Frederick v. Thompkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DERRICK D. FREDERICK,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:20-cv-1068-MMH-JBT

SGT. D. TOMPKINS,1

Defendant.

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Derrick D. Frederick, an inmate in the custody of the Florida

Department of Corrections (FDOC), initiated this action on September 22,

2020, by filing a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1)2 with exhibits (Doc. 11). Frederick

filed an Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 19) on February 4, 2021. In the AC,

Frederick asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (related to a December

13, 2019 incident at New River Correctional Institution (NRCI)) against

Defendant D. Tompkins.3 He seeks monetary damages.

1 The proper spelling of Defendant’s surname is Tompkins. See Doc. 46-1. The

Court will direct the Clerk to correct the docket.

2 In referencing documents filed in this case, the Court will cite the document

page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

3 The Court previously dismissed Frederick’s claims against Defendant R.

Johnson, a corrections officer. See Order (Doc. 40).

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tompkins’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (Motion; Doc. 46). He submitted exhibits in support of the

Motion. See Docs. 46-1 through 46-6; 57. The Court advised Frederick of the

provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting

of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a

final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the

matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order (Doc.

5); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 48). Frederick filed a response in

opposition to the Motion. See Motion to Refute Defendant’s Summary

Judgment (Response; Doc. 51). As such, Defendant’s Motion is ripe for review.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations4

In the AC, as count one, Frederick asserts that Defendant Tompkins

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment when Tompkins directed Johnson, his subordinate, to slam the

quad door, which caused “a partial amputation” of Frederick’s finger. AC at 2.

He also asks that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367 over the state law claims that he asserts in counts two through five;

specifically, civil battery (count two); civil assault (count three); negligent

4 The recited facts are drawn from the AC.

2

infliction of emotional distress (count four); and personal capacity negligence

(count five). Id. at 2-4.

As to the specific underlying facts supporting his claims, Frederick

alleges that he was returning to G dormitory after lunch between 11:30 a.m.

and 12:00 p.m. on December 13, 2019. Id. at 2. According to Frederick, he

entered the sallyport area, stood at the quad-four door, and waited for the

officer in the booth to open the door so he could enter. Id. He states that

Tompkins and Johnson were inside the wing waiting to exit. Id. Frederick

asserts that when he “grabbed the door frame,” Tompkins ordered Johnson to

close the door. Id. According to Frederick, Johnson “maliciously and

sadistically slammed the door on the inmates, pushing them in the process,

and on Mr. Frederick’s finger partially amputating [it].” Id. He maintains that

Tompkins and Johnson falsified their reports to “conceal” what happened. Id.

He avers that officers “rushed” him to the medical clinic. Id.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), “[t]he

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a

motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

3

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).5 An

issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

5 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010

Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains

unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to

require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing

development of the decisional law construing and applying

these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not

binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3

(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review

remains viable.

4

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has

discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view

all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing

summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)

(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571,

1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

5

nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In the Motion, Defendant Tompkins maintains that the Court should

grant summary judgment in his favor as to Frederick’s Eighth Amendment

and state law claims against him. See generally Motion. Tompkins argues that

the video evidence supports his position that he did not violate Frederick’s

Eighth Amendment right. He also asserts that he is entitled to qualified

immunity. Id. at 18-19. Additionally, Tompkins contends that Frederick fails

to state plausible assault, battery, and negligence claims. Id. at 14-18. In his

Response, Frederick repeats the allegations set forth in the AC, see Response

at 1-3, and asks the Court to “set this cause of action for trial,” id. at 3.6

6 Frederick also asks that the Court grant summary judgment in his favor as

to his claims against Defendant Tompkins. See Response at 3. However, a request for

affirmative relief, such as the entry of summary judgment in Frederick’s favor, cannot

be imbedded in a response to a party’s motion for summary judgment. Rather, a party

is required to file a proper motion seeking the entry of such relief in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District

Court, Middle District of Florida (Local Rule(s)). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b); Local Rule

3.01(a) (requiring, among other things, a memorandum of legal authority in support

of a request from the Court). This, Frederick has not done. Thus, his request for entry

of summary judgment in his favor is not properly before the Court and for this reason

is due to be denied.

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V. Applicable Law

A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for an Eighth

Amendment violation.

“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones ....”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S. Ct. at 1976 (internal

quotation and citation omitted).[ 7 ] Thus, in its

prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments,” the

Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials

provide humane conditions of confinement. Id.

However, as noted above, only those conditions which

objectively amount to an “extreme deprivation”

violating contemporary standards of decency are

subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503

U.S. at 8-9, 112 S. Ct. at 1000.[8] Furthermore, it is

only a prison official’s subjective deliberate

indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm

caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth

Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.

Ct. at 1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson,

501 U.S. at 303, 111 S. Ct. at 2327.[9]

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eighth

Amendment also requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. 832 (quoting Hudson

v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)); Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357

7 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

8 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).

9 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).

7

(11th Cir. 2021). However, not every injury that a prisoner suffers as a result

of a prison condition necessarily equates to a constitutional violation. See

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013). Only injuries

that occur as a result of a prison official’s deliberate indifference rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate

indifference to a substantial risk of harm as follows:

To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference,

a plaintiff must show “(1) a substantial risk of serious

harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to

that risk; and (3) causation.”[10]

The first element of deliberate indifference —

whether there was a substantial risk of serious harm

— is assessed objectively and requires the plaintiff to

show “conditions that were extreme and posed an

unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health

or safety.”[11] The second element — whether the

defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk —

has both a subjective and an objective component.

Subjectively, the “official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and ... also

draw the inference.”[12] Objectively, the official must

have responded to the known risk in an unreasonable

manner, in that he or she “knew of ways to reduce the

harm” but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.[13]

10 Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hale v.

Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)).

11 Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307.

12 Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).

13 Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620 (quoting Hale, 50 F.3d 1583).

8

Finally, the plaintiff must show a “necessary causal

link” between the officer’s failure to act reasonably and

the plaintiff’s injury.[14]

Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(emphasis added); Johnson v. Bessemer, Ala., City of, 741 F. App’x 694, 698-99

(11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).15

The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

Proof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal

more than does proof of negligence: “To be deliberately

indifferent a prison official must know of and

disregard ‘an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;

the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.’” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1319-20 (emphasis

supplied) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)).[16]

In other words, a plaintiff in [Frederick]’s

position must show not only that there was a

substantial risk of serious harm, but also that

[Defendant] “subjectively knew of the

substantial risk of serious harm and that [he]

knowingly or recklessly disregarded that risk.”

Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (alteration omitted) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Whether prison officials

had the requisite awareness of the risk “is a question

14 Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622-23.

15 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

16 Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313 (11th

Cir. 2005).

9

of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways,

including inference from circumstantial evidence, and

a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew

of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk

was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at

1981 (citation omitted). At the same time, the

deliberate indifference standard – and the subjective

awareness required by it – is far more onerous than

normal tort based standards of conduct sounding in

negligence: “Merely negligent failure to protect an

inmate from attack does not justify liability under [§]

1983.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th

Cir. 1990) (per curiam). And[,] needless to say, to

defeat a motion for summary judgment, [a

plaintiff] must adduce specific evidence from

which a jury could reasonably find in his favor;

“[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in

support of [his] position will be insufficient.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512.

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added and deleted); Cox, 15 F.4th at

1358; Mosley v. Zachery, 966 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2020); Scott v.

Miami Dade Cnty., 657 F. App’x 877, 883 (11th Cir. 2016) (stating that “a

plaintiff must allege facts that would allow a jury to conclude that: the

defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious

harm” (subjective component), and “the defendant disregarded that known risk

by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner” (objective

component)).

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B. Supervisory Liability

As to supervisory liability, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

Supervisory officials are not vicariously liable under

section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their

subordinates. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269

(11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff[] must instead allege that

the supervisor, through his own actions, violated the

Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129

S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022). A prisoner must assert

facts showing either that a supervisor personally participated in the alleged

constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection between the actions

of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation to state a

claim against a supervising official. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269

(11th Cir. 1999); Gaffney v. Warden, Taylor Corr. Inst., No. 20-13572, 2022 WL

18381, at *5 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (stating supervisory liability

“only occurs when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged

unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the

actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).

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VI. Analysis17

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

Frederick contends that Defendant Tompkins violated his Eighth

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. According to

Frederick, Tompkins (a supervisor) directed Johnson to close the quad door,

and when Johnson slammed the door shut, one-fourth of Frederick’s right

middle finger was caught in the door frame and severed. Tompkins contends

that he is entitled to summary judgment as to Frederick’s Eighth Amendment

claim against him. In support of his position, Defendant submitted exhibits,

including his own Declaration (Tompkins Decl.), Doc. 46-1; an Incident Report,

Doc. 46-2; Frederick’s grievances and appeals, Doc. 46-4; the Declaration of

Betty Renfroe, Doc. 46-6; and the Deposition of Derrick Frederick (P. Depo.),

Doc. 57. With the Court’s permission, see Order (Doc. 49), Defendant also

submitted a digital video disc under seal, see fixed wing (FW) video, Docs. 46-

3; 60 (sealed).

In his Declaration, Defendant Tompkins states in pertinent part:

I was employed by the Florida Department of

Corrections (“FDC”). On December 13, 2019, I was

17 For purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Frederick. Thus, the

facts described in the Court’s analysis may differ from those that ultimately can be

proved.

12

assigned to G dorm in New River Correctional

Institution in Raiford, Florida[,] as a Sergeant.

At the request of the Florida Office of the Attorney

General, I have reviewed the Complaint and reports

from the incident involving Inmate Derrick Frederick

on December 13, 2019. The allegations as alleged by

Inmate Frederick are not true. The facts are as follows:

On December 13, 2019, while in G-dorm, I was not

present at the door where the incident occurred. A

review of the video will show that someone pulled the

door open and just as soon as the door was pulled

open[,] Officer Johnson[] pulled the door shut.

Tompkins Decl. at 1 (enumeration omitted). In an Incident Report, Lieutenant

M. Nestved reported what he saw that afternoon. He stated in pertinent part:

At approximately 1235 hours on December 13, 2019,

while assigned as the G-dorm Housing Lieutenant[,] I

was present in G-Dorm and witnessed Inmate

FREDERICK, Derrick DC #122803 housed in G4101L

get his right middle finger shut in the Quad 4 door.

Inmate FREDERICK was escorted to medical where it

was determined that he be transported to an outside

medical facility for further treatment.

Doc. 46-2 at 1.

To defeat the Motion, Frederick is required to present evidence to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. In opposing Defendant’s Motion,

Frederick submitted his medical records and a variety of his grievances and

appeals and the FDOC’s responses, many pertaining to alleged improper

13

medical care. Doc. 11. In one grievance, Frederick provided the details

surrounding the incident. He stated in pertinent part:

On 12/13/19 at approximately 1130 AM to 1230 PM an

incident occurred where C/O Johnson acted with

[]reckless disregard for my safety and well being while

I was attempting to open and enter the door to quad 4

of G-dorm. When he slammed the door shut and

severed 1/4 of my middle finger completely off. C/O

Johnson was waiting at quad 4 dorm door, inside

waiting to come out, at no time did C/O Johnson

motion or verbally tell me to back up or to the other

inmates to back away from the door. C/O Johnson was

visi[]bly upset at the C/O in the booth for letting the

inmates outside in before letting him out of the quad

4. His actions with []reckless disregard to inmates has

cost me grav[e] injury in the damage done to my right

middle finger. . . .

Docs. 11-9 (selected capitalization omitted); 46-4 at 3.

Frederick also submitted the notarized affidavit of inmate Quentin

Bradley, FDOC #C00374, who says he saw the incident. Doc. 51-1 (Bradley

Aff.). Bradley avers in pertinent part:

I was standing right there by the wing door on

camera[.] You will be able to see me on 12-13-19 at

approximately 11:30 AM to 12:30 PM. I was in G-dorm

wing 4 where I live[.] [W]hile I was in the dorm I saw

all the other inmates returning from lunch chow. I saw

inmate Derrick Frederick #122803 standing at the

dorm door waiting to come in as the door open[ed.]

Inmate Derrick Frederick #122803 was opening the

door to allow Sgt. Thompkins and Officer Johnson to

exit the wing[.] [W]hen I heard Sgt. Thompkins

scream at Officer Johnson telling him to close

the fu[--]ing door[,] Officer Johnson then forcefully

14

slammed the door close[d] and it cut off Inmate

Frederick[’s] finger. And since that time Inmate

Frederick has not been acting like himself[,] he acts

like he is depressed[,] he hasn’t been the same since.

[H]e’s not himself. . . .

Bradley Aff. at 1 (emphasis added).

Frederick filed a Motion to Submit Declarations of Witnesses (Doc. 58)

and attached the unsigned and unnotarized affidavits of two inmates who

allegedly were among the inmates with Frederick in the sallyport. Affidavit of

Anthony Johnson, FDOC #E38917, Doc. 58-2 at 1-2; Affidavit of Tommy

Poindexter, FDOC #B07828, id. at 3-4. In the Motion, Frederick asks that the

Court accept the affidavits “as notarized” because Johnson and Poindexter

were not able to get the affidavits notarized due to a lockdown at South Bay

Correctional Institution. Motion at 1. Defendant opposes the Motion. See

Notice to Court (Notice; Doc. 61). He maintains that neither inmate is housed

with Frederick at South Bay Correctional Institution,18 see Notice at 1-2, and

there is “no way for [Frederick] to prove that the testimony came from anyone

other than [Frederick],” id. at 2. Defendant argues that Frederick “asks the

Court to accept the affidavits under false pretenses.” Id.

18 Defendant attaches exhibits, showing that Johnson was released from

FDOC custody on March 2, 2022, and Poindexter has been housed at Graceville

Correctional Institution since September 16, 2021. Docs. 61-1; 61-2.

15

The Court agrees that neither Johnson nor Poindexter is housed with

Frederick at South Bay Correctional Institution. Additionally, Frederick’s

assertions related to their inability to get affidavits notarized is seemingly less

than candid. Notably, Frederick has had ample time to submit signed and

notarized affidavits from Johnson and Poindexter.19 And, regardless of the

penal lockdown experienced by Frederick, he was able to obtain and submit a

signed, notarized affidavit by Bradley, who is housed at South Bay

Correctional Institution with Frederick. As such, Frederick’s request that the

Court consider Johnson’s and Poindexter’s unsigned and unnotarized

affidavits is due to be denied, especially when Frederick had plenty of time to

compile his exhibits and relies on Bradley’s account of what transpired that

afternoon.20

The parties agree that the fixed wing video (no audio) evidence captures

the December 13, 2019 incident. Each generally cites to the fixed wing video

footage and argues that the video evidence supports his own factual accounts

as to how the events unfolded. See Motion at 3, 8, 11-14; Docs. 9; 11-9; P. Depo.

19 Frederick initially listed Johnson and Poindexter as witnesses on January

11, 2021. Doc. 9 at 1. Over a year later, the Court gave Frederick a deadline (April

29, 2022) to “submit the declarations of the two inmates (Anthony Johnson and

Tommy Poindexter) that [Frederick] lists in his Index of Exhibits (Doc. 9) as exhibit

S, if he elects to do so.” Order (Doc. 56), filed April 13, 2022.

20 The Court notes that Bradley, who allegedly was present in G dormitory,

provided a factual account that is similar to Johnson’s and Poindexter’s versions of

how the incident unfolded.

16

at 19 (“The camera will show you everything.”), 20-21, 24-25, 27, 46, 57.

Notably, the fixed wing camera angle pointed directly towards the entry/exit

door. See FW video. The first minute of the video is uneventful, showing Officer

Johnson as he waited at the door while several inmates gathered and waited

to enter the dormitory. Id. The video captures Frederick, as he leaned against

the plexiglass window to the left of the door and stood among other inmates in

the sallyport. Id. The video shows that Johnson pushed the door open, id. at

12:16:52, and then instantaneously pulled the door shut, id. at 12:16:54. Next,

the video displays Frederick as he backed away from the door, cradled his

hand, and walked away from the scene through the inmate crowd. Id.

Despite Frederick and Bradley’s contention to the contrary, the video

evidence establishes that Tompkins was not present at the doorway when

Johnson opened and closed the door. Id. Because the video surveillance camera

pointed directly towards the door, the area where Tompkins was present is off

camera. Id. Nevertheless, within seconds of the incident, Tompkins is seen

walking down the dormitory staircase and directly towards the door. Id. at

12:17:01. The video displays that when Johnson opened the door again, several

inmates pointed and peered at the site where the severed portion of Frederick’s

finger was embedded, as they paraded through the doorway. Id. The video also

shows an inmate using a cell phone, presumably to capture an image, as he

17

walked past the door jam. Id. The video evidence reflects that Tompkins and

Johnson kept the door ajar and waited for the arrival of another officer, who

retrieved the severed portion of Frederick’s finger from the door jam. Id.

In his deposition, Frederick explained what transpired that afternoon:

We [were] coming in from lunch, and the officer

in the booth has to buzz us in. So[,] when the officer in

the booth buzzed the door, I’m opening the door to let

Officer Johnson and them out. When [Johnson] got the

orders, he slammed the door forcefully on my finger

and chopped my finger off and left it in the door, and

the lieutenant got my finger out [of] the door and put

it in the glove, and I was on my way to the emergency

room.

My finger -- one-fourth of my finger is gone. It’s

really ugly. It’s an ugly nail growing on there, and it’s

not my fault because it’s a -- it’s a -- it’s a certain way

that you secure a door.

. . . .

For some reason, [Tompkins] went back upstairs

for a minute. Before the door even opened, he was on

the way back downstairs. If you look on that camera,

you’ll see him about over halfway downstairs from

probably five feet from Johnson. So[,] he’s definitely in

earshot of him. He can hear him. Plus, there ain’t too

many people in the quad, so you can say something

way from upstairs and hear downstairs. He got orders.

He got orders -- direct orders from his supervisor,

which is the sergeant of the dorm, to close the door.

And it’s not correct. Because like you say, you seen the

door open, and you seen him close the door. Why would

the officer buzz the door and I’m opening the door to

let them out? He going to slam the door back. He got

orders to slam the door from [Tompkins].

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. . . .

[Johnson] pulled the door back, so it happened

so fast. I’m looking right at him. It happened so -- if

you see the camera, as soon as the door open[ed], boom,

it close[d] right back. That [is] not suppose[d] to

happen like that, ma’am. I’m not that fast. You need

Flash to be able to move that fast. Because I’m just

opening the door to be a gentleman to let the officers

out the door. Let Johnson and [Tompkins] out the door.

P. Depo. at 10-11, 20-21, 23-24. Frederick blamed Tompkins and Johnson for

his injury, stating that it was their “fault for not securing the door the proper

way.” Id. at 26. He explained:

Sergeant T[ompkins] and Johnson w[ere] at the door

first waiting to come out, but the officer in the booth

hadn’t opened the door yet [be]cause that’s the only

way we can get in and they can get out. If they don’t

have their key, the officer in the booth have to hit the

control panel to open the door. So[,] he was coming

back downstairs. Johnson was still at the door. You

can hear it when they open the door. It’s going to buzz.

So[,] the officer in the booth buzzed the door. I pulled

the door to let Johnson and them come out. As soon as

I pull[ed] the door, the door got slammed back and

Sergeant T[]ompkins gave him authority to slam the

door, which is wrong. It’s not professional because

care, custody, and control is a proper way to secure the

door. You don’t see nowhere on the video where

Johnson is telling nobody to move back from the door.

You didn’t tell -- you didn’t see him get on the walkie-

talkie and tell the officer in the booth not to open the

door. As they open the door, I didn’t want to rush in

and be disrespectful. When I see an officer at the door,

so I’m going to open the door and let them out. I’m a

gentleman, the courtesy. And he slammed the door. He

19

looked right -- I looked right at him closing the door.

Well, it happened so fast. I’m looking right at him close

the door on my finger. It happened so fast.

Id. at 14-15. According to Frederick, they should have secured the door the way

Tompkins did after the incident when he kept the door open for the lieutenant

to retrieve the severed portion of Frederick’s finger. Id. at 57.

In a conditions of confinement scenario involving an inmate, an officer’s

deliberate indifference to a known, substantial risk of serious harm to an

inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233

(emphasis added); see Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1331. To survive summary

judgment when asserting a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must

produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm (objective

component); (2) the defendant’s deliberate indifference to that risk, i.e., the

defendant actually knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious

harm (subjective component), and the defendant disregarded (by conduct that

was more than gross negligence) that known risk by failing to respond to it in

an objectively reasonable manner (objective component); and (3) causation, i.e.,

the defendant’s “failure to act reasonably” caused plaintiff’s injury. Goodman,

718 F.3d at 1332; Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir.

2010); Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (stating that plaintiff’s “deliberate-

indifference claim fails because he has not demonstrated a genuine factual

20

issue as to whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a

substantial risk of serious harm” to him).

The fixed wing video evidence submitted by Defendant Tompkins is

reliable, establishes where Tompkins, Johnson, and Frederick were situated,

and provides a chronology of how the incident unfolded. Notably, Frederick

acknowledges that the fixed wing video accurately recorded the event.

Undoubtedly, it was a rapidly-evolving incident. What began as a routine

movement of inmates from the chow hall to a housing dormitory morphed into

a highly unfortunate event. The video evidence shows that Johnson opened the

quad door and immediately closed the door (which caught a portion of

Frederick’s finger). Indeed, the video evidence unequivocally establishes the

immediacy of Johnson opening and closing the door. Notably, Frederick

himself testified that “it happened so fast.” P. Depo. at 24.

Importantly, the crux of the matter is Tompkins’ alleged directive to

Johnson to close the door. Frederick and Bradley maintain they heard

Tompkins’ directive, and Frederick stated that Tompkins was “definitely in

earshot” of Johnson. Id. at 21. At his deposition, Frederick stated that he

opened the door for the officers as a gentlemanly gesture, and that Johnson

slammed the door when Tompkins ordered him to close it. Id. at 24. Notably,

Bradley stated that he overheard Tompkins “scream at Officer Johnson telling

21

him to close the f--king door.” Bradley Decl. at 1. Frederick confirmed that

inmates had told him that they heard a direct order from Tompkins to “close

the door.” P. Depo. at 10. He states that he heard it, but did not know it was

Tompkins until later when other inmates told him. Id. at 18. Tompkins denies

giving such an order. Tompkins Decl. at 1 (“The allegations as alleged by

Inmate Frederick are not true.”). The video evidence lacks audio, and therefore

does not capture the entirety of what may have transpired. With no audio, the

video itself neither confirms nor refutes Frederick’s contention regarding

Tompkins’ verbal order, nor does it capture any post-incident discussions

between Tompkins and Johnson, as they stood at the quad door to preserve the

scene. Thus, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts Frederick’s

contention that Tompkins ordered Johnson to close the door. However, as noted

previously, the video does affirmatively refute Frederick’s contention that

Tompkins was standing beside Johnson when the door opened and closed.

Indeed, the video shows that Tompkins was not standing by Johnson and that

he walked down the stairs from the upper level after Frederick’s finger was

caught in the door, and then Tompkins stood alongside Johnson at the doorway

as they preserved the scene.

The first element of Frederick’s claim requires him to show that he was

exposed to “conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511

22

U.S. at 834. Here, no jury could conclude that closing a door where inmates are

gathered on the other side awaiting entry creates an objectively substantial

risk of serious harm. Frederick fails to produce any evidence showing that this

prison condition was an extreme deprivation that posed an unreasonable risk

of serious damage to his health or safety. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233;

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).21

Closing the door knowing that an inmate’s hand was partially inside the

door’s threshold, on the other hand, could present a substantial risk of serious

harm sufficient to present a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. However,

Frederick must produce evidence showing that Defendant Tompkins was

deliberately indifferent to that risk, i.e., that before ordering Johnson to close

the door, Tompkins knew that Frederick’s finger had crossed the threshold and

was in danger of being severed if the door closed. This is so because it is “[a]

prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to

an inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828

(citations omitted). Indeed, the deliberate indifference standard requires that

the plaintiff demonstrate that the prison official “was subjectively aware” of

21 Frederick presents no evidence in support of his conclusory belief that

Defendant Tompkins’ “bad history with inmates,” P. Depo. at 16, 25, 31, means that

Tompkins wanted to hurt him. The lack of other injurious incidents negates any

suggestion that Frederick was exposed to conditions posing a substantial risk of

serious harm.

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the risk of harm; mere negligence is not sufficient. Id. at 829, 835-36. “The

known risk of injury must be a ‘strong likelihood, rather than a mere

possibility’ before a guard’s failure to act can constitute deliberate

indifference.” Brown v. Hughes, 894 F. 2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990); see also

Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016)

(“[I]t is only a heightened degree of culpability that will satisfy the subjective

knowledge component of the deliberate indifference standard, a requirement

that is ‘far more onerous than normal tort-based standards of conduct sounding

in negligence.’”). Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate

must show a prison official “actually (subjectively) knows that an inmate is

facing a substantial risk of serious harm, yet disregards that known risk by

failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Rodriguez, 508

F.3d at 617 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 844) (footnote omitted).

Here, despite the seriousness and truly unfortunate nature of the injury

to Frederick’s finger, the Court finds that Frederick fails to produce any

evidence suggesting that Defendant Tompkins could actually have known

Frederick faced a substantial risk of serious harm, and disregarded that known

risk by failing to respond to it in an objectively reasonable manner.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that Frederick himself seemingly suggests that

Tompkins and Johnson were not intentionally trying to hurt him, but instead

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were reckless when they failed to follow prison protocol related to securing a

door, especially one with inmates nearby. See P. Depo. at 26-28. However,

negligence is insufficient. Frederick must show that Tompkins deliberately

disregarded a known substantial risk of serious harm. Goodman, 718 F.3d at

1332. Frederick simply points to no evidence supporting even an inference that

Defendant Tompkins was aware that Frederick faced a substantial risk of

serious harm as Frederick stood at the quad door among other inmates who

were waiting to enter the dormitory.

Indeed, nothing in the record supports an inference that at the moment

Tompkins ordered Johnson to close the door, Tompkins was aware that

Frederick’s finger had crossed the threshold of the door. Viewing the facts and

taking all reasonable inferences in Frederick’s favor, as the Court must, the

video evidence establishes that Tompkins would not have been able to observe

and appreciate the risk to Frederick from where Tompkins was located before

he gave the verbal command to Johnson. Indeed, the parties agree that the

video evidence shows the immediate succession of Johnson opening and closing

the door. Frederick himself testified:

[Johnson] pulled the door back, so it happened

so fast. I’m looking right at him. It happened so -- if

you see the camera, as soon as the door open[ed], boom,

it close[d] right back. That [is] not suppose[d] to

25

happen like that, ma’am. I’m not that fast. You need

Flash to be able to move that fast.

P. Depo. at 23-24. The video establishes Johnson’s rapid actions of opening and

closing the door were too fast to be in response to a verbal order given by

Tompkins. Moreover, even if it could have been in response to an order, the

video evidence establishes Tompkins’ vantage point from which he would not

have been able to see Frederick’s finger in the door when he told Johnson to

close the door. Additionally, given the speed with which Johnson opened and

closed the door, there simply was not enough time for Tompkins to observe and

appreciate a substantial danger of serious harm to Frederick’s finger, and then

recklessly disregard that risk by giving the order. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847

(stating that “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment

for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates

face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it”); Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332; Hale, 50

F.3d at 1583.

Notably, Frederick acknowledges that when the door caught his finger,

he immediately left the scene and reported to the medical clinic, as Tompkins

(along with Johnson) was “bodyguarding that door” to retrieve the severed

portion of Frederick’s finger. P. Depo. at 57. Indeed, Frederick fails to produce

any evidence showing Tompkins was deliberately indifferent to Frederick’s

26

health and safety needs following the incident. Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1334

(finding the dereliction of duty to be disturbing, but affirming the district

court’s granting of defendants’ summary judgment motion based on Eighth

Amendment law). The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

Our cases are clear that to survive summary judgment

on a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must

present some evidence of prison officials’ subjective

awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm to the

inmate. See, e.g., McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248,

1255 (11th Cir.1999) (explaining that “a finding of

deliberate indifference requires a finding of the

defendant’s subjective awareness of the relevant risk”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). [Plaintiff] has

adduced no evidence that either [Defendant] was

subjectively aware of the peril to which [Plaintiff] was

exposed on the night in question, and that failure is

fatal to his claim.

Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1333-34. Given Frederick’s failure to provide any

evidence that Tompkins was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm to Frederick, no reasonable jury could find that Frederick

suffered a violation of his Eighth Amendment right under these particular

circumstances. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that

version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”).

As such, Defendant’s Motion is due to be granted as to Frederick’s Eighth

27

Amendment claim against him, and Frederick’s request for summary

judgment in his favor is due to be denied.22

B. State Law Claims

Because Defendant Tompkins is entitled to summary judgment as to

Frederick’s Eighth Amendment claim against him and the Court has no basis

to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his pendent state claims. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370

F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that district courts are encouraged

“to dismiss any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have

been dismissed prior to trial.”). Accordingly, counts two, three, four, and five

are due to be dismissed without prejudice. See id. Frederick may refile these

claims in state court if he wishes to do so.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Tompkins’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is

GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s request for summary judgment (Doc. 51) is DENIED.

22 In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address Tompkins’ argument

on the issue of qualified immunity.

28

3. Plaintiffs Motion to Submit Declarations of Witnesses (Doc. 58) is

DENIED.

4. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state claims, and therefore, Frederick’s claims under counts two,

three, four, and five are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

5. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendant Tompkins,

correct the docket to reflect the correct spelling of Defendant’s surname,

terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 15th day of June,

2022.

United States District Judge

Jax-1 6/15

C:

Derrick D. Frederick, #122803

Counsel of Record

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