Houser v. Juul Labs, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JOHN P. HOUSER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:20-cv-1399-J-34JRK

vs.

JUUL LABS, INC., previously d/b/a as

PAX LABS, INC. and PLOOM INC., et al.,

Defendants.

/

O R D E R

THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. Plaintiff initiated the instant action on

December 13, 2020, by filing a seventeen-count Complaint and Jury Demand (Doc. 1).

Upon review, the Court finds that the Complaint constitutes an impermissible “shotgun

pleading.” A shotgun complaint contains “multiple counts where each count adopts the

allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came

before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” See Weiland v.

Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 & n.11 (11th Cir. 2015) (collecting

cases). As a result, “most of the counts . . . contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal

conclusions.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d

1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). Consequently, in ruling on the sufficiency of a claim, the Court

is faced with the onerous task of sifting out irrelevancies in order to decide for itself which

facts are relevant to a particular cause of action asserted. See id. Here, taking the

“shotgun” form to a level this Court has never seen before and hopes to never see again,

Plaintiff incorporates by reference not only the allegations of all the preceding Counts, but

all allegations of each of the succeeding Counts as well, such that each Count amounts to

a combination of all seventeen Counts of the Complaint pled not just once, but at least

twice. See Complaint ¶¶ 631, 652, 671, 685, 704, 721, 733, 754, 764, 776, 790, 805, 824,

864, 874, 887, 903.

In the Eleventh Circuit, shotgun pleadings of this sort are “altogether unacceptable.”

Cramer v. State of Fla., 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Cook v. Randolph

County, 573 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We have had much to say about shotgun

pleadings, none of which is favorable.”) (collecting cases). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit

has engaged in a “thirty-year salvo of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no

ceasefire in sight.” See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 & n.9 (collecting cases). As the Court

in Cramer recognized, “[s]hotgun pleadings, whether filed by plaintiff or defendant, exact

an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled

discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s

parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1263. When faced with the

burden of deciphering a shotgun pleading, it is the trial court’s obligation to strike the

pleading on its own initiative, and force the plaintiff to replead to the extent possible under

Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (admonishing district court for not

striking shotgun complaint on its own initiative); see also Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 n.10

(“[W]e have also advised that when a defendant fails to [move for a more definite

statement], the district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the shotgun

pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead.”). Accordingly, the Court will strike

the Complaint and provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a corrected Complaint.

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege this Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction

and therefore have an obligation to inquire into their subject matter jurisdiction. See

Kirkland v. Midland Mortg. Co., 243 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2001). This obligation

exists regardless of whether the parties have challenged the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)

(“[I]t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction

sua sponte whenever it may be lacking”). “In a given case, a federal district court must

have at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction under a

specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or

(3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).” Baltin v. Alaron Trading, Corp.,

128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).

Diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity or that “all plaintiffs must be diverse

from all defendants.” Univ. of S. Ala., 168 F.3d at 412; see also Newman-Green, Inc. v.

Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989) (“When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant

in a diversity action, the plaintiff must meet the requirements of the diversity statute for

each defendant or face dismissal”). The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that, for purposes

of establishing diversity jurisdiction, “a limited liability company is a citizen of any state of

which a member of the company is a citizen.” Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH

Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Thus, to properly

determine the citizenship of a limited liability company, the Court must consider the

citizenship of each of its members. See id.

Plaintiff names numerous Defendants to this action, three of which are limited

liability companies (LLC). Specifically, as to Defendant Eby-Brown Company, LLC, Plaintiff

asserts that its “managing member” is “Performance Food Group, Inc., a Colorado

corporation with its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia.” See Complaint ¶

48. However, this allegation is insufficient to establish the citizenship of Eby-Brown

because Plaintiff identifies only the “managing member” of this limited liability company.

To establish diversity jurisdiction, the Court needs information regarding the citizenship of

all the members of a limited liability company, not just the managing members. See Rolling

Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1022; Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Osting-Schwinn,

613 F.3d 1079, 1092 (11th Cir. 2010) (remanding case in which party invoking the court’s

diversity jurisdiction did not disclose the identity and citizenship of each member of an

unincorporated entity). It may be that the “managing member” identified in the Complaint

is the only one that exists. However, because of the manner in which that member is

identified, the Court cannot determine whether Plaintiff has listed all of Eby-Brown’s

members, or just the managing member. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations

as to the citizenship of Defendant Eby-Brown Company, LLC to be insufficient to allow the

Court to satisfy its obligation to assure complete diversity exists before exercising

jurisdiction over this action.1

1 Carefully ascertaining the citizenship of the parties and whether the Court has subject matter

jurisdiction over this action is more than just an academic exercise, as is evident from two Eleventh Circuit

cases decided in 2017. See Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Materials Corp of Am., 849 F.3d 1313, 1315-16 (11th

Cir. 2017) (vacating summary judgment order after three years of litigation where court determined on appeal

that the pleadings below had not sufficiently alleged the citizenship of a defendant limited liability company,

and upon further inquiry, found that the defendant limited liability company had a non-diverse member); see

also Purchasing Power, LLC v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., 851 F.3d 1218, at 1222, 1228 (11th Cir. 2017)

(discussing whether sanctions were warranted in a case where summary judgment was reversed on appeal

after the appellate court discovered that the pleadings did not sufficiently allege the citizenship of the plaintiff

LLC, leading to the realization that there was no diversity jurisdiction) (“While the requirements of diversity

jurisdiction in this scenario are complicated, they are the law. No party in this case acted with bad intentions,

In light of the foregoing, the Court will give Plaintiff an opportunity to file a corrected

complaint which properly establishes diversity of citizenship between the parties such that

this Court has jurisdiction over this action, and corrects the shotgun nature of the

Complaint. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Complaint and Jury Demand (Doc. 1) is STRICKEN.

2. Plaintiff shall file a corrected complaint? curing the shotgun nature of the

Complaint and the jurisdictional deficiencies on or before January 5, 2021.

Failure to do so may result in a dismissal of this action.

3. Defendants shall respond to the corrected complaint in accordance with the

requirements of Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida on December 15, 2020.

Me Maal Lae

United States District Judge

Ic11

Copies to:

Counsel of Record

Pro Se Parties

but the result was a colossal waste of time and effort. We trust that the damage done to the parties’ credibility,

finances, and time is enough of a sanction to curb their conduct and to serve as a warning to future diversity

jurisdiction litigants. In the end, when the parties do not do their part, the burden falls on the courts to make

sure parties satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. We must be vigilant in forcing parties to meet

the unfortunate demands of diversity jurisdiction in the 21st century.”).

2 The filing of the corrected complaint does not affect any right Plaintiff may have to amend as a

matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1).