Hamilton v. City of Lakeland Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

RODRECIUS ANTONIO HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:18-cv-885-T-02TGW

JEREMY WILLIAMS, JOEL MAILLY,

and JUSTIN KING,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. Dkt. 65. Plaintiff did not respond in accordance with court rules, despite

being ordered by the Court to do so.1 Dkt. 69. After reviewing Defendants’

submissions, including the Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and

accompanying exhibits, Dkt. 66, the Court grants Defendants’ motion. In granting

this motion, the Court denies as moot Defendants’ outstanding Motion for

Sanctions, Dkt. 61.

1 It is the law in the Eleventh Circuit that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires the Court,

even when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, to consider the evidence submitted by

the moving party and determine that the moving party has established a right to relief as a matter

of law and that no general dispute of material fact exists before the Court can award summary

judgment. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. One Piece of

Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004).

I. BACKGROUND

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint

for Violation of Civil Rights. Dkt. 17. Plaintiff, Rodrecius Hamilton, asserts claims

against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of his Fourth

Amendment rights.2 Hamilton alleges that Defendants Jeremy Williams, Joel

Mailly, and Justin King, all police officers with the Lakeland Police Department,

unlawfully entered his residence, arrested him without a warrant, and used

excessive force in effecting his arrest. Defendants move for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity.

II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS3

On April 19, 2016, David Rogers, an acquaintance of Hamilton, filed an in-

person report with the Lakeland Police Department, claiming that Hamilton

punched him repeatedly in the face following a dispute the day before at

Hamilton’s residence. Dkt. 65-2 at 2. Defendant Mailly, the station duty officer

who received the report, took photographs of Rogers’s face to document the

swelling around his right eye and had Rogers provide a sworn statement detailing

the incident. Id. at 2.

2 Hamilton also raises a Fourteenth Amendment claim. But as explained in the Court’s previous

order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this claim is duplicative of Hamilton’s Fourth

Amendment claims and thus not a discrete claim subject to separate analysis. Dkt. 36.

3 Because Hamilton has failed to respond or file his own statement of facts, the Court will

consider Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts to be undisputed for the purposes of deciding

this motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Later that day, Defendants Williams and King were asked to respond to

Hamilton’s residence to locate him in reference to the battery complaint. Dkt. 65-3

at 1. They were asked to assist because of Hamilton’s extensive and violent

criminal record, which included charges for armed robbery, aggravated battery

with a deadly weapon, and battery on a law enforcement officer. Id. at 1. Before

responding, Defendant Williams also reviewed the national and state crime

databases, which confirmed that Hamilton was indeed a violent offender and

“possibly armed and dangerous.”4 Id. at 1–2.

Defendants King and Williams, as well as Williams’s canine partner,

responded to Hamilton’s address, wearing their department-issued uniforms. Dkt.

65-3 at 1–2; Dkt. 65-4 at 2. As they approached the residence, Hamilton walked

out the front door to attend to the dog kennels in the yard. Dkt. 65-3 at 2. Standing

about twenty feet away, Defendant Williams yelled at Hamilton to “stop” and to

come toward him. Id. Upon hearing these commands, Hamilton froze and looked at

Defendants Williams and King. Dkt. 65-3 at 2; Dkt. 65-4 at 2. Defendant Williams

proceeded to announce himself as a police officer. Dkt. 65-3 at 2. In response,

Hamilton turned and ran back into his residence. Dkt. 65-3 at 2; Dkt. 65-4 at 2.

4 On July 20, 2017, after this incident, Hamilton was sentenced to 25 years in Florida State

Prison for sexual battery. Florida Department of Corrections,

http://www.dc.state.fl.us/offenderSearch/detail.aspx?Page=Detail&DCNumber=365067&TypeS

earch=AI (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).

Defendant Williams ran to the front door, while Defendant King ran to the rear of

the house to cut off any potential avenue for escape. Dkt. 65-3 at 2; Dkt. 65-4 at 2.

As Defendant Williams tried to enter the house, Hamilton pushed the door back on

him, so Williams kicked the door open. Dkt. 65-3 at 2.

Once inside the house, Defendant Williams again shouted for Hamilton to

stop and to come to him and warned that he would release the canine if Hamilton

did not comply. Id. Hamilton again ignored these commands. Id. at 3. Showing no

signs that he intended to surrender, Hamilton continued to walk backward down a

hallway further into the house, while yelling back at Williams. Id. at 2–3. At that

point, Defendant Williams, not having searched the house and with Hamilton’s

criminal history in mind, released the canine to subdue Hamilton before he could

obtain a weapon. Id. at 3. The canine sprinted down the hall and grabbed Hamilton

by the left leg, taking him to the ground. Id.

As Defendant Williams approached Hamilton, he was grabbing the canine

by the head trying to push the dog away. Dkt. 65-3 at 3. Defendant Williams

directed Hamilton to lay on his stomach and place his hands behind his back. Id.

Hamilton did not comply. Id. Defendant Williams then placed Hamilton facedown

and handcuffed him, and the canine released Hamilton’s leg. Id.

Defendant King transported Hamilton to the hospital where he was treated

for an injury to his left index finger and abrasions and puncture wounds to both

legs resulting from dog bites. Dkt. 65-4 at 2; Dkt. 65-6 at 1–2. The bite wounds

were cleaned and closed with Steri-Strips. Dkt. 65-6 at 3. Hamilton was then

medically cleared and transported to the Polk County Jail. Dkt. 65-4 at 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739,

742 (11th Cir. 1996). In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact

exists, the Court must view the evidence and draw all factual inferences therefrom

in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all reasonable

doubts in the non-moving party’s favor. Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d

1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment should then be granted only

“[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the non-moving party[.]” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Defendants assert qualified immunity as to Hamilton’s claims that the

warrantless entry into his home and the excessive use of force in securing his arrest

violated the Fourth Amendment. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

agents of the government “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, the Defendants must first establish that

they were acting under discretionary authority—that the actions they undertook

were of the type that fell within their job responsibilities. Holloman ex rel.

Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). This is easily

established here. The Defendants, by investigating a criminal complaint and

making an arrest, were carrying out quintessential law enforcement duties and

thereby exercising discretionary authority. See Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d

1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). Thus, the burden shifts to Hamilton to prove that the

Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity by showing that: (1) the

Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) the rights violated were

clearly established at the time of the Defendants’ alleged misconduct. Plumhoff v.

Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014). Hamilton must satisfy both requirements. If he

fails to establish a constitutional violation, that is the end of the inquiry and the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

At the outset, the Court finds no constitutional violation on the part of

Defendants Mailly and King. Neither officer directly participated in Hamilton’s

arrest or engaged in the use of force, much less excessive force. Defendant Mailly

was not at the scene of the arrest, and Defendant King was involved only in

transporting Hamilton following his arrest. As a result, both officers are entitled to

summary judgment.

This leaves the Court to consider only the actions of Defendant Williams. In

doing so, the Court need consider only the first prong of the qualified immunity

standard because the unrefuted evidence establishes that Defendant Williams did

not violate the Fourth Amendment.

A. The warrantless entry and arrest did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant Williams claims that his warrantless entry and subsequent arrest

of Hamilton were constitutionally permissible according to the exigent

circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The

Court agrees.

It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that warrantless searches or

seizures executed inside a home are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New

York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1980). Even so, the Constitution allows for a limited

exception to this general prohibition where the “arresting officer had probable

cause to make the arrest and . . . exigent circumstances demand[ed] that the officer

enter the home without a warrant.” Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., GA., 445 F.3d 1323,

1328 (11th Cir. 2006).

Exigent circumstances are those “compelling need for official action” and

that leave “no time to secure a warrant.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331,

1334 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)).

These may include “hot pursuit of a suspect, risk of removal or destruction of

evidence, and danger to the arresting officers or the public.” Bates v. Harvey, 518

F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2008). In determining whether an exigency existed at

the time a warrantless entry was made, the Court “looks to the totality of

circumstances.” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013).

Here, both articulable probable cause and exigent circumstances were

present to justify the warrantless entry and arrest. There was probable cause to

arrest Hamilton for battery based on the in-person police report made the day

before. There were exigent circumstances because it was reasonable for Defendant

Williams to conclude that he was in imminent danger of suffering serious bodily

harm. As soon as Hamilton saw the officers and they identified themselves, he ran

into an unsecured house. This put the Defendants in a precarious position because

at that point it was possible that Hamilton was armed or preparing to arm himself,

particularly when considering his violent criminal history and the crime database

warnings. Under these circumstances, Defendant Williams’s decision to enter the

house and subdue Hamilton to protect himself and Defendant King from a

potential armed threat was a reasonable one. This decision did not violate the

Fourth Amendment.

B. Defendant Williams did not use excessive force in arresting Hamilton.

Hamilton alleges that Defendant Williams used excessive force in arresting

him by siccing a police dog on him and kicking him multiple times in the ribs and

legs. Dkt. 17 at 7. The Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from using

excessive force when making an arrest. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th

Cir. 2002). Whether the force used to make an arrest is excessive is an objective

reasonableness inquiry that considers the “totality of the circumstances”

surrounding the arrest, Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 774, and is “judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision

of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

In assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force, the Court

considers the so-called Graham factors: “(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2)

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others; and (3) whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

evade arrest by flight.” Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1288 (11th Cir.

2011). Applying these factors here, the Court finds that Defendant Williams did

not use excessive force in making the arrest.

First, the unrefuted affidavits of the officers establish that Defendant

Williams never kicked Hamilton in the legs or ribs. The only suggestion to the

contrary can be found in the allegations of the unverified Second Amended

Complaint, which Hamilton cannot rely on as evidence to rebut the sworn

affidavits of the officers. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256

(1986). Moreover, there were no blunt force injuries to Hamilton’s ribs or legs

documented in his medical records. The only documented injuries were from dog

bites.

The use of the canine to subdue Hamilton also was not an excessive use of

force under the circumstances. Although the crime Hamilton was being arrested for

(simple battery) was not all that severe, the remaining Graham factors tilt in

Williams’s favor. Hamilton fled immediately when the officers announced

themselves as police officers and actively resisted all Defendant Williams’s

commands to surrender. And as explained above, Hamilton’s presence in an

unsecured house endangered the safety of the officers on scene, especially when

considering his violent criminal history. It was thus reasonable for Defendant

Williams to release the canine to neutralize quickly what he perceived to be a

potential armed threat. This choice was the type of split-second decision officers

are repeatedly confronted with in the field and that the Court in Graham warned

against second-guessing. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Likewise, the Court

will not second-guess Defendant Williams here. See, e.g., Edwards v. Shanley, 666

F.3d 1289, 1295–97 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding officer’s “split-second” decision to

release canine to track and initially subdue suspect fleeing on foot from scene of

minor traffic offense was reasonable under the circumstances).

V. CONCLUSION

The Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the

case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on August 26, 2019.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff, pro se