Martin V. Horn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

THADDEUS CHAYLON

MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:19-cv-474-MMH-PDB

OFFICER HORNE and

OFFICER MOBLEY,1

Defendants.

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Thaddeus Chaylon Martin, an inmate of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action on March 6, 2018, by filing a pro se Civil Rights

Complaint (Doc. 1). He filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 11) on June 14, 2018,

and a Second Amended Complaint (SAC; Doc. 24) on November 13, 2018.2 In

the SAC, Martin asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Corrections Officers Horne and Mobley. He alleges that Defendants violated

his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force against him on

1 The Court directs the Clerk to change the docket to reflect the correct spelling

of Defendant Horne’s surname.

2 In referencing documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the document

and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing System.

August 29, 2016, at Hamilton Correctional Institution Annex (HCIA). As relief,

he requests compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive and

declaratory relief.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Motion; Doc. 120). They submitted exhibits in support of the

Motion. See Docs. 120-1 through 120-8; S-132. The Court advised Martin of the

provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting

of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a

final adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the

matter, and gave him an opportunity to respond to the Motion. See Order (Doc.

46); Summary Judgment Notice (Doc. 121). Martin filed a response in

opposition to the Motion. See Response (Doc. 134). He also filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment (P. Motion; Doc. 122), a Brief (Doc. 123), a Statement of

Undisputed Facts (Doc. 124), a Declaration (P. Decl.; Doc. 125), and a Notice of

Exhibits (Doc. 136). Defendants filed a response in opposition to Martin’s

Motion. See Response (Doc. 131). The Motions are ripe for review.

2

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations3

In his verified SAC,4 Martin asserts that Defendants Horne and Mobley

violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force against

him on August 29, 2016, in HCIA’s H dormitory. See SAC at 5. He states that

inmates warned him that “the officers were setting [him] up to be hurt” by

assigning him to a cell with a disciplinary confinement (DC) inmate that he

describes as a troublemaker and homosexual infected with the human

immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Id. He maintains that he and the DC inmate

would not have been compatible cellmates because Martin’s DC time had

expired. See id. Martin avers that he “politely declined” the housing

assignment and asked to speak to a supervisor. Id. He also alleges that he was

not a threat to anyone and was in leg shackles and holding his property bag

with his hands cuffed behind his back. See id. He maintains that he was

“physically choked, manhandled, and force[d] into [the] cell,” and Horne

unnecessarily sprayed him with chemical agents. Id. Additionally, Martin

3 The recited facts are drawn from the verified SAC.

4 See Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x 948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted) (“The factual assertions that [Plaintiff] made in his amended complaint

should have been given the same weight as an affidavit, because [Plaintiff] verified

his complaint with an unsworn written declaration, made under penalty of perjury,

and his complaint meets Rule 56’s requirements for affidavits and sworn

declarations.”).

3

asserts that Horne and Mobley threw him on the ground where Horne sprayed

him again in his eyes, ears, nose, and mouth. See id. at 5-6. According to

Martin, he begged Horne to stop spraying because he has asthma and seizures

and could not breathe. See id. at 6. Martin describes his injuries as a dislocated

shoulder, a reinjured knee, a nosebleed lasting weeks, neck and collarbone

wounds, and permanent nerve damage to his arm. See id. at 5-6.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules(s)), “[t]he

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The record to be considered on a

motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).5 An

5 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and

deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee’s note 2010

Amends.

The standard for granting summary judgment remains

unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to

require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. The amendments will not affect continuing

4

issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ.,

93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support

of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for

summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381

F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). “When a moving party has

discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the

pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

development of the decisional law construing and applying

these phrases.

Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not

binding, they are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3

(11th Cir. 2013). Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review

remains viable.

5

590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court “must view

all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing

summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)

(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571,

1578 (11th Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Notably, the instant action

is before the Court on cross-motions seeking summary judgment. “The

principles governing summary judgment do not change when the parties file

cross-motions for summary judgment.” T-Mobile S. LLC v. City of Jacksonville,

Fla., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Instead, applying the same

principles, “the Court must determine whether either of the parties deserves

judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.” Id.

6

IV. Summary of the Arguments

In the Motion, Defendants maintain that there are no genuine issues of

material fact, and therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in

their favor as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Motion

at 10-21. They also assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars Martin’s claims

for monetary damages against them in their official capacities, see id. at 21-

22, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 22-24.

Additionally, they state that Martin fails to state claims for negligence under

Florida law or the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). See id. at 24. In his

Response, Martin contends that the video evidence shows that Defendants

violated his Eighth Amendment right when they used excessive force. See

Response (Doc. 134) at 4. Additionally, he maintains that he is entitled to

summary judgment in his favor as to Defendants’ liability, see P. Motion at 1,

and that his claims for damages against Defendants “must be determined at

trial,” Brief (Doc. 123) at 9.

V. Law

A. Excessive Use of Force

With respect to the appropriate analysis in an excessive use of force case,

the Eleventh Circuit has explained.

[O]ur core inquiry is “whether force was applied in a

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or

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maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999, 117 L.Ed.2d

156 (1992). In determining whether force was applied

maliciously and sadistically, we look to five factors:

“(1) the extent of injury; (2) the need for application of

force; (3) the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper

the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent

of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates[, as

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the

basis of facts known to them]. . .” Campbell v. Sikes,

169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations

omitted).

McKinney v. Sheriff, 520 F. App’x 903, 905 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). When

considering these factors, courts “must also give a ‘wide range of deference to

prison officials acting to preserve discipline and security,’ including when

considering ‘[d]ecisions made at the scene of a disturbance.’” Cockrell v.

Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Parker, 898

F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)).

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments

necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of

physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the

conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, not “every malevolent touch by a

prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted).

Notably, a lack of serious injury is relevant to the inquiry. See Smith v. Sec’y,

8

Dep’t of Corr., 524 F. App’x 511, 513 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (per curiam)). The United States

Supreme Court has explained:

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one

factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of force could

plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular

situation.” Ibid.[6] (quoting Whitley,[7] supra, at 321,

106 S.Ct. 1078). The extent of injury may also provide

some indication of the amount of force applied. . . . An

inmate who complains of a “‘push or shove’” that

causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to

state a valid excessive force claim. Id., at 9 (quoting

Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.

1973)).[8]

Injury and force, however, are only imperfectly

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts.

An inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does

not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim

merely because he has the good fortune to escape

without serious injury.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38.

6 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

7 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).

8 See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (“Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s

constitutional rights.”).

9

B. Qualified Immunity

The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

The qualified-immunity defense reflects an

effort to balance “the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly

and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,

231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The

doctrine resolves this balance by protecting

government officials engaged in discretionary

functions and sued in their individual capacities

unless they violate “clearly established federal

statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Keating v. City

of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation

marks and brackets omitted).

As a result, qualified immunity shields from

liability “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is

knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). But the

doctrine’s protections do not extend to one who “knew

or reasonably should have known that the action he

took within his sphere of official responsibility would

violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct.

2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks

and alteration omitted).

To invoke qualified immunity, a public official

must first demonstrate that he was acting within the

scope of his or her discretionary authority. Maddox v.

Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we

have explained the term “discretionary authority,” it

“include[s] all actions of a governmental official that

(1) were undertaken pursuant to the performance of

his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his

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authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it

is clear that Defendant Officers satisfied this

requirement, as they engaged in all of the challenged

actions while on duty as police officers conducting

investigative and seizure functions.

Because Defendant Officers have established

that they were acting within the scope of their

discretionary authority, the burden shifts to [plaintiff]

to demonstrate that qualified immunity is

inappropriate. See id. To do that, [plaintiff] must show

that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him,

the facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated

[plaintiff’s] constitutional right and that that right

was “clearly established ... in light of the specific

context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’

actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct.

2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on

other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808.

We may decide these issues in either order, but, to

survive a qualified immunity defense, [the plaintiff]

must satisfy both showings. Maddox, 727 F.3d at 1120-

21 (citation omitted).

Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court also has

instructed:

Because § 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative causal

connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation,” Zatler v.

Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per

curiam) (citation omitted), each defendant is entitled

to an independent qualified immunity analysis as it

relates to his or her actions and omissions. So[,] we

must be careful to evaluate a given defendant’s

qualified immunity claim, considering only the actions

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and omissions in which that particular defendant

engaged.

Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).

VI. Analysis9

A. Eighth Amendment Claims

Martin asserts that Defendants Horne and Mobley violated his Eighth

Amendment right when they used excessive force against him on August 29,

2016. Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment as to

Martin’s Eighth Amendment claims against them. They argue that Martin

“cannot demonstrate a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim because no reasonable jury could

believe [Martin]’s allegations….” Motion at 10. They also assert that the

material facts are not in dispute because Martin admits in his deposition that

he refused to enter the cell, stepped back away from the cell, braced his body

against the door frame to physically resist entering the cell, used his foot to

forego entering the cell, and ignored Horne’s verbal commands. See id. at 13.

Additionally, they maintain that the video evidence “confirms that [Martin]

violently struggled against officers in front of the cell” and contradicted Horne’s

lawful commands. Id. at 14 (citing Def. Ex. I, camera 4 at 19:04:35-19:07). In

9 For purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all

reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Thus, the facts described in the Court’s analysis may differ from those that ultimately

can be proved.

12

support of their position, Defendants submitted exhibits, including incident

reports, Docs. 120-1 through 120-5; Martin’s medical records, Doc. 120-6; the

Declaration of Kellie Caswell, RN, BSN (Caswell Decl.), Doc. 120-7; and

Martin’s deposition (P. Depo), Doc. 120-8. With the Court’s permission, see

Order (Doc. 130), Defendants also submitted two digital video discs under seal.

See Notice to Court (Doc. 133); Doc. S-132, Def. Exs. I, cameras 4, 5, 6 (fixed

wing recordings); J (handheld recording).

In an incident report, Defendant Horne described the circumstances

related to the incident involving Martin. He stated in pertinent part:

On August 29, 2016 at approximately 7:05 PM, while

assigned as H-Dormitory Housing Officer, Officer

William R. Schneier and I escorted Inmate MARTIN,

Thaddeus DC#M85852 to cell H-2214 where Inmate

BLACK, Jonathan DC#X47686 was present. Inmate

BLACK was placed in hand restraints and ordered to

step to the back of the cell to which Inmate BLACK

complied. Inmate MARTIN was placed in the cell at

which time Inmate MARTIN braced himself against

the door frame and utilized his foot to prevent me from

securing the cell. I ordered Inmate MARTIN to remove

himself from the door frame and allow the cell door to

be secured. Inmate MARTIN became argumentative

and belligerent in reference to his disapproval of his

cellmate. I implemented the Incident Command

System advising of the aforementioned incident. I

ordered Inmate MARTIN to cease his physical

resistance to which he refused by lunging towards me

in an aggressive manner, while utilizing his lower

extremities to attempt to strike me in my lower torso,

and lower extremities, while attempting to break from

my grasp. As a result of Inmate MARTIN’s aggressive

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combative actions, and physical resistance to multiple

lawful commands, I retrieved my assigned MK-4 OC

chemical agent canister #16-25 and administered one

continuous burst of chemical agent, striking Inmate

MARTIN[’s] torso and facial area. Officer Schneier and

I secured a hold to Inmate MARTIN’s upper

extremities and torso area as Inmate MARTIN lifted

his feet, continuing his physical resistance, by falling

chest first to [the] floor. When chest down on the floor

Inmate MARTIN ceased his combative behavior but

continued his physical resistance by refusing to stand

when ordered to do so. Officers Perry Mobley and

Zachary Smith responded and assisted by obtaining a

hold to inmate MARTIN[’s] upper extremities in order

to escort inmate MARTIN to the decontamination

shower. Inmate MARTIN reluctantly complied with

orders given by the responding officers and was

assisted to a standing position, however during the

escort from cell H-2214 to the decontamination shower

inmate MARTIN lifted his feet from the floor multiple

times and was held in a standing position briefly by

the escorting officers until inmate MARTIN placed his

feet back on the floor[] and resumed walking. Inmate

MARTIN was ultimately placed in the

decontamination shower and all forced ceased. I am

certified in the use of chemical agents as indicated on

my firearms card.

Doc. 120-1. Officer William R. Schneier provided a similar account of what

transpired that night. See Doc. 120-2.

According to Horne and Schneier, Officers Perry Mobley and Zachary

Smith responded to the incident and assisted by obtaining a custodial hold on

Martin’s upper extremities to escort him to the decontamination shower. See

Docs. 120-1; 120-2. In an incident report, Defendant Mobley describes his role

14

during the events that transpired when he arrived at the scene that night. He

stated in pertinent part:

On August 29, 2016 at approximately 7:07 PM, while

assigned as H-Dormitory Housing Officer, I responded

to an ICS (Incident Command System) incident

initiated by Officer Sam Horne. I arrived to the Cell

Front of Cell H2214 and assisted Officer Horne by

securing a hold to Inmate MARTIN, Thaddeus

DC#M85852’s upper extremities and ordered inmate

MARTIN to assume a standing position in order to be

escorted to the Wing Two (02) decontamination

shower. Inmate MARTIN reluctantly complied with

orders given, and with the assistance of responding

Officer Zachary Smith I escorted inmate MARTIN

from cell H-2214 to the Decontamination Shower.

During this escort inmate MARTIN lifted his feet from

the floor multiple times and it became necessary to

assist inmate MARTIN in maintaining a standing

position until he complied with orders given and

resumed walking unaided. Inmate MARTIN was

placed in the decontamination shower without further

incident and all force ceased by me.

Doc. 120-3. Officers Zachary Smith and Wayne A. Haley provided similar

narratives of the incident. See Docs. 120-4; 120-5.

To defeat the Motion, Martin is required to present evidence to show that

there is a genuine issue for trial. In opposing Defendants’ Motion, Martin

asserts that the video evidence “clearly shows” that Horne excessively sprayed

him with chemical agents, choked him, and punched him with a closed fist. See

Response (Doc. 134) at 4-5 (citing Def. Ex. I, camera 4 at 19:04-19:06).

Additionally, Martin maintains that he is entitled to summary judgment in his

15

favor as to Defendants’ liability. See P. Motion at 1. He argues that the video

footage neither showed him lunging at the guards nor attempting to kick them.

See Statement of Undisputed Facts (Doc. 124) at 2. In a Declaration, Martin

provides a factual account that is similar to the allegations in his SAC. He

states:

I never rec[ei]ved any disciplinary report or action on

8-29-2016 at all because I was not at fault and I was

the victim.

. . . .

Video footage shows me stepping backwards away

from guards, all while fully secured with hand[]cuff[]s

behind [my] back, s[h]ackles on [my] feet, and holding

all my property in my hands before Defendant Horn[e]

start[ed] to cho[]k[e] me, punch me, and physically

forc[e] [me] into an un[]assigned cell with an occupant

already in there that we did not match up. Due to me

being Administrative Confinement Status and inmate

Black[] being Disciplinary Confinement Status these

prison guards could not put me in that cell. You can

clearly hear me say I cannot go in there please let me

speak to your “Captain” and before I knew what was

going on Defendant Horn[e] said “you can’t speak to

nobody and get your a** in this cell” as he cho[]ked me,

punched me, and sprayed me over and over with

chemical agen[t]s in my eyes, nose[], ears, [and] mouth

as I pled for him to stop[.] I can’t breathe. I told

Defendant Horn[e] I have as[t]hma and seizures while

he continued to spray chemical[]s inside my mouth.

Video footage showed Defendant Horn[e] and

Defendant Mobley throw me on [the] ground all while

still fully secured with handcuffs behind [my] back and

s[h]ackles on [my] feet after already be[ing] sprayed

with chemical agen[t]s. As I am on [the] ground video

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footage showed Defendant Horn[e] and Defendant

Mobley jumping on me and continue attacking me on

[the] ground and continue to spray me with

chemical[]s. Video showed Defendant Horn[e] get up

and stand straight up to look around to see who is

watching him abuse me as all of the prisoners began

to scream at him, c[u]rse at him, and kicking doors to

alert staff about Defendant[’]s abuse. Defendant

Horn[e] stood up[,] look[ed] around[,] took few steps

away[,] look[ed] around again[,] then came right back

and jumped on me again and finish[ed] emptying the

“gas can” filled with chemical agen[t]s. Please review

8-29-16 video.

P. Decl. at 1-3. At his deposition, Martin similarly stated that Defendant Horne

used excessive force when Martin refused to enter the cell. See P. Depo at 40-

52.

The parties agree that the video evidence captures the August 29, 2016

incident, the post-use-of-force decontamination shower, and Nurse Booth’s

medical assessment.10 However, they disagree as to what the recordings show

10 Defendants’ exhibit I contains three video recordings from fixed wing

cameras 4, 5, and 6. Camera 4 provides a distant view from the opposite side of the

dormitory’s cell block. Camera 5 does not record the use of force at issue. It only shows

Martin entering the wing, see Def. Ex. I at 19:02:39-19:02:54, exiting the wing, see

id. at 19:28:43 and re-entering the wing after a visit to the medical clinic, see id. at

19:34:31. The closest camera to cell H-2214 is camera 6, but it does not point directly

at the cell (which is located to the left of the camera angle), and therefore does not

capture the details of Defendants’ involvement. Defendants’ exhibit J is a handheld

video recording of Martin’s decontamination shower and medical visit with Nurse

Albert Booth. Notably, the audio is unclear due to cellblock echoes, and therefore the

Court is unable to identify relevant voices and the substance of conversations.

However, the audio does record inmates kicking their doors and yelling during the

incident. In referencing each recording, the Court will use the time stamp in the top

left corner of the recording.

17

with regard to how the cell-front incident unfolded. Both generally cite to

camera 4’s footage (19:04 through 19:07) and argue that the video evidence

supports their factual accounts. See Motion at 6-7, 14; P. Decl. at 5 (citing Doc.

88); Doc. 88 at 4.

The Court first addresses Defendant Mobley’s involvement in the

incident. That night, Mobley responded (with Officer Smith) to Horne’s call for

assistance via the Incident Command System and helped Horne and Officer

Schneier secure Martin. See P. Depo at 53; see also Docs. 120-1 through 120-

5. At his deposition, Martin downplayed Mobley’s involvement, stating that

“Mobley really wasn’t trying to get involved in the incident.” P. Depo at 45.

Martin testified that Mobley “basically” kept him on the ground to secure him.

Id. at 53. He explained that “Mobley was just helping his fellow officer” and

“trying to address or resolve or rectify the matter” when Martin was on the

ground. Id. at 53; see id. at 45, 52, 54. According to Martin, Mobley never

sprayed him with chemical agents or punched, hit, or kicked him. See id. at 45,

49, 51-54. The video evidence supports Defendant Mobley’s account that he

was not involved in the initial escort of Martin to cell H-2214, but escorted

Martin from that cell to the decontamination shower without any excessive

force used against Martin. See Def. Ex. I, camera 4 at 19:07:31-19:08:13;

camera 6 at 19:07:31-19:07:50; see also Docs. 120-3; 120-4. Given the video

18

evidence and Martin’s assertions at his deposition, Defendants’ Motion is due

to be granted as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Mobley. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Motion is due to be denied as to his Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant Mobley.

Next, the Court turns to Defendant Horne’s involvement in the

application of chemical agents and use of force against Martin. Horne asserts

that he is entitled to summary judgment as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment

claims against him because he did not use any unnecessary force against

Martin. He maintains that the video evidence supports his version of the facts.

Martin argues that Horne is not entitled to summary judgment in his favor,

and that the video evidence supports his (Martin’s) version of the facts. As

such, Martin asserts that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor.

Camera 4’s footage captures the rapidly-evolving scuffle but distorts the

specific movements of the involved parties. Notably, the Court used a zoom

feature11 to magnify the small-scaled recorded incident (due to camera 4’s

location at the opposite corner of the cell block). However, it blurred the

recording. Additionally, the walkway railings as well as assisting officers

obstruct the view of Martin’s and Horne’s movements. Undoubtedly, there was

a physical confrontation at the cell front. Nevertheless, the distant camera 4

11 See Response (Doc. 134) at 11.

19

produced a grainy recording that is not determinative of how the incident

unfolded. Camera 6’s recording does not capture Horne’s actions due to the

camera’s angled view. The recording merely shows an unidentified officer’s

lower legs and some quick movements on his part, but the recording is not

determinative of Horne’s involvement.

While the video evidence provides a detailed chronology of how the

events unfolded, it fails to capture Horne’s and Martin’s interactions with each

other at the front of cell H-2214. Given the differences in Martin’s sworn

recollection 12 and the contemporaneous narratives provided in incident

reports coupled with Martin’s medical records and Caswell’s Declaration,13

there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether Horne appropriately

used chemical agents and force to gain control of Martin, or used force that was

excessive, causing Martin’s lasting injuries. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to

Martin’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Horne is due to be

denied. For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s request that the Court enter summary

judgment in his favor as to his claim against Horne is due to be denied.

12 See SAC at 5-6; P. Decl.; Def. Ex. J (recording Martin’s statement that the

back of his head was burning); see also generally P. Depo.

13 See Docs. 120-1 through 120-6; Caswell Decl. at 2 ¶10 (stating the post-use-

of-force medical assessment documented “no gross deformity, and no signs or

symptoms of injury noted”); Def. Ex. J (recording Martin’s stance, gait, and

movements during the decontamination shower, escort, and medical assessment).

20

B. Qualified Immunity

Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity because

they did not commit any federal statutory or constitutional violation. See

Motion at 22-24. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a defendant may

be protected from claims for monetary damages against him in his individual

capacity. Here, it is undisputed that Defendants were engaged in discretionary

functions during the events at issue. Thus, to defeat qualified immunity with

respect to each Defendant, Martin must show both that the specific Defendant

committed a constitutional violation, and that the constitutional right violated

was clearly established at the time. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed

that, in determining the applicability of qualified immunity, the Court must

“parse” the actions each Defendant undertook, and “address the evidence as it

pertains solely to” that defendant. Alcocer, 906 F.3d at 952.

Upon review of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds

that Defendant Mobley is entitled to qualified immunity from monetary

damages in his individual capacity as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment claim

against him. However, at this summary judgment stage of the proceedings,

genuine issues of material fact preclude a finding that Defendant Horne is

entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity as to Martin’s Eighth Amendment

21

claim against him. As such, Defendants’ Motion as to their assertion of

qualified immunity is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

C. Eleventh Amendment14

Defendant Horne asserts that, to the extent he is sued in his official

capacity, he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Motion at 21-

22.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he

Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.

It is well established that, in the absence of consent, “a

suit in which the State or one of its agencies or

departments is named as the defendant is proscribed

by the Eleventh Amendment.” Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)

(quotation omitted). The Eleventh Amendment also

prohibits suits against state officials where the state

is the real party in interest, such that a plaintiff could

not sue to have a state officer pay funds directly from

the state treasury for the wrongful acts of the state.

Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326,

1336 (11th Cir. 1999).

Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 563 F. App’x 701, 703 (11th

Cir. 2014) (per curiam).

14 The Court need not address Defendant Mobley’s assertion that the Eleventh

Amendment bars Martin’s claim for monetary damages against him in his official

capacity.

22

In Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam),

the Eleventh Circuit noted:

It is clear that Congress did not intend to

abrogate a state’s eleventh amendment immunity in

section 1983 damage suits. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.

332, 340-45, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358

(1979). Furthermore, after reviewing specific

provisions of the Florida statutes, we recently

concluded that Florida’s limited waiver of sovereign

immunity was not intended to encompass section 1983

suits for damages. See Gamble,[15 ] 779 F.2d at 1513-

20.

Accordingly, in Zatler, the court found that the Florida Department of

Corrections Secretary was immune from suit in his official capacity. Id. Thus,

insofar as Martin may be seeking monetary damages from Defendant Horne

in his official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit. Therefore,

Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted to the extent that Horne is entitled to

the entry of judgment in his favor on Martin’s claim for monetary damages

from Defendant Horne in his official capacity.

D. FTCA and Negligence Claims

In the SAC, Martin also asserts that Defendants owed him “a duty of

care” under Florida law and the FTCA. See SAC at 7. Defendants maintain

that Martin fails to state plausible negligence claims under Florida law and

15 Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Serv., 779 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir.

1986).

23

the FTCA. Upon review of Martin’s Response, it appears that he intends to

pursue his claims against Defendants under federal constitutional provisions,

specifically the Eighth Amendment. See generally Response; P. Motion. To the

extent Martin intends to advance an FTCA claim, the United States is the only

permissible defendant in an FTCA action. Simpson v. Holder, 184 F. App’x 904,

908 (11th Cir. 2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (stating that the FTCA remedy

against the United States “is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding

for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee

whose act or omission gave rise to the claim”). In Levin v. United States, the

Supreme Court explained that the FTCA “gives federal district courts exclusive

jurisdiction over claims against the United States for injury or loss of property,

or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission

of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” 568 U.S.

503, 506 (2013). “Substantively, the FTCA makes the United States liable to

the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, under the

law of the place where the tort occurred, subject to enumerated exceptions.” Id.

at 506-07. However, a state employee is not a proper defendant in a FTCA case.

See Daniel v. United States Marshal Serv., 188 F. App’x 954, 956 (11th Cir.

2006) (“[T]he United States [is] the only proper defendant, pursuant to the

FTCA.”). Additionally, the law is well-settled that the Constitution is not

24

implicated by the negligent acts of corrections officials. Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As

we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether

procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison

officials.”). As such, judgment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants as to

Martin’s FTCA and negligence claims.

E. Plaintiff’s Newly Asserted Claims

In his Motion (Doc. 122) and Response (Doc. 134), Martin asserts that

Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment as well as his

equal protection and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Additionally, he maintains that he was denied medical care. Insofar as Martin

asserts Fourth, Eighth (deliberate indifference to his medical needs), and

Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants in his response to

Defendants’ summary judgment motion, the Court determines that raising

new legal claims against Defendants for the first time at this stage of the

litigation is impermissible. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d

1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The central issue in this case is whether a non-

moving party plaintiff may raise a new legal claim for the first time in response

to the opposing party’s summary judgment motion. We hold it cannot.”). Thus,

the Court determines that Martin is not permitted to pursue his claims under

25

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendants in this case.16

Neither is Martin permitted to pursue Eighth Amendment claims (deliberate

indifference to his medical needs) against Defendants in this litigation.17

In consideration of the foregoing, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 120) is

GRANTED as to (1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant

Mobley; (2) Defendant Mobley’s assertion of qualified immunity as to Martin’s

Eighth Amendment claim against him; (3) Plaintiff’s claim for monetary

damages against Defendant Horne in his official capacity; and (4) Plaintiff’s

FTCA and state-law negligence claims. Otherwise, the Motion is DENIED.

16 The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “under the Supreme Court’s

current framework, the Fourth Amendment covers arrestees, the Eighth

Amendment covers prisoners, and the Fourteenth Amendment covers ‘those who

exist in the in-between—pretrial detainees.’” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246

(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2019))

(emphasis added).

17 To the extent Martin blames medical staff for the denial of treatment and/or

for the failure to document his injuries, see Doc. 143, he may initiate a new civil rights

action if he elects to do so. Insofar as Martin maintains that Defendants were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, the video evidence shows that Mobley

promptly escorted Martin to a decontamination shower, and that Martin was taken

to the clinic where Nurse Booth assessed Martin’s health. See Def. Ex. J; see also

Caswell Decl. at 3 ¶11 (“There is no documentation in the medical records provided

that Mr. Martin has been diagnosed with asthma and he has not been prescribed

medications that are typically prescribed for asthma.”).

26

Judgment in Mobley’s favor will be withheld pending adjudication of the action

as a whole. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.

2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 122) is DENIED.

3. The parties must confer in good faith to discuss the issues and the

possibility of settlement as to Martin’s remaining Eighth Amendment claim

for excessive use of force against Defendant Horne. No later than October

13, 2021, the parties must notify the Court whether they are able to reach a

settlement. If the parties are unable to settle the case privately among

themselves, they must notify the Court if they wish to have the case referred

to a United States Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference. Otherwise,

the Court will enter a case management order, set a trial date, and direct the

parties to begin trial preparations.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 30th day of

August, 2021.

United States District Judge

Jax-1 8/30

C:

Thaddeus Chaylon Martin #M85852

Counsel of Record

27