The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
WALTER ROSS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:20-cv-586-FtM-38NPM
STATE OF FLORIDA, LEE
COUNTY, FLORIDA and ERIN
CASEY,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 1). Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis
on the Complaint (Doc. 2), the Court must review the pleading under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Either provision lets the Court dismiss a complaint sua
sponte if it finds the pleading to be frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant.
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915 where it lacks an arguable
basis in law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is also
frivolous as a matter of law where the defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks
to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. In addition, where an affirmative
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defense would defeat a claim, it may be dismissed as frivolous. Clark v. Ga. Pardons &
Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 640 n.2 (11th Cir. 1990).
The phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” is governed
by the same standard as dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc. 366 F. App’x 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, a
complaint need not provide detailed factual allegations. But there “must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain enough
facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007). Courts also view a complaint’s factual allegations as true. Brown v.
Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 47 (11th Cir. 2004).
Pertinent here, courts liberally read a pro se litigant’s allegations. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). But in doing so, they need not rewrite a deficient pleading.
See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006). What is more, a pro
se litigant is usually allowed to amend the pleading—unless an amendment would be
futile. Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). Against this backdrop,
the Court turns to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant deprived
him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation
occurred under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must also allege and establish a causal connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v. Butler
County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
According to the Complaint, Defendant Erin Casey was Plaintiff’s public defender
in underlying Florida criminal cases. The Complaint accuses Casey of incompetence or
failing to defend Plaintiff vigorously. For instance, Casey allegedly did not move to
suppress a coerced statement that Plaintiff made to detectives. (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff
thus generally asserts Casey’s failure to perform her duties effectively violated his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $2 million.
Even if Casey performed deficiently, a public defender “does not act under color
of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in
a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (footnote
omitted); Hall v. Tallie, 597 F. App’x 1042, 1044 (11th Cir. 2015); Grinder v. Cook, 522 F.
App’x 544, 547 (11th Cir. 2007). Because Casey is not a state actor, the Complaint fails
to state a viable § 1983 claim and may be dismissed against her. If Plaintiff contends that
Casey’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that deficiency prejudiced his
defense, then he must petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Turning to the other Defendants. The Complaint lacks any direct claims against
Defendants Lee County or the State of Florida. Plaintiff appears to attribute liability to the
government entities because they employed Casey. See Doc. 1 at 6 (stating Casey “is a
public official in Lee County and employed by the State of Florida”). But § 1983 claims
may not turn on respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). Nor can any action lie against the State of Florida because
the Eleventh Amendment bars a private citizen’s suit for money damages. Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Comm. Health,
261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
In conclusion, the Court dismisses the Complaint as frivolous and failure to state
a claim. The Court need not provide Plaintiff leave to amend because any amendment
would be futile. As stated, Plaintiff's relief for Casey’s allegedly deficient performance is
through a habeas corpus petition—not a civil rights action. And Plaintiff cannot hold the
State of Florida or Lee County liable for Casey’s allegedly deficient performance as his
defense lawyer.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with the Court’s § 2254 habeas
corpus form, deny any pending motions as moot, enter judgment and close the
file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 25th day of August 2020.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record