Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security

United States District Court

Middle District of Florida

Orlando Division

ANTONIO CHRISTIAN JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. 6:20-cv-1600-PDB

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Order

Earlier in the case, the Court granted the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security’s unopposed motion to remand the case, reversed the denial of Antonio

Jones’s application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security

income and, under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), remanded for further

proceedings. Docs. 26, 27, 28. Jones now requests, under the Equal Access to

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an award of $3,595.87 in attorney’s fees.

Doc. 29. The Acting Commissioner has no opposition. Doc. 29 at 3.

In ruling on an EAJA request, a court must decide if the requesting party

is eligible and the requested attorney’s fees are reasonable. Comm’r, I.N.S. v.

Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160–61 (1990). A party is eligible if (1) he prevailed in a

case against the United States, (2) he timely requested the fees, (3) his net

worth did not exceed $2 million when he filed the case, (4) the United States’

position was not substantially justified, and (5) no special circumstance would

make the award unjust. Id. at 158; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1) & (2).

A social-security plaintiff prevails if the court orders a sentence-four

remand. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–02 (1993). An EAJA request is

timely if made within 30 days of the final judgment, which, if no appeal is

taken, is 90 days from the judgment’s entry. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) &

(d)(2)(G) (“final judgment” is judgment that is final and not appealable); Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days of judgment

in case in which United States is party). An EAJA request must contain an

allegation that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified,

Jean, 496 U.S. at 160, and, if made, the Commissioner bears the burden of

showing that it was, United States v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1425 (11th Cir.

1997). A court may deny an EAJA request based on equitable considerations.

Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 422−23 (2004).

The first four conditions are satisfied here, and, as to the fifth, no

equitable consideration is apparent or presented that would make an EAJA

award unjust. Jones prevailed because the Court ordered a sentence-four

remand. Doc. 27. His December 7, 2021, request, Doc. 29, was timely because

he made it within 30 days of finality of the September 9, 2021, judgment, Doc.

28. He represents that his net worth did not exceed $2 million when he filed

this case, Doc. 29 at 2, and the Court accepts that representation. His motion

includes an assertion that the Acting Commissioner’s position was not

substantially justified, Doc. 29 at 2, 6–7, and the Acting Commissioner has not

attempted to satisfy her burden of showing otherwise. The Acting

Commissioner does not contend that this case presents a special circumstance,

and none is apparent. Thus, Jones is eligible to receive an EAJA award, and

the only remaining issue is whether the requested amount is reasonable.

The EAJA provides that an attorney’s fee “shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except ... [it]

shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines

that an increase in the cost of living [since 1996, the date of the last

amendment to the amount,] or a special factor, such as the limited availability

of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28

U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). An EAJA award is to the party, not his attorney.

Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 592–93 (2010).

“The EAJA ... establishes a two-step analysis for determining the

appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the

Act.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992). “The first

step ... is to determine the market rate for similar services provided by lawyers

of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “The second step, which is needed only if the market

rate is greater than [$125] per hour, is to determine whether the court should

adjust the hourly fee upward from [$125] to take into account an increase in

the cost of living [since 1996], or a special factor.” Id. at 1033–34. “By allowing

district courts to adjust upwardly the [$125] hourly fee cap to account for

inflation, Congress undoubtedly expected that the courts would use the cost-

of-living escalator to insulate EAJA fee awards from inflation[.]” Id. at 1034.

If adjusting the cap, a court should use the cost-of-living increase when

the attorney performed the work, not to a later time. Masonry Masters, Inc. v.

Nelson, 105 F.3d 708, 711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1997). To do otherwise amounts to

awarding interest for which the United States has not waived sovereign

immunity. Id.; accord United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1346 n.28

(11th Cir. 2004) (finding Masonry and similar opinions persuasive in an

analogous context).

The party requesting fees must establish reasonableness. Norman v.

Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). That

burden includes “supplying the court with specific and detailed evidence.” Id.

at 1303. A court “is itself an expert” on reasonable rates, may consider its own

“knowledge and experience” about reasonable rates, and may “form an

independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”

Id. at 1303 (quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir.1940)).

Besides demonstrating the reasonableness of rates, a party requesting

fees must show the reasonableness of the number of hours expended. Watford

v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985).

Jones is represented by Richard Culbertson, Esquire, and Sarah Jacobs,

Esquire. Neither attorney provides an affidavit on experience or customary

rate, but their experience and specialization in social-security matters is

known in the legal community and reflected in their many appearances in

social-security cases here. Records of The Florida Bar show Culbertson has

been a member since 1991, and Jacobs has been a member since 2011. See

“Find a Lawyer” on www.floridabar.org.

Jones submits details of tasks performed for, and time spent on, the

action. See Doc. 29 at 11–12. Jones requests an hourly rate of $207.78 for work

completed in 2020 and $212.05 for work completed in 2021. Doc. 29 at 2, 7.

On the first step (determining the market rate for similar services

provided by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation), based on the Court’s own knowledge and expertise, the Court finds

the market rate for services provided by lawyers of comparable skills,

experience, and reputation exceeds $125 an hour. On the second step

(determining whether to adjust the rate upward from $125), the Court finds

the increase in the cost of living justifies an upward adjustment from $125

based on the increase in the cost of living from March 1996 to the time

Culbertson and Jacobs completed work for Jones. See U.S. Dep’t. of Labor,

Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0

(last visited December 8, 2021).

Culbertson and Jacobs together spent 17 hours on the case. Culbertson

worked 1.2 hours (0.9 hours in 2020 and 0.3 hours in 2021), and Jacobs worked

15.8 hours (1.2 hours in 2020 and 14.6 hours in 2021). Doc. 29 at 11–12. Their

tasks included preparing the complaint, reviewing the 1,000-plus-page

administrative record, preparing the brief, and preparing the EAJA motion.

Doc. 29 at 11–12. None of the work appears clerical or secretarial, and none

appears excludable as unnecessary. The number of hours is reasonable.

Using the number of hours and requested rates, attorney’s fees of

$3,595.87 (2.1 hours in 2020 at an hourly rate of $207.78 and 14.9 hours in

2021 at an hourly rate of $212.05) are reasonable.1

The Court leaves to the Acting Commissioner’s discretion whether to

accept Jones’s assignment of EAJA fees, Doc. 29-1, after determining whether

he owes a federal debt.

12.1 hours multiplied by $207.78 plus 14.9 hours multiplied by $212.05 equals

$3,595.88, but Jones requests $3,595.87. The Court awards the amount requested.

Because Jones is eligible and the requested attorney’s fees are

reasonable, the Court grants the motion, Doc. 29; awards him $3,595.87 in

attorney’s fees; and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of

Antonio Christian Jones and against the Acting Commissioner of Social

Security for $3,595.87 in attorney’s fees.

Ordered in Jacksonville, Florida, on December 8, 2021.

PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE

United States Magistrate Judge