Gallashaw v. Moody

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DAWN GALLASHAW, Administrator

and Personal Representative of

the Estate of Antonio Gallashaw,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20-cv-106-J-39MCR

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

______________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, Dawn Gallashaw, as personal representative of her

son Antonio Gallashaw’s estate, is proceeding on an amended

complaint (Doc. 3; Compl.) against the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC), the former warden of Baker Correctional

Institution (BCI), three BCI corrections officers, and one medical

staff person.1 Before the Court are the following motions: (1)

Officer Moody’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4; Moody Motion), to which

Plaintiff has responded (Doc. 6; Moody Resp.);2 (2) Officer Faltz’s

1 One corrections officer and the medical staff person are

identified as “John Does.” See Compl. at 4. The Court has directed

Plaintiff to identify the Doe Defendants by October 9, 2020, or

they will be dismissed. See Order (Doc. 31).

2 Defendant Moody filed a reply to Plaintiff’s response (Doc.

8). However, he did not seek or receive leave to do so. See M.D.

Fla. R. 3.01(c) (“No party shall file any reply or further

motion to dismiss (Doc. 7; Faltz Motion), to which Plaintiff has

responded (Doc. 14; Faltz Resp.); and (3) former-warden Lee’s

motion to dismiss (Doc. 25; Lee Motion), to which Plaintiff has

responded (Doc. 28; Lee Resp.).

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr.,

Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

plaintiff should allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the

plaintiff’s claims. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007).

Though detailed factual allegations are not required, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) demands “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. As such, a plaintiff may not rely on “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

memorandum directed to [a] motion or response . . . unless the

Court grants leave.”). As such, the Court does not consider

Defendant Moody’s reply.

statements.” Gill, 2019 WL 5304078, at *2 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678). Rather, the well-pled allegations must nudge the claim

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570. In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all reasonable

inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678.

III. Complaint Allegations

Plaintiff proceeds on behalf of her son, Antonio, who died on

July 28, 2015, while in BCI’s custody. See Compl. ¶¶ 14, 23.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant-officers Moody and Faltz entered

Antonio’s administrative confinement cell3 on July 27, 2015 to

conduct “a shake down.” Id. ¶¶ 16-18. According to Plaintiff, when

Moody and Faltz entered the cell, they “began to attack [Antonio]

without cause . . . . rendering him unconscious.” Id. ¶ 19. While

a bit unclear, it appears Faltz initially attacked Antonio.

Plaintiff alleges Moody knew of Faltz’s intent to attack Antonio,

but “did nothing to stop [it].” Id. ¶¶ 19, 55. Plaintiff also

alleges Moody “participated in the unlawful violence.” Id. ¶ 19.

Plaintiff alleges Moody and Faltz then removed Antonio from

his cell while he was “unresponsive . . . and suffering from a

life-threatening medical emergency.” Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff further

3 Antonio had been in BCI’s custody since January 2015. See

Compl. ¶ 14. On the day of the incident, July 27, 2015, Antonio

was placed in an administrative confinement cell because he

reported a medical condition and, separately, reported a

corrections officer was involved in illegal activity. Id. ¶ 17.

Antonio was housed in the cell by himself. Id. ¶ 16.

alleges “neither Defendants FDOC, Lee, Moody, Faltz, Correctional

Officer Doe[,] or Medical Staff Doe provided adequate medical

attention or care to [Antonio],” who remained unresponsive. Id. ¶

21. Plaintiff acknowledges Antonio eventually was transported to

the Reception and Medical Center (RMC) but “transportation . . .

was delayed.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.

As relevant to the motions under review, Plaintiff asserts

claims under Florida’s wrongful death statute (count two) and under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (counts three, four, and five).4

IV. Analysis

A. Constitutional Claims Against Defendants Moody & Faltz

In counts three and four, Plaintiff asserts Defendants

Moody’s and Faltz’s “use of force against [Antonio] . . . was

excessive, unreasonable, and constituted cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. ¶¶ 56, 62.

Plaintiff also alleges Defendants Moody and Faltz ignored or failed

to properly care for Antonio’s serious medical needs. Id. ¶¶ 57,

63. In count five, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Moody and Faltz

were deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s serious medical needs

by failing to obtain immediate medical attention for him. Id. ¶¶

68-69.

Defendants invoke qualified immunity. Defendant Moody asserts

Plaintiff alleges only in a conclusory manner that Moody witnessed

4 Count one is against the FDOC, who has not moved to dismiss

the complaint. See FDOC’s Answer (Doc. 26).

another officer attack Antonio but does not allege Moody himself

engaged in the attack. See Moody Motion at 5. Defendant Faltz

simply asserts Plaintiff does not allege facts showing he was

“acting outside the scope of his employment.” See Faltz Motion at

6.

An officer sued in his individual capacity “is entitled to

qualified immunity for his discretionary actions unless he

violated ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Black v.

Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Case v.

Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009)). Qualified immunity

allows officers to exercise their official duties without fear of

facing personal liability. Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951

(11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate an inmate’s

constitutional rights. Id.

Upon asserting a qualified immunity defense, a defendant

bears the initial burden to demonstrate he was acting in his

discretionary authority at the relevant times. Dukes v. Deaton,

852 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 72

(2017). Plaintiff concedes Defendant Moody was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority at the relevant times. See

Moody Resp. at 6. Plaintiff does not make the same concession as

to Defendant Faltz. See Faltz Resp. at 8-12. However, in her

complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Faltz was working as a

corrections officer on July 27, 2015, and in that role, “conducted

a ‘shake down’ of [Antonio’s] cell.” See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 18. Though

Plaintiff does not define “shake down,” this term generally is

understood in the correctional environment to refer to a cell

search, which is a legitimate job function of a corrections

officer. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges facts showing Defendant

Faltz was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority

at the relevant times.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate she alleges

Defendants engaged in conduct that, accepted as true, caused the

violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Alcocer,

906 F.3d at 951. “Because § 1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative

causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the

alleged constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant is entitled to

an independent qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or

her actions and omissions.” Id. (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802

F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).

The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain, or the infliction of pain totally without penological

justification.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987).

See also Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002)

(“The law of excessive force in this country is that a prisoner

cannot be subjected to gratuitous or disproportionate force that

has no object but to inflict pain.”); Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850,

853 (5th Cir. 1976) (“That an unjustified beating at the hands of

prison officials gives rise to a section 1983 action is clear.”).

The Eighth Amendment proscribes not only gratuitous uses of

force—as governed by the “malicious and sadistic” standard—but

also conduct that threatens the health and safety of inmates—as

governed by the deliberate indifference standard. See Danley v.

Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining the

different types of Eighth Amendment claims a prisoner may pursue

when he alleges a prison guard harmed him).

Thus, when an officer is aware an inmate faces a substantial

risk of serious harm, he may not intentionally ignore that risk by

conduct that is more than negligence. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 843 (1994). “The question under the Eighth Amendment is

whether prison officials, acting with deliberate indifference,

exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial ‘risk of serious

damage to his future health.’” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney,

509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). See also McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d

1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999) (“We have repeatedly found that ‘an

official acts with deliberate indifference when he or she knows

that an inmate is in serious need of medical care, but he fails or

refuses to obtain medical treatment for the inmate.’”).

When an officer uses excessive force against an inmate,

officers who are present and in a position to intervene can be

liable if they do not. Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340,

1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The law of this circuit is that an officer

who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps

to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force,

can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Because Defendants Moody and Faltz each raise a qualified-

immunity defense, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s allegations and

claims against them individually.

i. Excessive Force & Failure to Intervene

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Faltz physically beat Antonio to

the point of unconsciousness “without cause.” See Compl. ¶¶ 19,

56, 62. Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff asserts the

violation of a clearly established constitutional right under an

excessive-force theory, and Defendant Faltz is not entitled to

qualified immunity on this claim. See Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1304.

It is unclear, however, in which count—three or four—Plaintiff

proceeds on an excessive-force theory against Defendant Faltz.

Confusingly, in both counts, Plaintiff repeats the same basic

allegations (e.g., “use of force”; “beating”; “serious need for

medical attention”) and references the same overarching legal

principles (e.g., “cruel and unusual punishment”; “Eighth

Amendment”; “excessive [force]”; “deliberate disregard of

[Antonio’s] Constitutional rights”). See Compl. ¶¶ 54-58, 62-65.

To the extent Plaintiff intended to set forth multiple, independent

theories of liability against Defendant Faltz, she has not clearly

done so. The excessive force claim may proceed, but to the extent

Plaintiff intends to pursue other theories of liability against

Defendant Faltz, Plaintiff will be permitted an opportunity to

amend her complaint, as addressed later in this Order.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Moody also suffer from

a lack of precision and clarity. In both counts three and four,

Plaintiff seemingly asserts an excessive force claim against

Defendant Moody. However, it does not appear Defendant Moody

himself struck Antonio despite Plaintiff’s contention that

“Defendant Moody participated in the unlawful violence,” and

“Defendants Moody and Faltz attacked and beat [Antonio].” See

Compl. ¶¶ 19, 53, 61 (emphasis added). Id. Elsewhere in her

complaint, Plaintiff stresses that Defendant Moody merely “was

present” during the attack and failed to intervene, suggesting his

“participation” was limited to a passive role. Id. ¶ 55.

Additionally, Plaintiff describes Defendant Faltz’s physical

stature (height and weight), likely to show Defendant Faltz, as

the aggressor, was larger and stronger than Antonio, thus

permitting the inference the use of physical force was unnecessary.

Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff does not similarly describe Defendant Moody’s

physical stature, presumably because Defendant Moody did not

engage in the alleged beating. Finally, in response to Defendant

Moody’s motion, Plaintiff explains, “Defendant Moody participated

in the unlawful violence upon [Antonio] by Defendant Faltz. . . .

[by] moving an unresponsive [Antonio] from the Cell, who was

clearly suffering a medical emergency.” See Moody Resp. at 9.

Upon review, it appears Plaintiff alleges Defendant Moody’s

participation was limited to watching Defendant Faltz attack

Antonio knowing the attack was going to occur and assisting

Defendant Faltz after the fact. See Compl. ¶¶ 19, 55. Accepting

these allegations as true, Plaintiff does not state an excessive

force claim against Defendant Moody, but she does state a claim

under a failure-to-intervene theory. As with her claims against

Defendant Faltz, however, Plaintiff does not clearly articulate

the Eighth Amendment theory under which she proceeds against

Defendant Moody, nor is it apparent the distinction between counts

three and four.

ii. Deliberate Indifference

In counts three, four, and five, Plaintiff alleges both

Defendants Moody and Faltz “failed to properly care for [Antonio’s]

serious need for medical attention” (count three); “ignored

[Antonio’s] serious need for medical attention and deliberately

prevented [Antonio] from receiving proper medical care” (count

four); and was deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s serious

medical needs (count five). Id. ¶¶ 57, 63, 69.

Not only are the claims duplicative as stated, but Plaintiff

offers no facts explaining how Defendants Moody and Faltz were

deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s serious medical needs. Legal

conclusions unsupported by factual explanation do not satisfy the

minimal pleading standard. Even more, Plaintiff acknowledges

Antonio was transported to RMC in the afternoon on July 27, 2015,

where he received medical attention. Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff vaguely

asserts the transportation to RMC was delayed, id. ¶ 21, though

she does not explain who was responsible for or what caused the

delay.

To the extent Plaintiff suggests Defendants Moody and Faltz

were deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s serious medical needs

by removing him from his cell, id. ¶ 20, the allegations as stated

do not permit such an inference. In fact, it appears Defendants

Moody and Faltz removed Antonio from his cell to take him to the

medical unit where transportation to RMC was arranged. Id. ¶ 21.

Even if Defendants Moody and Faltz should have summoned medical

staff to Antonio’s cell instead of moving him themselves, such

conduct suggests poor judgment or negligence, not deliberate

indifference. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible

claim for relief against Defendants Moody and Faltz under a

deliberate-indifference-to-serious-medical-needs theory.

Finally, construing the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, she states a claim against Defendant Moody for

deliberate indifference to Antonio’s safety. “A prison official

violates the Eighth Amendment when a substantial risk of serious

harm, of which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the

official does not respond reasonably to the risk.” Brooks v.

Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2015). See also Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837 (defining “deliberate indifference” as the intentional

disregard of a known, excessive risk to an inmate’s safety).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Moody “was aware of Defendant

Faltz’s intentions to injure [Antonio] when they entered the Cell.”

See Compl. ¶ 55. Accepting as true that Defendant Moody knew of

Defendant Faltz’s alleged sinister intentions but took no steps to

alleviate the risk Antonio faced, Plaintiff states a deliberate

indifference claim against Defendant Moody.

B. Wrongful Death Claim Against Defendants Moody & Faltz

In count two, Plaintiff alleges Antonio died “as a result of

a wrongful and unjustified attack by Defendants Moody and Faltz.”

Id. ¶¶ 47-50. Defendants argue they are immune from suit under

Florida’s sovereign immunity statute because Plaintiff does not

allege facts showing they acted maliciously or in bad faith. See

Moody Motion at 7; Faltz Motion at 4.

Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a) provides an officer is

entitled to immunity for injuries caused while performing actions

within the scope of his employment “unless such officer . . . acted

in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting

wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”

Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (West).

Florida courts equate the intent standard under the sovereign

immunity statute with “recklessness.” See, e.g., Williams v. City

of Minneola, 619 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In

the civil rights context, the Supreme Court has equated “deliberate

indifference” with “recklessness.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836

(“[A]cting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent

of recklessly disregarding that risk.”).

Plaintiff alleges facts that, accepted as true, permit the

reasonable inference Defendants Moody and Faltz acted with the

requisite intent. If true that Defendant Faltz intended to attack

Antonio and then beat Antonio without cause and until Antonio lost

consciousness, a reasonable person could construe such conduct as

malicious, reckless, or done with a willful and wanton disregard

of human rights or safety. See, e.g., Gregory v. Miami-Dade Cty.,

Fla., 719 F. App’x 859, 874 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding the plaintiff

alleged the defendant-officer engaged in conduct “more

reprehensible and unacceptable than mere intentional conduct” when

he alleged the officer shot a teenager six times in the back and

the teenager was not resisting or threatening the officer).

Similarly, accepting as true that Defendant Moody knew

Defendant Faltz intended to attack Antonio for no reason and stood

by while the attack occurred, a reasonable person could conclude

he did so with the requisite intent under section 768.28(9)(a).

Accordingly, at this stage, the Court is not prepared to find as

a matter of law that Defendants Moody and Faltz are immune from

suit under Florida’s sovereign immunity statute.

C. Constitutional Claims Against Defendant Lee

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee was deliberately indifferent

to the needs of inmates by failing to train officers “how to

prevent [] acts of violence” (count four) and to Antonio’s serious

medical needs (count five). See Compl. ¶¶ 64, 68-69.

Defendant Lee invokes qualified immunity. As to count four,

Defendant Lee argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a

causal connection between the alleged injury and his acts or

omissions as a supervisor. See Lee Motion at 14. As to count five,

Defendant Lee argues Plaintiff does not allege he participated in

the alleged conduct (a denial of medical care) or enacted a policy

that resulted in a constitutional violation. Id. at 14-15.

In response, Plaintiff argues Defendant Lee “was not acting

within his discretionary authority.” See Lee Resp. at 12-13. An

officer is said to be acting within his discretionary authority if

he was engaged in acts that broadly fall within his job

responsibilities. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d

1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, the question is not whether an

officer had the authority, within the scope of his job, to violate

an inmate’s constitutional rights. Id. Rather, a court must

consider whether an officer was engaged in conduct that, if done

properly, was a legitimate job-related function. This question

requires the court to “temporarily put[] aside the fact that [the

officer’s act] may have been committed for an unconstitutional

purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an unconstitutional

extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances.”

Id.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee was the warden of BCI “at all

relevant times.” See Compl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff names Defendant Lee as

a party to the action solely because of his role as warden, which

necessarily implies he is sued because of how he carried out his

job. If Defendant Lee permitted unconstitutional practices or

policies to exist, as Plaintiff alleges, he was able to do so

because of the role he enjoyed. As such, Defendant Lee was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority for purposes of

the qualified immunity analysis. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff

to establish she alleges facts permitting the inference that

Defendant Lee violated a clearly established constitutional right.

Plaintiff does not contend Defendant Lee directly

participated in any of the alleged unconstitutional acts. For

instance, Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Lee was present

during or even knew about the alleged use of force against Antonio

on July 27, 2015. Nor does Plaintiff allege Defendant Lee knew

Antonio required urgent medical attention but failed or refused to

provide it in a timely manner.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Lee liable

for the actions of the other Defendants, such a theory of liability

is not viable under § 1983. “It is well established in this Circuit

that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326

F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall

v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010).

“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his]

individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely

rigorous.” Id. (alteration in original). Supervisor liability

arises only “when the supervisor personally participates in the

alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal

connection between the actions of the supervising official and the

alleged constitutional deprivation.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d

1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

The necessary causal connection can be

established “when a history of widespread

abuse puts the responsible supervisor on

notice of the need to correct the alleged

deprivation, and he fails to do so.”

Alternatively, the causal connection may be

established when a supervisor’s “custom or

policy ... result[s] in deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights” or when

facts support “an inference that the

supervisor directed the subordinates to act

unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would

act unlawfully and failed to stop them from

doing so.”

Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (internal citations omitted).

When a claim against a supervisor is premised on a

supervisor’s knowledge of prior constitutional deprivations, the

plaintiff must allege those prior deprivations were “obvious,

flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated

occurrences.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir.

1990). A supervisor’s failure to train employees may constitute an

unconstitutional policy or custom, but a plaintiff must allege

“the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom the [officers] come into contact.” See

Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1053 (11th Cir. 2014)

(alteration in original). Under a failure-to-train theory, a

plaintiff ordinarily must establish the alleged training

deficiency resulted in “[a] pattern of similar constitutional

violations.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)).

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee enacted policies or practices

with deliberate indifference “to the serious needs of jail inmates

. . . by allowing corrections officers to physically abuse

inmates.” See Compl. ¶ 64. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Lee

failed to train officers how to avoid or respond to instances of

violence or abuse toward inmates. Id. Plaintiff asserts,

“Defendants [including Lee] cooperated in a policy to permit,

facilitate, ratify and condone, correctional officer-on-inmate

assaults and batteries and were deliberately indifferent to known

risks of the life, health and safety of the inmates.” Id. ¶ 34,

35.

Plaintiff offers no facts to support these conclusory

assertions, however. Instead, she cites data representing the

number of male-inmate homicides that have occurred each year from

2011 through 2015 at corrections institutions throughout Florida.

Id. ¶¶ 28-33. Accepting as true that male inmates have been killed

at the numerous corrections institutions in Florida between 2011

and 2015, such facts do not permit the reasonable inference that

Defendant Lee was on notice of a widespread history of abuse or a

deficiency in a training program at BCI. Indeed, Plaintiff does

not assert any of the male-inmate homicides were caused by

corrections officers at BCI.

Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory reference to prior officer-

on-inmate assaults, with no factual detail, is insufficient to

satisfy the rigorous standard for supervisor liability under §

1983. Notably, Plaintiff offers no examples of prior use-of-force

incidents having occurred at BCI that would have put Defendant Lee

on notice of a potential issue, much less one that can be described

as obvious, flagrant, or rampant, or that was attributable to a

deficiency in a training program. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to

state a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Lee in count

four.

In count five, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Lee was

deliberately indifferent to Antonio’s serious medical needs.

Again, however, Plaintiff alleges no facts showing a causal

connection between Defendant Lee’s acts or omissions and the

alleged constitutional violation. For instance, Plaintiff does not

allege Defendant Lee maintained or adopted a policy of delaying

medical care for inmates harmed by officers. And Plaintiff does

not allege Defendant Lee was aware of a widespread history of abuse

against inmates with respect to the provision of medical services.

As such, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief

against Defendant Lee in count five.

In sum, Plaintiff alleges no facts demonstrating Defendant

Lee personally participated in the alleged constitutional

violations, nor does she allege facts otherwise demonstrating the

requisite causal connection. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions do

not suffice. Accordingly, Defendant Lee’s motion is due to be

granted as to counts four and five. See Tani v. Shelby Cty., Ala.,

511 F. App’x 854, 857 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of a

complaint that alleged, as labels and conclusions, violations of

various constitutional rights with no supporting facts to “explain

what actions caused which violations”).

D. Wrongful Death Claim Against Defendant Lee

Plaintiff names Defendant Lee in count two for the wrongful

death of Antonio. See Compl. ¶¶ 48-50. Defendant Lee contends

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against him to the extent the

claim is premised on negligent supervision of Defendants Moody and

Faltz. See Lee Motion at 4-5. Defendant Lee also argues he is

entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at 5.

To state a claim under Florida’s wrongful death statute, a

plaintiff must allege the defendant’s “wrongful act, negligence,

default, or breach of contract” caused the death of a person. See

Fla. Stat. § 768.19 (West). Plaintiff alleges Antonio “died as a

result of a wrongful and unjustified attack by Defendants Moody

and Faltz and the wrongful acts of the other Defendants, including

Defendant Lee for improper supervision of [BCI] and its employees.”

See Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49.

Plaintiff offers no facts to support her conclusory assertion

that Defendant Lee engaged in “wrongful acts” that caused Antonio’s

death. Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Lee participated in the

alleged attack against Antonio that caused his death, nor does

Plaintiff allege facts permitting the reasonable inference

Defendant Lee failed to supervise officers known to be unfit. To

the extent Defendant Lee improperly supervised or trained BCI

employees, such an allegation, without more, does not permit the

reasonable inference that Defendant Lee contributed to the death

of Antonio.5 Plaintiff also fails to allege Defendant Lee committed

“wrongful acts” with the requisite intent to overcome sovereign

immunity.

E. Conclusion

Defendant Moody’s and Faltz’s motions are due to be denied in

part to the extent they invoke qualified immunity as to the

following claims: excessive force against Defendant Faltz and

5 In her response, Plaintiff contends the complaint “sets

forth facts regarding Defendant Lee’s role in the negligent

implementation and operation of training corrections officers at

[BCI], and that this is what led to the death of [Antonio].” See

Pl. Lee Resp. at 7. Plaintiff may have intended to include such

factual allegations in her complaint, though she does not. Even if

true that “Defendants cooperated in a policy to permit, facilitate,

ratify and condone, correctional officer-on-inmate assaults and

batteries,” see Compl. ¶ 34, such an assertion does not necessarily

imply Defendant Lee implemented a training program in such a way

as to cause the death of Antonio under the circumstances Plaintiff

describes.

failure to intervene and deliberate indifference against Defendant

Moody. Their motions are also due to be denied as to the wrongful

death claim (count two). Their motions are due to granted in part

to the extent Plaintiff fails to adequately set forth the following

claims: excessive force against Defendant Moody and deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs against both Moody and Faltz.

Defendant Lee’s motion is due to be granted because Plaintiff

fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Lee.

Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint. See Lee Resp. at

14. See also Moody Resp. at 10; Faltz Resp. at 12. Accordingly,

the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendant Lee without

prejudice subject to Plaintiff’s right to amend her complaint. See

Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th

Cir. 2002).

Additionally, given the confusing and duplicative nature of

the claims against Defendants Moody and Faltz in counts three,

four, and five, Plaintiff shall amend those claims. In particular,

Plaintiff must clarify which Eighth Amendment theories of

liability she pursues against Defendants Moody and Faltz and the

factual allegations supporting each theory, and she must eliminate

the redundancy of her claims and allegations.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendant Moody’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 4) is denied

in part and granted in part to the extent stated herein.

2, Defendant Faltz’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is denied

in part and granted in part to the extent stated herein.

3. Defendant Lee’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is granted,

and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lee are dismissed without

prejudice subject to Plaintiff’s right to amend her complaint.

4. Plaintiff shall submit an amended complaint in

compliance with this Order within twenty-one days of the date of

this Order. Plaintiff’s failure to properly set forth her claims

against any Defendant may result in the dismissal of those claims.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of

September 2020.

Dow

BRIAN J. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Cc:

Counsel of Record

22