Martino v. Campbell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LESA MARIA MARTINO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 8:20-cv-694-T-33SPF

PAMELA CAMPBELL,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER

This cause is before the Court pursuant to Defendant

Pamela Campbell’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with

Prejudice (Doc. # 6), filed on April 21, 2020. The Court

grants the Motion.

I. Background

Plaintiff Lesa Maria Martino brought this pro se lawsuit

against the Honorable Pamela Campbell, Circuit Court Judge

for the Sixth Judicial Circuit in St. Petersburg, Florida.

(Doc. # 1). Judge Campbell presided over a guardianship case

involving Martino’s father, Roland Martino. (Id. at 6).

Martino alleges that Judge Campbell violated her rights under

the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by entering an

order in the guardianship case allegedly denying Martino the

capability to file pleadings in the case, despite Martino

being an “heir, interested person and petitioner of the

guardianship to protect her father.” (Id. at 3, 6); see also

(Doc. # 6-2).1 Martino further alleges that Judge Campbell

“protect[ed]” another party to the matter, Traci Hudson, and

that Judge Campbell caused her father “cruel emotional

distress” with her orders in the guardianship case. (Doc. #

1 at 6). According to Martino, Judge Campbell “denied Mr.

Martino his Constitutional right to association with his

daughter and violat[ed] the Bill of Rights in nursing homes

and assisted living facilities to be able to visit with whom

they decide.” (Id.). Martino alleges Judge Campbell “is an

accomplice to fraud with her corruption, collusion and

conspiracy in an abusive guardianship.” (Id.). Martino seeks

$20 million in punitive damages. (Id. at 7).

Judge Campbell has moved to dismiss the complaint on

several grounds, including judicial and qualified immunity,

the Eleventh Amendment, and failure to state a claim upon

1 The order Martino complains of explicitly found Martino was

not an interested person in the guardianship case, directed

that Martino should not have contact with her father or his

appointed guardian, and directed the Clerk of Court to refuse

to accept any further pleadings filed by Martino until she

had complied with the Court’s prior orders to obtain counsel.

(Doc. # 6-2).

which relief may be granted. (Doc. # 6). Martino has submitted

two “objections” to the Motion.2 (Doc. ## 7, 9). The Motion

is ripe for review.

II. Discussion

Because Judge Campbell’s Eleventh Amendment argument

challenges this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the

Court is required to address it first. See Seaborn v. State

of Fla., Dep’t of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998);

Prosperous v. Todd, No. 8:17-cv-1375-T-36AEP, 2018 WL

2298834, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2018). The Eleventh

Amendment bars Martino’s claims to the extent they are brought

against Judge Campbell in her official capacity. In any event,

the complaint is due to be dismissed in its entirety because

Judge Campbell is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for

her rulings in the guardianship action.

A. Eleventh Amendment

Judge Campbell contends that the Eleventh Amendment bars

this action. “Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prohibits

2 Martino improperly sent one document containing her

“objections” to the Motion directly to the undersigned, which

the Court filed on the docket as a courtesy. (Doc. ## 7, 8).

While the Court has reviewed both of Martino’s “objections,”

nothing contained therein is sufficient to overcome the

Court’s determination that the complaint is subject to

dismissal with prejudice.

federal courts from entertaining suits brought by citizens

against a state, including its agencies and departments.”

Uberoi v. Sup. Ct. of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir.

2016). The Eleventh Amendment also “prohibits suits against

state officials where the state is, in fact, the real party

in interest.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d

1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). “Suits against state officials

in their official capacity are essentially actions against

the state.” Higdon v. Tusan, 746 F. App’x 805, 810 (11th Cir.

2018). The Eleventh Circuit has held that Florida Circuit

Court Judges are “arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment

purposes.” Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 213 (11th

Cir. 2005).

Here, the Eleventh Amendment bars Martino’s official-

capacity claims against Judge Campbell, a Florida Circuit

Court Judge. See Rivas v. Sasser, No. 15-81306-CIV, 2015 WL

10376423, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2015) (“Plaintiff’s claims

against . . . Judge Sasser, a public official who was working

within her official capacity, . . . are barred by the grant

of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.”), adopted by 2016

WL 769011 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2016).

Moreover, although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar

suits “against state officers seeking prospective equitable

relief to end continuing violations of federal law,” Pryor,

180 F.3d at 1336 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)),

that exception is inapplicable here. Martino does not seek to

enjoin any ongoing conduct. Instead, she essentially asks

this Court to vacate or reverse Judge Campbell’s past rulings

— her orders regarding Mr. Martino and her order barring

Martino from making certain filings in the guardianship

action. These are alleged past wrongs, not ongoing

violations. See Bowling v. McCraw, No. 4:18-cv-610-ALM-CAN,

2019 WL 2517834, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2019) (“Plaintiff

does not request any prospective injunctive relief seeking to

enjoin any continued violation of federal law; Plaintiff’s

requested injunctive relief is retroactive in nature:

Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate and/or reverse Judge

McCraw’s previous orders in the state court case. . . .”),

adopted by 2019 WL 3712025 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019).

B. Judicial Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment aside, Martino’s complaint is due

to be dismissed in its entirety for a separate, independently

sufficient reason: Judge Campbell is entitled to absolute

judicial immunity for her rulings in the guardianship action.

“A judge enjoys absolute immunity from suit for judicial

acts performed within the jurisdiction of his court.”

McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018).

“To decide whether a judge was performing judicial acts, ‘[w]e

look at the nature and function of his act, not the propriety

of the act itself, and consider whether the nature and

function of the particular act is judicial.’” Velasquez

Andres v. Keyser, 777 F. App’x 392, 396 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1330-31). “A judge enjoys

absolute immunity for judicial acts regardless of whether he

made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded his

authority.” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1331.

Here, Judge Campbell was undoubtedly performing a

judicial act when she entered the complained-of order in the

guardianship case. Accordingly, Judge Campbell is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity unless Martino can establish that

she “acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Bolin

v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000). Martino has

not done so here.

At all times relevant to the complaint, Judge Campbell

was acting within the scope of her judicial capacity. Martino

has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that Judge

Campbell was acting outside of her judicial authority when

she entered any of the orders or took any of the actions

alleged in Martino’s complaint. “Even if [Martino] believes

that Judge [Campbell]’s rulings were in error, judicial

immunity bars [her] claims because Judge [Campbell] was

‘dealing with [Martino] in [her] judicial capacity.’” Dimaio

v. Foster, No. 3:18-cv-1093-J-39PDB, 2018 WL 5078907, at *2

(M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2018) (quoting Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d

1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996)).

C. Leave to Amend

“Generally, a pro se plaintiff must be given at least

one chance to amend his or her complaint.” Wright v. Ashton,

No. 6:17-cv-436-Orl-41DCI, 2017 WL 9690365, at *11 (M.D. Fla.

Oct. 13, 2017) (citing Cornelius v. Bank of Am., N.A., 585 F.

App’x 996, 100 (11th Cir. 2014)), adopted by 2018 WL 1466396

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2018). Nevertheless, a court may “dismiss

a pro se complaint with prejudice where any amendment would

be futile — that is, where even a more carefully drafted

complaint could not state a claim.” Alberto v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 770 F. App’x 467, 469 (11th Cir. 2019). Here,

dismissal with prejudice is warranted because no amendment

could overcome Judge Campbell’s entitlement to absolute

judicial immunity for her rulings in the guardianship action.

See Simmons v. Edmondson, 225 F. App’x 787, 788-89 (11th Cir.

2007) (affirming the district court’s denial of leave to amend

to a pro se plaintiff where “no amendment could have overcome

the defendants’ [judicial] immunity”).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendant Pamela Campbell’s Motion to Dismiss’ the

Complaint with Prejudice (Doc. # 6) is GRANTED.

(2) Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. # 1) is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

(3) The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions

or deadlines and thereafter CLOSE THIS CASE.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 8th

day of May, 2020.

lage Hunenby Croc

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE