American General Life Insurance Company v. Collum

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 8:20-cv-2754-WFJ-CPT

VALERIE COLLUM, TONI JEAN

BROWN a/k/a Toni Jean Collum, and

LAURA LYNNE SCOTT,

Defendants.

__________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant Valerie

Collum’s Counterclaim (Dkt. 15). After careful consideration of the allegations of

the counterclaim (Dkt. 14) and the applicable law, the Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

This action for declaratory relief and interpleader arises from an insurance

company’s uncertainty as to which of three survivors (the three named Defendants)

is entitled to pension benefits under an annuity. Dkt. 1. The complaint, together

with its exhibits, presents the following chain of events, which will be presumed as

true at this stage of the proceedings.

Thomas Larry Collum worked for a company that provided him a pension in

the form of an annuity issued by Plaintiff American General Life Insurance

Company (“American General”). Dkt. 1 ¶ 9; Dkt. 1-1. Mr. Collum died on

August 14, 2020. Dkt. 1 ¶ 16. Soon thereafter Defendant Valerie Collum made a

claim to the benefit due under the certificate. Dkt. 1 ¶ 25. Defendant Toni Jean

Brown a/k/a Toni Jean Collum and Defendant Laura Lynne Scott also asserted

separate claims to the monthly benefit. Dkt. 1 ¶ 26.

It appears that Mr. Collum left the company in 1993. Dkt. 1-2 at 2. That

same year Mr. Collum and “Ms. Bonnie Collum” divorced. Dkt. 1-2; Dkt. 1-3. In

the following year, 1994, Mr. Collum married Defendant Valerie Collum. Dkt. 1 ¶

7.

Mr. Collum and Mrs. Valerie Collum stopped living together approximately

one year later in 1995. Dkt. 1 ¶ 7. They never legally separated or divorced. Id.

Later in 1995 Mr. Collum began cohabitating with Defendant Toni Jean Brown

(a/k/a Toni Jean Collum). Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Collum and Ms. Brown never married. Id.

The annuity certificate issued in 2005. Dkt. 1-1. In June 2008, Mr. Collum

sought from American General a pension benefit calculation. Dkt. ¶ 11; Dkt. 1-2.

He wrote on the request form that he was divorced in 1993 from “Bonnie Collum”

and submitted the judgment of divorce as proof. Dkt. 1-2; Dkt. 1-3. Mr. Collum

revealed nothing on the request form about either of the two later relationships he

had with Mrs. Valerie Collum or with Ms. Toni Brown. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 12, 13; Dkt. 1-2;

Dkt. 1-3.

In August 2008, Mr. Collum designated his then cohabitant of over ten

years—Ms. Brown—as the joint annuitant. Dkt. 1 ¶ 13; Dkt 1-4. On the annuity

election form, he chose the fifth option, “100% Joint & Survivor,” which is

“payable to you [Thomas Collum] as long as you live and after your death to be

continued during the remaining lifetime of the Joint Annuitant.” Dkt. 1-4 at 2. Mr.

Collum did not designate on the form his marital status, but he typed “N/A” beside

“name of spouse.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 13; Dkt. 1-4 at 2.

In June 2017, he ceased cohabitating with Ms. Brown, and submitted a

pension service change request to American General. Dkt. 1 ¶ 14; Dkt. 1-5. The

change request form sought to change the beneficiary to Defendant Laura Lynne

Scott, his daughter because “ex-girlfriend – relationship ended.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 15; Dkt.

1-5.

American General alleges it is unclear which survivor is now entitled to the

decedent’s survivor monthly benefits. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 23, 24, 31, 33, 36. The confusion

stems from the decedent failing to obtain the consent of Mrs. Valerie Collum prior

to designating Ms. Brown as beneficiary in 2008 and substituting Laura Lynne

Scott for Ms. Brown in 2017. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 19, 20. Asserting the existence of

conflicting claims made among the competing beneficiaries, American General

seeks a declaration of the proper beneficiary and interpleader relief regarding the

survivor’s monthly annuity payments. Dkt. 1.

DISCUSSION

Mrs. Valerie Collum, pro se, filed a brief, twenty-line counterclaim against

American General (Dkt. 14 at 5; Dkt. 14-1 at 1) which it now seeks to dismiss.

Pleading Standard

The Court applies the Twombly-Iqbal standard, accepting all of the

counterclaim’s factual allegations, not legal conclusions, as true and construing all

reasonable inferences from those alleged facts in the light most favorable to the

counterclaimant.1 To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

Fed. R. Civ. P., the counterclaim must contain sufficient facts to state a claim for

relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Rule 8 does not

require detailed allegations, but the counterclaim must offer more than mere

“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Iqbal, 557 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The Court

takes into consideration the liberal construction afforded pro se litigants but will

1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (allowing reasonable inferences to be drawn from

factual content); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (stating legal conclusions

“couched” as facts need not be accepted as true); Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183,

1185 (11th Cir. 2003) (same).

not rewrite a counterclaim to sustain an action. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

The Counterclaim

The counterclaim generally complains of American General’s failure to

investigate public and social security records regarding the marital status of Mr.

Collum. The counterclaim specifically alleges negligence and lack of due

diligence on the part of American General in failing to ascertain that the decedent

was still married to counterclaimant, Mrs. Valerie Collum, both times he

designated beneficiaries. Dkt. 14-1. She also faults American General for “not

mak[ing] a decision based on the facts” and for going “to a court for help with

ERISA law” based on its failure to choose her as the proper beneficiary.

American General argues the claims raised by Mrs. Valerie Collum are

preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),

29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Second, negligence, or a failure to investigate, requires

the breach of a duty, and American General asserts no duty exists to investigate a

representation made by a pension annuitant. Finally, American General contends

the counterclaim must be dismissed because it duplicates the interpleader

defendant’s claim in the underlying interpleader. The Court agrees.

An interpleader action avoids multiple liability on the part of the stakeholder

plaintiff. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 40; Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. With respect to ERISA claims, if the

alleged conduct at issue “is intertwined with the refusal to pay benefits” and “the

counterclaim involves a dispute over a change of beneficiary form,” the

counterclaim does not “defeat” ERISA preemption. Unum Life Ins. Co. v. Burton,

No. 8:05-cv-1423-SDM-MAP, 2006 WL 69068, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2006).2

Here, American General’s refusal to pay Mrs. Valerie Collum the benefit due on

the annuity certificate is intertwined with the propriety of the August 2008 election

and beneficiary form. ERISA does not permit an intertwined claim apart from or

in addition to the interpleader action.

In addition to ERISA preemption, the counterclaim fails to state a claim for

relief under Florida law for either negligence or failure to investigate whether the

decedent was truthful in the 2008 election form. Negligence requires the breach of

a legal duty. Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1067 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citation omitted). An insurance company, however, does not have a duty to

investigate whether an applicant’s representations—at least in the context of an

application for insurance—are correct. Sciaretta v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 899

F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Where no duty exists, a negligence claim

must be dismissed. See Brake v. Wells Fargo Fin. Sys. Fla., Inc., No. 8:10-cv-338-

VMC-TGW, 2011 WL 6719215, at *10–11 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2011) (dismissing

2 See also Garren v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir. 1997)

(holding ERISA preempts state law “whenever the alleged conduct at issue in intertwined with

the refusal to pay benefits” under an ERISA-governed plan).

complaint and discussing Florida courts’ rejection of a bank’s duty to process and

consider loan applications in any particular or competent manner), report and

recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 6412430 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2011).

Lastly, “interpleader defendants” such as Mrs. Valerie Collum “are barred

from asserting counterclaims that duplicate their claims in the underlying

interpleader.” Coca-Cola Co. v. Lande, No. 1:19-cv-1741-WMR, 2019 WL

10093974, at 3 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 31, 2019) (citing cases); see also Genworth Life Ins.

Co. v. Sehorne, No. 8:07-cv-2308-JSM-EAJ, 2008 WL 912438, at * 4 (M.D. Fla.

Apr. 1, 2008) (determining that if interpleader defendants were allowed to

counterclaim against the stakeholder, the purpose of the interpleader action “would

be utterly defeated”). Because the counterclaim is duplicative of the precise issues

to be determined in the complaint, dismissal is warranted.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the counterclaim (Dkt. 15) is granted.

Defendant/Counterclaimant Valerie Collum may replead her counterclaim, if

legally possible, within twenty-one (21) days or her counterclaim will be dismissed

with prejudice without further notice.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on May 5, 2021.

me,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO: Counsel of record and all unrepresented parties