where a party’s story “is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”
How later courts described this case
- where a party’s story “is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”
- “Although [Jean-Denis] attempts to overcome summary judgment by offering his own sworn statement[s] ... to support his allegations, the contemporaneous medical records and opinions of the examining medical [professionals] show that this purported evidence is baseless.”
- setting forth the three components
- “As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION
JEAN-EWOLL JEAN-DENIS,1
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 3:17-cv-938-J-34JBT
LT. WAYMAN TATE and
JULIAN AVILES,
Defendants.
ORDER
I. Status
Plaintiff Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated
this action on August 16, 2017, by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Complaint; Doc.
1). In the Complaint, Jean-Denis asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 against the
following Defendants: (1) Sergeant Tate; (2) Sergeant Robinson; (3) Sergeant Trent; and
(4) Julian Aviles,2 M.D.3 He asserts that Defendant Tate deprived him of meals and
1 At deposition, Plaintiff stated that his first name is Jean-Ewoll and his surname
is Jean-Denis. See Doc. 76-3 at 7. Accordingly, the Court will refer to Plaintiff as Jean-
Denis.
2 See Order (Doc. 28) at 1 ¶ 1 (directing the Clerk to correct Defendant’s name to
Julian Aviles).
3 The Court dismissed Jean-Denis’ claims against Defendants Robinson and Trent
on May 31, 2018. See Order (Doc. 31).
running water while he was housed on self-harm observation status (SHOS) at Union
Correctional Institution (UCI), and Defendant Aviles denied him proper medical treatment.
As relief, he seeks compensatory and punitive damages.4
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Tate’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tate Motion; Doc. 76) and Defendant Aviles’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Aviles
Motion; Doc. 77). They submitted exhibits in support of the Motions. See Def. Exs., Docs.
75-1 through 75-4; 76-1 through 76-7; 77-15 through 77-6.6 The Court advised Jean-
Denis of the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, notified him that the granting
of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment would represent a final
adjudication of this case which may foreclose subsequent litigation on the matter, and
gave him an opportunity to respond to the motions. See Order (Doc. 5); Summary
Judgment Notice (Doc. 78). Jean-Denis filed responses in opposition to the motions. See
Response to Defendant Tate’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Part 1) (Response; Doc.
93); Response to Defendant Aviles’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Response II;
Doc. 94); Plaintiff’s Declaration Explaining Inability to Present before the Court Additional
Facts and Evidence Essential to Justify Plaintiff’s Opposition to the Defendants’ Summary
4 The Court granted Defendants Tate and Aviles’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 32,
33) as to Jean-Denis’ requests for declaratory and injunctive relief and dismissed his
claims for the requested relief. See Order (Doc. 43), filed January 14, 2019, at 7-8.
5 Defendant Aviles submitted the wrong deposition transcript. See Aviles Motion
at 2 (citing Doc. 77-1); see Doc. 76-3 (May 16, 2019 deposition transcript).
6 The Court cites to the document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s
Electronic Case Filing System.
2
Judgment Motions (Doc. 95). He also submitted exhibits. See P. Exs., Docs. 93-1; 93-2;
94-1; 94-2; 95-1 through 95-4. Defendants’ motions are ripe for review.
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations7
In his Complaint, Jean-Denis asserts that Defendant Tate deprived him of “all
meals” while he was housed in UCI’s V and T dormitories on SHOS from September 16,
2013, through October 4, 2013. Complaint at 7. He describes “an unofficial policy” where
officers used starvation “as a cruel tactic to force” prisoners off SHOS. Id. Additionally, he
states that Tate deprived him of running water “at one point” during the relevant time
period. Id. Jean-Denis avers that Defendant Aviles disregarded the urgent nature of his
resulting medical needs and failed to schedule him for an appointment with an “outside”
physician who could provide “specialized treatment or evaluation.” Id.
The injuries Jean-Denis complains about are allegedly the result of Defendant Tate
denying him meals, and Defendant Aviles depriving him of urgent medical care. According
to Jean-Denis, he suffered dehydration, decreased blood sugar, and low blood pressure
during the nineteen-day starvation period, and was found unconscious in his confinement
cell several times. See id. at 7-8. He maintains that his stomach is "severely injured" from
the starvation, and he experiences ongoing stomach pain and intolerance to most foods
and drinks that are available at the prison. Id. at 8. He states that he often regurgitates
after eating and has bloody vomit sometimes. See id.
7 The recited facts are drawn from the Complaint, and because this matter is
before the Court on summary judgment motions filed by Defendants Tate and Aviles, the
Court’s recitation of the facts will focus on Jean-Denis’ allegations as to them.
3
III. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules(s)), “[t]he court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,
interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).8 An issue is
genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor
of the non-moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.
1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)).
“[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is insufficient
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v.
8 Rule 56 was revised in 2010 “to improve the procedures for presenting and
deciding summary-judgment motions.” Rule 56 advisory committee's note 2010 Amends.
The standard for granting summary judgment remains
unchanged. The language of subdivision (a) continues to
require that there be no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and that the movant be entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The amendments will not affect continuing
development of the decisional law construing and applying
these phrases.
Id. “[A]lthough the interpretations in the advisory committee[’s] notes are not binding, they
are highly persuasive.” Campbell v. Shinseki, 546 F. App’x 874, 879 n.3 (11th Cir. 2013).
Thus, case law construing the former Rule 56 standard of review remains viable.
4
Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to
the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to
be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.
1991). “When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then
go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines
the materiality of facts, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a
court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995)
(citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1994)). “Summary judgment is improper, however, if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Guevara v. NCL
5
(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
IV. Summary of the Arguments
In the Motions, Defendants Tate and Aviles assert that there are no genuine issues
of material fact, and therefore, the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor as
to Jean-Denis’ Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Tate Motion at 9-16; Aviles
Motion at 10-12. Aviles contends that Jean-Denis failed to comply with Florida’s pre-suit
requirements, and therefore, requests dismissal of Jean-Denis’ state-law negligence
claim against him. See Aviles Motion at 12. Tate maintains that he is entitled to qualified
immunity. See Tate Motion at 13-14. Additionally, he asserts that Jean-Denis is not
entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. ' 1997e(e) because he
has not alleged any physical injuries resulting from Defendant’s acts and/or omissions.
See id. at 14-16. In his Response, Jean-Denis maintains that Defendants are not entitled
to summary judgment in their favor because there remain genuine issues of material fact
as to his Eighth Amendment claims against them. See Response; Response II.
V. Law
A. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
The Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirements for a claim of constitutionally
inadequate care:
“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones . . . .”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976 (internal quotation
and citation omitted).[9] Thus, in its prohibition of “cruel and
9 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
6
unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment requires that
prison officials provide humane conditions of confinement. Id.
However, as noted above, only those conditions which
objectively amount to an “extreme deprivation” violating
contemporary standards of decency are subject to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9, 112 S.Ct. at
1000.[10] Furthermore, it is only a prison official’s subjective
deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm
caused by such conditions that gives rise to an Eighth
Amendment violation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at
1974 (quotation and citation omitted); Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303,
111 S.Ct. at 2327.[11]
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2010). “A prisoner bringing a
deliberate-indifference claim has a steep hill to climb.” Keohane v. Fla. Dept. of Corr.
Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). “To show that a prison official acted with
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective
and a subjective inquiry.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)). First, the plaintiff must
satisfy the objective component by showing that he had a serious medical need. Goebert
v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
“A serious medical need is considered ‘one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Id.[12]
(citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187
(11th Cir. 1994)). In either case, “the medical need must be
one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).
10 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
11 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
12 Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243.
7
Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351. Next, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective component, which
requires the plaintiff to “allege that the prison official, at a minimum, acted with a state of
mind that constituted deliberate indifference.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737
(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (describing the three components of deliberate indifference
as “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than mere negligence.”) (citing Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245); Lane v.
Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (setting forth the three components) (citing
Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245).
[T]he Supreme Court established that “deliberate
indifference” entails more than mere negligence. Estelle,[13]
429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, 114
S.Ct. 1970. The Supreme Court clarified the “deliberate
indifference” standard in Farmer by holding that a prison
official cannot be found deliberately indifferent under the
Eighth Amendment “unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (emphasis added). In interpreting Farmer
and Estelle, this Court explained in McElligott that “deliberate
indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge
of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by
conduct that is more than mere negligence.” McElligott, [14]
182 F.3d at 1255; Taylor,[15] 221 F.3d at 1258 (stating that
defendant must have subjective awareness of an “objectively
serious need” and that his response must constitute “an
objectively insufficient response to that need”).
13 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
14 McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).
15 Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000).
8
Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46. Notably, the Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff may
demonstrate the deliberate indifference of prison officials by showing that they
intentionally interfered with prescribed treatment or intentionally denied access to medical
care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
B. Qualified Immunity
The Eleventh Circuit has stated:
The qualified-immunity defense reflects an effort to
balance “the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). The
doctrine resolves this balance by protecting government
officials engaged in discretionary functions and sued in their
individual capacities unless they violate “clearly established
federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d
753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
As a result, qualified immunity shields from liability “all
but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating
the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th
Cir. 2002). But the doctrine’s protections do not extend to one
who “knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first
demonstrate that he was acting within the scope of his or her
discretionary authority. Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109,
1120 (11th Cir. 2013). As we have explained the term
“discretionary authority,” it “include[s] all actions of a
governmental official that (1) were undertaken pursuant to the
performance of his duties, and (2) were within the scope of his
authority.” Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)
9
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it is clear that
Defendant Officers satisfied this requirement, as they
engaged in all of the challenged actions while on duty as
police officers conducting investigative and seizure functions.
Because Defendant Officers have established that they
were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority,
the burden shifts to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that qualified
immunity is inappropriate. See id. To do that, [plaintiff] must
show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, the
facts demonstrate that Defendant Officers violated [plaintiff's]
constitutional right and that that right was “clearly established
... in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition[,]” at the time of Defendant officers’
actions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151,
150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by
Pearson, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808. We may decide these
issues in either order, but, to survive a qualified immunity
defense, [the plaintiff] must satisfy both showings. Maddox,
727 F.3d at 1120-21 (citation omitted).
Jones v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 850-51 (11th Cir. 2017). The Court has instructed:
Because § 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative causal
connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the
alleged constitutional deprivation,” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802
F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted),
each defendant is entitled to an independent qualified
immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and
omissions. So[,] we must be careful to evaluate a given
defendant’s qualified immunity claim, considering only the
actions and omissions in which that particular defendant
engaged.
Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).
10
VI. Analysis16
A. Florida’s Pre-Suit Requirements
for a Medical Malpractice Claim
Defendant Aviles contends that Jean-Denis failed to comply with Florida’s pre-suit
requirements, and therefore, requests dismissal of Jean-Denis’ claim against him. See
Aviles Motion at 12. Aviles states that Jean-Denis failed to provide “an expert affidavit of
a physician in the same specialty,” and therefore there is no legal basis for Jean-Denis to
assert a negligence claim against Aviles. Id. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires an
inmate wishing to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Additionally, as to medical malpractice claims, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:
Florida law requires that[,] before filing any claim for
personal injury or wrongful death arising from medical
malpractice, the claimant conduct an investigation of the claim
and send the defendant(s) a notice of intent to sue, along with
a corroborating opinion by a medical expert. Fla. Stat. §
766.203(2) (2005). Attorneys must file with the claim a
certificate of counsel, verifying that they have conducted a
reasonable investigation and that there is a basis for a good
faith belief that medical negligence occurred. Fla. Stat. §
766.104 (2005). The Florida Supreme Court has made clear
that these requirements are prerequisites to suit, but not
jurisdictional. Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 283 (Fla.
1996). . . .
Florida law mandates the dismissal of a claim for medical
malpractice when the pre-suit requirements have not been
fulfilled. Fla. Stat. § 766.206(2) (2005). . . .
16 For purposes of summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Jean-Denis. Thus, the facts
described in the Court’s analysis may differ from those that ultimately can be proved.
11
Johnson v. McNeil, 278 F. App’x 866, 871-72 (11th Cir. 2008).
The first step in the pre-suit investigation process is for the claimant to make a
reasonable investigation to determine whether there are “grounds for a good faith belief
that there has been negligence in the care or treatment of the claimant.” Fla. Stat. §
766.104(1); see Fla. Stat. § 766.203(2); Weaver v. Myers, 229 So.3d 1118, 1121 (Fla.
2017) (“[B]efore filing a medical negligence action in Florida, a claimant must satisfy
statutory requirements, which include conducting a presuit investigation process to
ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant medical
provider was negligent, and that the negligence resulted in injury to the claimant.”). After
completing this pre-suit investigation and prior to filing a claim, the claimant must notify
each potential defendant “of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice.” Fla. Stat.
§ 766.106(2)(a). The claimant must corroborate his claim with a verified written medical
expert opinion, which must be furnished to each potential defendant with the notice of
intent to initiate litigation. See Fla. Stat. § 766.203(2). To the extent Jean-Denis intends
to bring a medical malpractice claim against Defendant Aviles, he must follow Florida’s
mandatory pre-suit requirements. Accordingly, Defendant Aviles’ Motion is due to be
granted as to Jean-Denis’ medical malpractice claim because he failed to comply with
Florida’s pre-suit requirements.
B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Jean-Denis asserts that Defendants Tate and Aviles violated his Eighth
Amendment right when Tate deprived him of meals and water while he was housed on
SHOS, and Aviles denied him proper medical treatment for injuries Jean-Denis sustained
12
as a result of the nineteen-day starvation and dehydration. Defendants maintain that they
are entitled to summary judgment as to Jean-Denis’ Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746,17 Defendants Tate and
Aviles submitted declarations in support of their summary judgment requests.18 See
Docs. 76-2, 76-4, Declarations of Joseph Falk (Falk Decl.) and Registered Nurse Kellie
Caswell (Caswell Decl.). Defendant Tate maintains that he was not on duty in V or T
dormitory where Jean-Denis was housed from September 16, 2013, through October 4,
2013. See Doc. 76-1, Internal Movements and Facility Housing Assignment. Assistant
Warden Falk states in pertinent part:
At the request of the Florida Office of the Attorney
General, I have reviewed the approved Daily Security Rosters
for Union CI from Monday, September 16, 2013 through
Friday, October 4, 2013. According to the approved Daily
Security Roster, Sergeant Wayman Tate was on duty at the
listed posts on only the following dates and times:
a. Hospital Security Sergeant on Wednesday,
September 18, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.; Monday,
September 23, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.; Tuesday,
September 24, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.; Friday,
September 27, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.;
b. Housing Sergeant, D Area, on Saturday, September
28, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.; Sunday, September 29, 2013
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.; and
17 A declaration under § 1746 includes the following affirmation: “I declare (or
certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on (date). (Signature).” 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2).
18 Defendant Aviles asserts that he “incorporates … the facts and documents
referenced” in Defendant Tate’s Motion “as it relates to the timeline of Plaintiff’s treatment
and access to food and water during his time on SHOS.” Aviles Motion at 6 ¶ 11.
13
c. Housing Sergeant, Dorm O on Wednesday, October
2, 2013 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.; and Thursday, October 3, 2013
6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Falk Decl. at 1 (enumeration omitted). Additionally, Nurse Caswell provides a chronology
relating to Jean-Denis’ assertions concerning food and water deprivation from September
16, 2013, to October 4, 2013, based on her review of Jean-Denis’ medical records. She
states in pertinent part:
I am aware of the allegations of injury raised by inmate
Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis (FDC# J34720) from the above
referenced case. The case pertains to inmate Jean Denis'
allegations of being denied food and/or water while housed at
Union Correctional Institution (“CI”) from September 16, 2013,
to October 4, 2013. I have reviewed the records for allegations
of denial of food/water, failure to provide treatment, and side
effects associated with lack of food/water.
I have reviewed the medical records for inmate Jean-
Ewoll Jean-Denis (FDC# J34720) for the time period at issue
in this case, which was filed as Medical Record Attachment 1
and consists of 389 pages.[19] It is noted that according to
FDC procedure, when an inmate refuse[s] nine or more
consecutive meals, it is considered a hunger strike.
On September 1[6], 2013, Jean-Denis claimed a
mental health emergency due to feeling of cutting, feeling
suicidal. (Doc. 75-1 at 64-65.) On September 17th, he was
intent on cutting or swallowing batteries. (Id., at 60-61.) On
September 17th, lunch was checked on Mental Health Daily
Nursing Evaluation (for 7am-3pm shift), where Jean-Denis
ate, there were no incidents, he was cooperative, oriented,
had normal speech, a pleasant mood, a normal affect, and a
coherent thought process. (Doc. 75-2 at 53-54.)
19 Defendants submitted Jean-Denis’ mental health and medical records for the
relevant time period. Notice of Filing Medical Record Attachment for Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 75); see Docs. 75-1 through 75-4; 77-2 through 77-6.
14
On September 18, 201[3], he ate all of his lunch and
dinner. (Doc. 75-2 at 47-52.) There were no incidents to report
and he consumed his lunch and dinner. (Id.) Patient had
cooperative behavior, was oriented, had good eye contact,
normal speech, pleasant mood, normal affect, and coherent
thought process. (Id.) On September 19, 201[3], he ate his
lunch and all of his dinner where there were no incident[s] to
report. (Id. at 43-46.)
On September 20, 201[3], Jean-D[enis],[20] refused
three meals, and initiated a hunger strike. (Id. at 37-42.)
Throughout the hunger strike, the patient’s vital sign[]s were
monitored. He is encouraged to eat[,] but is being monitored.
(Id.) He stated he is refusing to eat because he is having
stomach problems and nothing is being done. (Id.) On
September 21st, he refused his meals. (Id. at 33-36.) He had
no complaints, was resting quietly with eyes closed, and had
no other incidents noted. (Id.)
On September 22, 2013, he refused breakfast and
dinner, but he ate lunch where [it] is noted on the 7am to 3pm
shift he ate lunch. (Id. at 27-32.)[21]
On September 23, 2013, he refused meals, continues
his hunger strike. (Id. at 23-26.) In the mental health records
from September 23rd, it is noted that he stated that he wanted
to buy a razor and wants to starve himself to die. (Doc. 75-1
at 50.) He is depressed and sad, is trying to get batteries to
swallow, and has urges to swallow or cut himself with a razor.
(Id.) Also, on September 23rd, Jean-D[enis] was interviewed,
stated, “I’m not eating anything,” was educated on meal
consumption and the consequences of not consuming meals,
the possibilities of dehydration, offered dinner, and he verbally
refused, responding, “I’m good.” (Id. at 48.)
On September 24, 2013, Jean-D[enis] continued to
refuse all meals and stated, “I’m not drinking or eating
anything … If I get peoples [sic] attention they will know what
20 Defendant Tate asserts that Nurse Caswell erred when she referred to Plaintiff
as Jean-Davis instead of Jean-Denis. See Tate Motion at 4 n.1.
21 According to the Observation Checklist, Jean-Denis refused breakfast, lunch,
and dinner on September 22, 2013. See Doc. 75-3 at 44.
15
I want done and it will be done.” (Id. at 47.) Medical staff
educated Jean D[enis] on the importance of nutrition. (Id.; see
Doc. 75-2 at 19-22.)
On September 25, 2013, he stated “I want a painless
death … I tried to drink some water … I told you that I’m
suicidal.” (Doc. 75-1 at 45-46; see Doc. 75-2 [at] 17-18.) He
was admitted to Crisis Stabilization Unit (CSU) on September
25th. (Doc. 75-1 at 4, 8.)
On September 26th, brought to clinic because he
refused to eat for seven days, skin was moist and warm,
apparently is drinking, Zantac and Antacid ordered, no signs
of dehydration at that time, advised to continue drinking water
and to ask for medications anytime. (Id. at 41.) Jean-D[enis]
inquired, “how low can your blood sugar get?” while he
continued his hunger strike. (Doc. 75-2 at 11-16.) Jean-
D[enis] stated that he is “not eating, and wanted to kill himself
for ‘awhile.’” (Doc. 75-1 at 37.) The mental health provider
notes that Jean-D[enis] [was] still not eating due to suicidal
idealities. (Id. at 38.)
On September 27, 2013, even though he refused
meals, Jean-D[enis]' oral glucose was less than 60, so
diabetes protocol was performed where he was provided
glucose, raising the blood sugar level to 64 at 15 minutes.
(Doc. 75-1 at 36; Doc. 75-2 at 3-10.) He stated that he will
drink water and take a shower. (Id.)
On September 28th, he continued his hunger strike.
(Id. at 1.) On September 29th and 30th, he continued his
hunger strike. (Doc. 75-1 at 91-100.)
On October 1, 2013, Jean-D[enis] continues hunger
strike, is yelling about blanket complain[t]s about officers, has
his door window covered with paper, eventually removes
paper with much coaxing, his skin is dry and flaky, refused
liquid glucose, mucus membranes pink and moist, and blood
sugar is 61. (Doc. 75-1 at 35, 85-90.)
On October 2nd, he continues hunger strike, wants to
die. (Id. at 25-28, 79-84.) Nurse requests him to respond
during rounds, it agitates him somewhat, dry flaky skin is
noted. (Id.) He refused psych and medical meds. (Id.) An
16
order was written to use force if necessary to bring him out for
evaluation and to use force to take to Urgent Care for IV fluids,
lab, blood sugar 47. (Id.) He refused care in Urgent Care. Two
physicians discussed the issue with Jean-D[enis], and he still
refused, was making a decision, and was not psychotic. (Id.)
At that time, he consumed two coffee cakes.[22] (Id.)
On October 3, 2013, unresponsive, hunger strike, eyes
blinking, refused oral intake, oral glucose given. (Doc. 75-1 at
15-20, 71-78.) He stated to nurse, “I’m ok.” (Id.) On October
4th, Jean-D[enis] was taken to Urgent Care. (Id. at 3-14.)
After reviewing all of the records there is no evidence
that Jean-D[enis] was denied water on one day within the
period of review.
After reviewing the medical records, there appears to
only be a record of dehydration and low blood sugar
associated with lack of food and water. The details of Jean-
D[enis]’ allegations of potential side effects are as follows.
Dehydration: There is documentation that the Plaintiff
had dry and flaky skin during the time of his Hunger Strike.
Low blood sugar: He had low blood sugar on October
2nd, where he refused glucagon, it was monitored and his vital
signs were stable, he was stable, he was coherent, he was
taken to Urgent Care on October 3rd, where he was treated
with IV fluids, and was provided with oral glucose. There was
also a record of low blood sugar at the Reception and Medical
Center on October 4th.
Low blood pressure: There is no documentation of low
blood pressure.
Fainting: There is a note from September 20, 2013,
where Jean-D[enis] alleges that he passed out but there are
no injuries recorded or noted.
Vomiting[:] There is no documentation that the Plaintiff
vomited during this time frame.
22 According to a medical record, Jean-Denis may have eaten coffee cake on the
morning of October 2, 2013, or “maybe not.” Doc. 75-1 at 25 (emphasis added).
17
Stomach pain: Prior to the dates for review, the Plaintiff
complained of stomach pain on September 5, 2013. (Doc. 75-
2 at 55.) He was assessed and had normal bowel sounds,
vital signs were within normal limits and his stool guaiac was
negative. (Id.)
Internal bleeding: After the dates for review, on
December 23, 2013, Jean-D[enis] was seen for abdominal
pain. (Doc. 75-4 at 15-16.) He complained that he had blood
in stool. (Id.) His vital signs were within normal limits, his
bowel sounds were present. (Id.) It is noted in the record that
he has a history of swallowing hard and sharp objects (i.e.,
batteries and razor blades). (Id.) On January 7, 2014, he was
seen at RMC in the Chronic Illness Clinic (CIC) for his
“stomach.” (Id.) He was diagnosed with gastritis and was
given medications. (Id.)
Caswell Decl. at 1-4 (enumeration omitted).
In opposing Defendants’ Motions, Jean-Denis submitted his own declarations. See
P. Exs., Docs. 93-1, Declaration Supporting His Response to Defendant Tate’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Jean-Denis Decl.); 94-2, Declaration Supporting His Response
to Defendant Aviles’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Jean-Denis 2nd Decl.).
Additionally, he submitted the declaration of an inmate who was confined in a UCI mental
health unit in 2006, 2007, and 2013. See Doc. 93-2, Declaration of Michael Noel (Noel
Decl.). He also submitted Defendant Aviles’ responses to his Second Set of
Interrogatories. See Doc. 94-1. In a declaration, Jean-Denis describes the SHOS
conditions he experienced from September 16th, through October 4, 2013, in pertinent
part:
Before and at all times relevant to my civil rights complaint,
the Union Correctional Institution’s Crisis Stabilization and
Transitional Care Units had an unofficial policy of, among
several abuses, beating and starving prisoner-patients who
18
were on self-harm observation status (“SHOS”) there, as cruel
tactics to force such patients off SHOS.
In the broad majority of such cases, the starved prisoner-
patients were untruthfully reported as refusing their meals
and/or as being on hunger-strikes by staff.
I was on SHOS in the afore-mentioned units from September
16, 2013 through and including October 4, 2013. During that
time period, Tate and a group of other officials literally
deprived me of all meals, due to no fault of my own.
At one point during the said period I was even deprived of
running water, on information and belief, in order to render me
unable to drink.
Based on the information I was given by various medical staff,
e.g., Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner Marsha
Nichols, the starvation in question caused me the injuries I
reported on pages 5(b)- 5(c) of my civil rights complaint.[23]
Santa Rosa Correctional Institution (“C.I.”) and Charlotte C.I.
staff have lost much of my personal properties, including a
copy of an incident report written by Sergeant Robinson
pertaining to my supposed refusals of all meals on September
20th, 21st, and 22nd, 2013. (I received the said copy from
Tate’s attorney, and it was filed with the Court (supposedly) to
support Tate’s Motion for Summary Judgment.)[24]
Though Robinson, who was previously a Defendant in this
case, wrote that I did not eat anything on the above-
referenced dates, Nurse Kellie Caswell, who is Tate’s witness
in this case, testified under oath that I ate dinner on
September 22, 2013. (Doc. 76 at 4.)[25]
This is not the only inaccuracy in Caswell’s testimony. In fact,
Caswell and Tate’s testimonies are so inconsistent, the Court
shouldn’t accept such testimonies (as credible).
23 See Complaint at 7-8.
24 See Doc. 76-6 at 1.
25 See Caswell Decl. at 2 (citing Doc. 75-2 at 27-32).
19
Both Tate and Aviles, to date, have refused to produce for
inspection and copying discoverable materials I timely
requested since the beginning of discovery.
Jean-Denis Decl. at 2-4 (enumeration and capitalization omitted). Inmate Noel provides
the following account of his confinement in a UCI mental unit, stating in pertinent part:
I was confined in the mental health settings at the Union
Correctional Institution (UCI), which is a state prison in
Florida, in 2006, 2007, and 2013. During the times of my
confinement at UCI, the guards there had an unofficial policy
of, among other abuses, beating, starving, and verbally
degrading the prisoner-patients, who were on self-harm
ob[s]ervation status (SHOS) there as a cruel tactic to force the
said patients off SHOS.
The guards at UCI’s mental health settings have often beaten,
starved, and/or verbally abused inmate-patients who were not
on SHOS as well, when said inmates have done and/or said
things the guards disliked, even when what the said inmates
have done and/or said were not against prison rules or the
law.
Noel Decl. at 2-3 (enumeration omitted). In a declaration opposing the Defendant Aviles’
Motion, Jean-Denis states in pertinent part:
I have been treated, though inadequately, for the injuries I
have alleged in my civil rights complaint since 2013. There are
plenty of documentations in my medical and mental health
records reflecting such treatments.
Jean-Denis 2nd Decl. at 2 (enumeration omitted).
At deposition, Jean-Denis testified that he was assigned to SHOS in V dormitory,
a transitional-care inpatient psych unit, where he was “very distressed” with suicidal
thoughts. Doc. 76-3, Videotaped Deposition of Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis (P. Depo.) at 11.
He described an “unofficial policy” where the guards used starvation of the SHOS
20
prisoner-patients as a “tactic” to “force” inmates off SHOS because the guards felt
overburdened with inmate-observation checks every fifteen minutes instead of their
regular rounds every thirty minutes. See id. at 13-15; Jean-Denis Decl. at 2; Complaint at
7; see also Noel Decl. Jean-Denis states that, in “the broad majority” of situations, “the
starved prisoner-patients were untruthfully reported as refusing their meals and/or as
being on hunger-strikes by staff.” Jean-Denis Decl. at 2. At deposition, Jean-Denis
proclaimed that he “never refused any meals.” P. Depo. at 38. He asserted that UCI
guards deprived him of food for nineteen days. See id. at 35. According to Jean-Denis,
the SHOS guards provided him with empty food trays, resulting in his thirty-pound weight
loss. See id. at 22, 26, 28-31. As to water deprivation, Jean-Denis testified that the water
from the cell sink (from which he drank) was turned off once for “at least 24 hours.” Id. at
32-33. He surmised that “they” turned off the sink water to punish him. Id. at 34; Jean-
Denis Decl. at 2-3 (“At one point during the said period I was even deprived of running
water, on information and belief, in order to render me unable to drink.”).
According to Jean-Denis, the nurses who attended to his medical needs provided
him with proper medical care. See P. Depo. at 49. He claimed that Defendant Aviles saw
the nurses’ reports and should have transferred him for urgent medical care in a timely
manner. See id. at 44-49, 52-53, 65. He testified that he asked Aviles to send him for
urgent care “shortly” before his transfer to RMC. See id. at 53. Defendants submitted
Jean-Denis’ mental health and medical records in support of their assertions that mental
health and medical professionals treated Jean-Denis throughout his self-declared hunger
strike. In his declaration opposing Defendant Aviles’ Motion, Jean-Denis states: “There
21
are plenty of documentations in my medical and mental health records reflecting such
treatments.” Jean-Denis 2nd Decl. at 2; see Response II at 10-11 (“Plaintiff’s medical
records ... are replete with documentations of medical staff’s past and ongoing treatments
of Plaintiff for injuries he alleged in his civil rights complaint.”).
The chronology of events on which Jean-Denis bases his Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Tate and Aviles is as follows. According
to Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) mental health records, Jean-Denis
experienced severe depression and religious hallucinations on September 16, 2013, for
which the medical staff changed his medications and returned him to his cell. See Doc.
75-1 at 64-65. On September 17, 2013, he declared a mental health emergency due to
hearing voices and experiencing suicidal ideations. See id. at 60-62. According to an
FDOC Office of Health Services Mental Health Daily Nursing Evaluation (MHE) and
Observation Checklist (OC), Jean-Denis had consumed a meal with fluids and was
cooperative and coherent that day. See Docs. 75-2 at 53-54; 75-3 at 49. Additionally,
MHE and OC reports reflect that Jean-Denis ate 100% of his lunch and dinner and
appeared cooperative and oriented on September 18th and 19th. See Docs. 75-2 at 43-
52; 75-3 at 48.
Jean-Denis complained on Friday, September 20th, that he had not eaten anything
for the past several days, and that his refusal to consume food was due to “stomach
problems.” Docs. 75-2 at 41 (stating he had not eaten since Monday); 75-1 at 54-55
(stating he had not consumed any food since Tuesday). That same day, he refused
breakfast, lunch, and dinner as well as fluids. See Docs. 75-2 at 37-42; 75-3 at 46. Nurse
22
Polingo noted that Jean-Denis’ refusal to eat was related to his stomach issues, for which
he needed to see a medical doctor. See Doc. 75-2 at 42. The staff observed Jean-Denis
every fifteen minutes and documented his behavior with a “code explanation.”26 Doc. 75-
3 at 46. Additionally, the nursing staff encouraged him to eat and monitored his physical
and mental well-being. See Doc. 75-2 at 37-42. Jean-Denis refused all meals on
September 21st. See Docs. 75-2 at 33-36; 75-3 at 45. According to the MHE report for
that day, Jean-Denis “usually” consumed 100% of his daily meals, “but [was on a] hunger
strike.” See Doc. 75-2 at 34. According to an OC report, Jean-Denis refused all meals on
September 22nd.27 See Doc. 75-3 at 44. That same day, Sergeant Robinson wrote an
Incident Report concerning the nine consecutively-missed meals. He reported in pertinent
part:
At approximately 2300 hours on September 22, 2013 while
assigned as V Dorm Housing Sergeant, I was reviewing the
DC6-229, Daily Record of Special Housing, when I noticed
that Inmate JEAN-DENIS, Jean-Ewoll DC #J34720 housed
in V2-101 had refused the last nine consecutive meals. [28]
Inmate JEAN-DENIS missed all meals between
September 20, 2013 through September 22, 2013. LPN
Kirschner offered Inmate JEAN-DENIS a medical assessment
to which he refused. This incident was referred to the Shift
Supervisor for further disposition.
26 If a corrections officer observed behavioral codes 1 (beating on door/wall), 2
(yelling or screaming), or 3 (crying), the FDOC protocol required that the officer
immediately notify health care staff. See Doc. 75-3 at 46.
27 According to the September 22nd MHE report, Jean-Denis ate lunch. See 75-2
at 30; see also Caswell Decl. at 2. Notably, Jean-Denis points out the inconsistent reports,
see Jean-Denis Decl. at 3, and maintains that he did not eat for nineteen days, see P.
Depo. at 35.
28 According to Nurse Caswell, when an inmate refuses nine or more consecutive
meals, it is considered a hunger strike. See Caswell Decl.
23
Doc. 76-6 at 1 (emphasis added). In his declaration, Jean-Denis is skeptical of the factual
accuracy of Sergeant Robinson’s Incident Report. See Jean-Denis Decl. at 3. At
deposition, he maintained that guards lied when they said he refused meals. See P. Depo.
at 37-39. As a result of Robinson’s Incident Report, Lieutenant Kevin Adkins attempted
to interview Jean-Denis that same day. He stated in pertinent part:
I attempted to interview Inmate JEAN-DENIS concerning his
refusal of the nine meals to which he refused to make a
statement. Inmate JEAN-DENIS will be referred to Mental
Health[.] [I]t should be noted that he is currently on SHOS.
Duty Warden Colonel K. Box was notified on this incident.
EAC Duty Scareno was notified at approximately 0010 hours.
A copy of the DC6-229 Is attached. MINS entry #515456 was
initiated and is attached. This incident was referred to the
Chief of Security for further disposition.
Id. Duty Warden Colonel K. Box reviewed the Incident Report and referred the incident to
the medical and mental health departments with a copy to Defendant Aviles. See id. On
September 23rd, Warden Andrews stated that the medical department would “attempt” to
have Jean-Denis drink a protein shake. See id. The nurses documented that the “plan”
was to keep Jean-Denis in SHOS and monitor his behavior and wellness with fifteen-
minute-interval observation checks. See Doc. 75-2 at 27-32.
According to FDOC medical records, Jean-Denis refused all meals on September
23rd. See Docs. 75-2 at 23-28; 75-3 at 43. The nursing staff referred him to the crisis
stabilization unit (CSU), stating Jean-Denis “continues on [a] hunger strike.” Doc. 75-2 at
24. According to mental health records, Jean-Denis wanted to starve himself to death and
experienced urges to swallow batteries or cut himself with a razor. See Doc. 75-1 at 50,
52. The nursing staff educated him on the importance of eating meals and drinking fluids
24
as well as the negative consequences of non-consumption and dehydration. See id. at
48. The medical records reflect that he refused meals on September 24th, see Docs. 75-
2 at 19-22; 75-3 at 42, and told the nursing staff that he was “not drinking or eating
anything,” Doc. 75-1 at 47. He advised the staff that his refusal to eat would “get peoples[’]
attention,” and then “they will know what [he] want[s] done and it will be done.” Id. Nurse
Taylor educated him on the importance of nutrition. See id.
On September 25th, Jean-Denis refused all meals, see Docs. 75-2 at 17-18; 75-3
at 41, and proclaimed: “I want a painless death. I tried to drink some water. I told you that
I’m suicidal,” Doc. 75-1 at 45. A mental health counselor documented that Jean-Denis
had missed “17 of 17 meals,” and therefore needed to “remain on SHOS status” for close
monitoring. Id. at 46. After trying to persuade Jean-Denis to eat and drink, Felix Vega,
M.D., a staff psychiatrist, stated that Jean-Denis was aware of the negative
consequences associated with a hunger strike. See id. at 47.
On September 26th, Jean-Denis proclaimed that he was not eating, and wanted
to kill himself for “awhile.” Doc. 75-1 at 37. He was examined in the clinic to assess his
physical and mental wellness as a result of missing “21 meals” due to his refusal to eat
for “7 days.” Id. at 40-41. There were no signs of dehydration, and staff advised him to
continue to drink water and take medications. See id. at 41. He asked the nurse: “how
low can your blood sugar get?” Doc. 75-2 at 11. On September 27th, Corrections Officer
Peugh reported the following incident:
At approximately 0627 hours on Friday, September 27, 2013,
while assigned as V Dorm Housing Officer, I was conducting
my pick-up in V Dormitory on quad 2. As I approached cell V2-
101, which houses Inmate JEAN-DENIS, Jean-Ewoll, DC
25
#J34720, I observed the Inmate JEAN-DENIS was
unresponsive. I made several attempts to gain a response
from Inmate JEAN-DENIS, to no avail. I initiated ICS
emergency protocol. Lieutenant J. Cox, CO Nicholas Gay,
Sergeant Perry Randall, and CO Chad Hope responded. This
incident was referred to the Shift Supervisor.
Doc. 76-7 at 1. Shift Supervisor Lieutenant J. Cox stated in pertinent part:
I responded to the front of cell V2-101 in V dormitory. At
approximately 0632 hours, with adequate staff present, and
under my supervision, the cell door was breached. Officer
Nicholas Gay entered the cell with the shield as a
precautionary safety measure. Security staff entered the cell
and Inmate JEAN-DENIS remained unresponsive. Inmate
JEAN-DENIS was restrained and escorted to the V Dorm
Medical Treatment room via wheelchair where he was
assessed and treated by Nurse Michael Tunsil, LPN.[29] At
approximately 0720 hours, Inmate JEAN-DENIS was returned
to his assigned cell without incident. It should be noted that at
no time was force used.
Id. The medical staff followed the FDOC diabetes protocol and gave Jean-Denis a shot
of glucagon,30 which promptly raised his blood sugar level to 64. See Docs. 75-1 at 36;
75-2 at 7. According to the medical record, Jean-Denis stated that he would drink water
and take a shower. See Doc. 75-1 at 36. Nurse Hall referred him to CSU and waited for
approval. See Doc. 75-2 at 4. The medical and mental health staff closely monitored Jean-
Denis from September 28th through 30th. See Docs. 75-1 at 91-100; 75-2 at 1-2; 75-3 at
36-38.
29 See Doc. 75-1 at 36.
30 See Doc. 75-1 at 36 (“Due to [Jean-Denis’] refusal to take anything by mouth,
[the nurse] gave [him] a shot of glucagon.”).
26
Defendant Tate asserts that Jean-Denis admitted in a September 29th formal
grievance that he had been on a “hunger strike” since September 17th. See Tate Motion
at 7, 13. Jean-Denis discounts use of the “hunger strike” terminology, and maintains that
another inmate submitted the grievance on his behalf. See Response at 3-4. He states:
Tate claimed that Plaintiff was on a hunger strike. Such
amounts to a genuine dispute. (It is true that no one reported
‘starvation’ in their medical, psychiatric, and/or security
entries. This, however, is a no-brainer. Not only (culpable)
staff have control of what goes in a prisoner’s records, or files,
but also said staff work in collusion. In fact, “We Never Walk
Alone” is a well-known saying among the personnel of the
Florida’s penal system. Hence, of course, correctional staff
and contractors will often cover each other’s malfeasance,
especially when a hierarchical supervisor is involved and at
fault, or when doing what is right amounts to a conflict of
interests. In addition, another prisoner, of his own free will,
filed a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf – without Plaintiff’s
consent – and also repeated the phrase ‘hunger strike,’
possibly due to his being misled by staff’s
misinformation.)
Response at 3-4 (emphasis added). The facts in the formal grievance are as follows:
This is a grievance of an “Emergency” and it is being
submitted bypassing the informal grievance level due to the
urgency of the actions needed to alleviate the conditions
giving rise to this emergency. If I am compelled to address this
matter via an informal grievance, I may be dead or my kidneys
may be damaged in an irreversible manner because the
Respondent is permitted 10 days to act on that level. Because
this matter cannot wait even a few days, an emergency
grievance is the appropriate avenue for relief. To support my
position, I allege the following:
Because I have been on [a] hunger strike since
Sept. 17, 2013, most of the security officers are upset with me
because it is causing them unwanted work. So[,] on or about
September 28, 2013[,] one of the officers or housing
supervisor turned off my sink and toilet water to punish and
retaliate against me and it has been off since. Consequently,
27
I have not been able to drink any water since yesterday and I
don’t know when they plan to turn it back on, which they have
refused to do thus far. Since I am being prevented from
drinking water against my will, there is a great likelihood that
serious or irreparable harm can result to my health or life
within a few days, especially in combination with the fact that
I have not eaten in twelve days.
I am being denied a basic necessity of life with the
depriva[tion] of drinking water against my will. Said actions are
in violation of my 8th Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.
To conclude, I request that immediate actions be taken
to alleviate the conditions giving rise to this emergency.
Doc. 76-5 at 2 (emphasis added). On October 2nd, S. Androlevich and Warden Diane
Andrews determined that the grievance was not an emergency, stating in pertinent part:
Investigation into your complaint reflects that you have not
filed this DC1-303 according to Chapter 33-103.014(1)(f)&(g).
Grievances of those matters which, if disposed of according
to the regular time frames, would subject the Inmate to
substantial risk of personal injury or cause other serious and
irreparable harm to the inmate, is the definition of an
Emergency Grievance, per Chapter 33-103.002(4). You have
not shown that this would occur in the direct filing of this
Grievance. Sergeant Trent, V dorm Sergeant[,] was
contacted and advised that you do have water in your cell
and your toilet does flush. If you feel you need medical
attention, contact the institutional medical department
via the sick call/emergency process. If you are within the
time frames for doing such, you may resubmit your appeal
utilizing the Informal Grievance Process first. If you are not
satisfied with that response, you will have (15) days in which
to file a Formal Grievance. Be sure to attach a copy of the
Informal Grievance with the response when you file. Based on
the foregoing, this grievance is returned without disposition.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
28
According to FDOC records, Jean-Denis continued his hunger strike, yelled, and
complained about corrections officers on October 1st. See Doc. 75-1 at 30-33, 85-88. Dr.
Springer, a psychiatrist, admitted Jean-Denis to CSU on or about October 1st, see id. at
2, 88, due to “persistent depression,” gastrointestinal “distress,” and hunger-strike issues,
id. at 3. On October 2nd, Jean-Denis stated he “wanted to die,” and refused meals,
medications, and urgent care treatment. Doc. 75-1 at 24-25, 79, 81. When a nurse
requested that Jean-Denis respond during observation rounds, Jean-Denis became
agitated. See id. at 79-80. The medical staff instructed Jean-Denis that his multi-day
hunger strike “could cause a decline in health or death,” especially if he refused their
urgent-care-treatment recommendation Id. at 24-25. At noon, Jean-Denis refused Ensure
and stated, “I’m good, please just leave me alone.” Id. at 23. According to the medical
records, Defendant Aviles evaluated Jean-Denis at 12:35 p.m. See id. at 23. The medical
staff consulted with another physician who agreed that Jean-Denis was not a candidate
for a mental health treatment facility. See id. at 22-23. They determined that he needed
“close observation.” See id. at 23. On October 3rd, Jean-Denis had declined and did not
want to respond when medical staff checked on him. See id. at 15-20, 71-78. He told the
nursing staff that he was “okay.” Id. at 77. On the morning of October 4th, Jean-Denis
drank one-half of a can of Ensure, and was transferred to RMC for urgent care treatment
that afternoon. See id. at 9-14.
Given the evidence submitted by Defendants, the Court finds they have met their
initial burden of showing, by reference to the declarations and Jean-Denis’ deposition
testimony, that Defendants Tate and Aviles’ conduct did not violate Jean-Denis’ federal
29
constitutional rights. Thus, Jean-Denis is required to present evidence to show that there
is a genuine issue for trial. This, he has not done. If this case were to proceed to trial,
Jean-Denis would have only his testimony to support his claims,31 and his testimony does
not refute Defendants’ medical and mental health evidence. Indeed, the exhibits
submitted by Defendants support their position that they performed their duties in such a
manner that was not violative of Jean-Denis’ federal constitutional rights.
In his Complaint and declaration, Jean-Denis maintains that a group of prison
officials, including Tate, deprived him of meals from September 16th through October 4,
2013. See Jean-Denis Decl. at 2; Complaint at 7. According to FDOC internal movement
records, Jean-Denis was housed in V and T dormitories from September 16, 2013,
through October 4, 2013, until the FDOC transferred him to the Reception and Medical
Center (RMC) on October 5, 2013. See Docs. 76-1; P. Depo. at 11; see also Complaint
at 7. According to Warden Falk, Defendant Tate was not on duty in V or T dormitory during
the relevant time period, but instead was assigned to other areas in the facility. See Falk
Decl.at 1. Nevertheless, at deposition, Jean-Denis asserted that Tate worked the day shift
and came to his cell “quite a few times” during the relevant time period. See P. Depo. at
17, 63-64, 68-69. However, Jean-Denis did not recall Tate making any comments to him
about food or non-consumption. See P. Depo. at 17. Additionally, he testified Tate “was
on duty during more than one rotation.” Id. at 68. He maintained that Tate “knew what
31 Inmate Noel neither provided evidence that Defendant Tate starved Jean-Denis
nor that Defendant Aviles denied Jean-Denis urgent medical care. See Noel Decl.
30
was going on” and “could have made a difference” if he had reported the starvation that
Jean-Denis experienced while in SHOS. Id. at 62.
Assuming Defendant Tate knew that Jean-Denis had not eaten when he stopped
by Jean-Denis’ SHOS cell, see id. at 63, Jean-Denis has not shown that Tate was
deliberately indifferent to Jean-Denis’ medical and/or mental needs. Jean-Denis asserts
that Tate should have reported that Jean-Denis was the victim of the starvation tactics by
guards. Notably, Jean-Denis neither accused Tate of providing him with an empty tray
nor coercing other guards to starve him. Indeed, FDOC officials had documented Jean-
Denis’ suicidal ideations as early as September 16, 2013, as well as his physical and
mental issues relating to the lack of food on or about September 20, 2013. Medical
professionals, including Drs. Springer, Vega, Ward, and Pages, as well as nurses and
mental health clinicians closely monitored and documented Jean-Denis’ behavior and
wellness on a daily basis throughout the relevant time period. See Docs. 75-1; 75-2; 75-
3. Corrections officers, such as Tate, undoubtedly are responsible for ensuring that
inmates under their supervision are safe and secure, however, it is ultimately the medical
professionals who monitor an inmate’s mental and physical wellness, especially during a
period of time when an inmate, such as Jean-Denis, battled suicidal ideations.32 As to
Jean-Denis’ assertion that he was without water in his cell for twenty-four hours, he
32 To the extent Jean-Denis asserts that Defendant Tate failed to intervene to stop
the officers’ starvation tactics, see P. Depo. at 62; Complaint at 5, he neither provides
facts suggesting that Tate was in a position to intervene and failed to do so nor that Tate
could have prevented the officers’ alleged abuses. See Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d
753, 764 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1290 n.21
(11th Cir. 2011); Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 740 n.25 (11th Cir. 2010).
31
testified that Tate was the one who responded to his complaint. According to Jean-Denis,
Tate came to his cell door, and advised him to test the flow, at which time the water from
the sink worked. See P. Depo. at 33. Given Jean-Denis’ factual account, Tate’s response
was neither an “objectively insufficient response to that need” nor one that would cause
Jean-Denis to suffer a health risk. Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1245-46.
Next, Jean-Denis asserts that Defendant Aviles denied him proper medical care.
He testified that Aviles ignored the nurses’ reports, see P. Depo. at 45, and failed to
provide “urgent care in a timely fashion,” id. at 47. He explained that the nurses were
treating him, but Aviles should have provided “urgent care” or transferred him to an
outside facility. Id. at 49, 52-53. The medical records reflect, and Jean-Denis agrees, that
medical and mental health professionals treated him during the relevant time period. See
Docs. 75-1; 75-2; 75-3. Nevertheless, Jean-Denis explains the level of care he expected
from Aviles, stating in pertinent part:
Now, it can be proven that as early as the morning of
September 21, 2013, Aviles was aware of Plaintiff’s serious
medical needs deriving from his “hunger strike.” See Doc. 75-
1 at 53. Aviles stated under oath that he has been practicing
medicine in the State of Florida for over forty (40) years.[33]
Therefore, it is safe to infer that a medical doctor with so much
experience, i.e., Aviles, would have recognized Plaintiff’s
then-conditions (in light of the related existing reports)
constitute serious medical needs, especially when his
colleagues and/or fellow multidisciplinary services team
members, which included Dr. Vega, and with whom Aviles
regularly conferred, as required by regulations, have
recognized so. However, though Plaintiff was in need of I.V.s,
among other things, which he could not receive at UCI’s V
dormitory, by September 25, 2013 (a fact that the record
evidence proves that Aviles knew as well), and Aviles did not
33 See Doc. 94-1 at 1.
32
order Plaintiff’s transfer to UCI’s urgent care unit, which, at the
time, was the only place Plaintiff could have received an I.V.
and certain other specific treatments not provided in the afore-
mentioned dormitory, until October 1, 2013. On information
and belief, such misconduct is also in violation of the
directives of the Health Services Bulletin (“HSB”) which Aviles
should have followed in the case at bar, as per his contract
with his employer at the time. As such, the record evidence
that is now before the Court clearly shows that Aviles knew of
and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health (by
virtue of his then-medical conditions, which could have led to
his demise) for, at least, an entire week.
Response II at 9-10 (footnote omitted).
In the Complaint, Jean-Denis asserts that he “was clearly in need of a physician’s
attention” after several days of starvation. Complaint at 6. According to the medical
records, Drs. Springer, Vega, Ward, and Pages oversaw Jean-Denis’ medical and mental
health care, as he battled his physical ailments associated with missed meals as well as
suicidal tendencies. See Docs. 75-1 at 29, 30, 35, 40, 44, 47, 52. It is undisputed that
Aviles was aware of Jean-Denis’ declining mental and physical health on or about
September 21, 2020. See Response at 9 (citing Doc. 75-1 at 53). Additionally, Sergeant
Robinson provided Aviles with a copy of the September 22nd Incident Report that had
documented Jean-Denis’ nine consecutively-missed meals from September 20th through
22nd. See Doc. 76-6 at 1. When Jean-Denis became uncooperative and refused
medications on October 2nd, Dr. Springer spoke with Aviles about a transfer from CSU
to an urgent care facility. See Doc. 75-1 at 25. That same day, Dr. Aviles evaluated Jean-
Denis, at which time Jean-Denis asked to be transferred. See P. Depo. at 52-53; Doc.
75-1 at 23. Medical personnel closely monitored Jean-Davis until his transfer to RMC on
October 4th. See Doc. 75-1 at 9-23.
33
To the extent Jean-Denis complains about Aviles’ course of treatment, such a
complaint would be at most a claim of negligence or a disagreement with Aviles’ medical
treatment choice, neither of which would be sufficient to state a claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical condition. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505
(11th Cir. 1991). Nor has Jean-Denis provided specific facts or medical evidence
suggesting that the delay in sending him to RMC was unreasonable, especially given that
medical and mental health professionals closely monitored and evaluated him through
the multi-day starvation period. As to any complaints about unprofessional or negligent
conduct by Defendant Aviles in providing allegedly substandard mental health and
medical care, the law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent
acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels,
the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just
not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). A complaint that a physician has
been negligent “in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim
of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1176
(quotation marks and citation omitted). While Plaintiff’s allegations may suggest medical
malpractice, “[a]ccidents, mistakes, negligence, and medical malpractice are not
‘constitutional violation[s] merely because the victim is a prisoner.’” Harris v. Coweta Cty.,
21 F.3d 388, 393 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Consequently, any allegedly negligent conduct of which Jean-Denis complains does not
34
rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation and provides no basis for relief in this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Defendants assert, and this Court agrees, that there remain no genuine issues of
material fact. Jean-Denis’ conclusory assertions of food and water deprivation and
inadequate medical treatment do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory,
contemporaneously created medical records. See Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App’x
401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although [Jean-Denis] attempts to overcome summary
judgment by offering his own sworn statement[s] ... to support his allegations, the
contemporaneous medical records and opinions of the examining medical [professionals]
show that this purported evidence is baseless.”); see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007) (where a party’s story “is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”).Given the strong and consistent
medical and mental health records as well as Nurse Caswell’s declaration and Jean-
Denis’ failure to provide any evidence other than his own beliefs, no reasonable jury could
find for Jean-Denis under these circumstances. See Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332
(recognizing that “to defeat a motion for summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must adduce
specific evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor; [t]he mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of [his] position will be insufficient”). As such,
Defendants' Motions are due to be granted as to Jean-Denis’ Eighth Amendment claims
against them.
35
In consideration of the foregoing, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Tate’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76) and Defendant
Aviles’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Doc. 77) are GRANTED to the extent
provided herein.**
2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of Defendants Tate and Aviles,
terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
3. The Clerk shall change the docket to correct the order of Plaintiff's first and
last names as follows: Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis.
DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 27th day of April, 2020.
United States District Judge
sc 4/24
C:
Jean-Ewoll Jean-Denis, FDOC # J34720
Counsel of Record
34 Given the findings herein, the Court need not address Tate’s assertion of
qualified immunity or his contention that Jean-Denis is not entitled to compensatory and
punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). See Tate Motion at 14-16. Notably, the
Court previously addressed the issue of compensatory and punitive damages. See Order
(Doc. 43) at 13-16.
36