Doe v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:20-cv-1454-KKM-TGW

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________/

ORDER

The Plaintiff John Doe, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit against Connecticut

General Life Insurance, Cigna Corporation, Life Insurance Company of North

America, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Isha Tirado-Baker, Jeffrey Duck, the Office of

the Clerk of Court of the Thirteenth Circuit in and for Hillsborough County (Clerk of

Court), Florida Office of the State Court Administrator, and Judge Rex Barbas. (Doc.

1).1

The complaint fails to identify precisely what claims Plaintiff asserts against the

Defendants and the factual basis for those claims. But—from what the Court can

decipher—his allegations concern a delay in state-court proceedings that involve Cigna

1 The Plaintiff also sues Steven Lehner, Ruel Smith, “Doe Agency,” “Doe Company,” “Doe

Corporation,” “Doe LLC,” “Doe PA,” “Doe PL,” “Doe PLLC,” and “Jane and John Doe 1-5.” See

(Doc. 1). Without addressing the propriety of suing those defendants, the Court dismisses without

prejudice the Plaintiff’s claims against them for failure to timely serve them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)

(“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss

the action without prejudice against that defendant.”).

and discovery and settlement disputes with the parties in that case. See (Doc. 1). What

is clear is that the Plaintiff asserts claims under the American with Disabilities Act

(ADA) and 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985. (Id. at 12). For relief, he seeks a

temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction, declaratory

judgment, damages, and “costs of suit and fees as provided by law.” (Id. at 12–13).

For the reasons discussed in the Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 26, 44,

45, and 59), the Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. Namely, to the extent the

Plaintiff seeks review of a state-court ruling or judgment, that cause of action is

prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d

1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that

precludes the lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.”) (citation

omitted). To the extent he seeks review of state-court orders entered in ongoing

proceedings, that cause of action is prohibited by Younger abstention. Wexler v. Lepore,

385 F.3d 1336, 1340 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[Younger] abstention doctrine is not triggered

unless the federal injunction would create an ‘undue interference with state

proceedings.’”) (citation omitted).

The Plaintiff also fails to state a claim for relief under the ADA. See Bircoll v.

Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007) (“In order to state a Title II

claim [under the ADA], a plaintiff generally must prove (1) that he is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that the exclusion, denial of benefit,

or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.”) (citation omitted); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating that a pleading must, among other things, contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).

Nowhere in his complaint does the Plaintiff sufficiently allege how a public entity

excluded him from participation in its services, denied him benefits of the entity’s

services, or discriminated against him by reason of his disability.

As to the Section 1983 claim, that fails because the Plaintiff never alleges a

specific federal right that the Defendants violated. See Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.,

Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A [Section] 1983 plaintiff must allege a

specific federal right violated by the defendant.”). Nor does the Plaintiff sufficiently

allege facts to establish a claim under Section 1985 or which civil rights he alleges

Defendants conspired to violate. See Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir.

2003) (“Section 1985 provides a vehicle to redress conspiracies to interfere with civil

rights.”).

As alleged, Tirado-Baker, Duck, the Clerk of Court, and Judge Barbas are also

entitled to absolute immunity from the Plaintiff’s claims. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234,

1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages

for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in

the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”); Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir.

1994) (“Nonjudicial officials are encompassed by a judge’s absolute immunity when

their official duties ‘have an integral relationship with the judicial process.’”) (citation

omitted).

Finally, the Plaintiff’s complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. See

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320–23 (11th Cir. 2015)

(discussing types of shotgun pleadings). Most obviously, the complaint fails to separate

into difference counts each cause of action or claim for relief. Id. at 1321–23). And the

Plaintiff asserts multiple claims against multiple Defendants without specifying which

Defendant is responsible for which action or against which Defendant a specific claim

is brought. Id. at 1323; see also Omanwa v. Catoosa Cnty., Ga., 711 F. App’x 959, 964 n.2

(“[D]espite the fact that pro se complaints are to be liberally construed, they are still

required to conform with procedural rules governing the proper form of pleadings.”).

The Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted and the Court will allow the

plaintiff one opportunity to amend his complaint. O’Halloran v. First Union Nat’l Bank of

Fla., 350 F.3d 1197, 1206 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[D]istrict courts are required to give

plaintiffs at least one opportunity to amend a complaint before the district court

dismisses an action with prejudice.”). But the Plaintiff’s failure to cure the deficiencies

discussed above will result in dismissal with prejudice. As a result, the following is

ORDERED:

1. The Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 26, 44, 45, and 59) are

GRANTED. The plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

2. By August 17, 2021, the plaintiff must file an amended complaint that

cures the deficiencies discussed in the Defendants’ motions and this order.

Failure to file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies discussed

will result in the Court closing this case or dismissing his claims with

prejudice, or both.

3. If the Plaintiff files a nondeficient amended complaint, the Defendants’

deadline to respond to the complaint is September 3, 2021.

4. The Plaintiffs’ other pending motions (Docs. 79, 80, 85, and 86) are

DENIED. The plaintiff is once again reminded not to file extraneous

motions until he files a nondeficient amended complaint.

ENTERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 3, 2021.

Jahn Keonlath Mizell

KathryrY Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge