holding district court did not err in finding that retaliation claim was not precluded where facts alleged could have “reasonably been extended to encompass a claim . . . because they were inextricably intertwined with [plaintiff’s] complaints of race and sex discrimination.”
How later courts described this case
- holding district court did not err in finding that retaliation claim was not precluded where facts alleged could have “reasonably been extended to encompass a claim . . . because they were inextricably intertwined with [plaintiff’s] complaints of race and sex discrimination.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
TIMETHIA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:19-cv-2888-T-60AAS
ADVANCED CONCEPT
INNOVATIONS, LLC,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER DENYING “DEFENDANT’S PARTIAL MOTION
TO DISMISS COUNTS II – IV OF THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT”
This matter is before the Court on “Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
Counts II – IV of the Amended Complaint and Memorandum in Support,” filed by
counsel on December 12, 2019. (Doc. 9). On January 7, 2020, Plaintiff Timethia
Brown filed her response in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 19). After reviewing the
motion, response, court file, and the record, the Court finds as follows:
Background
Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant Advanced Concept Innovations,
LLC. According to Plaintiff, she suffered from ptyalism during a difficult
pregnancy. Plaintiff was terminated on May 14, 2018, after she returned from leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Plaintiff alleges that her
termination was due to her race, gender, disability, and pregnancy. She has
asserted four claims for relief – disability discrimination under the Florida Civil
Rights Act (Count I), race discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act (Count
II), gender discrimination under Title VII (Count III), and pregnancy discrimination
under Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (Count IV).
Analysis
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues two grounds for dismissal. First,
Defendant argues that Count IV is untimely. Second, Defendant argues that
Counts II, III, and IV should be barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to these claims.
Timeliness
Defendant argues that Count IV should be dismissed because it is untimely.
Specifically, Defendant contends that Plaintiff filed her pregnancy discrimination
claim for the first time in her amended complaint on November 5, 2019 – 200 days
after the EEOC’s dismissal and notice of rights letter. Defendant further asserts
that the claim cannot relate back to the date of the initial complaint because
Defendant was only served with a copy of the amended complaint.
A plaintiff seeking relief under Title VII must file suit within ninety days of
receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). 42 U.S.C. 2000e–5(f)(1); see, e.g., Curry v. Bank of America, N.A., No.
8:11-cv-1904-T-33MAP, 2012 WL 5989351, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2012). “The 90-
day deadline has been strictly enforced by the Eleventh Circuit.” Id. (citing Law v.
Hercules, Inc., 713 F.2d 691, 692 (11th Cir. 1983)). It is undisputed that the
pregnancy discrimination claim was filed more than ninety days after the EEOC
right-to-sue letter.
However, the pregnancy discrimination claim may proceed if it relates back
to the initial complaint. An “amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of
the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the
original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Here, the pregnancy discrimination
claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set out in the
original complaint – Plaintiff’s termination following her return from FMLA leave.
See (Doc. 1-1). Although Defendant cites to Giner v. AllStars Ins. Partners, Inc.1 to
support its position, the Court finds that this case is not binding authority and is
distinguishable on the facts. Consequently, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
pregnancy discrimination claim is timely under Rule 15(c). Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Count IV on this basis is therefore denied.
Exhaustion of Remedies
Defendant additionally argues that Counts II, III, and IV should be dismissed
because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Defendant
generally asserts that the crux of Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was termination due to
her alleged disability – not race, gender, or pregnancy. Defendant argues that the
Court should dismiss these counts due to the failure to include factual support for
these discrimination claims.
1 No. 19-22434-CIV-MORENO, 2019 WL 6130772 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2019).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “a ‘plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited
by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow
out of the charge of discrimination.’” Gregory v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources,
355 F.3d 1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207
F.3d 1303, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000)). However, courts are “extremely reluctant” to
preclude discrimination claims due to procedural technicalities. See id.
In her EEOC charge, Plaintiff checked the boxes indicating that the charge
was based on race, sex, and disability discrimination. See (Doc. 1-1). The content of
the charge itself provides that Plaintiff believes she was terminated due to her
disability, race, and gender. See (id.). Finally, the particulars of the claim include
that Plaintiff was terminated after returning from FMLA leave due to a difficult
pregnancy. See (id.) (emphasis added). It is clear to the Court that a reasonable
EEOC investigation would likely have included investigation into each of these
possible reasons for termination.2 See Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1280 (holding district
court did not err in finding that retaliation claim was not precluded where facts
alleged could have “reasonably been extended to encompass a claim . . . because
they were inextricably intertwined with [plaintiff’s] complaints of race and sex
discrimination.”); see also Ramjit v. Benco Dental Supply Co., No. 6:12-cv-528-Orl-
28DAB, 2013 WL 140238, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2013) (concluding that
pregnancy discrimination claim was within the scope of reasonable EEOC
2 The Court additionally notes that “[p]regnancy discrimination is–by statutory definition–a subset
of sex discrimination.” See Ramjit v. Benco Dental Supply Co., No. 6:12-cv-528-Orl-28DAB, 2013 WL
140238, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 11, 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
investigation). As such, the motion to dismiss Counts II, III, IV based on the failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is due to be denied.
It is therefore
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) “Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Counts II — IV of the Amended
Complaint and Memorandum in Support” (Doc. 9) is hereby DENIED.
(2) Defendant is directed to file an answer on or before May 19, 2020. In the
interest of judicial economy, even though Defendant has previously filed a
separate amended answer as to Count I (Doc. 23), Defendant should refile
one document that includes its answer and affirmative defenses as to each of
the counts of the amended complaint.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 28th day of
April, 2020.
Hy’ BOS
-TOMBARBER =——“‘“‘ C;iC‘(C(‘(‘(‘(
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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