Brown v. Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ANDREW A. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

vs. Case No. 3:20-cv-726-BJD-MCR

CHAPLAIN W. THOMAS,

Defendant.

_____________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Andrew A. Brown is proceeding on a pro se Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights (Complaint) (Doc. 1) against Defendant Chaplain W.

Thomas, a chaplain employed by the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO), in his

individual and official capacities. Id. at 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims

Defendant Thomas violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and raises a claim pursuant to

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA). Id. at 3.1

Plaintiff claims Defendant Thomas, acting under color of state law, denied

Plaintiff the right to be served vegan meals as an alternative to a kosher diet

1 Page numbers reflect the pagination assigned by the Court’s electronic docketing system,

which are found at the top of each page.

and deprived him of his right to observe Passover and the Feast of Unleavened

Bread. Id. at 4.

Defendant Thomas filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses to

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights in Chaplain Thomas’s Official Capacity

(Answer) (Doc. 12). Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Motion) (Doc. 21 at 1, 21) seeking partial summary judgment. See

Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 22). In response, Plaintiff filed a document

entitled, “Plaintiff’s Facts Against Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment[;] See Attached Declaration [Declaration of Andrew A. Brown]”

Response (Doc. 24).

II. The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges, while he was confined at the Duval County Jail (jail),

referred to by Defendant Thomas as the Pretrial Detention Facility (PTDF),

Plaintiff wrote a January 8, 2020 request to Defendant Thomas to be placed on

a vegan diet as an alternative diet because he had been told there was no

kosher diet available in the PTDF and Plaintiff does not eat meat. Id. at 6. He

did not receive a response to his request. Id. Again, on January 27, 2020,

Plaintiff wrote a second request for a vegan diet, referring back to his original

request. Id. After a few days, he was called to the Chaplain’s Office for an

interview. Id.

Chaplain Thomas conducted the interview and asked Plaintiff why he

wanted to be on a vegan diet, and Plaintiff explained he was a Hebrew Israelite

and according to his religion’s dietary restrictions, he cannot eat meat products

or any food that is not prepared in a clean place. Id. Plaintiff asked about a

kosher option to confirm the information Plaintiff had acquired, and Defendant

Thomas told Plaintiff that the facility does not provide kosher diet meals. Id.

Plaintiff said he had heard that from officers and inmates and that is why

Plaintiff requested a vegan diet as an alternative to a kosher diet. Id.

Defendant Thomas provided Plaintiff with a questionnaire to fill out. Id.

Plaintiff explained he has a language barrier and has difficulty spelling

without a dictionary.2 Id. at 7. Defendant Thomas responded, write what you

can spell. Id. On February 6, 2020, Defendant Thomas denied Plaintiff’s

request, stating, “the sincerity of your claims cannot be confirmed.” Id. Upon

entering the jail, Plaintiff told the booking officer he was a Hebrew Israelite.

Id.

On March 12, 2020, Plaintiff wrote another request to the Chaplain’s

Department complaining he was having problems with obtaining a vegan diet.

Id. He explained he is a Hebrew Israelite, which can be confirmed by reviewing

2 The record demonstrates Plaintiff is from Jamaica and his first language is Jamaican Patois,

an English-based creole language with West African influences. (Doc. 21-3 at 7, 10-11). He

has an eighth-grade education and does not feel proficient in English, particularly in writing

English, but he does understand English. Id. at 10.

his file at the jail. Id. On March 13, 2020, Plaintiff received a reply stating he

would be provided with a follow-up with the Chaplain. Id. Plaintiff never

received a follow-up with the Chaplain. Id.

On March 3, 2020, Plaintiff wrote a request to the Chaplain’s

Department stating he would like to observe the Passover and the Feast of

Unleavened Bread starting on April 1-8, 2020. Id. at 8. Plaintiff states he did

not receive a response to this request. Id.

On March 30, 2020, Plaintiff wrote a grievance complaining he had not

received a response to his request. Id. He stated he is a sincere Hebrew

Israelite and according to his faith, he must observe the high holy days. Id.

On that same day, he received a response from Defendant Thomas. Id.

Defendant Thomas, in denying the grievance, said, “[o]ur current policy does

not include accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread and Passover

Meals at this time[.] The correct dates are the evening of Wednesday 4/8 thru

Thursday Evening 4-16-2020 for your personal observance and/or worship.” Id.

Plaintiff, on April 1, 2020, appealed the denial of the grievance, advising

Defendant Thomas that he stated the wrong dates for worship as Plaintiff is

not a Jew but is a Hebrew Israelite and the dates of observance are different,

explaining that Hebrew Israelite Passover is April 1, 2020, and the Celebration

for the Feast of Unleavened Bread is from April 2 to 8, 2022. Id. at 9. Plaintiff

further complained he was being deprived of his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Plaintiff states the jail has policies allowing

religious observance by other faiths, but not for Hebrew Israelites. Id. at 10.

On April 16, 2020, he received a response to his appeal stating the inmate has

been released. Id. That was not the case as Plaintiff was still confined in the

jail. Id. Ultimately, on May 6, 2020, the appeal was denied, and Plaintiff

submits that the reason for the decision on appeal is “hid[d]en.” Id.

On April 23, 2020, Plaintiff wrote a request to food services asking if the

jail provides kosher meals. Id. Food services responded, yes the jail provides

kosher meals. Id.

In sum, Plaintiff provides:

(1) I was deprived from the vegan meals as an

alternative for the kosher diet[;] (2) I have been

force[d] to eat tainted food. I was discriminated

against my [religion] and my way of life[;] (3) I was

deprived the right to freely exer[c]ise my religious

belief, observing the Passover and the celebration for

the Feast of Unleavened Bread meal as part of my

religious [practice][;] (4) not having A policy to

accommodate Hebrew Israelites. But there is a policy

for other [religions]. Chaplain Thomas is responsible

for all of this.

Id. at 11-12.

As injuries, Plaintiff states he has been subjected to pain and suffering,

suffering from mental anguish. Id. at 11. As relief, Plaintiff seeks a

declaratory judgment asking that the Court enter judgment that Plaintiff’s

rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States have been violated

by the acts described in the Complaint; a permanent injunction ordering

Defendant Thomas to put in place a policy for Hebrew Israelites to practice

their faith; compensatory damages in the amount of $175,000; punitive

damages in the amount of $235,000; a jury trial; and recovery of costs and any

additional relief the Court deems just, proper and equitable. Id. at 11, 13.

In response to the questions concerning the exhaustion of administrative

remedies, Plaintiff states he grieved the fact he was deprived of vegan meals

as an alternative for a kosher diet and grieved the matter that he was deprived

of the right to freely exercise his religious beliefs of observing Passover and the

celebration for the Feast of Unleavened Bread. Id. at 14.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of

Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun

Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence

in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington,

381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats

& Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered

on a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule 56(c)(1)(A).

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v.

Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law

determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining

whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view all evidence

and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary

judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing

Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578

(11th Cir. 1994)).

IV. Motion for Summary Judgment

A. JSO Policies and Procedures

Defendant Thomas submits that JSO policy provides that inmates may

participate in established practices of their faith, inmates may request a

special religious diet through the electronic tablet system, but that some

components of the practice of their faith may be restricted due to identified

safety and security threats. Motion at 2-3. If an inmate requests religious

accommodation meals, the Chaplaincy Services Department has the inmate

complete a questionnaire, the Chaplain reviews the questionnaire and

interviews the inmate concerning his request and explains the decision to the

inmate. Id. at 3. Generally, at the PTDF, three religious accommodation meals

are requested: (1) vegetarian; (2) vegan; and (3) kosher. Id.

The jail provides a grievance system. Id. If an inmate disagrees with

the Chaplaincy Services Department’s decision, the inmate can file a grievance

to be addressed by the Chaplaincy Services Department. Id. If the inmate

does not agree with the results of the grievance, the inmate may appeal. Id. at

3-4.

B. Defendant’s Statement of Facts

Defendant Thomas recognizes that Plaintiff professes to be a Hebrew

Israelite and claims to be prohibited from eating meat. Motion at 4. In

January 2020, Plaintiff requested a vegan diet based on his religious beliefs

and met with Chaplain Thomas. Id. Chaplain Thomas denied the religious

accommodation diet due to lack of sincerity. Id. In March 2020, Plaintiff

requested special meals for observance of the Passover and Feast of

Unleavened Bread, and this request was denied with the explanation that the

PTDF policy did not include accommodating holy day religious meal requests,

but Plaintiff could personally observe and worship during these holy days. Id.

at 4-5.

In July 2020, a PTDF doctor placed Plaintiff on a vegan diet. Id. at 5.

Plaintiff grieved the delay in being provided a vegan diet, and he was finally

provided vegan meals in August, 2020. On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff was

transferred to the Florida Department of Corrections. Id.

C. Observations

Defendant Thomas, in his Declaration, states he: “always followed the

rules, directives, and orders of the JSO in performing my duties as Chaplain.”

(Doc. 21-1 at 6). He adds, “I have always been professional to every inmate,

including Mr. Brown, and I have done everything within the rules and my

jurisdiction to accommodate inmates.” Id. Chief George C. Pratt, in his

Declaration, states he: “always followed the rules, directives and orders of the

JSO in performing my duties as Chief.” (Doc. 21-2 at 6). Chief Pratt adds,

“[a]ll JSO personnel are required to follow the procedures governing

reasonable accommodations for various religious faiths.” Id.

Upon review, the record demonstrates there were several blunders made

by the Chaplaincy Department /jail staff in the handling of Plaintiff’s requests

for religious accommodations. First, Plaintiff received no response to his initial

January 8, 2020, request for a vegan diet addressed to the Chaplaincy Services

Department. (Doc. 21-1 at 22). It was not until Plaintiff filed a second request

on January 27, 2020, that he received a response to his request for a vegan

diet. Id. at 24.

Plaintiff alleges he received no response to his March 3, 2020, request to

the Chaplaincy Services Department concerning Plaintiff’s request to observe

the Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread. Complaint at 8. Upon

review, the record shows Plaintiff is mistaken as he did receive a

response/inquiry dated March 16, 2020: “Jewish Passover are for devout

Jewish Inmates. Are you part of the Aleph Institute?”3 (Doc. 21-1 at 31).

3 Although not a model of clarity, this response implies that members of the Hebrew Israelite

faith are not in parity with followers of the Jewish faith and only devout Jews will be allowed

to celebrate Passover, apparently with the aid of the Aleph Institute.

Plaintiff filed a March 12, 2020 request to the Chaplaincy Services

Department again asking to be provided vegan meals as he is a Hebrew

Israelite. Id. at 26. The response states, Plaintiff’s “name will be provided to

the Chaplain for follow up.” Id. The follow-up did not occur, and the matter

was summarily closed.4 Id.

Finally, on March 30, 2020, Plaintiff filed a grievance asking for

Passover meals as a Hebrew Israelite who must observe the high holy days of

his faith. Id. at 33. Plaintiff received a response relating, “current policy does

not include accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread Passover meal at

this time.”5 Id. It continued, “[t]he correct dates are the evening of Wednesday

4/8 thru Thursday evening 4/16 for your personal observance and/or worship.”6

Id.

Unlike the grievance response, Defendant Thomas, in his Declaration

recognizes that, usually, the high holy days for the two faiths differ. (Doc. 21-

1 at 6). Plaintiff appealed the decision denying his grievance, noting that the

chaplain assumed the wrong days of Passover, repeating that he is not a Jew

4 Based on the record before the Court, it is unclear whether staff failed to provide Plaintiff’s

name to the Chaplain for follow-up or whether the Chaplain simply failed to follow up once

given Plaintiff’s name. Either way, no follow up occurred and staff simply closed the matter.

5 No mention is made that the rejection of the grievance was based on the conclusion that

Plaintiff lacked sincerity in his religious beliefs.

6 Defendant Thomas avers in his Declaration, “[w]hile members of both the Hebrew Israelite

and Jewish faith celebrate Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread, the dates on which

these holy days fall usually differ.” (Doc. 21-1 at 6).

but a sincere Hebrew Israelite, explaining the Hebrew Israelite celebration

falls on different days from the Jewish celebration, and noting, as a sincere

Hebrew Israelite, he must adhere to the commandment of his faith. (Doc. 21-

1 at 33).

Curiously, on April 16, 2020, staff closed Plaintiff’s appeal, stating

“[i]nmate has been [r]eleased.” Id. That was not the case. On April 17, 2020,

Plaintiff appealed, stating he was still in the jail. Id. At that point, on May 6,

2020, the notation states Chief Pratt handled the grievance, and the

disposition is recorded as resolved, not in favor of the inmate. Id. No

explanation for the decision is provided either in the grievance response

provided to the Court or in the Declaration of Chief Pratt, although Chief Pratt

states that Hebrew Israelite inmates commonly receive meals which are vegan

or vegetarian for religious diet accommodations. (Doc. 21-2 at 3). No mention

is made in the documents before the Court that Plaintiff’s March 30, 2020

grievance seeking religious accommodation was denied due to identified safety

and security threats or for Plaintiff’s lack of sincerity.7

7 Chief Pratt, in his Declaration, states, generally, if an inmate is denied a religious

accommodation meal and the denial is appealed, Chief Pratt will meet with the inmate to

discuss the request and the inmate’s religious dietary requirements. (Doc. 21-2 at 5).

Although Plaintiff’s grievance concerns his request to be placed on “Passover meals” and

Plaintiff appealed the decision, Chief Pratt does not attest in his Declaration that he met

with Plaintiff to discuss Plaintiff’s request for Passover meals and Plaintiff’s religious dietary

requirements. (Doc. 21-2 at 1-7).

D. Exhaustion

The Court will address the threshold issue of whether Plaintiff

exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA). In his Answer, Defendant Thomas asserts Plaintiff failed

to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to initiating this action, and his

claims are therefore barred. Answer at 5. Defendant Thomas, in his Motion,

states, although Plaintiff raises two issues in his Complaint, the denial of his

request for a vegan diet and the denial of his request for special holy day meals,

the only matter properly exhausted is the request for special holy day meals.

Motion at 7-9.

Upon review, the only matter grieved and properly exhausted is

Plaintiff’s request for Passover meals for the high holy days. (Doc. 21-1 at 33-

34). Although Plaintiff made several requests for a vegan diet, he did not file

a grievance concerning a vegan diet and appeal the denial of a grievance nor

did he appeal the decision of the Chaplain concerning a vegan diet.

The PLRA requires that an inmate exhaust available administrative

remedies before filing a § 1983 claim concerning prison conditions. See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions

under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.”). Also, the PLRA requires proper exhaustion. Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 92-93 (2006). In Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th

Cir. 2008), the Eleventh Circuit established a two-step process that the district

court must employ when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative

remedies. As such, the district court looks to the factual allegations in the

motion and those in the response and accept the prisoner’s view of the facts as

true. The court should dismiss if the facts as stated by the prisoner show a

failure to exhaust. If dismissal is not warranted, the district court is required

to make specific findings to resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if,

based on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to exhaust. Whatley

v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015). See Pavao

v. Sims, 679 F. App’x 819, 823-24 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Defendant

Thomas bears the burden of proving that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his

available administrative remedies.

Chief George C. Pratt, in his Declaration explains, if an inmate disagrees

with the Chaplaincy Services Department’s decision, the inmate can file a

grievance through the electronic tablet system, and if the inmate does not

agree with the results of the grievance, the inmate may appeal. (Doc. 21-2 at

4-5). Defendant Thomas, in his Declaration, explains, if an inmate disagrees

with the Chaplaincy Services’ Department’s decision, the inmate may file a

grievance through the electronic tablet system, and if the inmate does not

agree with the results of the grievance, the inmate may file an appeal through

the electronic tablet system. (Doc. 21-1 at 4). The electronic tablet system

maintains a record of all of the religious accommodations requests, grievances,

and appeals filed by an inmate. Id.

The record shows there is an established grievance procedure at the jail,

and Plaintiff fully utilized this procedure, at least on a couple of occasions. He

filed a grievance concerning his request for Passover meals and he filed a

grievance concerning a delay in being provided a medically ordered vegan diet.

(Doc. 21-1 at 28-29; 33-34). He properly appealed the decisions concerning both

of these matters. Id. Thus, he properly exhausted the matter of special holy

day meals.

Although Plaintiff refers to his March 30, 2020 grievance and its

resolution, Plaintiff also mentions all of his requests for a vegan diet, and

contends he properly exhausted all of his claims because he need not

repeatedly file grievances about the same issue. Response at 2-4. Upon due

consideration, there are two discreet issues: (1) the request for a vegan diet as

a Hebrew Israelite; and (2) the request for special holy day meals or Passover

meals as a Hebrew Israelite.

Accepting Plaintiff’s version of the facts as true, under the first step of

the two-step process, a dismissal of the claim for a vegan diet for lack of

exhaustion is not warranted at the first step. As such, the Court proceeds to

the second step in the two-part process where the Court considers the

Defendant’s arguments regarding exhaustion and makes findings of fact.

To fully exhaust, Plaintiff was required to file a grievance, and if

dissatisfied with the response to the grievance, file an appeal. He filed a

grievance, and he appealed the denial of his grievance. (Doc. 21-1 at 33-34).

Here, Plaintiff properly grieved the matter of Passover meals or holy day meals

using the two-step process and the electronic tablet system.8

Plaintiff never filed a grievance concerning the Chaplain’s decision to

deny Plaintiff’s request for a vegan diet. He never even sought to appeal the

Chaplain’s decision. Filing numerous requests does not absolve Plaintiff of the

requirement to properly exhaust his administrative remedies. As such, the

Court concludes that Defendant’s Motion is due to be granted with respect to

the exhaustion issue as to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Thomas

concerning the request for a vegan diet.

E. Fourteenth Amendment – Failure to State a Claim

As to Plaintiff’s exhausted claim, that he was improperly denied his

request for appropriate meals as a Hebrew Israelite for high holy days, the

Court will address the matter of whether Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. The

Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from denying any person within

its jurisdiction equal protection of the law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec.

8 The record shows Plaintiff grieved the matter of the delay in receiving his medically

prescribed vegan diet; however, he does not raise this particular claim in his Complaint.

(Doc. 21-1 at 28-29).

1. Here, the question is whether Plaintiff has been denied equal protection of

the law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff contends there is a policy to accommodate or provide other

religions with appropriate meals for high holy days, but there is no comparable

policy to accommodate Hebrew Israelites. Complaint at 12. Defendant

Thomas submits that Plaintiff’s claim is conclusory and argues that Plaintiff

provides no further allegations supporting this purported claim. Motion at 10.

As such, Defendant Thomas asserts Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for

relief for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of

the law. Id.

Generally, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "[T]he tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555).

For its review, the Court accepts the facts in the Complaint as true and

views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.9 In order to survive a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), however, “the allegations must state a claim for relief

that is plausible, not merely possible.” Gill v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th

Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

The Court must read a plaintiff's pro se allegations in a liberal fashion.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam). However, the duty of a

court to construe pro se pleadings liberally does not require the court to serve

as an attorney for the plaintiff. Walker v. Williams, No. 21-10597, 2022 WL

363809, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2022) (per curiam) (not reported in Fed. Rptr)

(the court does not serve as de facto counsel or rewrite deficient pleadings);

Freeman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 679 F. App’x 982, 982 (11th Cir. 2017) (per

curiam) (citing GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. Of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

Cir. 1998)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “a person”

acting under the color of state law deprived him of a right secured under the

9 In considering the motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the Complaint as

true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. Miljkovic v. Shafritz and

Dinkin, P.A., 791 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations and citations omitted). As

such, the recited facts are drawn from the Complaint and may differ from those that

ultimately can be proved.

United States Constitution or federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff,

in raising a claim pursuant to section 1983 must allege that (1) the defendant

deprived him or her of a right secured under the United States Constitution or

federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato

v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Generally, a court should not consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on

a motion to dismiss unless a document “is central to the plaintiff’s claim” and

incorporated by reference in the complaint. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[T]he

analysis of a 12(b)(6) motion is limited primarily to the face of the complaint

and attachments thereto.”). In fact, Rule 12 provides, “If, on a motion under

Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not

excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary

judgment under Rule 56.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See also Trustmark Ins.

Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Whenever a judge

considers matters outside the pleadings in a 12(b)(6) motion, that motion is

thereby converted into a Rule 56 Summary Judgment motion.”).

However, the Eleventh Circuit has held a court may consider extrinsic

evidence when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion if a document “is (1) central to the

plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.” Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2005) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002)). Thus,

when a plaintiff, in his complaint, incorporates by reference a document that

is central to his claim, and the opposing party does not contest the authenticity

of the document, a court may consider it when ruling on a motion to dismiss.

Id.

Here, both Plaintiff in his Complaint and Defendant Thomas in his

Motion rely on the requests and grievances filed by Plaintiff and the responses

thereto of the jail officials and the Chaplain. Indeed, Defendant Thomas raises

the issue of failure to state a claim in his motion for summary judgment,

attaching the relevant documents. As such, the Court will fully consider these

documents when addressing Defendant’s contention that Plaintiff has failed to

state a plausible claim for relief.

Upon review of the Complaint, there are factual allegations supporting

Plaintiff’s contention that a jail policy exists to allow other religions to be

provided appropriate meals for high holy days, but there is no comparable

policy to accommodate Hebrew Israelites. Plaintiff wrote a very specific

request to the Chaplaincy Services asking, “to observe Passover and the feast

of unleavened bread 4/1-8/20.” (Doc. 21-1 at 31). See Complaint at 8. The

Chaplaincy Services responded: “Jewish Passover are [sic] for devout Jewish

Inmates. Are you a part of the Aleph Institute?”10 (Doc. 21-1 at 31).

In the Complaint at 8, Plaintiff specifically points to the response he

received to his grievance concerning his request to receive Passover meals for

high holy days as a Hebrew Israelite. (Doc. 21-1 at 33). The relevant grievance

response states: “Mr. Brown, Our current policy does not include

accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread Passover meal at this time.

The correct dates are the evening of Wednesday 4/8 thru Thursday evening

4/16 for your personal observance and or worship. Thank you, Chaplaincy

Services.” Id. Once again, the Chaplaincy Services referred to Jewish religious

holidays and observances, referring to the dates for Passover celebrated by

Jews, not Hebrew Israelites.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that the jail policy accommodates other

religions, but not his religion, referencing the Chaplaincy response of February

6, 2020, noting dietary restrictions or limitations would be accommodated for

10 The Aleph Institute is a Jewish humanitarian organization with prison programs focusing

on Jewish inmates during their prison stay, helping with the observation of Jewish holidays,

practices, food, and materials. The record does not demonstrate whether members of the

Aleph Institute provide PTDC Jewish inmates with meals for Passover. Based on the March

16, 2020 response, perhaps members of the Aleph Institute provide Jewish inmates with food

delivered from outside the jail - during special occasions, but the matter is certainly unclear

based on the record before the Court.

those of sincere religious beliefs.11 Complaint at 10. Plaintiff, construing the

Chaplaincy’s March 30, 2020 response as referring to a policy allowing for

Jewish inmates to celebrate high holy days, appealed the decision, explaining

that he is not a Jew, pointing out the days for observance for Hebrew Israelites’

Passover are different from Jewish Passover, stating he is a sincere Hebrew

Israelite and needs to adhere to the commandment of his faith, and

complaining that the Chaplaincy is depriving him of his rights to freely

exercise his religious beliefs in violation of the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. (Doc. 21-1 at 33). Plaintiff appealed the decision denying his

grievance concerning denial of Passover meals as a Hebrew Israelite, and the

Chaplaincy responded that the inmate has been released and closed the

grievance. Id. Plaintiff appealed again, as he had not been released, and

without explanation the matter on appeal was “[r]esolved [n]ot in favor [of] the

inmate[.]” Id. Plaintiff states the reasoning for this response is “hid[di]n.”

Complaint at 10. Upon review, not only is the reason for denying the appeal

not found in the tablet notes, the Declarations of Thomas and Pratt do not

address or provide the reason for the decision on appeal.

Plaintiff claims Defendant Thomas discriminated against Plaintiff’s

religion, the jail has a policy which accommodates other religions but not

11 Food Services advised Plaintiff it does serve kosher meals, although the provision of kosher

meals to an inmate has to be approved by the medical department. (Doc. 21-3 at 85).

Hebrew Israelites, Chaplain Thomas is responsible for the deficiencies of the

jail’s policy that excludes Hebrew Israelites, and as relief, Plaintiff asks that a

policy be put in place for Hebrew Israelites to be able to practice their faith.

Id. at 11-12.

Upon review, Plaintiff has certainly nudged the equal protection claim

across the line from conceivable to plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Indeed, he has alleged enough facts to state an equal protection claim pursuant

to the Fourteenth Amendment that is plausible on its face against Defendant

Thomas. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion will be denied in this respect.

F. Fourteenth Amendment Claim - Evidence

Defendant Thomas avers he did not violate the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. Motion at 10-11. Here, Plaintiff contends there

is a policy of not recognizing the Hebrew Israelite faith and its practices that

substantially burdens the Plaintiff’s ability to practice his religion or prevents

him from engaging in conduct or having a religious experience mandated by

his faith. Brown v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:10-cv-2101-T-17TGW, 2011 WL

766388, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2011) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (citation

and quotation omitted).

In response to a request, staff provided the following information, “[t]he

Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, Department of Corrections, accommodates

inmates who have a sincere religious belief concerning their faith and

dietary restrictions and or limitations.” (Doc. 21-1 at 24) (emphasis

added). Initially, Plaintiff was told that the sincerity of his claim of needing a

vegan diet as a Hebrew Israelite could not be confirmed. Id. Apparently, later

on, the question of Plaintiff’s sincerity was completely dropped and instead he

was advised that “Jewish Passover are [sic] for devout Jewish Inmates.”12 Id.

at 31. Additionally, he was advised JSO’s current policy “does not include

accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread Passover meal at this time.”

Id. at 33. No mention is made of any lack of sincerity of belief on Plaintiff’s

part in these subsequent responses.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the observation of the high holy

days through observance of the high holy day meals “is essential to practicing

his religion.” Brown, 2011 WL 766388, at *3. Plaintiff complains he was

deprived of observing Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread. Complaint

at 4. Plaintiff notes, as a sincere Hebrew Israelite he must observe the high

holy days according to his faith. Id. at 8. He reiterated, “as a sincere Hebrew

Israelite I must adhere to the commandment of my God Yahweh.” Id. at 9.

Notably, he also states, he was forced to eat tainted food, discriminated against

12 Defendant Thomas, in his Declaration, states that on August 4, 2020, he met with

Plaintiff and found him to be sincere in his religious beliefs and approved him for a vegan

meal. (Doc. 21-1 at 5). Of note, this act occurred after Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July

1, 2020.

based on his religion, and not allowed to observe the Passover and the

celebration for the Feast of Unleavened Bread in accordance with his faith.13

Id. at 11.

Of import,

The Equal Protection Clause requires that the

government treat similarly situated people in a

similar manner. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne

Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87

L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). To establish an equal protection

claim, “a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is

similarly situated to other prisoners who received

more favorable treatment; and [that] (2) the state

engaged in invidious discrimination against him based

on race, religion, national origin, or some other

constitutionally protected basis.” Sweet v. Sec'y Dep't

of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006); see

also Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201,

1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “the equal

protection clause prohibits only intentional

discrimination”).

Brown, 2011 WL 766388, at *4.

Plaintiff alleges that similarly situated inmates, such as the inmates of

the Jewish faith in the PTDF, are provided high holy day meals, but those of

the Hebrew Israelite faith are not provided high holy day meals. The responses

to Plaintiff’s requests for high holy day meals supports Plaintiff’s contention

13 Plaintiff explains in his Complaint, as part of his faith, he must not eat meat, meat

products, or any food not prepared in a clean place. Complaint at 6. Additionally, as stated

during his deposition, during the Feast of Unleavened Bread, a person of sincere faith is not

to eat anything with yeast, baking soda, bread, pastries, cream of tartar, or ingredients used

to make batter or dough rise. (Doc. 21-3 at 22).

that some faiths are accommodated and provided with the appropriate meals

during high holy days, but Hebrew Israelites are not accommodated and fall

outside of the jail’s policy. (Doc. 21-1 at 31, 33).

Defendant Thomas provides a copy of JSO Order 698 (effective May 6,

2019), and it broadly states: “[i]nmates will have the opportunity to participate

in established practices of their faith limited only by documentation showing a

threat to the safety of persons in such activity or disruption of facility order.”

(Doc. 21-1 at 9). Further, it provides that inmates may request a special

religious diet through the electronic tablet system to be processed by

Chaplaincy Services. Id. at 11. Of course, Plaintiff used the electronic tablet

system to grieve his complaint for high holy day meals, but his request,

grievance, and appeal were all denied, and notably no reason is provided for

the denial of the appeal.

Although Defendant Thomas relies on Unit Procedure 698 (Doc. 21-1 at

14-20) (effective November 24, 2020), its effective date is after the period at

issue in the Complaint (January 8, 2020 to April 16, 2020). Complaint at 11.

As such, the Court will not consider Unit Procedure 698 as its effective date

renders it inapplicable to the allegations raised in the Complaint.

The second question for the Court’s consideration is more difficult: is the

Defendant’s decision to deny high holy day meals to Plaintiff, a Hebrew

Israelite, a product of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Plaintiff must

show that the decision to provide high holy day meals or otherwise

accommodate some religions but not him and his faith, Hebrew Israelite, “was

motivated by intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Patel v. U.S. Bureau

of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807, 816 (8th Cir. 2008).

The Court is unable, based on the evidence presented to it, to determine

whether the Defendant Thomas consulted with religious leaders, including

Hebrew Israelite leaders, and then made a reasoned attempt to accommodate

all religious beliefs and not to discriminate against certain beliefs, including

Plaintiff’s beliefs and his fundamental practices as a Hebrew Israelite to

celebrate the high holy days with Passover meals. Additionally, no security or

institutional concerns were ever expressed in the responses to Plaintiff’s

grievances or appeals. Apparently religious accommodation meals are readily

provided at the jail upon approval by the Chaplaincy Services Department

and/or medical department, including vegetarian, vegan, and kosher options.

There is nothing before the Court suggesting that the provision of Hebrew

Israelite high holy day meals to Plaintiff would have posed a safety risk or

caused undue disruption of the facility or presented a security threat to the

institution. See JSO Order 698 (Doc. 21-1 at 9-12).

Defendant Thomas, in his Declaration, states there was no intent to

discriminate against Hebrew Israelites or Plaintiff, as evidenced by the fact

that the Chaplaincy Department told Plaintiff he could personally observe and

worship during Passover and the Feast of Unleavened Bread, just that the

Chaplaincy Department and the jail would not support him in this observance

by specially preparing meals for Plaintiff’s Hebrew Israelite high holy days.

(Doc. 21-1 at 6). In his Deposition, Plaintiff explained that the food served by

the jail is mixed together, like rice with meat, potato with meat, and he is left

with eating just the vegetable, cake, and bread, occasional commissary snacks,

and of course, on high holy days, he would be unable to eat a good portion of

these remaining food items. (Doc. 21-3 at 36-38). Here, Defendant Thomas

has not shown that other accommodations were made by providing Plaintiff

with, for example, an alternative item to satisfy his religious dietary

requirements for high holy days. See Smith v. Gov. for Ala., 562 F. App’x 806,

814 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (the inmate’s request for a fire pit was denied

because he already had access to a candle).

Plaintiff alleges he was discriminated against based on his religion.

Complaint at 11. The record shows he was repeatedly denied his requests,

grievances, and appeals to accommodate his faith by providing meals for high

holy days, and not on the basis of the lack of sincerity or for specific safety and

security reasons. Plaintiff has demonstrated that while the Jewish Passover

was recognized and apparently accommodated, including the provision of

kosher diets, Plaintiff’s Passover and high holy days meal requirements were

not comparably met.14

Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence to raise a material question of

fact as to whether Defendant Thomas intentionally discriminated against him.

Indeed, a claim of discriminatory purpose or intent, “implies that the decision

maker ... selected ... a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’

not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Smith

v. Hatcher, No. CV 219-167, 2021 WL 6006298, at *9 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2021)

(quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass v. Freeney, 442. U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).

In this action, Plaintiff has presented more than just a showing of

disparity of treatment. Id. He has presented an ongoing, repeated denial of

religious dietary accommodation for high holy days to a member of the Hebrew

Israelite faith without the reviewer expressing or providing documentation

showing a threat to the safety of persons or security threats, or disruption to

the institution if the religious accommodation were to be provided. Again, the

14 Again, since Defendant Thomas has not provided the reason for the denial of Plaintiff’s

appeal (Grievance #085793283), the decision that “[o]ur current policy does not include

accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread Passover meal” remains unexplained. (Doc.

21-1 at 33). The Chaplaincy’s response is not a model of clarity; the Court is unable to

determine whether the Chaplaincy is referring only to the Hebrew Israelite Feast of

Unleavened Bread Passover meal, since the response is based on Plaintiff’s inquiry as a

Hebrew Israelite and the specific dates for the high holy days relative to his faith, or the

response encompasses all faiths and all requests for high holy day meals. The Chaplaincy’s

earlier response espousing that Passover is for devout Jewish inmates only serves to muddy

the waters. (Doc. 21-1 at 31).

grievance response does not state the denial of the relief requested was based

on the lack of sincerity on Plaintiff’s part.15 As such, Defendant is not entitled

to summary judgment on this claim.

G. RLUIPA

Defendant Thomas contends that any claim for monetary damages

against Chaplain Thomas based on RLUIPA is barred, as the only relief

available under the Act is injunctive or declaratory relief. Motion at 12.

Plaintiff concedes this point and states he is only seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief under RLUIPA. Response at 4.

H. MOOT

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive

relief is moot. Motion at 12-13. Since Plaintiff is no longer confined in the

PTDF or any other facility owned or operated by the City of Jacksonville, nor

is he housed in a facility which employs Defendant Thomas, his demands for

injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.16 “The general rule is that a

prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for

15 Of note, Defendant Thomas eventually stated he accepted Plaintiff’s sincerity. (Doc. 21-1

at 5). Plaintiff alleges he identified himself as a Hebrew Israelite upon his admission to the

jail. Complaint at 7. In his Deposition, he said he has been a Hebrew Israelite since 2017,

acquiring his faith several years before he filed his 2020 religious requests and grievances.

(Doc. 21-3 at 11).

16 Plaintiff was transferred back to the Florida Department of Corrections and is currently

confined at the Baker County Detention Center. (Doc. 21-2 at 5); (Doc. 25).

declaratory and injunctive relief” even when “there is no assurance that he will

not be returned to the jail.” Robbins v. Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 799 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quoting McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363

(11th Cir. 1984)). Thus Circuit precedent forecloses Plaintiff’s claim for

injunctive and declaratory relief.

Of note, the exception to the rule in inapplicable. Nothing before the

Court shows Defendant Thomas attempted to evade jurisdiction by

transferring Plaintiff, and Plaintiff has not made a showing that his

complaints are capable of repetition, yet evading review. See United States v.

Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1540 (2018) (“A dispute qualifies for that

exception only ‘if (1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully

litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable

expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same

action again.’”) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff no longer resides in the PTDF. He names only Defendant

Thomas, an employee of the PTDF, as a Defendant. Thus, there is no longer a

live case or controversy.

“Article II of the Constitution requires that there be a

live case or controversy at the time that a federal court

decides the case; it is not enough that there may have

been a live case or controversy when the case was

filed.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).

“The doctrine of mootness provides that the requisite

personal interest that must exist at the

commencement of the litigation (standing) must

continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Id.

(citations, alterations, and internal quotations

omitted).

KH Outdoor, L.L.C. v. Clay Cnty., Fla., 482 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2007).

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking injunctive and declaratory

relief against the Defendant, his claim for injunctive and declaratory relief

against Defendant Thomas is due to be dismissed as moot. Summary judgment

is proper on the claims of declaratory and injunctive relief.

I. Individual Liability of Defendant Thomas

Defendant Thomas specifically addressed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim. Motion at 1, 9-11. As stated above, the Court finds Plaintiff

has plausibly stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant

Thomas. Thus, the Motion is due to be denied with respect to this contention.

To the extent Defendant Thomas is asserting Plaintiff did not plausibly state

a First Amendment claim, the Court concludes otherwise. Not only does he

plausibly state a First Amendment claim, there also remain disputed issues of

material fact.

Defendant Thomas does not specifically and fully address the First

Amendment claim in his Motion. Instead, he summarily states Plaintiff fails

to allege any facts that would support a claim against Chaplain Thomas in his

individual capacity. Id. at 14.

Upon review of the Complaint, the Court rejects Defendant’s contention

that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would support a claim under the First

Amendment against Defendant Thomas in his individual capacity. Indeed,

Plaintiff’s Complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a plausible First Amendment claim for relief:

“To plead a valid free exercise claim, [Plaintiff]

must allege that the government has impermissibly

burdened one of his ‘sincerely held religious beliefs.’”

Watts v. Florida Intern. University, 495 F.3d 1289,

1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of

Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)). “A

[prison] should accommodate an inmate's religious

dietary restrictions, subject to budgetary and logistical

limitations, but only when the belief is ‘truly held.’”

Hathcock v. Cohen, 287 Fed. Appx. 793, 801 (11th Cir.

2008) (per curiam) (not selected for publication in the

Federal Reporter) (quoting Martinelli v. Dugger, 817

F.2d 1499, 1504-06, 1508 (11th Cir. 1987)).

Gardner v. Riska, No. 3:09-CV-482-J-32MCR, 2010 WL 11506602, at *3 (M.D.

Fla. Dec. 27, 2010) (not reported in Fed. Supp.), aff'd, 444 F. App’x 353 (11th

Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff identifies his religion, Hebrew Israelite, and contends that

eating religiously authorized food for high holy days is a sincerely held tenet of

his religion. See Walker v. Iske, No. 8:12-cv-1539-T-30AEP, 2012 WL 5341380,

at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2012) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (the plaintiff raised

a First Amendment claim alleging he is a Muslim, adheres to all tenets of his

faith, and sincerely believes he must keep the diet mandated by the Holy

Qur’an, but the district court found the allegations of the complaint concerning

a denial of his right to exercise his religion were conclusory and lacking in

specific facts to support a plausible claim). Of note, based on the record,

Defendant’s denial of high holy day meals was not based on lack of sincerity.

Furthermore, Defendant Thomas did not reference budgetary and logistical

limitations in denying Plaintiff’s grievance for high holy day meals.

In this case, Plaintiff specifically states that the standard meals provided

at the PTDF violate the requirements of his faith (including meat or meat

mixtures or food not prepared in a clean place), that he may not consume

according to his faith. He notes his frequent requests for a vegan diet, in

accordance with his faith.17

Defendant Thomas makes much of his assertion that he abided by all

policies of the PTDF. This too is at issue. The Order 698, upon which

17 Additionally, in response to questions concerning the details of high holy day meals,

Plaintiff responded in his Deposition and described the food needed to abide by the tenets of

his faith during high holy days, including needing a vegan tray, without baking soda, no

bread, pastries, or any item containing yeast, cream of tartar, or ingredients used to make

batter or dough rise. (Doc. 21-3 at 22).

Defendant Thomas relies, states that inmates will have the opportunity to

participate in established practices of their faith, “limited only by

documentation showing a threat to the safety of persons in such activity or

disruption of facility order.” (Doc. 21-1 at 9). Further, the Order state inmates

will not be discriminated against on the basis of their religion. Id.

Nothing before the Court suggests that accommodation of Plaintiff’s

religious diet for the high holy days constituted a threat to safety or may cause

disruption of facility order. Indeed, Defendant Thomas never identified any

“safety and security threats” which would justify restriction of Plaintiff’s access

to components, here a religious diet for high holy days, involved in the practice

of Plaintiff’s faith: Hebrew Israelite. Thus, this Court “cannot dismiss these

claims on their merits without a factual inquiry in the [PTDF] interests

justifying the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s right to free practice of his

religion.” Schneider v. Donald, No. CV 305-158, 2006 WL 1344587, at * 6 (S.D.

Ga. May 12, 2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (addressing a claim of failure to

provide an alternative religious diet during the Jewish celebration of

Passover). See Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

(citing Ashleman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing that requiring a believer to defile himself by doing something

completely forbidden by his religion is both different from and far more serious

than curtailing the expression of beliefs for which there are alternative

expressions)).

Plaintiff followed the grievance requirements and exhausted his

administrative remedies in an attempt to obtain Passover meals in accordance

with his faith. Here, Plaintiff adequately alleges that Defendant Thomas, the

Chaplain for the PTDF, has impermissibly burdened one of Plaintiff’s sincerely

held religious beliefs, to keep the high holy days holy by denying Plaintiff the

requested Passover meals suitable to his faith and in compliance with a tenet

of his faith.

Of note, both vegan, and kosher meals are served at the jail.

Nevertheless, Defendant Thomas denied Plaintiff’s request for Passover meals

without reference to institutional security, safety, budgetary or logistical

limitations. The Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, as it must,

and finds the Motion is due to be denied. Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient

to show a plausible claim for a violation of a right to free exercise of religion

under the First Amendment. Indeed, “the First Amendment is implicated

when a law or regulation imposes a substantial, as opposed to inconsequential,

burden on the litigant's religious practice.” Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp.2d

1328, 1349 (N.D. Fla. 2003) (quoting Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313, 1320

(D.C. Cir. 2002)), relying on O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351

(1987).

J. Compensatory Damages

Defendant Thomas contends Plaintiff cannot recover the compensatory

monetary damages he seeks under § 1983. Motion at 17-18. “No Federal civil

action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other

correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody

without a prior showing of physical injury. . .” See 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e). As such,

42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(e) bars recovery for compensatory damages “stemming from

purely mental or emotional harms.” Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1358

(11th Cir. 2021) (en banc).

In short, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (PLRA) precludes Plaintiff from recovering compensatory damages

because he has failed to allege any physical injury. “We’ve recently held that

an incarcerated plaintiff may not recover compensatory damages for mental or

emotional injuries absent any physical injuries.” Mays v. Joseph, No. 21-

10919, 2022 WL 18981, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (citing

Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1359-60). Upon review, Plaintiff has not alleged any

physical injury. “However, he may recover punitive and nominal damages in

the absence of physical injury.” Id. (citing Hoever, 993 F.3d at 1361-62). A

liberal construction of Plaintiff’s Complaint supports a contention that he is

seeking nominal damages as he seeks, “any additional relief this court deems

just.” Complaint at 13.

Therefore, the Court grants the Motion to the extent Plaintiff is seeking

compensatory damages from Defendant Thomas in his individual capacity.

K. Qualified Immunity

Defendant Thomas invokes qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s

claim of a First Amendment violation. Motion at 16-17. Defendant Thomas

contends Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Defendant violated a clearly

established rights, and therefore, he is entitled to qualified immunity from

damages. This Court previously found Plaintiff is not entitled to seek

compensatory damages; therefore, there is no call to address this defense with

regard to Plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages. Of note, Plaintiff seeks

punitive damages. Also, liberally construing Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, he

seeks nominal damages.

Qualified immunity “offers complete protection for government officials

sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Muhammad v. Sapp, 388 F. App’x 892, 987 (11th Cir.

2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted). Thus, a jail chaplain sued in his

individual capacity is entitled to qualified immunity for his discretionary

actions unless he violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known. See Black v. Wigington, 811

F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325

(11th Cir. 2009)). Qualified immunity allows jail chaplains to exercise their

official duties without fear of facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906

F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate an inmate’s constitutional rights.

Id.

Upon asserting a qualified immunity defense, a defendant bears the

initial burden to demonstrate he was acting in his discretionary authority at

the relevant times. Dukes v. Deaton, 852 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 138 S. Ct. 72 (2017). Here, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates

Defendant Thomas was acting within the scope of his discretionary duties at

the time of the alleged incidents, which Plaintiff does not dispute. As such,

Defendant Thomas carries his burden on qualified immunity and the burden

now shifts to Plaintiff.

To overcome a qualified immunity defense, a plaintiff bears the burden

to demonstrate two elements: the defendant’s conduct caused plaintiff to suffer

a constitutional violation, and the constitutional violation was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged violation. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 951.

Defendant admits, “[b]ecause a question of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff’s

First Amendment rights have been violated, for purposes of this Motion,

Chaplain Thomas only argues the second requirement – that Plaintiff’s rights

were not clearly established at the time Chaplain Thomas acted.” Motion at

16. The Eleventh Circuit held the law can be “‘clearly established’ for qualified

immunity purposes, ‘only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case

arose.’” Shepard, 657 F. Supp.2d at 1345 (quoting Jenkins v. Talladega City

Bd. of Ed., 115 F.3d 821, 826–27 n. 4 (11 Cir. 1997) (en banc)).

In support of his claim, Plaintiff states, when he was admitted to the jail,

he listed his faith as Hebrew Israelite. He told Defendant Thomas it was a

tenet of his faith to comply with its dietary requirements and he repeatedly

complained about the food preparation and the type of food served and

requested a vegan diet to comply with the dietary requirements of his faith

when he heard the jail did not serve kosher food. He alleges Defendant Thomas

told him kosher meals are not provided in the jail. Before Hebrew Israelite

Passover, Plaintiff grieved the matter of receiving appropriate Passover meals

for high holy days. Defendant Thomas denied his grievance, which was

affirmed on appeal.

The question is whether the alleged constitutional violation was clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation. The alleged violation occurred

in 2020, when Plaintiff asked for high holy days meals or Passover meals and

was denied the same. Thus,

“In order to determine whether a right is clearly

established, we look to the precedent of the Supreme

Court of the United States, this Court's precedent, and

the pertinent state's supreme court precedent,

interpreting and applying the law in similar

circumstances.” [Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907

(11th Cir. 2009)]. If there is no precedent on point, a

right is clearly established only if the law has “earlier

been developed in such [a] concrete and factually

defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable

government actors, in the defendant's place, that what

he is doing violates federal law.” Crawford v. Carroll,

529 F.3d 961, 977–78 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation

marks omitted). “Qualified immunity affords

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those

who knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 978 (quotation

marks omitted). “We have noted that ‘[i]f the law does

not put the [official] on notice that his conduct would

be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on

qualified immunity is appropriate.’” See Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S. Ct. 2151,

2156–57, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).

Muhammad, 388 F. App’x at 898.

Thus, if no precedent is found on point, a right is clearly established only

if the law has previously been developed in a concrete and factually defined

context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the

defendant’s stead, that what he is doing violates the law. Id. (citing Crawford

v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 977-78 (11th Cir. 2008)). It is clear, the First

Amendment “safeguards the free exercise of [one’s] chosen form of religion.”

Fetzer v. McDonough, No. 4:07cv464-MS, 2009 WL 3163147, at *5 (N.D. Fla.

Sept. 29, 2009) (not reported in F.Supp.2d) (quoting Cantwell v. State of Conn.,

310 U.S. 196, 303 (1940)). Upon review, inmates, upon their confinement, do

not forfeit all First Amendment rights, including the right to exercise their

religious practices and beliefs. Shepard, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 (citations

omitted). In fact,

Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the

First Amendment, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822,

94 S. Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), including

its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise

of religion. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct.

1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam). Second,

“[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary

withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and

rights, a retraction justified by the considerations

underlying our penal system.” Price v. Johnston, 334

U.S. 266, 285, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L. Ed. 1356

(1948). The limitations on the exercise of

constitutional rights arise both from the fact of

incarceration and from valid penological objectives—

including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of

prisoners, and institutional security. Pell v. Procunier,

supra, 417 U.S., at 822–823, 94 S. Ct., at 2804;

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412, 94 S. Ct.

1800, 1810–11, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974).

O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348.

As early as 1994, a federal district court recognized the Hebrew Israelite

faith as “a bona fide religion.” Jefferson v. Naiman, No. 1:05-cv-00127-MP-

WCS, 2007 WL 2827748, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2007) (relying on Lawson v.

Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538, 1545 (S.D. Fla. 1994), rev’d sub nom., Lawson v.

Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding district court abused

discretion in refusing to alter or amend judgment to consider new policy

adopted by FDOC)), subsequent determination, 2009 WL 1884389 (N.D. Fla.

June 30, 2009). In Jefferson, a Hebrew Israelite inmate confined in the FDOC,

claimed the defendants failed to provide him with leaven-free vegetarian meals

during religious holidays as required by his beliefs, in violation of the First

Amendment. Id. at *1. Like Plaintiff, inmate Jefferson grieved the matter of

obtaining Passover meals prior to Passover. Id. at *8. As such, the district

court found, considered in a light most favorable to inmate Jefferson, the

evidence shows a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff’s free exercise of religion

was substantially burdened during the high holy days. Id.

The next question employed is whether the applicable regulations “may

nonetheless be upheld if ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.’” Id. (citing O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350, applying Turner v. Safley, 482

U.S. 78 (1987)). However, the district court, in denying summary judgment,

found the Turner issues were not before it because the defendants had not

come forward with evidence to show how the denial of meals without leavening

during the holy days was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

Id.

Here, Defendant Thomas has not submitted an affidavit establishing

that complying with Plaintiff’s dietary requests was too costly, a threat to

institutional security, disruptive to the operation of the jail, or any other

reason usually found to be satisfactory under the reasonableness test of

O’Lone. Of note, vegan meals and kosher meals are provided at the jail, with

approval by the Chaplain and/or medical department. When Plaintiff grieved

the matter, he was simply told, “[o]ur current policy does not include

accommodating the Feast of Unleavened Bread Passover meal at this time.”

(Doc. 21-1 at 33). On appeal, the summary of affirmance simply states:

“Resolved Not in favor [of] the inmate[.]” Id.

The Court is not able to conclude, based on the record before it, whether

the Defendant’s decision was an exaggerated response to jail concerns or a

reasonable one. Like Jefferson, 2007 WL 2827748, at *8 (footnote omitted),

“the Turner issues are not before the court on this motion for summary

judgment.” Indeed, Defendant Thomas has not come forward with any

evidence to show how the denial of vegan meals or other comparable meals

without leavening during the Hebrew Israelite holy days was reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests.

Under the Plaintiff’s version of the facts, the law is clearly established

at the time of the alleged deprivation. As such, Defendant Thomas is not

entitled to qualified immunity. The Court is unable, however, to proceed to

conduct an inquiry under Turner and O’Lone based on this record.

L. Eleventh Amendment

Plaintiff also names Defendant Thomas in his official capacity, seeking

monetary damages. To the extent Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages

against Defendant Thomas in his official capacity, his complaint for monetary

damages fails as a matter of law. Motion at 19-20. See Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.

1986) (per curiam) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to bar a prisoner’s

section 1983 damage claim against a prison official in his official capacity). As

such, the only relief Plaintiff could possibly obtain from Defendant Thomas in

his official capacity would be declaratory and injunctive relief; however,

Plaintiff’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot as Plaintiff is no

longer confined in the PTDF. Therefore, the Motion is due to be granted as to

Plaintiff’s suit against Defendant Thomas in his official capacity.

M. Punitive Damages

Again, Defendant Thomas asserts Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim

for relief against Defendant Thomas in his individual capacity. Motion at 20.

The Court has rejected this contention.

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Under an equal protection claim, in

order to obtain punitive damages, Plaintiff would need to show “an element of

intentional or purposeful discrimination.” E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d

1107, 1113 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted) (citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321

U.S. 1, 8 (1944)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). This can be satisfied by

showing the defendant’s conduct is “motivated by evil motive or intent or when

it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of

others.” Hooks v. Brewer, 818 F. App’x 923, 931 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 55 (1983)), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1384 (2021).

Of note, “[a]n ‘injury’ is ‘any harm, damage, wrong, or injustice.’” Hoever,

993 F.3d at 1357 (citation omitted). Punitive damages are not meant to

compensate the individual injured. Id. at 1358-59. Indeed, the purpose of

punitive damages “is to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious

conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.” Id. at 1359 (citing

Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 n.9 (1986) (citation

omitted)). Thus, punitive damages are aimed at both retribution and

deterrence. Id. at 1359 (citation omitted). Therefore, punitive damages may

be used for punishment or deterrence for intentional or reckless invasions of

the rights of an individual. See Smith, 461 U.S. at 54-55.

The Court will not, at this stage of the litigation, find punitive damages

are not recoverable as a matter of law. Viewing the facts in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes Plaintiff has alleged facts to

plausibly support his claim that Defendant Thomas acted with purposeful

discrimination or callous indifference to Plaintiff’s rights under the First

Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Thus, Defendant’s Motion is due to be denied as to Plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages. Also, Plaintiff’s claim for nominal damages remains.

Therefore, it is now

ORDERED:

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) is GRANTED

with respect to the following: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative

remedies with respect to Plaintiff’s request for a vegan diet; (2) the claim for

monetary damages against Defendant Thomas pursuant to RLUIPA is barred;

(3) the request for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot; (4) Plaintiff may

not seek compensatory damages against Defendant Thomas in his individual

capacity; (5) Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendant

Thomas in his official capacity; and (6) dismissing the suit against Defendant

Thomas in his official capacity. In all other respects, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Therefore, partial summary judgment is entered as to the following

claims: (1) for failure to receive a vegan diet; (2) for monetary damages against

Defendant Thomas pursuant to RLUIPA; (3) for compensatory damages

against Defendant Thomas in his individual capacity; (4) for monetary

damages against Defendant Thomas in his official capacity; (5) for injunctive

and declaratory relief; (6) for the suit against Defendant Thomas in his official

capacity; and (7) for the suit against Defendant Thomas based upon RLUIPA

as the claim for declaratory and injunctive relief is moot.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of

March, 2022.

J) i

(J on—| ar

BRIAN/I, DAVIS

United States District Judge

sa 3/16

C:

Andrew A. Brown

Counsel of Record

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