Brown v. Goodwin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

TARONN KENARD BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:21-cv-00907-BJD-JBT

WARDEN GODWIN, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Taronn Kenard Brown, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action pro se by filing a complaint for the violation of civil rights

(Doc. 1; Compl.) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). Plaintiff

alleges four close-management inmates attacked him on a transport bus using

homemade razors. See Compl. at 7. He asserts the inmates were able to attack

him because the guards did not put their handcuffs on properly. Id. at 6-7.

Plaintiff alleges as follows:

As each inmate walked out [of] the property

room to be placed on the bus for transfer Major Kelly

and both Warden Goodwin and Assistant Warden

Allen watched Major Kelly inspect every inmate [sic]

handcuffs and shackles to make sure each inmate

were [sic] properly secured. Major Kelly[,] Warden

Goodwin[,] and Assistant Warden Allen did not alert

the prison officials that each inmate were [sic]

improperly handcuffed with the black lock handcuff

box.

Id. at 6 (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff contends the officers’ failure to

“follow[] the manufacture instructions concerning how to use the black lock

handcuff box [caused his] injuries.” Id. at 8. He says their conduct “resulted in

reckless disregard and a deliberate indifference” to his safety. Id. at 8. Plaintiff

acknowledges he received immediate medical treatment when the transport

bus arrived at Lake Butler Reception Center. Id. at 7.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires a district court to

dismiss a complaint if the court determines the action is frivolous, malicious,

or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b)(1). With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the

language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so courts apply the

same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th

Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that amount to “naked

assertions” will not suffice. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation omitted).

2

Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under

some viable legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d

678, 683 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). In reviewing a

complaint, a court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, liberally

construing those by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, but need not accept as true

legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA because he

fails to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See id. To state a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) both that the

defendant deprived [him] of a right secured under the Constitution or federal

law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.” See

Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175 (alteration in original). The Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been interpreted to

mean that prison guards have a duty “to protect inmates from violence at the

hands of other inmates.” Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.

2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)). But not every

injury an inmate sustains at the hands of another inmate is actionable as an

Eighth Amendment violation against prison guards who fail to prevent the

injury. Id. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has stressed “that a prison custodian

3

is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v.

Toombs Cnty., Ga, 400 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Popham v.

City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)).

An inmate proceeding against prison guards for injuries he sustained at

the hands of another inmate must allege the guards were “deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm,” which is a high standard. See

Oliver v. Harden, 587 F. App’x 618, 620 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Carter, 352

F.3d at 1349). “To be deliberately indifferent, [prison] guards must have been

subjectively aware of [a] substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate and

must have failed to respond reasonably to the risk.” Id. An injured plaintiff

must allege prison guards who failed to prevent harm “were aware of specific

facts from which it could be inferred that a substantial risk of serious harm

existed and . . . actually drew that inference.” Id. “Mere negligent failure to

protect an inmate from attack does not justify liability.” Id.

A random, isolated incident between inmates does not, by itself, give rise

to a deliberate indifference claim against prison guards who happen to be

present at or near the time of the incident. Id. Rather, a plaintiff must allege

facts permitting the reasonable inference prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to an “excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence.” Id. See also

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ccasional,

4

isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel and

unusual punishment.”). In Oliver, for example, the court affirmed summary

judgment in favor of prison guards because the evidence showed the incident

was an isolated event, the plaintiff and the attacking inmate did not have a

history of conflict, and the plaintiff did not report having been fearful of the

attacking inmate before the incident. Id. See also Averhart v. Warden, 590 F.

App’x 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding the district court did not err in

granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant prison guard because

the evidence showed the inmate-on-inmate attack was “a random-violence

case”).

Even when prison officials are aware of prior incidents of inmate-on-

inmate violence involving weapons, officials will not be responsible under the

Eighth Amendment unless the plaintiff shows the prison environment is one

“where violence and terror reign.” Harrison, 746 F.3d at 1299-1300. It is not

enough to allege prison officials “had subjective awareness of only some risk of

harm.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in

original).

Accepting as true that some inmates’ restraints were not secured

properly, Plaintiff does not allege facts permitting the reasonable inference any

named Defendant knew of an excessive risk of inmate-on-inmate violence

5

occurring during transport. Rather, Plaintiff describes an isolated, random

attack. He does not describe a similar incident having occurred previously. Nor

does Plaintiff allege he reported to any named Defendant that he feared or was

threatened by some of the inmates being transported with him. Additionally,

Plaintiff does not allege any Defendant intentionally misapplied some of the

inmates’ restraints to enable those inmates to harm him during transport. On

the contrary, Plaintiff alleges an officer checked every inmates’ handcuffs

before permitting the inmates to board the bus. See Compl. at 6. To the extent

the officer was not as diligent as he should have been, Plaintiff alleges at most

negligence, not deliberate indifference.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 14th day of

September 2021.

Zh. WS -

A Aram 67am

. BRIAN/I, DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

c: Taronn Kenard Brown

7