Rhodes v. Florida Commission on Offender Review

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MERVIN G. RHODES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:19-cv-497-J-34JBT

KEVIN DAVIS, et al.,

Defendants.

________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Mervin Rhodes, an inmate in the custody of the Florida Department of

Corrections, initiated this action on April 29, 2019,1 by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint

(Complaint; Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Rhodes is proceeding on a third

amended complaint (Third Amended Complaint; Doc. 51), filed on August 2, 2019. In the

Third Amended Complaint, Rhodes names as defendants Kevin Davis,2 Tori Bowden,

and John or Jane Doe the director of supervisors for the Florida Commission on Offender

Review (FCOR). Third Amended Complaint at 2. Rhodes asserts that Defendants violated

his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by falsely imprisoning him. Id. at 5-10. As

relief, Rhodes seeks compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages. Id. at 10. Before the

Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Third

Amended Complaint (FCOR Motion; Doc. 52); and Defendant Bowden’s Motion to

1 See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (mailbox rule).

2 In Rhodes’ Response to the FCOR Motion, Rhodes requested that Davis “be

dismissed from liability in this action.” Response to FCOR Motion at 2. By order dated

April 8, 2020, the Court dismissed all claims against Davis. Doc. 58.

Dismiss (Bowden Motion; Doc. 61). Rhodes filed separate responses to both motions and

also titled them as motions for summary judgment. See Motion for Summary

Judgment/Response to Motions to Dismiss (Response to FCOR Motion; Doc. 57);

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Bowden’s Motion to Dismiss/Request for Summary

Judgment (Response to Bowden Motion; Doc. 64). The Motions are ripe for review.

II. Rhodes’ Allegations

In the Third Amended Complaint, Rhodes asserts that a Florida circuit court

sentenced him to twenty years in prison, with a maximum release date of June 16, 2014.

Third Amended Complaint at 5. Approximately two years before his scheduled release

date, on August 31, 2012, FCOR conditionally released Rhodes under supervision. Id.

However, in August of 2013, Rhodes violated the conditions of his release and FCOR

remanded him back to prison. Id. In February of 2014, Rhodes alleges he received a

response to an inmate request that stated he would be placed under supervision and

conditionally released on July 21, 2014. Thereafter, Rhodes contends he sent an informal

grievance to Defendant Davis in February 2014, in which Rhodes maintained his “rightful

maximum release date was June 14, 2014 and that he could receive no conditional

release supervision upon meeting said maximum release date.” Id. at 6. Davis denied the

informal grievance. Id. In response to the denial of his informal grievance, Rhodes filed a

request for administrative remedy on the same matter. Id. Rhodes maintains that

Defendant Bowden “returned the grievance without action and/or denied it without further

review into the circumstances. Id. Rhodes contends at this point he wrote a letter to John

or Jane Doe of FCOR complaining about the allegedly incorrect release date and arguing

that the time he spent on conditional release should have been considered when

calculating his release date. Id. at 6-7. His letter was unsuccessful. On July 21, 2014,

FCOR conditionally released Rhodes from prison under supervision. Id. at 7. Rhodes

once again violated his conditional release and was re-incarcerated on November 6,

2014, with FCOR re-setting the release date to July 9, 2015. Id. However, Rhodes

maintains that he was detained beyond July 9, 2015, and was not released until the

middle of August 2015. Id. Rhodes avers that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of

Defendants malfeasance, the Plaintiff was ‘falsely imprisoned’ approximately 11 ½

months of incarceration and left in Fla. DOC custody unlawfully (on conditional release

supervision) a total of 107 days.” Id. Rhodes states that Defendants acted with reckless

indifference and without court-authorization to alter his release date. Id. at 8.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set

forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's

World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable

inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading

requirements. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]" the complaint

should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which

it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough

facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has

facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also

Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "conclusory allegations, unwarranted

deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal")

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as

true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]"

which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,

680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the

complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face[.]'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while

"[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed," Tannenbaum v. United States, 148

F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the court a license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App'x 837, 839 (11th

Cir. 2011)3 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th

3 "Although an unpublished opinion is not binding . . . , it is persuasive authority."

United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see generally

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding

precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.").

Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in

Randall, 610 F.3d at 706).

IV. Claims Against Bowden and FCOR

Defendant Bowden argues in her motion that the Court should dismiss the claims

against her because Rhodes’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations, Bowden is

entitled to qualified immunity, Rhodes has failed to state a claim for relief against a

grievance responder, and Rhodes is not entitled to monetary damages. Bowden Motion

at 1, 5-11. Regarding FCOR, the Court notes that Rhodes did not name FCOR as a

defendant in his Third Amended Complaint; therefore, Rhodes abandoned his previous

claims against FCOR. However, to the extent the Third Amended Complaint could be

liberally construed to raise a claim against FCOR, the Court will address the merits of its

motion to dismiss. According to FCOR, there are multiple reasons why the claim against

it should be dismissed: (1) FCOR is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (2) the

Heck-doctrine bars Rhodes’ due process claims; (3) FCOR has discretion under Florida

law to grant or deny credit for time spent on conditional release; and (4) the statute of

limitations bars this action. FCOR Motion at 1, 6-15. Upon review of the motions,

responses, and the Third Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Rhodes has failed to

state a claim for relief against either Bowden or FCOR. As such, Rhodes’ claims against

these Defendants are due to be dismissed and the Court need not address their additional

arguments.

“A § 1983 claim of false imprisonment requires a showing of common law false

imprisonment and a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” See

Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Cannon v. Macon

County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1562–63 (11th Cir.1993)). To establish common law false

imprisonment, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had an intent to confine, an act

resulted in the plaintiff’s confinement, and the plaintiff was aware of the confinement. Id.

“The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause includes the ‘right to be free from

continued detention after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled

to release.’” Id. (quoting Cannon, 1 F.3d at 1563). A plaintiff demonstrates a due process

violation when he or she can show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference.

Id. Thus, to prevail, Rhodes must prove that Defendants “had subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by actions beyond mere negligence.” Id.

At the core of Rhodes’ false imprisonment claim is that FCOR failed to count his

time served on conditional release towards the time he spent in prison when calculating

his release date. Rhodes’ contention that a constitutional violation occurred here fails.

Under Florida law, time spent on conditional release Is not the equivalent of time spent in

prison, and FCOR has “the authority to either grant or deny credit for time spent under

supervision when it determines that a violation has occurred.” Gay v. Singletary, 700 So.

2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 1997). Indeed, the Department of Corrections is permitted under

Florida law to exclude such credit when calculating a release date after FCOR denies

credit. Id. Here, Rhodes admits that he twice violated the terms of his conditional release

and FCOR remanded him to prison. Accordingly, FCOR had the authority to detain him

past the original release date. Therefore, Rhodes has not established a due process

violation because he has not shown that he was entitled to an earlier release, see

Campbell, 586 F.3d at 840, or that Defendants had subjective knowledge that Rhodes

was being illegally detained. In light of the above, Rhodes’ false imprisonment claim is

due to be dismissed. Likewise, to the extent Rhodes raises a claim concerning

Defendants’ failure to properly respond to his grievances, “prisoners have no

constitutionally protected liberty interest in having access to prison grievance

procedures.” Allen v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 578 F. App'x 836, 839 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citing Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011)). Therefore, as Rhodes

does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the grievance process, he has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in a § 1983 suit. See id.

V. Claims Against John or Jane Doe

The Court notes that “[a]s a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted

in federal court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). However,

under certain circumstances, plaintiffs may sue John Doe defendants, such as when a

“plaintiff is unwilling or unable to use a party’s real name,” or “one may be able to describe

an individual . . . without stating his name precisely or correctly.” Moulds v. Bullard, 345

F. A’ppx 387, 390 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-1216

(11th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). Where, as here, the plaintiff fails to

describe the defendant or provides only a general description of the John Doe and does

not request further discovery to identify the defendant, a court may properly dismiss the

John Doe. See id. Moreover, further discovery would be futile given the Court’s findings

that Rhodes has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As such

Defendant John or Jane Doe is due to be dismissed from this action for the reasons

expressed above.

In consideration of the foregoing, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendant FCOR’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 52) is GRANTED.

2. Rhodes’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 57; 64) are DENIED.

3. Defendant Bowden’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 61) is GRANTED.

4. This case is DISMISSED.

5. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case, terminate any pending

motions, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of July, 2020.

aes Mal be

United States District Judge

Jax-8

C:

Mervin G. Rhodes, #295730

Counsel of Record