Brown v. Jane Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARLON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:21-cv-545-JES-MRM

JANE DOE, Nurse, individual

capacity, FNU RICEWICK, LPN,

individual capacity, FNU

BEARD, Nurse, individual

capacity, FNU ATHEMIDOR,

Nurse, and J. JACKSON,

Nurse, individual capacity,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 12) and Plaintiff Marlon Brown’s

Response (Doc. 16).

I. Background

Brown is a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections

(FDOC). He sues five nurses—the four named Defendants and an

unknown nurse identified as Jane Doe—over medical treatment he

received while incarcerated at DeSoto Correctional Institution.

The Court recounts the allegations as pled in Brown’s Complaint,

which the Court must accept as true when considering Defendants’

Motion. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d

1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).

On September 26, 2020, while getting dressed for a medical

appointment, Brown slammed his hand into a locker. During the

appointment, Brown showed Jane Doe his fingers, which were swollen,

disfigured, and painful, and told her he believed they were broken.

Doe told Brown to submit a sick call request. Brown did so on

September 28, 2020. On October 1, 2020, Brown saw Defendant

Athemidor for an unrelated medical appointment and complained

about the pain in his fingers. Athemidor responded that the

appointment was not for his fingers and told Brown to submit a

sick call request.

Brown submitted a second sick call request for his fingers on

October 9, 2020. Ten days later, at a medical appointment for

unrelated issues, Brown showed Ricewick his fingers. Ricewick

stated the fingers looked broken and advised Brown to submit a

sick call request. Brown submitted his third sick call request

on October 20, 2020. During another unrelated medical visit ten

days later, Brown showed Beard and Jackson his fingers, complained

about the pain, and informed the nurses he had injured the fingers

almost a month earlier. Beard and Jackson recommended Brown

submit a sick call request. During another unrelated medical

visit on November 2, 2020, Ricewick again suggested that Brown

submit another sick call request for his fingers.

Brown submitted his fourth request on November 23, 2020.

Brown saw Jackson for another unrelated medical visit the next

day. Brown brought up his fingers again, and Jackson said she was

tired of hearing about them. On December 24, 2020, Ricewick

finally saw Brown for his injured fingers. Ricewick noted the

fourth and fifth fingers on Browns right hand were swollen and

deformed and ordered an x-ray, which confirmed the fingers were

fractured.

Brown accuses each Defendant of violating his Eighth

Amendment rights by failing to treat a serious medical need. He

seeks a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, and his costs

and fees.

II. Legal Standard

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as

true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The preferential

standard of review, however, does not let all pleadings adorned

with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The Supreme

Court has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss

a claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim

facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw

a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing

party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)). And

a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions amounting

to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Brown files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state

a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant

deprived him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal

law, and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law.

Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing

Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In

addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative

causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the

constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d

1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).

III. Discussion

Defendants first claim Brown’s Complaint is a shotgun

pleading. A shotgun pleading is one that fails to comply with

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b), or both. The

problem with shotgun pleadings is that they fail “to give the

defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). Brown’s

Complaint does not suffer this defect. It states in clear and

plain language the specific factual allegations against each

Defendant in separate, sequentially numbered paragraphs, and it

separately accuses each Defendant of deliberate indifference to

Brown’s serious medical need. Brown’s Complaint is not a shotgun

pleading.

Defendants next argue Brown fails to state an Eighth Amendment

claim. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court established that

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners

constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’

proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).

But not every claim of inadequate medical treatment gives rise to

an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 105. Negligence in

diagnosis or treatment—even if it constitutes medical malpractice—

does not necessarily violate the constitution. Id. at 106.

“To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to serious

medical need in violation of the [Eighth] Amendment, a plaintiff

must show: ‘(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant['s]

deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) causation between

that indifference and the plaintiff's injury.’” Youmans v.

Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mann v. Taser

Int'l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009)). In the

Eleventh Circuit, “[a] serious medical need is ‘one that has been

diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so

obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for

a doctor’s attention.’” Shaw v. Allen, 701 F. App’x 891, 893

(11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th

Cir. 2003)). “Severe pain that is not promptly or adequately

treated can…constitute a serious medical need depending on the

circumstances.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1222 (11th Cir.

2016). Brown claims his fractured fingers were swollen, painful,

and disfigured, and that Defendants declined to treat the fingers

for three months. The Court finds that Brown has plausibly alleged

a serious medical need. See Lepper v. Nguyen, 368 F. App’x 35,

39 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Lepper’s hand injury certainly qualifies as

an objectively serious medical need.”)

Deliberate indifference has three components: “(1) subjective

knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;

(3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Conduct that is more than mere negligence

includes: (1) grossly inadequate care; (2) a decision to take an

easier but less efficacious course of treatment; and (3) medical

care that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.” Id.

But “a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s

medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course

of treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference.”

Wilson v. Smith, 567 F. App’x 676, 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, matters of

medical judgment do not constitute deliberate indifference.” Id.

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107).

Brown’s claims against each Defendant follow the same

pattern: Brown saw each nurse for a reason unrelated to his hand,

he showed the nurse his swollen and disfigured fingers and

complained of pain, and the nurse declined to treat the fingers

and advised Brown to submit a sick call request. Each Defendant

has responded to Brown’s Complaint with the same arguments: Brown

failed to allege (1) that Defendants had subjective knowledge of

a risk of serious harm, (2) that the delay in treatment caused him

to suffer injury, and (3) that each Defendant’s decision not to

treat Brown’s injury was a matter of medical judgment.

The Court rejects Defendants’ arguments. The Court can

reasonably infer from Brown’s allegations—that he showed each

nurse his swollen and disfigured fingers and complained about the

pain—that each Defendant knew Brown was in severe pain. The Court

can also reasonably infer that Defendants’ refusal to treat Brown’s

fingers prolonged his pain, which satisfies the causation element

at this stage of the case. The Complaint does not suggest

Defendants refused to treat Brown’s injured fingers due to their

medical judgment. In fact, each nurse at least implicitly

acknowledged a need for treatment by advising Brown to submit a

sick call request.

In sum, the Court finds that Brown’s Complaint plausibly

pleads that each Defendant violated his Highth Amendment rights by

refusing to treat his fractured fingers.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 12)

is DENIED. Defendants must answer the Complaint within 14 days

of this Order.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 10th day

of February 2022.

Not & AKL.

JGHE E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies:

Counsel of Record