1-1 ¶¶ 8−11, he does not clarify which counts are official capacity

claims and which counts are individual capacity claims. This is an important

distinction, as “official capacity claims are substantively different than individual

capacity claims.” Denson v. Cnty. of Collier, No. 2:21-cv-497-JES-NPM, 2022

WL 294721, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2022) (citations omitted). A court must be

able to determine whether a plaintiff is suing defendants in their individual or

official capacities to ensure those defendants have received sufficient notice with

respect to the capacity in which they are being sued. See Young Apartments, Inc. v.

Town of Jupiter, 529 F.3d 1027, 1047 (11th Cir. 2008). Other courts in this district

have found that a plaintiff’s failure to differentiate individual and official capacity

claims renders his or her complaint a shotgun pleading. See Pinkson v. Univ. of S.

Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 8:15-cv-1724-T-33TBM, 2016 WL 3196474, at *6 (M.D. Fla.

June 9, 2016) (citing Thorn v. Randall, No. 8:14-cv-862-T-36MAP, 2014 WL

5094134, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2014)).

Relatedly, Plaintiff concedes that the state law and § 1983 claims that he

brings against Ms. Saunders, Mr. Damico, and Mr. Barber in Counts 1, 2, 5, 11,4

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and 12a are redundant, as he also brings those claims against their employer, the

School Board. Dkt. 26 at 3; Dkt. 27 at 3; Dkt. 28 at 3. The Court agrees that these

4 While Plaintiff states that he brings Count 11 under § 1981, that section provides substantive—

not remedial—rights. See Butts v. Cnty. of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2000). For

present purposes, the Court construes Count 11 to be a § 1983 claim, as § 1983 provides the

remedial scheme for violations of § 1981. Id. at 892−94. To continue pursuing this claim,

Plaintiff must correctly plead Count 11 as a § 1983 claim.

state law and § 1983 claims brought against the School Board and its employees—

presumably in their official capacities, given Plaintiff’s concession—are

redundant. Claims against a municipality’s employees in their official capacities

are the functional equivalent of claims brought against the municipality itself.

Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 claims);

Geidel v. City of Bradenton Beach, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (M.D. Fla. 1999)

(state law claims); Braden Woods Homeowners Ass’n v. Mavard Trading, Ltd., 277

So. 3d 664, 670 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (same). Plaintiff should amend his Complaint

to remedy this redundancy.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is ultimately difficult to decipher as currently pled. As

such, the Court finds that Defendants’ alternative Motions for a More Definite

Statement are due to be granted.5 The Court declines to reach the merits of

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Plaintiff’s claims at this time.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

PART Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for a More Definite

Statement, Dkts. 10, 11, 12, 13. Specifically, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED

5 While Plaintiff’s Complaint bears the hallmarks of a shotgun pleading, dismissal for failure to

comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is not warranted because it is not “virtually impossible” to

know which factual allegations are intended to support which claims. See Weiland v. Palm Beach

Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jackson v. Ocwen Loan

Servicing, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-10-J-39PDB, 2017 WL 238174, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017).

to the extent they seek a more definite statement. Plaintiff may file an amended

complaint that complies with the pleading requirements of Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b)

within fourteen (14) days of this order. The Court retains the authority to dismiss

with prejudice shotgun pleadings that have not been corrected despite an

opportunity to do so. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir.

2018).

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on June 29, 2022.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record