Logan v. Clemmons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JAMES ALEXANDER LOGAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:17-cv-765-J-39PDB

T. A. SPREADLY,1

Defendant.

______________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, James Alexander Logan, an inmate of the Florida

Department of Corrections, is proceeding pro se on a civil rights

complaint (Doc. 1; Compl.) against Defendant Sergeant T. Spradley.

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was deliberately indifferent

to his safety when Spradley saw his cellmate attack him on December

15, 2016, and failed to intervene. See Compl. at 9, 13.2 Before

the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72;

1 In his complaint, Plaintiff spells Defendant’s last name as

“Spreadly,” which is the spelling reflected on the Court’s docket.

As is evident from Defendant’s filings (Docs. 72, 72-1), his last

name is spelled “Spradley.” The Court will direct the Clerk to

update the docket accordingly.

2 Plaintiff’s allegations are fully summarized in this Court’s

order on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 63).

Plaintiff’s claims against the other Defendants have been

dismissed. Id.

Motion), which Plaintiff opposes (Docs. 78, 79; Pl. Resp.) (Docs.

78-1, 78-2; Pl. Ex.).3

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in

favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93

F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville

Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere

scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s

position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243,

1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden

of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that

there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at

trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th

Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on a motion for summary

judgment may include “depositions, documents, electronically

3 On different dates, Plaintiff submitted duplicate copies of

his response with an exhibit.

stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only),

admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-

moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own

affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox,

Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

On summary judgment, a party opposing the motion must point

to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Substantive law determines

the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is

appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary

judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.

1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del

Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Defendant’s Motion

Defendant Spradley argues the evidence shows the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s request for protection

(under a failure-to-protect theory) or whether he failed to

intervene during the attack (under a failure-to-intervene theory).

See Motion at 8, 10-11. Additionally, Defendant Spradley maintains

Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages must be

dismissed because he suffered only de minimis injuries. Id. at 13-

14. Finally, Defendant Spradley invokes qualified immunity. Id. at

15.

Defendant Spradley does not dispute Plaintiff was injured on

December 15, 2016. See Motion at 3. However, Defendant disputes

all other pertinent allegations, including that Plaintiff was

attacked by his cellmate, Inmate Banks.4 In his declaration (Doc.

72-1; Def. Ex. A), Defendant Spradley avers the facts relayed by

Plaintiff “are not true.” Def. Ex. A ¶ 3. In stark contrast to

Plaintiff’s version of events, Defendant Spradley says the

following transpired on December 15, 2016:

I was on quad 4 of F dormitory cell front

F4208, where Inmate Logan . . . and Inmate

Banks . . . were housed. Inmate Banks and

Inmate Logan both told me they had issues and

could no longer be housed together. In

4 Plaintiff spells the inmate’s last name as “Bank.” See

Compl. at 11; Resp. at 2. According to prison documents, the

inmate’s last name is spelled “Banks.” Def. Ex. B at 1.

response, I ordered both [i]nmates to submit

to hand restraints to be reassigned to a new

housing location. I restrained both inmates

and removed Inmate Logan from the cell with

Inmate Banks and placed him in the holding

cell. Inmate Banks remained in the housing

cell. At this time, Inmate, [sic] Logan had no

visible injuries. Approximately 30 minutes

later, I returned to the holding cell and

Inmate Logan had spots of blood on his chest,

nose, left middle-finger, and he was

complaining of his knee hurting. Inmate Logan

then made an allegation that Inmate Banks

assaulted him. Inmate Logan was seen by

medical with 2 1cm superficial lacerations to

his left knee, 1 cm laceration to his upper

left chest, 3cm laceration to his middle left

middle [sic] finger, and the bridge of his

nose was swollen. . . . [A]t no time during

this incident did I see the inmates exchanging

blows or fighting.

Id. Defendant Spradley wrote an incident report on December 15,

2016, relaying the facts as stated in his declaration (Doc. 72-2;

Def. Ex. B). The shift supervisor noted there were no witnesses to

the incident and Inmate Banks was “a confirmed member of the

security threat group known as ‘Gorilla Stone Ganstas.’” Def. Ex.

B at 1. The supervisor forwarded the incident report to the Office

of the Inspector General (IG) and placed Plaintiff on protective

management pending a review by the ICT (Institution Classification

Team). Id. A nurse evaluated Plaintiff, recorded his injuries, and

cleansed his lacerations. Id. at 2-3, 6.

Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance on December 19,

2016, reporting that Defendant Spradley ignored Inmate Banks’s

initial attack (a punch) and allowed another gang-member inmate to

slide a knife under their shared-cell door to Inmate Banks (Doc.

72-3; Def. Ex. C). Plaintiff expressly requested video footage be

retained pursuant to section 33-602.033 of the Florida

Administrative Code. Def. Ex. C at 3, 4. The Warden’s office

approved Plaintiff’s grievance and referred his complaint to the

IG’s office for “appropriate action.” Id. at 2. The response did

not address Plaintiff’s request to preserve video evidence.

IV. Analysis & Conclusions

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spradley was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety for Spradley’s

failure to protect Plaintiff and his failure to intervene when

Plaintiff’s cellmate attacked him. See Compl. at 9, 17. In his

response, Plaintiff clarifies that he does not proceed under a

failure-to-protect theory but under a deliberate-indifference

theory. In fact, Plaintiff asserts he did not tell Defendant

Spradley he and Inmate Banks had issues, and he disputes that

Defendant Spradley moved him to a holding cell to separate the two

inmates. See Pl. Resp. at 5, 7; Pl. Ex. at 2-3.

A. Eighth Amendment Claim & Qualified Immunity

In his verified complaint,5 Plaintiff asserts Defendant

Spradley saw Inmate Banks punch Plaintiff and then walked away

5 The factual assertions a plaintiff makes in a verified

complaint satisfy “Rule 56’s requirements for affidavits and sworn

declarations,” and are therefore given the same weight as factual

from the cell where the two inmates were housed together. Compl.

at 11. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Spradley heard Inmate Banks

request a knife from another gang member, Inmate Harris. Id. at

11-12. Plaintiff does not make clear in his complaint whether

Defendant Spradley permitted Inmate Harris to pass the knife to

Inmate Banks or whether he witnessed the act. See id. However, in

his affidavit, which he provides with his response to Defendant’s

motion, Plaintiff clarifies that Defendant Spradley “was present”

when Inmate Harris slid the knife to Inmate Banks. Pl. Ex. at 4.

Defendant Spradley denies having seen the cellmates fighting

and maintains he separated the inmates before Plaintiff sustained

his injuries. Def. Ex. A ¶ 3. And, he argues, Plaintiff’s

“speculation about what [he] saw” is not enough to withstand

summary judgment. Motion at 11. Defendant Spradley also says

Plaintiff’s grievance conflicts with the allegations in his

complaint, and Spradley faults Plaintiff for using imprecise

terminology in his complaint. For instance, Defendant Spradley

notes Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he asked Spradley to

“roll the door” when Inmate Banks started punching him, but

Plaintiff did not assert as much in his grievance written days

after the incident. Id. at 18. Additionally, Spradley says

Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed because he does not overtly

statements made in an affidavit. Stallworth v. Tyson, 578 F. App’x

948, 950 (11th Cir. 2014).

say that Inmate Banks “took the knife and stabbed [Plaintiff].”

Id. at 18-19. Rather, Defendant points out, Plaintiff alleges

another gang member, Inmate Harris, slid a knife under

“[Plaintiff’s] cell door” and he was stabbed. Compl. at 12

(emphasis added).

As Defendant’s attorney surely is aware, this Court must

liberally construe Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings. See Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011). And the Court must credit Plaintiff’s

sworn allegations. See Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th

Cir. 2019) (“[S]tatements in [a plaintiff’s] verified complaint,

sworn response to [a] motion for summary judgment, and sworn

affidavit attached to that response should [be] treated as

testimony by the district court.”). While Plaintiff’s filings are

not sophisticated, precise, or grammatically perfect, his

allegations are clear and consistent: he alleges Defendant

Spradley walked away when Inmate Banks started punching him inside

their shared cell, and Defendant Spradley actively or passively

permitted another inmate, a known gang member, to pass a knife to

Inmate Banks, which Inmate Banks then used to stab Plaintiff.

Plaintiff uses the imprecise passive voice (“was stabbed”), but

reading this allegation in context, it is apparent Plaintiff

alleges Inmate Banks stabbed him using the knife Inmate Harris

provided to him. Additionally, Plaintiff clarifies in his

affidavit that “Inmate Harris slid[] the knife to his blood gang

member brother Bank[s].” Pl Ex. at 4.

That Defendant Spradley denies Plaintiff’s allegations does

not permit the Court to discredit Plaintiff’s version of events.

When two parties’ stories conflict, neither of which is blatantly

contradicted by indisputable evidence, a district court may not

make credibility determinations in favor of one party over the

other.6 See Sears, 922 F.3d at 1208 (holding summary judgment in

favor of the corrections officers was not proper because each

side’s version of events was different, meaning there remained a

genuine dispute of material fact). There is no indisputable

evidence contradicting Plaintiff’s story. What the parties submit

to the Court is a quintessential “he-said, he-said,” which

precludes the entry of summary judgment. See id.

Accepting as true Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendant

Spradley watched Inmate Banks spontaneously and without

provocation start punching Plaintiff but declined to intervene,

and that Defendant Spradley was aware another gang-member inmate

armed Inmate Banks with a knife, Plaintiff provides enough evidence

to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact whether Defendant

Spradley was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

6 Additionally, Plaintiff cannot be penalized for lacking

concrete, indisputable evidence given his timely request that

video footage be preserved was not honored.

serious harm.7 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)

(“[P]rison officials have a duty ... to protect prisoners from

violence at the hands of other prisoners.”). And because this

constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the

incident, Defendant Spradley is not entitled to qualified

immunity.

B. Injuries

Defendant Spradley asserts Plaintiff’s request for

compensatory and punitive damages must be dismissed because

Plaintiff did not sustain a constitutional injury during the attack

on December 15, 2016. Motion at 12-13.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a

plaintiff seeking damages demonstrate the conduct he alleges

violated his constitutional rights caused a physical injury. 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional

facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody

without a prior showing of physical injury.”).

The PLRA does not define “physical injury,” but the Eleventh

Circuit has explained a physical injury is one that is not simply

7 Even if Defendant Spradley did not know Inmate Harris passed

a knife to Inmate Banks, Plaintiff alleges facts that, if true,

would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Spradley was

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety when he ignored

Inmate Banks’s initial attack on Plaintiff.

de minimis, though it “need not be significant.” Dixon v. Toole,

225 F. App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Harris

v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999)). Bruising and

scrapes fall into the category of de minimis injuries. Id. Accord

Mann v. McNeil, 360 F. App’x 31, 32 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding vague

back injuries and scrapes amounted to de minimis injuries).

On the other hand, a prisoner need not demonstrate a

permanent, long-lasting injury to satisfy the PLRA’s “physical

injury” requirement. Thompson v. Smith, 805 F. App’x 893, 903 (11th

Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit recently pronounced that, in

accordance with Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, “routine

discomfort[s] associated with confinement” are not the kinds of

“injuries” for which compensatory and punitive damages are

recoverable, but the PLRA “was not intended to allow only those

prisoner-plaintiffs with severe physical injuries to recover

[such] damages.” Id. at 904. The court clarified that to constitute

a “physical injury” under the PLRA, a prisoner’s condition need

not be so severe as to require “professional medical attention.”

Id. at 904. Rather, temporary injuries, such as the temporary

effects of pepper spray, may satisfy the PLRA’s standard. Id. at

904-05 (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment

as to damages because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude

the prisoner-plaintiff suffered more than de minimis injuries from

being pepper sprayed sadistically and without penological

justification).

Defendant Spradley argues Plaintiff provides no proof of a

physical injury and implies Plaintiff’s assertions are merely

conclusory and “blatantly contradicted” by medical records. Motion

at 13. Defendant’s position is confusing given the exhibits he

himself provides confirm Plaintiff sustained injuries on December

15, 2016, following an inmate altercation. Immediately after the

incident, a nurse documented multiple lacerations and a swollen

nose. See Def. Ex. B at 2, 6. The lacerations required cleaning

and bandaging. Id. at 3. Additionally, according to post-incident

medical records, Plaintiff reported left shoulder pain and

received treatment for a suspected dislocated left shoulder, which

he attributed to the December 15, 2016 incident. Def. Ex. D-3 at

3, 7, 8, 10, 12, 35. See also Pl. Ex. at 4. The prison doctor found

Plaintiff’s complaints serious enough to warrant an x-ray, and

Plaintiff’s shoulder was immobilized. Def. Ex. D-3 at 8. The x-

ray results showed Plaintiff did not sustain a fracture and had no

malalignment or dislocation at the time. Id. at 31, 32, 34.

The Court is not inclined to conclude as a matter of law that

multiple lacerations, a nose injury, and a shoulder injury

requiring an x-ray are de minimis injuries under the PLRA. While

Plaintiff did not sustain broken bones or require stitches, he

sustained more than scrapes and bruises. The evidence is enough to

permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude Plaintiff’s injuries

meet the “more-than-de-mimimis” threshold. Accordingly, Defendant

Spradley fails to carry his burden on summary judgment, and

Plaintiff’s request for compensatory and punitive damages is not

barred as a matter of law under the PLRA.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Spradley is not

entitled to summary judgment. This case is in a posture to proceed

to settlement conference and trial. As such, and because of the

troubling, alleged spoliation-of-evidence issue the Court has

addressed previously, see Orders (Docs. 69, 77), the Court finds

Plaintiff is entitled to the appointment of counsel to assist him.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320

(11th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court will refer this case to the

Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program. If

counsel is appointed to represent Plaintiff, the Court will afford

counsel an opportunity to file a motion to reopen discovery for a

limited period if counsel deems it necessary.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 72) is

DENIED.

2. This case is referred to the Jacksonville Division Civil

Pro Bono Appointment Program so the designated deputy clerk of

the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff.

3. The Clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect

the correct spelling of Defendant Spradley’s last name.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 17th day of

July 2020.

4 De

=f J. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

Cc:

James Alexander Logan

Counsel of Record

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